The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MATTHEW GARY SHULTZ,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:25-cv-918-LHP
DUSTIN MUELLER, SMITH
PREDELUS and CITY OF ORLANDO,
Defendants
ORDER1
On March 27, 2026, the Court dismissed without prejudice pro se Plaintiff
Matthew Gary Shultz’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 70), and provided
Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended pleading. Doc. No. 75.
Plaintiff timely-filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on April 15, 2026
(Doc. No. 77), to which Defendants Dustin Mueller (“Mueller”), Smith Predelus
(“Predelus”), and the City of Orlando (“the City”) have filed a joint motion to
dismiss (Doc. No. 79). Plaintiff never responded to the motion, thus the Court
1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
and the Inexpensive Determination, Efficient, and Abbreviated Litigation (IDEAL)
Program. Doc. Nos. 59, 60.
deems the motion unopposed in all respects. See Local Rule 3.01(d). For the
reasons that follow, the motion (Doc. No. 79) is due to be granted, and Plaintiff’s
SAC will be dismissed in its entirety without further leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND.
Plaintiff first filed suit against Defendants on May 27, 2025, relating to a
September 12, 2021 incident where Defendants Mueller and Predelus, both officers
with the Orlando Police Department, responded to a domestic violence call and
arrested Plaintiff and seized his firearms. Doc. No. 1. Defendants moved to
dismiss (Doc. Nos. 35, 41, 45), which the Court denied as moot on October 23, 2025,
and sua sponte granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Doc. No. 69.
Plaintiff thereafter timely filed his First Amended Complaint on November
3, 2025, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to the September 12, 2021
incident for false arrest and excessive force, due process and equal protection
violations, a violation of his Second Amendment rights, and several municipal
liability claims against the City of Orlando pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Doc. No. 70. Defendants again moved to
dismiss (Doc. No. 71), and Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, in which he
alternatively requested leave to amend. Doc. No. 72.
On March 27, 2026, the Court granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(Doc. No. 71), dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as a shotgun
pleading, and provided Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended
pleading “to assert claims that comply with all pleading requirements and assert
plausible claims for relief.” Doc. No. 75, at 10. The Court also provided Plaintiff
detailed guidance on the facts that must be sufficiently alleged to plausibly establish
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, excessive force, municipal liability,
equal protection and due process violations, First Amendment retaliation, and to
overcome qualified immunity. Id. at 10-15. The Court also explained to Plaintiff
that there is no cognizable claim for a violation of the Second Amendment’s right
to bear arms. Id. at 14-15.
Plaintiff filed his SAC on April 15, 2026. Doc. No. 77. Plaintiff now asserts
four (4) claims against Defendants, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) false arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Mueller and Predelus
(Count I); (2) a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against the City
related to the return of his seized firearms (Count II); (3) a claim against the City for
violation of Plaintiff’s Second Amendment right to possess a firearm (Count III);
and (4) a Monell municipal liability claim against the City for failure to train,
supervise, and provide procedures for return of property (Count IV). Id. To
support these claims, Plaintiff alleges the following facts:
8. On September 12, 2021, Plaintiff was involved in a
domestic dispute in which he was the victim.
9. Plaintiff had visible injuries, including scratches and
redness, observable at the scene.
10. Officers Mueller and Predelus failed to reasonably
investigate the incident.
11. Upon information and belief, Defendant Smith Predelus
was the subject of Internal Investigation IR 22-14, which
resulted in sustained findings for use of force and conduct
toward the public.
12. Officers ignored exculpatory evidence and arrested
Plaintiff without probable cause.
13. No reasonable officer would have concluded probable
cause existed.
14. Charges were later dismissed.
15. The City seized Plaintiffs firearms.
16. After dismissal of charges, Plaintiff requested their return.
17. Plaintiff was required to request a hearing before the
firearms were returned.
18. The delay occurred without timely notice or adequate
procedural safeguards.
Doc. No. 77, at 2-3. In terms of relief, Plaintiff seeks an unspecified amount of
compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Id. at 4, 5.
On May 5, 2026, Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the SAC, to which
Plaintiff has failed to respond. Doc. No. 79. With the motion now ripe, this Order
follows.
