Opinion

Rai

Court
District Court, N.D. New York
Filed
Aug 25, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRENDA R.,

Plaintiff,

6:26-CV-539

v. (DJS)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

BRENDA R.

«| Plaintiff Pro Se

Indian Lake, New York 12842

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. VERNON NORWOOD, ESQ.

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

Attorney for Defendant

6401 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, Maryland 21235

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

]

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER!

On April 6, 2026, Plaintiff commenced this action, using a form complaint, in

which she “complains of a decision which adversely affects the plaintiff in whole or in

| part.” Dkt. No. 1, Compl., ] 2. The Complaint alleges that it challenges a final decision

of Defendant. /d. And while the Complaint alleges that a copy of the Appeals Council

decision is included, id. at § 3, no such decision is attached. Defendant moves to dismiss

the Complaint alleging that no final, adverse determination has been issued against

Plaintiff and, therefore, this matter is not ripe for the Court’s review. Dkt. No. 9.

Plaintiff has responded to the Motion. Dkt. No. 13.

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted and the Complaint is

dismissed.

This Court has the authority to review an adverse decision from the

Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). That statute “allows federal

courts to review ‘any final decision of the Commissioner . . . after a hearing.’” Nunez

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 848 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

There is a four-step procedure for a claimant to obtain a final decision

subject to judicial review: (1) the claimant files an application and receives

an initial determination, (2) the claimant may request reconsideration by

filing a written request, (3) the claimant may challenge the decision on

reconsideration by requesting a hearing before an ALJ, and (4) if

' Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General

Order 18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 4 & General Order 18.

dissatisfied with the hearing decision, the claimant may request review by

the Appeals Council within 60 days of receiving notice of the hearing

decision.

Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(a), 404.968(a)). “It is well settled that . . . judicial

review of Social Security benefit determinations is limited to ‘final’ decisions of the

Commissioner made after a hearing, that available administrative procedures must be

exhausted and that a final decision is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction in the

District Court.” Mathews v. Chater, 891 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

The record establishes that Plaintiff sought and was granted Title X VI benefits

as of May 1, 2001. Dkt. No. 9-1, § 3(a). It appears that she continues to receive benefits.

«| /d. Defendant has no record of an adverse determination against Plaintiff. /d. at [¥ 3(b)-

(c). The record, therefore, is devoid of evidence of a denied claim, a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge, or a decision from the Appeals Council. Absent that

evidence the record demonstrates that “Plaintiff failed to follow the steps for reaching a

final decision, as promulgated by the Commissioner and, thus, failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.” Leong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 13599341,

at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011); see also Gist v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 4239593,

at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2008).

In rare circumstances exhaustion may be waived, but exhaustion is the

rule, waiver is the exception. The court considers three factors in making

its determination: (1) whether the plaintiff's claim is collateral to the

demand for benefits; (2) whether exhaustion would be futile, and (3)

whether requiring exhaustion would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff.

Jason P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 2079411, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not established that any of these

exceptions are applicable here. Plaintiff has not suggested that this matter is collateral

to a claim for denial of benefits. Nor is there any real basis for claiming that exhaustion

would be futile or that requiring exhaustion would cause harm.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-

Decision and Order on the parties.

Dated: August 25, 2026

Albany, New York

U.SMMfagistrate Judge

2011 WL 13599341 to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) for lack of jurisdiction and improper

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. venue.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Gail LEONG, Plaintiff, II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter

v.

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.”

8:11-CV-00370 Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)

| (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

Signed July 25, 2011 405(g), an individual must obtain a “final decision of the

Commissioner” before a federal court has jurisdiction over

Attorneys and Law Firms the claim. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 617 (1984);

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977); Matthews v.

Gail Leong, Van Buren, ME, Pro Se. Chater, 101 F.3d 681, 681 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), an individual must obtain a ‘final decision

Suzanne M. Haynes, Social Security Administration, Office

of the Secretary’ before judicial review of Social Security

of Regional General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.

benefit determinations is granted.”) (affirming the district

court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when

the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies).

DECISION and ORDER

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior United States District Judge III. DISCUSSION

*1 Plaintiff Gail Leong commenced this action pro se a. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

asserting claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on the

Act of 1990 (“ADA”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of ground that she failed to her exhaust administrative remedies

1964 (“CRA”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the Social before filing the instant action and, thus, the Court lacks

Security Administration's refusal to allow her to choose her subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As stated above,

own medical evaluator. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requires the SSA to reach a final

decision on a claim before it can be brought in federal court.

Although the statute does not define the term “final decision,”

I. FACTS

the Commissioner has set forth a detailed administrative

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and,

process. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975)

for purposes of the instant motion, are deemed to be true.

(holding that the Commissioner is to “flesh out by regulation”

what constitutes a “final decision.”) Under these regulations,

Plaintiff is currently a resident of Van Buren, Maine and

an individual must: (1) receive an initial determination of

is receiving disability benefits from the Social Security

benefits; (2) if unsatisfied with the determination, ask for a

Administration (“SSA”). To keep receiving benefits, she must

reconsideration; (3) request and appear at a hearing before an

be periodically evaluated by a medical professional chosen

administrative law judge; and (4) request the Appeals Council

by the SSA. According to Plaintiff, patients are not permitted

to review the decision by an administrative law judge. 20 C.

to verify the qualifications of the medical evaluator and

F. R. § 404.900. Only after these four steps are completed

the SSA does not take the individual needs of patients into

can a plaintiff file an action seeking district court review. Id.

account when selecting the medical professional. Plaintiff

Completion of the administrative process is “central to the

requested that her next medical evaluation be performed at

requisite grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Weinberger v.

the Adirondack Medical Center in Saranac Lake, New York.

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975).

Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking an order

*2 Here, Plaintiff's sole argument is that she should be able

requiring SSA to permit her to receive her next medical

to select the medical professional who will conduct her next

and is not up for a review of those benefits until November To the extent Plaintiff's Complaint may be considered to be

2011. Plaintiff failed to follow the steps for reaching a final asserting a claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

decision, as promulgated by the Commissioner and, thus, Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Accordingly, (1971), it must be dismissed. In Bivens, the Supreme Court

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court lacks jurisdiction recognized an implied private cause of action for damages

over Plaintiff's claims. against federal officers who violate a citizen's constitutional

rights. Nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint plausibly suggests the

violation of any constitutional right. Accordingly, Plaintiff's

b. Title VII, ADA, and § 1983 Claims Complaint is dismissed.

Plaintiff's Complaint may be read to be asserting claims

pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, and § 1983. Title VII,

the ADA, and § 1983 do not apply to a federal agency IV. CONCLUSION

implementing a federal program. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's motion to

717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (Title VII “was meant to cover dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED IN

only those situations where federal funding is given to a non- ITS ENTIRETY.

federal entity which, in turn, provides financial assistance

to the ultimate beneficiary.”); Cellular Phone Taskforce v. IT IS SO ORDERED.

F.C.C., 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Title II of the ADA

is not applicable to the federal government.”); Kingsley v.

All Citations

Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1991) (an

action brought pursuant to § 1983 “cannot lie against federal Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2011 WL 13599341

officers.”). Insofar as these statutes do not apply to the federal

government, they must be dismissed.

End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2008 WL 4239593 Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint. (Dkt. No. 11.)

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Dkt. No. 121.) Because I find

United States District Court, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, I

N.D. New York. recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted.

David L. GIST, Sr., Plaintiff, 1 Plaintiff filed additional opposition papers on

v.

May14 and May 20, 2008. Those papers were not

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

served on Defendant, and will thus be rejected for

filing. Consideration of the papers would not have

No. 5:07–CV–1246.

changed the undersigned's recommendation.

|

Sept. 11, 2008.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Attorneys and Law Firms Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

on September 23, 2002. (Herbst Decl. Ex. 2.) On January 20,

David L. Gist, Sr., Syracuse, NY, pro se. 2005, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) informed

Plaintiff in writing that he was eligible to receive monthly

Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney for the

SSI payments, including retroactive payments to January

Northern District of New York, Vernon Norwood, Esq.,

1, 2003. Id. The SSA's letter included a calculation of the

Special Assistant United States Attorney, of Counsel, Street

payments owed to Plaintiff and a description of how the

Syracuse, NY, for Defendant.

calculation was performed. Id. The letter advised Plaintiff

that he could appeal the SSA's calculation of benefits by

requesting reconsideration in writing within 60 days of

DECISION and ORDER receiving the letter. The letter stated that the S SA “will

ask you to sign a form SSA–561–U2, called ‘Request for

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior District Judge.

Reconsideration.’ “ Id.

*1 This matter brought pursuant to the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 41 U.S.C. § 12101 was referred to the On April 6, 2005, the SSA informed Plaintiff in writing that

Hon. George H. Lowe, United States Magistrate Judge, for a he was entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits, retroactive

Report–Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and to September 2001. (Herbst Decl. Ex. 3.) However, the

Local Rule 72.3(c). SSA stated that “[w]e are withholding your Social Security

benefits for September 2001 through March 2005. We may

No objections to the May 27, 2008 Report–Recommendation have to reduce these benefits if you receive ... SSI ... for this

have been raised. After examining the record, this Court has period.” Id. Again, the letter advised Plaintiff of the steps to

determined that the Report–Recommendation is not subject to take if he wanted to appeal the decision. Id.

attack for plain error or manifest injustice. Accordingly, this

Court adopts the Report–Recommendation for the reasons On April 11, 2005, SSA informed Plaintiff in writing that

stated therein and DISMISSES the petition. his SSI payments would cease beginning on May 1, 2005,

because his receipt of Disability Insurance Benefits rendered

him economically ineligible for SSI. (Herbst Decl. Ex. 4.)

IT IS SO ORDERED. Again, the letter advised Plaintiff of the steps to take if he

wanted to appeal the decision. Id.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On June 5, 2005, the SSA informed Plaintiff in writing that

GEORGE H. LOWE, United States Magistrate Judge. “we cannot pay you all of the Social Security benefits that

we withheld. This is because you received SSI money for

This matter was referred to the undersigned for report September 2002 through June 2005.” (Herbst Decl. Ex. 5.)

and recommendation by the Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, However, the SSA informed Plaintiff that he would “soon

decision. Id. when a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must read the

complaint liberally. Shah v. N.Y. Dep't of Civil Serv., 168

*2 On August 1, 2005, the SSA informed Plaintiff in writing F.3d 610, 614 (2d Cir.1999). The court may also refer to

that, because of his income, he had not been eligible for SSI evidence outside the pleadings and the plaintiff carries the

payments in October 2003 and April 2004. (Herbst Decl. Ex. burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

6.) Again, the letter advised Plaintiff of the steps to take if he subject matter jurisdiction exists. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113.

wanted to appeal the decision. Id.

“It is well settled that ... judicial review of Social Security

Plaintiff did not file a “request for reconsideration or any other benefit determinations is limited to ‘final’ decisions of

administrative appeal of the determinations.” (Herbst Decl. ¶ the Commissioner made after a hearing, that available

3(g).) Plaintiff asserts that when he requested form SSA–561– administrative procedures must be exhausted and that a final

U2 on two separate occasions from his local Social Security decision is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction in

office, office personnel were rude to him and refused to give the District Court.” Matthews v. Chater, 891 F.Supp. 186,

him the form. (Dkt. No. 12–3.) Plaintiff did, however, seek 188 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing, inter alia, Califano v. Sander,

assistance from his Congressman. (Dkt. No. 1.) Eventually, he 430 U.S. 99 (1977)). “Exhaustion is generally required as

filed a complaint in this Court on November 29, 2007. (Dkt. a matter of preventing premature interference with agency

No. 1.) processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so

that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to

Although the complaint is far from clear, Plaintiff appears afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience

to dispute the SSA's finding that he was ineligible for SSI and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate

payments due to his income. (“Alleges am below income, for judicial review.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765

and it clearly states both incomes, SSDI and SSI, when just (1975).

receive one SSDI, is reasons to belief there a conflict of

interests hear, is why am bring this matter to Court, being *3 When a plaintiff disputes a determination of the SSA

railroad by means stated all alone, where unemployable, regarding his economic eligibility for payments or the

forever lost of surgery of objects its taking a toll something underpayment or overpayment of benefits, he must pursue

has of right to it hear otherwise, where are civil rights.”) three levels of administrative procedures in order to fully

Plaintiff also alleges that he never received a check for his exhaust his administrative remedies. First, the plaintiff must

withheld benefits. (Dkt. No. 1.) request reconsideration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.913, 416.1413

(2007). Second, if the reconsideration decision is unfavorable,

Defendant filed the motion to dismiss on April 9, 2008. (Dkt. the plaintiff must request a hearing before an Administrative

No. 11.) Plaintiff filed opposition papers on April 29, 2008. Law Judge (“ALJ”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.930, 416.1430 (2007).

(Dkt. No. 12) (see also footnote 1, supra.) Third, if the ALJ's determination is unfavorable, the plaintiff

must request that the Appeals Council review the ALJ's

decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416 .1467 (2007). “A

II. DISCUSSION determination is only final after the Appeals Council has

Defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed for denied review or decided the case after review.” Matthews,

lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not 891 F.Supp. at 188 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.981).

exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 11.) Defendant

is correct. Here, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies.

He did not seek reconsideration, an ALJ hearing, or review

A case may properly be dismissed for lack of subject matter by the Appeals Council.

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

(1) when the court lacks statutory or constitutional authority The District Court may waive the exhaustion requirement

to adjudicate it. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, only if (1) the plaintiff's legal claims are collateral to the

113 (2d Cir.2000). When deciding whether to grant a 12(b) demand for benefits; (2) exhaustion would be futile; or (3)

(1) motion to dismiss, the court “must accept all factual exhaustion would cause irreparable harm. Matthews, 891

allegations in the complaint as true and draw inferences from F.Supp. at 188 (citing Smith v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 777,

waive exhaustion should not be made solely by mechanical RECOMMENDED, that the Court dismiss the complaint

application of [these] factors, but should also be guided by (Dkt. No. 1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); and it is further

the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement.” Bowen

v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986)

ORDERED, that the papers filed by Plaintiff on May 14 and

May 20, 2008, be rejected for failure to serve Defendant.

