Gallagher

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

EMILY GALLAGHER, ) Case No. 5:25-cv-00878

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd

)

CITY OF CANTON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Emily Gallagher brings this lawsuit against Defendants City of

Canton and various police officers for various federal and State-law claims arising

from an incident involving the police’s use of a canine. Defendants move for partial

judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN

PART Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in

Plaintiff’s favor, as the non-moving party, the complaint alleges the following facts.

On or about May 1, 2024, Officers Bryan Jeffries, Jennifer Henderson, and

Anthony Ankrom entered a house with a canine. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 2–3, PageID #2.) At

the time, Emily Gallagher was asleep in an upstairs bed. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #4.)

Plaintiff alleges that, when Officer Jeffries “unleashed” the canine on her, “[Officer]

Jeffries was not in danger, nor was anyone else.” (Id., ¶¶ 14 & 16, PageID #4.)

Plaintiff alleges that she was “not trying to flee or otherwise resist arrest” (id., ¶ 17,

PageID #4) and that the crime which Officer Jeffries was investigating did not

necessitate the use of “potentially deadly force” (id., ¶ 18, PageID #5). Also, Plaintiff

alleges that Officer Jeffries failed to warn her before deploying the canine. (Id., ¶ 29,

PageID #6.)

The canine bit Ms. Gallagher and “violently wrenched her hand and wrist

around” for an unspecified amount of time “which caused her significant pain, fear,

and injury.” (Id., ¶ 15, PageID #4.) After Officer Jeffries attempted and failed to

regain control of the canine, he used a “tool to detach [the canine’s] mouth from

[Ms. Gallagher’s] wrist.” (Id., ¶ 19, PageID #5.) Ms. Gallagher was handcuffed and

charged in State court with “numerous felonies and misdemeanors including, inter

alia, resisting arrest.” (Id., ¶ 20, PageID #5.) All charges were dropped before trial.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the officers “jointly agreed and/or conspired with one

another to prepare false, misleading, and incomplete official reports and to give false,

misleading, and incomplete versions of the events to their superiors” to “cover up

their misconduct.” (Id., ¶ 21, PageID #5; see also id., ¶ 22, PageID #5.)

As a direct and proximate result of the officers’ actions, Plaintiff alleges that

she suffered physical injuries, a variety of emotional damages, and “loss of liberty and

costs.” (Id., ¶¶ 24–25, PageID #5.) Plaintiff alleges that she “will continue to suffer

from and incur the same in the indefinite future.” (Id., ¶ 25, PageID #5.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Emily Gallagher sued Defendants City of Canton, Officer Jeffries,

Officer Henderson, Officer Ankrom, and two “John Doe” K9 handlers for a variety of

federal and State-law claims. (ECF No. 1.) She brings federal claims for excessive

force, malicious prosecution, and Monell liability under Section 1983 as well as State-

law claims for malicious prosecution, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id., ¶¶ 27–79, PageID #5–

13.)

Defendants move for partial judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s federal

claims for excessive force and malicious prosecution and State-law claims for

malicious prosecution and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 16,

PageID #87.)

ANALYSIS

“The only difference between Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6)” is timing. Hunter

v. Ohio Veterans Home, 272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003). Rule 12(c)

provides that, once “the pleadings are closed” a party may “move for judgment on the

pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings . . .

generally follows the same rules as a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule

12(b)(6).” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Assoc., 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citing D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)); see also Holland v.

FCA US LLC, 656 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2016). On a motion under Rule 12(c),

courts “must follow the Supreme Court’s changes to the pleading standards in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007).” Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (citing Engler v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir.

2017)). “In other words, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where, construing

the material allegations of the pleadings and all reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court concludes that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166, 1174

(6th Cir. 2021). In construing the pleadings, the Court accepts the factual allegations

of the non-movant as true, but not unwarranted inferences or legal conclusions.

Holland, 656 F. App’x at 236–37 (citing Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446

(6th Cir. 2000)).

While “the court’s decision rests primarily upon the allegations of the

complaint[,]” “exhibits attached to the complaint may also be taken into account.”

JTO, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 242 F. Supp. 3d 599, 602 (N.D. Ohio 2017)

(citation modified). Only “well-pleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise

to an entitlement of relief” and “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” will survive. Bates, 958 F.3d at

480 (quotation and citation omitted). Conversely, “[m]ere labels and conclusions are

not enough[.]” Engler, 862 F.3d at 575. Nor are facts that are “merely consistent

with” liability. Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (quotation omitted).

I. Body-Worn Camera Videos

In support of their motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, Defendants

made body-worn camera videos from Officers Jeffries, Ankrom, and Eckelberry from

the incident part of the record. (ECF No. 17.) Officers Jeffries and Ankrom are

Defendants in this lawsuit. Officer Eckleberry is not.

“In the motion to dismiss context, we have consistently held that we may only

consider the video footage over the pleadings when the videos are clear and blatantly

contradict or utterly discredit the plaintiff’s version of events.’” Hodges v. City of

Grand Rapids, 139 F.4th 495, 506 (6th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Saalim v.

Walmart Inc., 97 F.4th 955, 1002 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Bell v. City of Southfield,

37 F.4th 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2022))). “Otherwise, we must accept the plaintiff’s version

as true.” Bell, 37 F.4th at 364 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). “This

all makes sense” because, even at the pleadings stage, “if the indisputable video

evidence contradicts [plaintiff’s] pleadings, his allegations are implausible.” Id.

(citing Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2017)).

Accordingly, the Court construes the body-worn camera videos in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff and considers them only where the videos are clear and

blatantly contradict or utterly discredit Plaintiff’s version of events.

II. Federal Claims

“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 unless

their conduct violates clearly established law.” Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 569, 571–72

(2026) (per curiam) (citing Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per

curiam)). In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit directs a

district court to undertake two inquiries, in either order. The Court must determine

whether “the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Martin v.

City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). Also, the Court asks if

the right at issue was clearly established at the time “such that a reasonable officer

would have known that his conduct violated it.” Id. (citation omitted). A right is not

clearly established “if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question

beyond debate.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572 (cleaned up). To determine if a right is clearly

established, “courts generally ‘need to identify a case where an officer acting under

similar circumstances. . . was held to have violated’ the Constitution.” Id. (quoting

Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019) (per curiam) (cleaned up)). “The

relevant precedent must define the right with a ‘high degree of specificity,’ so that

‘every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the

plaintiff seeks to apply.’” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63

(2018) (cleaned up)).

II.A. Excessive Force

Defendants argue that Officer Jeffries is entitled to qualified immunity

because Plaintiff cannot show that he violated a clearly established constitutional

right. (ECF No. 16, PageID #92–95.) Specifically, Defendants argue that “he did not

violate clearly established law in releasing the canine to search an unfamiliar house

for a potentially dangerous felon after numerous warnings.” (ECF No. 19, PageID

#107.) Plaintiff argues that Officer Jeffries is not entitled to qualified immunity

because the use of force was excessive. (ECF No. 18, PageID #103–04.) Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that “the warnings were issued when [she] was asleep in an upstairs

bedroom far from the front door where the announcements were made” and because

the canine “was not released until after Officer Jeffries knew [she] was asleep and

without additional warnings or attempts to wake her.” (Id., PageID #103.)

To determine if an officer used excessive force in deploying a canine, the Sixth

Circuit considers several factors, including whether the officers warned before

deployment; whether the suspect was committing or fleeing a serious crime; whether

the officers entered an unfamiliar location; and whether the canine was adequately

trained. See Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869, 872 (6th Cir. 2018). Sixth Circuit

cases for canine seizures fall along a spectrum of reasonableness spectrum. At one

end of the spectrum falls Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 2012),

where the canine seizure used excessive force because the offices failed to warn before

deployment, the canine was inadequately trained, the officers were unsure of the

extent of the crime, if any, and the plaintiff was not fleeing. On the other end lies

Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 1988), where the canine seizure was

reasonable because the plaintiff ignored multiple warnings before deployment, the

canine was properly trained, and the plaintiff was actively committing a burglary in

an unfamiliar location, showing an “unwillingness to surrender[.]”

For cases with facts that do not align with Campbell or Robinette, the Sixth

Circuit determines where the case falls on the reasonableness spectrum. In Baxter,

751 F. App’x at 872, the court determined that the case “looks closer to Robinette than

Campbell” because, despite the plaintiff raising his hands before the bite, he fled the

police after committing a serious crime, hid in an unfamiliar location, ignored

multiple warnings, and was bitten by an adequately trained canine. In Burgess v.

Bowers, 773 F. App’x 238, 247 (6th Cir. 2019), the court determined that, while the

facts “do not match those in Robinette perfectly[,]” the force was reasonable because,

despite the canine continuing to bite the plaintiff after the officer called off the canine,

he fled police after committing a misdemeanor, hid in an unfamiliar location, and

ignored multiple warnings.

Against this backdrop, the parties compare the facts of the incident involving

Ms. Gallagher. (ECF No. 16, PageID #94–95; ECF No. 18, PageID #103.) To

determine whether the officers used excessive force in deploying the canine, the Court

analyzes whether the officers warned before deployment, whether Ms. Gallagher was

committing or fleeing a serious crime, whether the officers had to enter an unfamiliar

location, and whether the canine was adequately trained. In doing so, the body-worn

camera footage addresses each of these considerations.

II.A.1. Evidence of Warnings

The body-worn camera videos leave no doubt that the officers warned

Ms. Gallagher before deploying the canine. Officer Eckelberry’s body-worn camera

footage shows that he loudly announced “Canton Police” on the house’s porch as he

opened the front door. (ECF No. 17, Eckleberry, 15:30–15:32.) Twenty-seven seconds

later, Officer Eckleberry yelled “Canton Police” again from the open doorway (id.,

15:57–15:58), and an out-of-view officer (identifiable in another video as Officer

Jeffries) announced “Canton Police canine, make yourself known or you’re gonna get

bit” (id., 15:57–16:00). Five seconds after that, Officer Eckleberry announced “Canton

Police canine, make your presence known or you will be bit.” (Id., 16:02–16:06.)

Eighteen seconds later, still from the open doorway, the out-of-view officer (Officer

Jeffries) shouted a final announcement, “Canton Police canine, make your presence

known or you will be bit. This is your final warning.” (Id., 16:20–16:24.)

Officer Ankrom’s body-worn camera footage captures four of the five warnings.

(See ECF No. 17, Ankrom, 6:03–6:04 (“Canton Police.”); 6:03–6:06 (“Canton Police

canine, make yourself known or you’re gonna get bit”); 6:08–6:12 (“Canton Police

canine, make your presence known or you will be bit”); 6:26–6:30 (“Canton Police

canine, make your presence known or you will be bit. This is your final warning.”).)

Officer Jeffries’s body-worn camera does not include sound until thirty seconds into

the video, but thirty-seven seconds into the footage, Officer Jeffries’s final warning is

audible. (See ECF No. 17, Jeffries, 0:35–0:39.) Both Officer Ankrom’s footage and

Officer Jeffries’s footage show that one minute and two seconds after the last

warning, Officer Jeffries enters the house with the canine (ECF No. 17, Ankrom, 7:32;

ECF No. 17, Jeffries, 1:38).

Although Plaintiff alleges that the officers failed to warn before deploying the

canine (ECF No. 1, ¶ 29, PageID #6), the body-worn camera footage clearly shows

that the officers gave five loud warnings over the span of fifty seconds, then waited

an additional one minute and two seconds before entering the house. In her

opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the video footage shows the officers giving

warnings. Instead, she argues instead that “[she] was not aware of [the officers’]

warning because she was asleep[.]” (ECF No. 18, PageID #104.) But the officers gave

sufficiently loud warnings so that anyone inside the house would hear them. In any

event, the law evaluates the reasonableness of the seizure from the point of view of

the responding officers, not Ms. Gallagher.

II.A.2. Evidence of a Crime

Plaintiff’s complaint is silent as to the crime that the officers were

investigating at the time of the incident. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff does not allege

why the officers were at the scene with a canine. The closest the complaint comes is

the allegation that “[a]t the time [Officer] Jeffries unleashed [the canine], he was not

investigating a serious crime necessitating the use of potentially deadly force.” (Id.,

¶ 18, PageID #5.) However, the body-worn camera footage fills in this gap.

Officer Eckelberry’s body-worn camera video captures the landlord explaining

to the officers that he evicted the former tenant, Ms. Gallagher, the previous day; the

property manager changed the locks; the property manager’s crew found the front

door open that morning; and the landlord believes that Ms. Gallagher came in

through a window. (ECF No. 17, Eckleberry, 00:44–1:04.) After apprehending

Ms. Gallagher and her boyfriend, Officer Ankrom’s body-worn camera footage shows

Officer Jeffries stating that “we have to charge her—both of them with B&E [breaking

and entering].” (ECF No. 17, Ankrom, 15:36–15:39.) Based on this body-camera

footage, the record leave no doubt that the officers reasonably suspected

Ms. Gallagher of committing a serious crime at the time of deployment.

II.A.3. Evidence of Unfamiliar Location

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege whether the location was unfamiliar to the

officers. (See genearlly ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that, when Officer Jeffries

entered the house, he “was not in danger, nor was anyone else.” (Id., ¶ 16, PageID

#4.) However, Officer Jeffries’s body-worn camera video shows that he had to enter

a multi-story house with several confined rooms and that it took him thirty-eight

seconds to search and clear the building, ultimately locating Ms. Gallagher in an

upstairs bedroom. (ECF No. 17, Jeffries, 1:40–2:18.) He entered an enclosed area

believing that Ms. Gallagher was inside but did not respond to the warnings. In

Officer Eckelberry’s body-worn camera video, the landlord explains that

Ms. Gallagher has a boyfriend who “does not really live there” and that the two cars

in the driveway belong to Ms. Gallagher and her boyfriend. (ECF No. 17, Eckleberry,

1:19–1:24, 2:02–2:06; 2:22–2:24.)

The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that, where an officer was “forced to

explore an enclosed unfamiliar area in which he knew a man was hiding, the officer

would have reasonably believed that the suspect posed a threat to the officer and to

others.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1048–51 (6th Cir. 1994). To determine

whether force was reasonable, courts have found a location to be unfamiliar where

confinement and darkness make an area likely to expose officers to ambush. See

Matthews, 35 F.3d at 1048-51 (concluding that the police used reasonable force where

the plaintiff fled into “heavy trees and undergrowth[,]” where plaintiff “could easily

ambush the officers”); Rainey v. Patton, 534 F. App’x 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2013)

(concluding that the police used excessive force where the “interaction occurred in a

parking lot with an overhead streetlight, so there was no risk that [the defendant]

would be ‘ambushed’”).

Although Plaintiff alleges that the officers were not in danger, the body-worn

camera footage shows that they had to enter a confined, unfamiliar location where

Ms. Gallagher—and possibly her boyfriend—was located but did not respond to the

officers’ warnings. On these facts, the officers reasonably believed that they were

vulnerable to a potential ambush from one or more persons in an unfamiliar location

with multiple confined rooms. Accordingly, the body-worn camera footage contradicts

the allegations in the compliant that the officers were not in danger, and the record

shows, as a matter of law, that they were.

II.A.4. Evidence of Training

Plaintiff alleges that the officers “fail[ed] to train either or both the K9 unit

and its hander” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 3, PageID #2) and that “[a]fter Defendant Jeffries’[s]

attempts to regain control over [the canine] failed, he needed to use a tool to detach

[the canine’s] mouth from [her] wrist” (id., ¶ 19, PageID #5). Plaintiff argues that the

canine “was not sufficiently trained” because Officer Jeffries “could not order the

[canine] to release” and “had to use a tool to pry its mouth open.” (ECF No. 18, PageID

#103.)

The body-worn camera videos do not provide clear evidence one way or another

about the canine’s training. Officer Jeffries’s body-worn camera video shows that

Officer Jeffries instructed the canine “here, here” (ECF No. 17, Jeffries, 2:16) before

he and the canine entered a room with a mattress on the floor and multiple people

lying on it covered with blankets. The canine jumped onto the mattress and bit one

of the people, Ms. Gallagher. (Id., 2:24.) Fifty-six seconds later, Officer Jeffries pulled

out a tool to release the canine’s bite. (Id., 3:17.) About thirteen seconds later, Officer

Jeffries used the tool on the canine. (Id., 3:30.) After one minute and thirteen

seconds, the canine released its bite on Ms. Gallagher. (Id., 3:35.) The videos do not

show Officer Jeffries giving any verbal commands for the canine to release.

Because the body-worn camera footage does not provide clear evidence of

adequate or inadequate training, the Court construes the allegations in Plaintiff’s

favor and assumes that the canine was inadequately trained.

* * *

Taking these factors together on the record as a whole, notwithstanding any

inadequate training of the canine, the officers were investigating Ms. Gallagher for

breaking and entering, a serious crime, in an unfamiliar location at the time of

deployment and gave repeated and loud warnings before deployment over the span

of fifty seconds. Accordingly, on these specific facts and circumstances, the Court

determines that the use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. Because this

record shows that there was no constitutional violation, the Court does not need to

analyze the availability of qualified immunity. Therefore, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s federal claim for use

of excessive force.

II.B. Malicious Prosecution

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

Plaintiff’s federal claim for malicious prosecution because Plaintiff cannot

demonstrate that her prosecution lacked probable cause and because Plaintiff’s

prosecution was not terminated in her favor. (ECF No. 16, PageID #95–96.) Plaintiff

argues that she can rebut the indictment’s presumption of probable cause because

“Defendants prepared false and misleading reports and pursued charges to justify the

use of force.” (ECF No. 18, PageID #104.) Plaintiff also argues that her criminal

prosecution “was terminated in her favor without a conviction.” (Id.)

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff

must prove that (1) “the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision

to prosecute the plaintiff”; (2) there was no probable cause for the prosecution; (3) the

plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, apart from the initial arrest, as a result of

the legal proceedings; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s

favor. France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 625 (6th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff must satisfy all

four elements.

II.B.1. Favorable Termination

Defendants argue that Ms. Gallagher’s criminal prosecution “was not

terminated in her favor” because it was dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No. 16,

PageID #96.) Plaintiff argues that “federal law requires only that the criminal

proceeding end[] without a conviction.” (ECF No. 18, PageID #104.)

To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for a

malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff need only show that [her]

prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022).

A plaintiff does not need to show that “the criminal prosecution ended with some

affirmative indication of innocence.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 48. Dismissal without

prejudice qualifies as favorable termination under federal law. For this reason, the

Court determines that Plaintiff’s prosecution terminated in her favor. Accordingly,

Plaintiff establishes this element of her federal claim for malicious prosecution.

II.B.2. Probable Cause

A finding of “an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand

jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of

holding the accused to answer.” Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006).

While a grand jury indictment is presumed to prove probable cause, a plaintiff can

rebut this presumption where the “indictment was obtained wrongfully by defendant

police officers who knowingly presented false testimony to the grand jury” or where

officers “testify with a reckless disregard for the truth.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d

606, 616 (6th Cir. 2014).

“It is not sufficient, even at the motion-to-dismiss stage, to make only vague

and conclusory assertions without factual support.” Meeks v. Larsen, 611 F. App’x.

277, 282 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that a complaint asserting that the government

caused a grand jury investigation by using “false and misleading information,”

without more specific facts, is insufficient to establish malicious prosecution). To

rebut a presumption of probable cause, “a plaintiff must plead specific facts showing

a defendant-officer made false statements or fabricated evidence that set the

prosecution in motion.” Saal v. City of Wooster, No. 5:18-cv-2744, 2020 WL 836498,

at *4 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (determining that, where the plaintiff alleged that defendant-

officers, “or someone at their direction, used [plaintiff’s] OHLEG login information to

perform searches of his living and deceased relatives,” “[plaintiff] has pleaded

sufficient facts to support a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983”) (quoting Allen

v. Rucker, 304 F. Supp. 3d 638, 643 (E.D. Ky. 2018)); see also Buehner v. City of

Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 3d 827, 910–11 (N.D. Ohio 2025) (determining that, at the

motion to dismiss phase, plaintiff “plausibly alleged facts sufficient to rebut this

presumption” because he alleged that the defendant-officers “fabricat[ed] [two

witnesses’] testimony and suppress[ed] evidence including the exculpatory non-

identification of [him].”).

Plaintiff does not dispute that a grand jury indicted her. (See ECF No. 18,

PageID #104.) In fact, by arguing that she can rebut the indictment’s presumption

of probable cause, Plaintiff necessarily acknowledges that the indictment. Plaintiff

maintains that this “presumption may be overcome where a plaintiff alleges that

officers made false statements, fabricated evidence, or withheld material

information.” (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she alleged that “Defendants

prepared false and misleading reports and pursued charges to justify the use of force.”

(Id.)

Looking at the complaint, Plaintiff includes only two allegations that arguably

relate to any false statements or fabricated evidence. First, “[t]he Defendant officers

jointly agreed and/or conspired with one another to prepare false, misleading, and

incomplete official reports and to give false, misleading, incomplete versions of the

events to their superiors in order to cover up their misconduct.” (See ECF No. 1, ¶ 21,

PageID #5.) Second, “[t]he policy, practice, and custom of a police code of silence

results in police officers . . . remaining silent or giving false and misleading

information during official investigations in order to protect themselves or fellow

officers from internal discipline, civil liability or criminal charges, in cases where they

and their fellow officers have engaged in misconduct." (Id., ¶ 49, PageID #9.) These

allegations are conclusory, so the Court does not take them as true. Plaintiff fails to

allege any detail about who made the false statements, which statements are false,

how the statements are false, or that such statements could have influenced the

grand jury’s decision to indict. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to allege who fabricated

evidence, which evidence was fabricated, how the evidence was fabricated, or that

such evidence could have influenced the grand jury indictment.

Further, Plaintiff’s complaint includes only three allegations about

Defendants’ alleged conspiracy to prosecute her to justify their use of force. First,

“for the purpose of covering up Jeffries'[s] excessive force, these Defendants acting

individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with each other, instigated, influenced, or

participated in the decision to prosecute [Plaintiff][.]” (iI., ¶ 35, PageID #9.) Second,

“the Defendant Officers, acting individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with each

other, deliberately engaged in arbitrary conduct that contravened fundamental

canons of decency and fairness and violated Plaintiff Emily's substantive due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." (Id., ¶ 37, PageID #7.) Third, “Defendants

acted with malice to initiate and/or maintain prosecution of Plaintiff without probable

cause, causing Plaintiff to suffer a loss of liberty.” (Id., ¶ 56, PageID #10.) These

allegations are also conclusory, so the Court does not take them as true either.

Plaintiff fails to allege any detail about how Defendants conspired to prosecute her.

For these reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to rebut

the presumption of probable cause. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish the second

element of her federal claim for malicious prosecution.

* * *

Because Plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption of probable cause that the

indictment represents, she cannot satisfy all four elements for her claim for malicious

prosecution under Section 1983, and the Court need not consider the remaining

elements. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings on Plaintiff’s federal claim for malicious prosecution.

II.C. Monell Liability

With respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim, a municipality “may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Department

of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (2018). “Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. “There can be no liability

under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.” Robertson, 753 F.3d

at 622. The “conclusion that no officer-defendant has deprived the plaintiff of any

constitutional right a fortiori defeats a claim against the government entity as well.”

Scott v. Clay Cnty., 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799)) (cleaned up).

On its own motion, because Defendants are entitled to judgment on the

pleadings on Plaintiff’s federal claims for excessive force and malicious prosecution,

the Court determines that Plaintiff cannot maintain a Monell claim. Therefore, the

Court DISMISSES this claim.

III. State-Law Claims

Plaintiff brings four State-law claims for malicious prosecution, negligence,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. (ECF No. 1, PageID #10–13.) The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s State-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under federal law “the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of

the same case or controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This grant of

jurisdiction brings all claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact before

the Court. Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016).

Even then, a court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” in

certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine

of discretion.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

To determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should

consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also James v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 462–

63 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1882

(6th Cir. 1993)). Section 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional

circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court may, in

its discretion, either retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims and proceed

on the merits, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009), or

decline jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to

pursue the remaining claims in State court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[G]enerally

‘when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations

usually will point to dismissing the [S]tate law claims.” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co.

of Columbus, 423 F. App’x 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Musson Theatrical v. Fed.

Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Juergensen v. Midland

Funding, LLC, No. 5:18-cv-1825, 2018 WL 5923707, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2018).

Based on its review of the record, and because the case remains in its early

stages, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s State-law claims. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES these claims

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for partial

judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s federal claims for excessive force and

malicious prosecution and, on its own motion, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

Monell claim. Further, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s State-law claims and DISMISSES them WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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