The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
MARK LANE BROWN, )
) Case No. 1:25-cv-162
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF )
AGRICULTURE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff Mark Lane Brown’s objections (Doc. 13) to Magistrate
Judge Steger’s report and recommendations regarding his complaint (Doc. 2) and Brown’s
request for appointed counsel (Doc. 13). For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES
Brown’s objections and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Steger’s well-reasoned report and
recommendations (Doc. 9). The Court further DENIES Brown’s request for appointment of
counsel (Doc. 13).
Brown filed his complaint in this action on May 15, 2025, as well as a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. (Docs. 1, 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Magistrate Judge Steger
screened Brown’s complaint to determine whether this action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. On July 17, 2026, Magistrate Judge Steger filed his report and
recommendation (Doc. 9), finding that Brown’s complaint failed to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)’s requirement that the complaint “contain a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As a result, Magistrate Judge Steger
recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice. (Id.)
On July 31, 2026, Brown filed an emergency motion for extension of time, appointment
of counsel, and leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 10.) In this motion, Brown
represents, among other things, that: (1) he suffers from “significant disabilities that materially
impair his ability to research complicated legal issues, organize the record, and prepare legally
sufficient objections within the remaining time”; (2) he sought “an opportunity to correct any
curable deficiencies and present his factual allegations clearly”; and (3) he sought “an
opportunity to amend his complaint to identify, to the extent presently known, the responsible
USDA employees; the dates and substance of relevant communications; the allegedly false
statements; the officials who received or relied upon them; the adverse USDA action; and facts
supporting a causal connection.” (Id., at 3–4.)
On August 5, 2026, the Court granted Brown’s motion to the extent he sought additional
time to object to the report and recommendation. The Court, however, denied Brown’s request
for appointment of counsel and denied his motion to amend his complaint. (Doc. 12.) Despite
denying his motion for leave to amend, the Court granted Brown leave to file a renewed motion
for leave to amend his complaint in conjunction with any objections he had to Magistrate Judge
Steger’s report and recommendation. (Id.) In its order, the Court specifically instructed that, if
Brown filed a subsequent motion for leave to amend his complaint, he was required to “(1)
attach a proposed amended complaint to the motion and (2) adequately explain why his proposed
amended complaint complies with any applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” on or before
August 21, 2026. (Id.)
On August 21, 2026, Brown filed objections to the report and recommendation, and,
again, requested that the Court appoint him counsel. (Doc. 13). Brown also requested leave to
file an amended complaint after appointment of counsel but did not follow the Court’s directive
to attach a proposed amended complaint or explain why such proposed amended complaint
complied with any applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See generally id.)
The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report and
recommendation to which objections are made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Although the
Court is required to engage in a de novo review of specific objections, if the objections merely
restate the arguments asserted in Brown’s earlier motion, which were addressed by the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the Court may deem those objections waived.
See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (E.D. Mich. 2004). “A general objection, or
one that merely restates the arguments previously presented is not sufficient to alert the court to
alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.” Id. “An ‘objection’ that does nothing more
than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what
has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context.” Id. The
Sixth Circuit has also explained that:
A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects
as would a failure to object. The district court’s attention is not focused on any
specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate
useless. The functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as both the
magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks. This duplication of time
and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to
the purposes of the Magistrates Act.
Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Cole v.
Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The filing of vague, general, or conclusory
objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete
failure to object.”).
Although Brown has objected to Magistrate Judge Steger’s report and recommendation,
his objection fails to clarify his allegations or specify how his allegations state a claim for relief.
(See generally Doc. 13.) Additionally, the Court’s independent review of Brown’s complaint
and Magistrate Judge Steger’s report and recommendation confirms that the background set forth
in the report and recommendation, including the summary of Brown’s allegations, is accurate.
Accordingly, for the purposes of reviewing Brown’s objections to Magistrate Judge Steger’s
report and recommendation, the Court ADOPTS BY REFERENCE the factual and procedural
background set forth in the report and recommendation (Doc. 9).
Additionally, Brown’s objections fail to include specific objections. Rather, the only
sentence in the document the Court can reasonably construe as an objection is that “Plaintiff
respectfully objects to the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Steger.”
(Doc. 13, at 3.) Therefore, the objections are “not sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors
on the part of the magistrate judge.” See VanDiver, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 937. Brown’s objection
devotes significant time to explaining the need for accommodation because of his disabilities, the
need for appointment of counsel, and general accommodation requests, but completely fails to
show how the allegations in his complaint state a claim for relief. (Doc. 13, at 6.) After
independently reviewing Brown’s complaint, the record, and the report and recommendation, the
Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Steger’s well-reasoned conclusions and his stated reasons for
recommending dismissal of Brown’s claims.
To the extent Brown requests that the Court appoint him counsel, that request is also
denied. Appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is not a constitutional right, but a privilege
justified only in exceptional circumstances. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F. 2d 601, 605‒6 (6th Cir.
1993). A district court has discretion to determine whether to appoint counsel for an indigent
plaintiff. Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 1992). In exercising that discretion, the
district court should consider the nature of the case, whether the issues are legally or factually
complex, and the plaintiff’s ability to present his claims. Lavado, 992 F.2d at 605–6.
When determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, courts should consider
(1) the nature of the case, (2) whether the issues are legally or factually complex, and (3) the
plaintiff’s ability to present his claims. Lavado, 992 F.2d at 605–6.
In this case, although Brown represents that he will have difficulty presenting his claims
to the Court, the remaining factors militate against appointing counsel. Brown’s claims appear to
arise out of his dealings with United States Department of Agriculture officials and their
decisions regarding Brown personally or through Brown’s role in various businesses. The legal
and factual complexity of those claims, however, is impossible to ascertain because of the
deficiencies in the complaint described above. And, while Brown requests counsel because of
cognitive impairments resulting from traumatic brain injury and the lack of financial resources
necessary to retain private counsel (Doc. 13), Brown also stated that “[e]xhaustive search for
counsel was made and [he] hope[d] to add one when possible.” (Doc. 2, at 4.) On the whole, the
relevant factors do not weigh in favor of appointing counsel in this case. Accordingly, Brown’s
request for appointment of counsel will be DENIED.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby: (1) ACCEPTS and ADOPTS
Magistrate Judge Steger’s report and recommendation (Doc. 9) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); (2) OVERRULES Brown’s objections to Magistrate Judge Steger’s report and
recommendation; (3) DENIES Brown’s request for appointment of counsel; and (4) ORDERS
that this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE