The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
GARY SAWYER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:26-cv-1861-VMC-CPT
PASCO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on consideration of
Defendant Pasco County School Board’s Motion to Partially
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. # 10), filed on July 23,
2026. Plaintiff Gary Sawyer responded on August 24, 2026.
(Doc. # 18). The Motion is granted.
I. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all the
allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,
the Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences
from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990).
But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court must limit its
consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents
central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358
F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
II. Discussion
Mr. Sawyer asserts six claims against his former
employer, the Pasco County School Board: age discrimination
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) (Counts I-II), sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) (Counts
III-IV), retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count V), and
retaliation in violation of the ADEA (Count VI). (Doc. # 1).
The complaint alleges that all “conditions precedent to the
institution of this action have been fulfilled, including the
timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Florida Commission
on Human Relations.” (Id. at 2).
But the School Board insists that Mr. Sawyer has not
exhausted his administrative remedies for the Title VII
claims. (Doc. # 10). According to the School Board, Mr. Sawyer
“failed to allege that either the EEOC or FCHR ever issued
him a [notice of right to sue]” and, in fact, “the EEOC has
not issued a notice of right to sue and their investigation
remains open.” (Id. at 6).
“It is well settled that before bringing a Title VII
suit in federal court, an aggrieved employee must file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and obtain a right-
to-sue letter.” Ferrari v. E-Rate Consulting Servs., 655 F.
Supp. 2d 1194, 1201 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (emphasis added); see
Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562,
1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Before instituting a Title VII action
in federal district court, a private plaintiff must file an
EEOC complaint against the discriminating party and receive
statutory notice from the EEOC of his or her right to sue the
respondent named in the charge.”). “[R]eceipt of a right-to-
sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but
rather, is a statutory precondition which is subject to
equitable modification.” Forehand, 89 F.3d at 1569–70. “A
claim filed without the letter is subject to dismissal, unless
reasons exist to equitably modify the condition.” Williams v.
Fla., No. 5:00 CV 12 SPM, 2000 WL 799729, at *2 (N.D. Fla.
May 10, 2000), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Moore, 265 F.3d
1066 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here, Mr. Sawyer admits that he has not yet received a
right-to-sue letter. (Doc. # 18 at 6, 14). And he offers no
reason to equitably modify this statutory precondition. See
Forehand, 89 F.3d at 1571 (noting that “the burden of proof
with respect to equitable modification” belongs to the
plaintiff). It is therefore appropriate to dismiss the Title
VII claims without prejudice. See Barclay v. First Nat. Bank
of Talladega, No. 1:14-cv-01573-KOB, 2014 WL 5473829, at *7
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2014) (dismissing without prejudice
“Title VII failure to promote claim” because it had “not yet
been administratively exhausted because [plaintiff] has not
received a right to sue letter for her 2011 EEOC charge”);
Moore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:13-cv-228, 2014 WL 4776714,
at *3 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2014) (“Moore has neither alleged
that she has a right-to-sue letter, nor that she has yet to
receive a right-to-sue letter for Charge 93C. In
circumstances such as these, the proper course for the Court
to take is to dismiss the charges predicated on Charge 93C
without prejudice to allow time for Moore to receive a right-
to-sue letter, if she has not yet received one, or to
otherwise provide a right-to-sue letter that is not time
barred.”).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant Pasco County School Board’s Motion to
Partially Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. # 10) is
GRANTED.
(2) The Title VII claims (Counts III, IV, and V) are
dismissed without prejudice.
(3) Defendant is directed to file its answer to the remaining
claims within 14 days of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
25th day of August, 2026.
tiie 9r. Munnbey CneeZB.
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE