Hinrichs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER A. HINRICHS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:26-cv-909-KCD-KRH

v.

CHARLOTTE COUNTY FL,

SERVE: JOSEPH TISEO, CHAIRS

OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS; COUNTY

ADMINISTRATOR HECTOR L

FLORES, INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY; COUNTY

ADMINISTRATOR EMILY S

LEWIS, INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;

AND HR DIRECTOR MARY L

SHELLEY, INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY;

Defendants,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher Hinrichs, a former employee relations manager

for Charlotte County, alleges that the County and its top administrators

abruptly stripped him of his job without the constitutionally mandated pre-

termination hearing. (Doc. 1.)1 Defendants now move to dismiss the

complaint, insisting that Hinrichs was merely placed on administrative leave

and afforded a full hearing before the ax officially fell. (Doc. 11.) Because

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

Hinrichs plausibly alleges that he was handed a termination notice days

before any hearing took place, Defendants’ motion raises a factual dispute

that cannot be resolved at this stage.

I. Background

Because this case arrives on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the

factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

93-94 (2007). Hinrichs began working for Charlotte County in December

2024. By the summer, he had successfully completed his probationary period,

securing a property interest in his continued public employment. (Doc. 1 ¶ B.)

But trouble started after Hinrichs initiated disciplinary investigations into

several union firefighters. (Id. ¶ D.) They allegedly retaliated by filing

misconduct complaints against Hinrichs. (Id. ¶ F.)

Things came to a head on February 18, 2026. According to the

complaint, Defendant Mary Shelley summoned Hinrichs to a conference

room, presented him with the union’s allegations, and demanded his

immediate resignation. (Id. ¶ H.) When Hinrichs refused to quit, he was

handed an “Employee Notice Form” terminating his employment, ordered to

surrender his county-issued equipment, and escorted out of the building. (Id.)

What happened next forms the crux of this constitutional dispute. The

termination notice Hinrichs received listed an effective date of February 18.

Two days later, Defendant Emily Lewis officially signed off on the

termination form. (Id. ¶ I.) Yet on February 23—five days after he was

marched out the door—the County held what it labeled a “pre-determination”

hearing with Defendant County Administrator Hector Flores. (Id. ¶ J.) Flores

issued a letter stating his decision to “uphold” the prior termination decision.

(Id. ¶ K.)

Hinrichs now sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the County and its

administrators violated his procedural due process rights by firing him first

and asking questions later.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient

facts, accepted as true, to state a facially plausible claim for relief.” Galette v.

Goodell, No. 23-10896, 2023 WL 7391697, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023). “A

claim is facially plausible if it pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. The question at this stage is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately win, but simply whether the complaint can proceed into discovery.

At this starting gate, we must accept the complaint’s factual allegations

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94. That benefit of the doubt, however, has limits.

The court is not bound to accept legal conclusions dressed up as factual

allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pleading

that offers nothing more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not unlock the courthouse

doors. Id. In short, the plaintiff must tell a factual story that makes the

defendant’s liability plausible, not just point a finger and recite the law. See,

e.g., Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).

Also relevant here, a pleading drafted by a pro se party is held to a less

stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. Jones v. Fla. Parole

Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). But “this leniency does not

give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). “[A] pro se pleading

must suggest (even if inartfully) that there is at least some factual support

for a claim; it is not enough just to invoke a legal theory devoid of any factual

basis.” Jones, 787 F.3d at 1107.

III. Discussion

The Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits a state from depriving a person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Reams v. Scott, No.

4:18CV154-RH/CAS, 2018 WL 5809967, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2018). When

a public employee can be fired only for cause, that employee has a

constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment. See,

e.g., Hollis v. W. Acad. Charter, Inc., 782 F. App’x 951, 958 (11th Cir. 2019).

Once that property interest attaches, the state cannot unilaterally snatch it

away. Instead, due process requires that the employee receive “some kind of a

hearing” before being discharged. Harrison v. Wille, 132 F.3d 679, 684 (11th

Cir. 1998). The requirements for this pre-termination hearing are not overly

burdensome. The employee needs notice of the charges, an explanation of the

employer’s evidence, and a chance to respond. Id. at But the sequence is non-

negotiable: the opportunity to be heard must come “before his termination.”

Bailey v. Henry Cnty., No. 119CV03504LMMRDC, 2022 WL 4596653, at *5

(N.D. Ga. June 27, 2022).

Hinrichs alleges exactly this kind of sequencing failure. According to

the complaint, he possessed a property interest in his position after passing

his probationary period. Defendants do not contest that point. Instead, the

dispute centers on when the actual termination occurred. Hinrichs claims he

was fired on February 18. On that day, County officials handed him a notice

that said he was terminated and escorted him from the building. (Doc. 1 ¶ H,

Doc. 1-1 at 6.)2 It was not until five days later that he received what the

County labeled a “pre-determination” hearing. The result of that hearing,

according to a letter from Defendant Flores, was to “uphold” the termination.

(Doc. 1-1 at 9.)

2 For ease of reference, the Court will cite the page numbers generated by its electronic

filing system for all exhibits.

If Hinrichs’s timeline is accurate, he has stated a textbook procedural

due process claim. Being handed a termination notice before being given a

chance to respond is precisely what the law forbids. See, e.g., Galbreath v.

Hale Cnty., Alabama Comm’n, 754 F. App’x 820, 828 (11th Cir. 2018).

Defendants attempt to short-circuit this claim by introducing their own

version of events. They insist that Hinrichs was only placed on

administrative leave on February 18. (Doc. 11 at 5.) The official termination

did not happen until after the pre-deprivation hearing, so “Hinrichs was

afforded due process.” (Id. at 7.)

Defendants might ultimately be right about the sequencing. But at this

stage, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Hinrichs’ favor. And

he has presented enough facts to suggest he was terminated before any

process. The County’s notice form lists an effective termination date of

February 18. (Doc. 1-1 at 6.) He was also escorted from the premises and

removed from the County’s website. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ H-I.) And when the County

Administrator later held a hearing on February 23, he sent a letter stating he

would “uphold” the discipline. (Doc. 1-1 at 9.) You cannot uphold a decision

that has not already been made. So even if Defendants insist Hinrichs was

merely on administrative leave, he has pled a plausible claim that the County

fired him first and went through the procedural motions later. That is enough

to move the case forward.

The County separately argues that Hinrich has not pled municipal

liability. (Doc. 11 at 7.) A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 just because it employs someone who committed a constitutional

violation. There is no respondeat superior liability for civil rights violations.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Monell is a “case about responsibility,” and is meant to limit liability to acts

that the local government body has “officially sanctioned or ordered.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 480 (1986). Under this

framework, municipal liability requires “(1) an express policy; (2) a

widespread practice so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a

custom; or (3) an act or decision of an officer with final policy-making

authority.” Boudreaux v. McArtor, 681 F. App’x 800, 804 (11th Cir. 2017).

Hinrichs checks at least two of those boxes. First, he plausibly alleges a

widespread custom. As the County’s former employee relations manager,

Hinrichs claims to have first-hand knowledge of the County regularly

finalizing terminations before holding any hearing. (Doc. 14 at 10.) Given his

unique perspective, those allegations are enough. Second, Hinrichs might

prevail if the officials who fired him wielded final policymaking authority. He

points the finger directly at the County Administrator and the Deputy

Administrator, claiming they made the ultimate call. Whether those

individuals possessed final authority over employment decisions is a fact-

intensive question of state and local law. We simply cannot resolve that

question on a motion to dismiss. For now, Hinrichs has laid out a plausible

path to municipal liability.

The individual defendants—Flores, Lewis, and Shelley—also ask the

Court to dismiss them based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 11 at 8.) Qualified

immunity protects government officials from civil damages unless their

conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009). The doctrine gives officials breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments, protecting “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 743 (2011). To overcome this shield, a plaintiff must show not only

that a constitutional violation occurred, but also that the right was so clearly

established that every reasonable official would have understood his conduct

was wrong. Id. at 741.

Defendants maintain they were merely “performing their job functions”

and never violated any clearly established rights. (Doc. 11 at 9.) But to reach

that conclusion, they again rely on their own version of events—namely, that

Hinrichs was placed on administrative leave and afforded a pre-

determination hearing before being terminated. (Id. at 11.) As mentioned,

those are contested facts. Viewing the complaint in Hinrichs’ factor, as the

Court must, the individual defendants handed him a termination notice, cut

off his network access, and tossed him from the building, all without a prior

hearing. It has long been clear that a public employee with a property

interest in his job must receive “some kind of a hearing prior to the

discharge.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). If

Defendants actually fired Hinrichs on the 18th and then held a sham hearing

to rubber-stamp an already finalized decision, they violated a constitutional

rule that every reasonable public official should know. See also Hogan v. City

of Fort Walton Beach, No. 3:18-CV-1332-MCR-HTC, 2019 WL 11638968, at *4

(N.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2019).

Once discovery sheds light on the actual timeline of events, Defendants

are free to raise qualified immunity again at summary judgment. But for

now, the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds is denied.

One last issue needs attention. Hinrichs’ briefing makes reference to a

a “liberty interest claim” that Defendants “failed to address.” (Doc. 14 at 12.)

Even reading the complaint with generosity, it contains no such claim. From

top to bottom, the complaint questions one thing: the County’s failure to

provide a pre-deprivation hearing. If Hinrichs believes there is some other

claim lurking in the background, he must properly move to amend his

pleading to include it. As it stands today, however, this is a procedural due

process case about the lack of a pre-termination hearing and nothing more.

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is

DENIED.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 25, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge

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