II. LEGAL STANDARD.
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so as to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). “Rule 10
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each claim be separated into
separate counts and supported by distinct factual allegations.” Bagley v. City of
Tampa, No. 8:07-cv-218-T-27EAJ, 2007 WL 9723949, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)). Although a court must accept as true well pleaded
allegations, it is not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
Further, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed
factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A
pleading must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
These requirements apply to pro se litigants, although courts give a “liberal
construction” to pro se pleadings. Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1386 (11th
Cir. 1998). But this leeway is not limitless, as courts cannot serve as “de facto
counsel for a party, or . . . rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain
an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted). See also Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 281 (11th Cir. 2013)
(“[L]iberal construction is not the same thing as wholesale redrafting.”). Pro se
parties must comply with the minimum pleading standards set forth in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. Nawab v. LVNV Funding LLC, Case
No. 5:12-cv-129-Oc-10PRL, 2012 WL 12918283, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2012).
III. ANALYSIS.
A. Shotgun Pleading.
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s SAC remains a shotgun pleading
because it does not incorporate any of the facts alleged into any of the four claims,
and because Plaintiff does not clearly identify which claim is asserted against which
Defendant. Doc. No. 79, at 4-6. See also Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,
792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015) (identifying the four types of impermissible
“shotgun pleadings,” including where a complaint contains “multiple counts where
each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the
entire complaint,” or contains “multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or
omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”). Upon
review, the Court disagrees.
Unlike prior iterations, Plaintiff’s SAC lists each factual allegation and each
claim in separately numbered paragraphs, in compliance with Rule 10. And while
Plaintiff does not identify in the caption of each claim which Defendant the claim is
brought against, the allegations underneath each claim make clear that Count I is
against both Mueller and Predelus, and Counts II-IV are against the City. See, e.g.,
Doc. No. 77 at ¶¶ 19, 24, 26, 29, 31, 33. And while Plaintiff does not specifically
incorporate the sparse factual allegations into each claim, it is clear that Count I
relates to Plaintiff’s arrest, and Counts II through IV relate to the seizure of
Plaintiff’s firearms. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 19-21, 23-27, 28-30, 32. Further, as
demonstrated by the pending joint motion to dismiss, each Defendant was clearly
on notice of the claims brought against them and was able to raise arguments in
defense of the claims. Doc. No. 79. As such, the Court will not dismiss the SAC
on the basis of shotgun pleading. See Weiland, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir.
2015) (noting that the “unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is
that they fail to . . . give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”); see also Bunck v. King, No. 2:10-cv-
735, 2013 WL 12146523, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2013), aff’d, 530 F. App’x 905 (11th
Cir. 2013) (“Although certainly not a model of clarity, the Third Amended
Complaint is not a ‘shotgun pleading.’ A shotgun pleading is ‘unintelligible,
indecipherable, and replete with irrelevant facts, making it impossible for the
defendants to know what [the plaintiff] is claiming, against whom, and on what
grounds.’ In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs make an effort to separate
out their allegations as to each Defendant and each cause of action. . .” (citation
omitted)).
B. Count I – False Arrest.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a claim for
false arrest against Mueller and Predelus and, in particular, that Mueller and
Predelus are entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. No. 79, at 7-11.
“Qualified immunity provides protection for government officials
performing discretionary functions and sued in their individual capacities as long
as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Brannon v. Finkelstein, 754 F.3d
1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1313
(11th Cir. 2003)). There is no dispute that Mueller and Predelus were performing
discretionary functions when they arrested Plaintiff. See Bercini v. City of Orlando,
No. 6:15-cv-1921-Orl-41TBS, 2016 WL 11448994, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2016)
(“[A]n officer making an arrest is acting within his discretionary duty.” (citing
Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004))). Accordingly, in order
to ascertain whether the qualified immunity defense applies to this case, the Court
must determine: “(1) whether the facts alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of the alleged misconduct.” Bratt v. Genovese, No. 8:13-cv-3210-T-36AEP, 2015 WL
12835684, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2015), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2016)
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
Defendants focus on the first prong – whether Plaintiff has alleged facts
sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional right. Doc. No. 79, at 8-11.2
Liberally construing the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Mueller and Predelus lacked
probable cause to arrest him because they (1) failed to reasonably investigate the
September 12, 2021 incident, including that Plaintiff was the victim; (2) ignored
clearly exculpatory evidence, including Plaintiff’s visible injuries; and (3) the
charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dismissed. Doc. No. 77 ¶¶ 8-10, 12, 14,
19-22.3 However, as Defendants correctly point out, none of these facts, taken as
true, are sufficient to allege that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
2 With respect to the second prong, the law is clear that “[a] warrantless arrest
without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section
1983 claim.” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Marx v.
Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Medley v. City of Orlando, No. 6:08-
cv-1456-Orl-18DAB, 2009 WL 10706233, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2009) (“[I]t is clearly-
established that an arrest made without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, as discussed herein, Plaintiff
has not plausibly alleged any Fourth Amendment violations.
3 Plaintiff mentions an “Internal Investigation IR 22-14” against Predelus “which
resulted in sustained findings for use of force and conduct toward the public,” but
nowhere explains how this allegation relates to his arrest. Doc. No. 77 ¶ 11. Nor has
Plaintiff alleged a claim for excessive force. Thus, the Court does not consider this
allegation further.
See Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1343 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
2528 (2024) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 false arrest claim based on a failure to
allege a lack of probable cause where plaintiff alleged that his “injuries were
exculpatory evidence that the officers ignored,” because such injuries “do not rule
out probable cause,” as they could both be used to paint the plaintiff as a victim or
be inculpatory evidence that the plaintiff was the aggressor, and in any event “even
where officers see or hear some exculpatory evidence, the fact that they still
conclude probable cause exists does not mean they ignored or turned a blind eye or
deaf ear to the exculpatory evidence.”); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“That a defendant is subsequently acquitted or charges are dropped
against the defendant is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest
itself.”); Wymer v. Baxter, No. 6:15-cv-1669-Orl-37DAB, 2015 WL 7731406, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 4, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:15-cv-1669-Orl-37DAB,
2015 WL 7721330 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2015) (sua sponte dismissing pro se complaint
and holding that “Plaintiff cannot state a claim on the theory that ‘he was treated
like nothing’ when ‘he was the real victim’ and [the officer] should have believed
his version of events over the statements of [the alleged victim]. Once a police
officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required
to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before
making an arrest.” (internal citation and quotations omitted)).
Plaintiff provides no other facts to suggest that his arrest was unlawful,
beyond conclusory assertions that there was no probable cause, which is not enough
to survive dismissal. Doc. No. 77 ¶¶ 13, 19, 21-22. See also Brivik v. L., 545 F. App’x
804, 806 (11th Cir. 2013) (conclusory allegation that officer “performed a reckless
investigation that ultimately led to his wrongful arrest and incarceration”
insufficient to demonstrate that officers lacked probable cause, or arguable probable
cause, for the arrest).4 Nor has Plaintiff made any argument in response to
Defendants’ motion, arguably leading to the conclusion that he has abandoned his
claims. See Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., 564 F. App’x 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A
party's failure to respond to any portion or claim in a motion indicates such portion,
claim or defense is unopposed. Also, when a party fails to respond to an argument
or otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim abandoned.”
(alterations adopted) (citations omitted)). Thus, in the absence of any other factual
allegations or argument to the contrary, the Court finds that Count I is due to be
dismissed. See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Generally
speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds
when the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit are cited as persuasive authority.
See 11th Cir. R. 36–2.
C. Count II – Due Process Violation.
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his property interest in
his firearms without due process because the City retained his seized firearms after
all charges against him were dismissed, Plaintiff was forced to seek a hearing to
recover his property, and the City “failed to provide timely and adequate
procedures.” Doc. No. 77 ¶¶ 15-18, 23-27. Defendants contend that these
allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief in that they are both
conclusory, and because they fail to demonstrate that the available state law
remedies – in this case a hearing – were inadequate. Doc. No. 79, at 11-13. The
Court agrees.
As the Court previously explained to Plaintiff, to allege a procedural due
process claim, he must allege “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected
liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate
process.” Chen v. Lester, No. 6:08-cv-1954-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 10698631, at *14
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted omitted).
