Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, §

§

Petitioner, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-1736-L

§

DISCOVERY GLOBAL LLC, §

§

Respondent. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner, the Slovak Republic (“Petitioner” or the “Slovak Republic”), seeks to confirm

and enforce an arbitration award entered by an international tribunal against Discovery Global

LLC (“Discovery”). See generally Pet. (Doc. 1). After the Slovak Republic effected service,

Discovery failed to enter an appearance, and the Slovak Republic moved for entry of default and

default judgment. See Pet.’s Mot. Default J. (Doc. 15) (“Motion”). Discovery has not entered an

appearance or otherwise opposed the Motion. After careful consideration of the Motion, pleadings,

record, and applicable law, the court grants the Motion (Doc. 15) and issues judgment in favor of

the Slovak Republic.

I. Background

A. The ICSID Convention

The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and

Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention” or “Convention”), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.

1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, is a “multilateral treaty aimed at encouraging and facilitating private

foreign investment in developing countries.” Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of

Venez., 863 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Anthony R. Parra, The History of ICSID 11-12, 24-

26 (Oxford 2012)). The Convention established the International Centre for Settlement of

Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) to administer arbitration proceedings between a contracting state

and a national of another contracting state, including the arbitral proceeding here. Convention arts.

1-3, 25; see Pet. (Doc. 1).

ICSID is not empowered to enforce its awards. Instead, contracting states are required to

“recognize an award . . . as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award

within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” Convention art. 54. Both

the Slovak Republic and the United States are contracting parties to the ICSID Convention. See

ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (Doc. 1-4).

Congress has passed implementing legislation to give effect to the Convention’s

requirement that contracting states recognize and enforce ICSID awards. Section 22 U.S.C. §

1650a(a) provides:

An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to [the ICSID Convention] shall

create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations

imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith

and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of

one of the several States. The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall not

apply to enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the convention.

Section 1650a gives exclusive jurisdiction over “actions and proceedings under subsection (a)” to

the federal district courts, “regardless of the amount in controversy.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(b).

B. The Underlying Arbitration and Award

Discovery’s claims arose under the Treaty between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

and the United States of America Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of

Investment, signed on October 22, 1991 (“Treaty”). See First Decl. of Stephen Anway in Support

of Petition for the Recognition and Enforcement of ICSID Arbitration Award (“Anway Decl.”) ¶

7 (Doc. 1-1 at 2); Treaty (Doc. 1-5). Article VI.3(a) of the Treaty allows a qualifying United States

investor to commence arbitration under the Treaty against the Slovak Republic before an ICSID

arbitration tribunal. Treaty (Doc. 1-5 at 9-10).

On September 30, 2021, Discovery filed a Request for Arbitration against the Slovak

Republic with ICSID. Anway Decl. ¶ 8 (Doc. 1-1 at 2); Request for Arbitration (Doc. 1-6).

Discovery relied on a third-party funder, 24LF Capital, to fund its prosecution of its claims against

the Slovak Republic. Anway Decl. ¶ 9 (Doc. 1-1 at 2). During the proceedings, the Slovak Republic

“learned that 24LF Capital was responsible only for financing the costs of the proceedings for

Discovery, not for paying a potential costs award should Discovery lose the Arbitration.” Id.

Following briefing, the Arbitral Tribunal ordered Discovery to provide “an instrument securing a

potential cost order, such as an insurance policy.” Id. ¶ 10 (Doc. 1-1 at 2); Decision (Doc. 1-7 at

2-3). “On January 20, 2023, Discovery informed the Arbitral Tribunal that it had secured a so-

called ‘After the Event’ (or ‘ATE’) insurance policy for USD 1 million in favor of the Slovak

Republic.” Anway Decl. ¶ 11 (Doc. 1-1 at 2).

In the arbitration, Discovery alleged that the Slovak Republic prevented it from pursuing

oil and gas exploration activities through a series of measures that allegedly violated the Slovak

Republic’s obligations under the Treaty. Award ¶¶ 273-278 (Doc. 1-2 at 77-79). Specifically,

Discovery alleged that the Slovak Republic violated the Treaty’s prohibition against unlawful

expropriation, unfair and inequitable treatment, arbitrary and discriminatory treatment, and failure

to provide effective means. Id. ¶ 273 (Doc. 1-2 at 77).

On January 17, 2025, after lengthy and contested proceedings, the Tribunal issued its

decision rejecting Discovery’s claims in their entirety and upholding the Slovak Republic’s

defense that it did not breach the Treaty and was not the cause for the failure of Discovery’s

business ventures in the Slovak Republic. Anway Decl. ¶ 13 (Doc. 1-1 at 3); Award (Doc. 1-2).

The Tribunal found that, “confronted with a project that did not run as smoothly as it may have

expected and certainly hoped, Discovery decided not to pursue its efforts mainly due to financial

constraints.” Award ¶ 380 (Doc. 1-2 at 110). The Tribunal further found that Discovery “resorted

to self-help, circumvented an interim injunction adopted by the local courts, and generally

conducted itself in a manner that, it seems to the Tribunal, needlessly antagonized the local

residents.” Id. ¶ 378 (Doc. 1-2 at 109). The Tribunal found that Slovak officials acted legally and

reasonably as they “sought to accommodate and support [Discovery], on the one hand, and at the

same time to consider the views expressed by the local population and environmental and climate

change activists, on the other.” Id. ¶ 380 (Doc. 1-2 at 110).

The Tribunal dismissed Discovery’s claims and ordered Discovery to pay the Slovak

Republic: (i) “one half of the total arbitration costs,” which amounted to US $457,248.31; (ii) EUR

2,310,718.90 for the Slovak Republic’s “legal fees and other costs incurred in connection with this

arbitration”; and (iii) “simple interest on” these two sums “at a rate equivalent to the yield of 2-

year Slovak government bonds, from the date of the Award until payment.” Id. ¶ 713 (Doc. 1-2 at

230). “According to the National Bank of Slovakia’s published calculations, the 2-year Slovak

government bond yield was 2.46% on the date of the Award.” Anway Decl. ¶ 19 (Doc. 1-1 at 4);

see also Pet. at Exhibit J (Doc. 1-11).1

1 On July 3, 2025, the Slovak Republic requested that the court take judicial notice of Exhibit J to its Petition,

“The National Bank of Slovakia’s historical, estimated zero coupon yield curve database.” Pet.’s Request

for Judicial Notice 1 (Doc. 3). In support, Petitioner asserted that “Exhibit J, a spreadsheet of historical

economic data published by the National Bank of Slovakia and available publicly at

https://nbs.sk/en/statistics/financial-markets/interestrates/estimated-yield-curve/,” is properly subject to

judicial notice because it is “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” and “can be

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Id. at 2

(citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), (2)). On March 16, 2026, the court granted Petitioner’s request after

determining that “Exhibit J is not subject to reasonable dispute because the information contained in Exhibit

J can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

Order 1 (Doc. 16).

Further, because the interest rate was expressed in euros, the Slovak Republic converted

the “USD 457,248.31” under the Award to Euros by using the USD/EUR official exchange rate of

the European Central Bank. Using the official exchange rate at the time, total principal under the

Award as of January 17, 2025, in Euros was €2,754,752.73. Anway Decl. ¶20 (Doc. 1-1 at 4)

(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/ht

ml/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html.)

Following receipt of the Award, the Slovak Republic sought payment from Discovery

pursuant to the Award. Anway Decl. ¶ 14 (Doc. 1-1 at 3). After Discovery refused to pay the

ordered amounts, in February 2025, the Slovak Republic contacted the insurer that issued the ATE

insurance policy. Id. Since then, the Slovak Republic has received three payments:

• On February 22, 2025, the ATE insurance provider paid the Slovak Republic

USD 999,985.00 (“Interim Payment No. 1”) (Doc. 1-9);

• On June 17, 2025, Discovery’s counsel, acting on its behalf, paid the Slovak

Republic USD 31,398.08 (“Interim Payment No. 2”) (Doc. 1-10); and

• On June 18, 2025, Discovery’s counsel, acting on its behalf, paid the Slovak

Republic USD 4,982.00 (“Interim Payment No. 3”) (Doc. 1-10).

The “remaining amounts owed under the Award, plus interest, remain unpaid.” Anway

Decl. ¶ 16 (Doc. 1-1 at 3). Following conversion from Dollars to Euros, as of July 3, 2025,

“Discovery owes the Slovak Republic €1,790,638.73, which includes the applicable interest under

the Award.” Id. ¶ 17 (Doc. 1-1 at 3); see also Doc. 1-8 (spreadsheet calculating amount remaining

due from date of Award (January 17, 2025) to date of Petition (July 3, 2025) after accounting for

interim payments).

C. This Proceeding

On July 3, 2025, the Slovak Republic commenced this action to enforce the Award. See

Pet. On July 21, 2025, the Slovak Republic served the Petition and an accompanying summons on

Discovery by personally delivering those documents to Discovery’s Chief Executive Officer and

Texas-based attorney Mr. Steven Walker. See Return of Service (Doc. 6). The deadline for

Discovery to file an answer or other responsive pleading to the Petition was August 11, 2025. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A); Summons (Doc. 6 at 3). Discovery failed to serve an answer or

responsive pleading and, to date, it has not entered an appearance or otherwise made any filings in

this case. The Slovak Republic moved for an entry of clerk’s default on August 27, 2025. See Mot.

for Entry of Clerk’s Default (Doc. 13). The clerk entered default against Discovery that same day.

See Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 14).

The Slovak Republic seeks entry of a default judgment against Discovery. It requests that

the court award it damages in the amount of €1,831,842.04, which includes interest calculated as

at the date of its Petition; and award the Slovak Republic post-judgment interest at the statutory

rate defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default and default judgment.

There are three stages to entry of default judgment. First, a default occurs “when a defendant has

failed to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time required by the Federal

Rules.” N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)

(noting default occurs where the defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against the

complaint). Second, the Clerk may enter a defendant’s default if it is “established by affidavit or

otherwise.” Brown, 84 F.3d at 141 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). Third, if the Clerk enters default,

the plaintiff must apply for a default judgment from the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). A default

judgment may not be entered against an infant or incompetent person unless such person is

represented in the action by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has

appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Likewise, a default judgment may not be entered against an

individual in the United States military service until an attorney is appointed to represent the

defendant. 50 U.S.C. § 3931.2

“[A] party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even where the

defendant is technically in default.” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001). Rather,

courts retain ultimate discretion to grant or deny default judgments. Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161

F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit has “adopted a policy in favor of resolving cases

on their merits and against the use of default judgments,” although this policy is “counterbalanced

by considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a weighing process . . . within the domain

of the trial judge’s discretion.” In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d

576, 594 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 936

(5th Cir. 1999)). Default judgment remains “a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules.”

Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989).

In determining whether a default judgment should be entered against a defendant, courts

have developed a three-part analysis. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126

F. Supp. 3d 809, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (citation omitted). First, courts consider whether the entry

of default judgment is procedurally warranted. Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. Relevant factors include:

[1] whether material issues of fact exist; [2] whether there has been substantial

prejudice; [3] whether the grounds for default are clearly established; [4] whether

the default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect; [5] the

harshness of a default judgment; and [6] whether the court would think itself

obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.

Id.

2 These requirements do not apply to Discovery because it is a limited liability company and, thus, cannot

be a minor, an incompetent person, or a current member of the military service.

Second, courts assess the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims and determine whether

there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v.

Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that “default is not treated as an

absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right to recover.”). The

pleadings are sufficient if they satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Wooten v. McDonald

Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). “The

defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on

those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”

Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. The defendant, however, “is not held to admit facts that are not

well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Id.

Third, courts determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. See J & J

Sports Prods., 126 F. Supp. 3d at 814 (citation omitted). Normally, damages are not to be awarded

without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts. See

United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). If the amount of damages can

be determined with mathematical calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting

documents, a hearing is unnecessary. James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993).

B. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, the court determines it has subject matter jurisdiction over this

proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a) because it is a civil action arising

under the laws and treaties of the United States to enforce an ICSID award. See Pet. ¶ 1. Section

1650a(a) provides that “[a]n award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the

[ICSID] convention shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States,” and section

1650a(b) states that “district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions and

proceedings under” section 1650a(a).

The court also concludes it has personal jurisdiction over Discovery because it is a Texas

entity with its principal place of business in this State. See Pet. ¶ 2. Finally, the court determines

that venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) & (c)(2) because Discovery

has its registered office and principal place of business in this District. See Pet. ¶ 3.

C. Default Judgment

1. Default judgment is procedurally warranted.

The Clerk entered default against Discovery. See Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 14). The

court, therefore, must now determine whether default judgment is appropriate. The Slovak

Republic contends that “default judgment is appropriate in the circumstances set forth in Lindsey,

161 F.3d at 893.” Pet. (Doc. 1 at 3). The court agrees.

First, Discovery failed to file any response to the Slovak Republic’s Petition. Accordingly,

there are no material issues of fact. Thus, the court may take as true the pleadings demonstrating

all material facts underlying the claim. See Pet. (Doc. 1). Lindsey’s first prong thus favors default

judgment.

Second, nothing in the record shows substantial prejudice to Discovery should the court

enter default judgment. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. The Slovak Republic properly served

Discovery, and it has had ample opportunity to respond in this matter. See Return of Service (Doc.

6).

The third and fourth elements also support default judgment because the grounds of

Discovery’s default are clearly established, and nothing indicates this default is due to “a good

faith mistake or excusable neglect.” See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. Despite being afforded multiple

opportunities to do so, Discovery failed to respond to the Petition or file any other pleadings

explaining this unresponsiveness.3 Lindsey’s fifth factor, therefore, also supports default judgment.

See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893; see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Tacos Bar & Grill, LLC, 2017

WL 373478, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (“Entering default judgment against [Defendant], who has

taken no action to respond to this action, is not ‘harsh.’”) (quoting Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893); John

Perez Graphics & Design, LLC v. Green Tree Inv. Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 1828671, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

2013) (“[Defendant] has had over five months to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s

Complaint, mitigating the harshness of a default judgment.”).

Finally, nothing in the record indicates that the court would be obligated to set aside the

default judgment if challenged by Discovery. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893; see also Moreno v. LG

Elecs., 800 F.3d 692, 698 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting district courts are not obliged to set aside a default

upon defendant’s motion where “the default was willful, the plaintiff will be prejudiced, or the

defendant has no meritorious defense”). Accordingly, the Lindsey analysis reflects that default

judgment is proper here.

2. The Petition establishes a viable claim for relief.

Having found default judgment appropriate under Lindsey, the undersigned looks next to

the Award, asking whether the Petition establishes a sufficient basis for default judgment. The

Slovak Republic maintains that the “Petition establishes a viable claim for relief.” Pet. (Doc. 1 at

4). For the reasons that follow, the court agrees.

3 The record supports a finding that Discovery’s default was not caused by a good faith mistake or excusable

neglect. As the Slovak Republic explained in its Motion for Entry of Clerk’s Default, Discovery’s CEO,

Mr. Steven Walker, was properly served with the Slovak Republic’s Petition. See Pet.’s Mot. for Entry of

Clerk’s Default ¶ 4 (Doc. 13). Moreover, the Slovak Republic twice contacted Mr. Walker about this action,

and about the deadlines to respond. Id. at Ex. A (Doc. 13-1). Discovery, therefore, has been aware of this

action through formal service of process and through informal means of communication with the Slovak

Republic.

The relevant statute provides that “[t]he pecuniary obligations imposed by [an ICSID]

award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a

final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several states.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a);

see also Convention art. 54(1) (requiring member States “recognize an award rendered pursuant

to [the] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within

its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”). “This is not a demanding

standard.” ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 628 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9

(D.D.C. 2022) (citation omitted). The court has an “extremely limited” role in reviewing an Award

rendered under the ICSID Convention. Valores Mundiales, S.L. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez.,

Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, 87 F.4th 510, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2023)

(explaining Congress’s intent to “reduc[e] the scope of judicial review of ICSID awards below

even the ‘extremely limited’ review available” to other arbitral agreements under the Federal

Arbitration Act). The court’s role in considering a petition for enforcement of an ICSID award is

limited to “examin[ing] the judgment’s authenticity and enforc[ing] the obligations imposed by

the award.” Id. at 522 (citation omitted).

Under this deferential framework, and with no argument from Discovery to the contrary,

the court determines that it must enforce the Award. First, the Slovak Republic has shown that the

Award is authentic by attaching to the Petition a copy of the Award accompanied by a certificate

of authenticity signed and stamped by the Secretary-General of ICSID. See Award (Doc. 1-2). In

addition, excerpts of the same Award are accessible on ICSID’s online case database. See

Discovery Global LLC v. Slovak Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/21/51),

https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/21/51.

Further, the Slovak Republic has submitted the Anway Declaration (Doc. 1-1); the Treaty

(Doc. 1-5); the Request for Arbitration (Doc. 1-6); the Tribunal’s Decision (Doc. 1-7); and proof

of Discovery’s partial payment of the Award (Docs. 1-9 and 1-10). Like the Award, these

documents are each thorough, careful, and well-reasoned, and the court has no basis to disregard

them. These materials are enough to establish a prima facie entitlement to relief, and the Slovak

Republic has, therefore, established its entitlement to relief under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a.

Consequently, “[b]ased on a straightforward application of Section 1650a,” the Award is

enforceable against Discovery. Valores Mundiales, 87 F.4th at 520. The court, therefore, will grant

the Slovak Republic’s Petition, enter default judgment against Discovery, and enforce the Arbitral

Award.

3. No hearing is required because the Slovak Republic’s damages can be

determined with mathematical calculation.

A hearing is not necessary to establish the Slovak Republic’s damages because they can be

determined with mathematical calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents.

See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alima, 2014 WL 1632158, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2014)

(“Damages must be proven by a hearing or a demonstration of detailed affidavits establishing the

necessary facts. If the amount of damages can be determined with mathematical calculation by

reference to the pleadings and supporting documents, a hearing is unnecessary.”) (citing James, 6

F.3d at 370).

The amounts owed to the Slovak Republic were determined in the Award. The Tribunal

ordered Discovery to pay the Slovak Republic: (i) “one half of the total arbitration costs,” which

amounted to US $457,248.31; (ii) EUR 2,310,718.90 for the Slovak Republic’s “legal fees and

other costs incurred in connection with this arbitration”; and (iii) “simple interest on” these two

sums “at a rate equivalent to the yield of 2-year Slovak government bonds, from the date of the

Award until payment.” Award § 713 (Doc. 1-2 at 230). “According to the National Bank of

Slovakia’s published calculations, the 2-year Slovak government bond yield was 2.46% on the

date of the Award.” Anway Decl. § 19 (Doc. 1-1 at 4); see also Pet. at Exhibit J (Doc. 1-11).

Regarding the interest awarded by the Tribunal in the Award, the Slovak Republic explained in

Stephen Anway’s Declaration how to calculate the interest rate in the Award, see Anway Decl. 4

17-26 (Doc. 1-1) and included documentation showing those calculations (see Doc. 1-8).

II. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court grants the Slovak Republic’s Motion for Default

Judgment (Doc. 15). Further, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the court recognizes and enforces

the Award in Discovery Global LLC v. Slovak Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/21/51), dated

January 17, 2025 (Doc. 1-2).

The Slovak Republic is hereby ordered to submit a proposed judgment by Friday, August

28, 2026. As the court intends to issue a final judgment on Monday, August 31, 2026, the court

directs the Slovak Republic to include in its proposed judgment its calculations of prejudgment

interest up to and including Sunday, August 30, 2026, and to convert all amounts due and owing

to Euros.*

It is so ordered this 25th day of August, 2026.

United States District Judge

“In " Petition, the Slovak Republic requests that the court enter judgment in Euros. See Pet. 23 (Doc. 1

at 8).

Memorandum Opinion and Order — Page 13