Thus, “[i]t is the state’s failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the
otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to
a federal procedural due process claim.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th
Cir. 2000). But, as Defendants correctly point out, other than the conclusory
allegations previously identified, Plaintiff provides no facts to support his assertion
that he was denied any due process or that the procedures utilized to recover his
firearms – a hearing – were neither timely nor adequate. And again, Plaintiff has
not made any argument in response to Defendants’ motion as to this claim.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count II. See Bishop v. City of Boynton
Beach, No. 25-cv-80606, 2026 WL 229410, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Bishop v. Harper, No. 25-cv-80606-WPD, 2026 WL
222565 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2026) (dismissing as insufficiently pled a procedural due
process claim for deprivation of a protected property interest where plaintiff “solely
provided threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, which are more
conclusory than factual.”). See also Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996)
(plaintiffs “failed to state a valid procedural due process claim because they have
not alleged that [state] law provided them with an inadequate post-deprivation
remedy.”); Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Even assuming the
continued retention of plaintiffs’ personal property is wrongful, no procedural due
process violation has occurred if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss
is available.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Barker v. Sheldon, No.
209-cv-701-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 672767, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2010) (“Plaintiff
cannot allege an inadequate post-deprivation process because Plaintiff’s claim
regarding any loss of or destruction to his personal property may be raised in a tort
action under Florida state law.” (citing Fla. Stat. § 768.28)).
D. Count III – Second Amendment Violation.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that the City’s continued retention of his seized
firearms “burdened” his constitutional right to possess a firearm, and that the delay
in returning his firearms “was not justified by any lawful basis.” Doc. No. 77
¶¶ 28-30. However, as the City argues (Doc. No. 79, at 14-15), and as the Court
previously pointed out to Plaintiff (Doc. No. 75, at 14-15), “there is no cognizable
cause of action by a gun owner against a government agency or employee for
[violations of the right to bear arms].” Raymond v. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., No. 8:24-
cv-1404-TPB-CPT, 2024 WL 4792016, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-
14124, 2025 WL 2409096 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025). See also Blidge v. Ferguson, No.
4:24-cv-00131, 2026 WL 852132, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2026) (finding that § 1983
does not provide a cause of action for retaliation under the Second Amendment);
Howe v. City of Enter., Al., No. 1:15-cv-113-JA-SRW, 2018 WL 8545947, at *33-34 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 17, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-cv-113-ECM, 2019
WL 8723922 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2019) (rejecting claim of second amendment
violation where individual officer disarmed plaintiff during investigation at
plaintiff's home). Plaintiff cites to no legal authority suggesting that he has alleged
a viable claim for relief, has not alleged any facts or made any argument that the
City could be held vicariously liable in this regard, and has not otherwise opposed
dismissal of this claim. Count III will be dismissed.
E. Count IV – Monell Liability.
Plaintiff’s fourth and final claim is also against the City, and alleges, again in
conclusory fashion, that the City maintained policies or customs relating to the
failure to train, supervise, and provide procedures for the return of property. Doc.
No. 77 ¶¶ 31-32. Plaintiff also points to an unexplained “prior sustained Internal
Affairs findings” as proof of the City’s deliberate indifference to the need for better
training and supervision. Id. ¶ 34. Defendants seek dismissal of this claim on the
grounds that the allegations are wholly conclusory, and because Plaintiff fails to
identify any policy, custom, or practice that caused any violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Doc. No. 79, at 15-17. Plaintiff makes no argument in
opposition.
Upon consideration, the Court again agrees with Defendants. Under Monell
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id.
at 691. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. In order to plausibly allege a claim for
Monell liability, Plaintiff “must ultimately prove that [the City] had a policy, custom,
or practice that caused the deprivation.” Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271,
1279 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). “A
‘policy’ includes decisions of [the municipality’s] duly constituted legislative body
or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.
A ‘custom’ includes a practice that has not been formally approved by an
appropriate decisionmaker but that may fairly subject a municipality to liability on
the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.”
Greer v. Ivey, No. 6:15-cv-677-Orl-41GJK, 2016 WL 11464648, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 18,
2016) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, “[t]he official policy or custom ‘must be the moving force of the
constitutional violation in order to establish liability of a government body under
§ 1983.’” Skyles v. McCoy, No. 6:16-cv-1968-Orl-37TBS, 2017 WL 1322071, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2017) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).
Here, Plaintiff only makes generic references to a failure to train, supervise,
or provide procedures for the return of property, nothing more. He provides no
factual allegations even suggesting that the City has any policy, custom, or practice
of not returning – or delaying the return – of any seized property. Rather, all of his
allegations are broad and conclusory in nature, which is insufficient. See, e.g.,
Gurrera v, Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Ofc., 657 F. App’x 886, 893 (11th Cir. 2016)
(finding that conclusory allegations that there was a “pattern . . . of obtaining
coerced and false statements,” and “a pattern and practice of engaging in false
arrests, imprisonment, [and] false prosecution” failed to state a claim under Monell
(alterations in original)); Skyles, 2017 WL 1322071, at *6 (“Plaintiff has made wholly
conclusory statements that the City “fail[ed] to promulgate reasonable policies and
procedures among [its] officers for the use of force,” and that such failure “was
excessive and unreasonable” and “was done intentionally, willfully, [and]
maliciously . . .” (alterations in original)).
At most, Plaintiff relies upon the facts – to the extent any are alleged – relating
to the seizure of his own firearms. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege “a
widespread policy of the relevant constitutional violations and that the prior
conduct is sufficiently similar.” Guarda v. City of Melbourne, Fla., No. 6:17-cv-756-
Orl-37TBS, 2017 WL 3034071, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2017); see also Weiland, 792 F.3d
at 1329–30 (affirming dismissal of custom, policy, and practice claim where the only
facts alleged in support of the claim were about the individual defendant officers’
own conduct along with conclusory allegations of a practice of covering up
excessive force against the mentally ill); Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1311
(11th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff failed to establish an unconstitutional custom or policy
sufficient to impose municipal liability when he relied only on his own experience).
Plaintiff’s attempts to cast Count IV as a claim for inadequate training and
supervision also fails. “In limited circumstances, a municipality’s failure to train
its employees may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of
§ 1983.” Guarda, 2017 WL 3034071, at *2 (citations omitted). The failure to train
“must amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
untrained employees come into contact.” Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard.” Id. (quoting
Connick, 563 U.S. at 61); see also Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir.
1994) (“[O]nly if, ‘in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees,
the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely
to result in the violation of constitutional rights,’ can a municipality reasonably ‘be
said to have been deliberately indifferent to that need.’” (quoting City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989))). “Ultimately . . . a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 for conduct of which its officials were unaware; instead, the
plaintiff must show that municipal officials had actual or constructive knowledge
of the misconduct, but that they failed to take corrective action.” Johnson v. City of
Daytona Beach, No. 6:16-cv-941-Orl-40TBS, 2017 WL 119744, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12,
2017) (citing Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff does not elaborate on how the City failed to implement any certain
training policy, or how the City’s failure to train law enforcement resulted in a
related unconstitutional policy application in his case or in any other cases where
firearms are seized in connection with an arrest. Plaintiff also fails to provide any
factual allegations demonstrating that the City had actual or constructive
knowledge that police officers were seizing firearms and delaying their return (to
the extent such an action would constitute a constitutional violation). Thus, Count
IV is insufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Guarda, 2017 WL
3034071, at *3 (“[T]he Complaint does not identify a particular omission in the City’s
training program. Rather, Plaintiff points to the City’s policies and training
generally. In addition, Plaintiff relies on imprecise and conclusory allegations . . .
which do not approach the requisite pleading of a pattern of similar constitutional
violations.”). Count IV is therefore also due to be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 79) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without
further leave to amend.5
5 Eleventh Circuit precedent “does not require affording pro se plaintiffs multiple
opportunities to amend.” Gurrera, 657 F. App'x at 894; see also Marantes v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 649 F. App'x 665, 673 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur case law does not require a district
court to give a pro se litigant multiple opportunities to amend”). The Court has already
provided Plaintiff two prior chances to allege plausible claims for relief, which included
detailed guidance regarding pleading standards and the elements of each of his claims.
Doc. Nos. 69, 75. And by his failure to respond to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has
arguably abandoned his case. See Jones, 564 F. App’x at 434. Accordingly, dismissal
without leave to amend is warranted.
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate all other pending motions and
close the file.
4, The Clerk is FURTHER DIRECTED to place Plaintiff's contact
information as set forth in Doc. No. 82 on the docket, and to ensure that Plaintiff
receives a copy of this Order via electronic filing as required by the Court’s October
1, 2025 Order (Doc. No. 58).°
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on August 25, 2026.
LESLIE AN PRICE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
6 The Court notes Plaintiff's request to seal his address (Doc. No. 82), which the
Court now finds moot based on the rulings in this Order. In any event, Plaintiff's motion
does not satisfy the requirements for sealing as set forth in Local Rule 1.11, and in
particular provides no explanation for why sealing is necessary.
Ay.