Waiver is not appropriate in this case. First, Plaintiff's claim

is not “collateral” to a demand for benefits. Indeed, Plaintiff's

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have ten days

complaint is a demand for benefits. Second, exhaustion would

within which to file written objections to the foregoing report.

not be futile. Although Plaintiff did not file a request for

Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court.

reconsideration within 60 days, he could still pursue his

administrative remedies by requesting an extension of time FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN

from the SSA in which do so. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909(b), TEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.

Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Small

416.1409(b) (2007). This would give the SSA an opportunity

v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d

to correct any errors, afford the parties and the courts the

Cir.1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72, 6(a),

benefit of the SSA's experience and expertise, and result in

6(e).

a record that is adequate for judicial review. Third, nothing

in the record indicates that requiring exhaustion would

irreparably harm Plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court does not

All Citations

have subject matter jurisdiction.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4239593

WHEREFORE, it is hereby

End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2020 WL 2079411 constitute the defendant's answer within 90 days of said

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. service, or a motion to dismiss within 90 days of said

United States District Court, N.D. New York. service.” N.D.N.Y. General Order No. 18 (June 12, 2018)

(Dkt. No. 7 at 3) (emphasis added). In this case, defendant has

JASON P.,1 Plaintiff, filed a timely motion to dismiss which is now pending before

me. (Dkt. No. 15). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the

v.

motion, and defendant has filed a reply. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 17, 18).

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

For the following reasons, this court agrees with defendant

1 In accordance with recent guidance from the and will order dismissal of this action without prejudice for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Committee on Court Administration and Case

Management of the Judicial Conference of the

United States, which was adopted by the Northern I. Motion to Dismiss

District of New York in June 2018 in order to better Defendant's motion to dismiss is based upon lack of subject

protect personal and medical information of non- matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “ ‘Dismissal

governmental parties, this Memorandum-Decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is proper when the

and Order will identify the plaintiff and any other district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

individual, using only his or her first name and last adjudicate a case.’ ” Oliver v. New York State Police, No. 1:19-

initial. CV-233, 2020 WL 1849484, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020)

(quoting Sokolowski v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 723 F.3d 187,

1:19-CV-1463 (ATB) 190 (2d Cir. 2013)). The court considers all uncontroverted

| facts in the complaint as true, and draws all reasonable

Signed 04/29/2020 inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. Id.

| (citing Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc.,

Filed 04/30/2020 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014)).

Attorneys and Law Firms In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court may consider competent evidence

JASON P., Plaintiff pro se.

outside the pleadings, such as affidavits and exhibits. Id.

JESSICA TUCKER, Special Asst. U.S. Attorney for (citing Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.

Defendant. 2000)). “ ‘Where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute,

the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of

fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings.’ ” Id.

(quoting Tandon, 752 F.3d at 243) (quoting APWU v. Potter,

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003)). A plaintiff who asserts

ANDREW T. BAXTER, United States Magistrate Judge subject matter jurisdiction has the burden to show that it exists

by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

*1 This matter was referred to me, for all proceedings and

entry of a final judgment, pursuant to the Social Security Pilot

Program, N.D.N.Y. General Order No. 18, and in accordance II. Background

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. In May of 2010, plaintiff filed an application for CIB,

73, N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 73.1 and the consent of the parties. based on the earnings of his mother Mary Beth P.L.

(Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff seeks review of a partially favorable (Def.’s Ex. 1)2 (Dkt. No. 15-3). Plaintiff's application was

decision on his claim for Child's Insurance Benefits (“CIB”) denied initially on September 12, 2010. (Def.’s Ex. 2)

under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. No. 15-4). Plaintiff's application was denied again

after he requested reconsideration. (Def.’s Ex. 3, 4) (Dkt.

General Order No. 18 provides that “after service of the Nos. 15-5, 15-6). Plaintiff requested and attended a hearing

Complaint and the Social Security Identification Form before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who issued

audio recording of the ALJ's hearing could not be found, and United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)).

the Appeals Council ultimately vacated the ALJ's decision,

remanding the case for additional proceedings before the ALJ. The Social Security Act provides that judicial review of

(Def.’s Ex. 7 at 3) (Dkt. No. 15-9). Social Security benefit determinations, under both Title II3

and Title XVI4 of the Act, is limited to “final decisions” of

2 The defendant's exhibits have been filed under the Commissioner, made after a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

the Declaration of Jenay Podraza, Acting Chief of Available remedies must be exhausted. Maynard v. Soc. Sec.

Court Case Preparation and Review Branch 4 of Admin., No. 11-CV-6046, 2012 WL 2319249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

the Office of Appellate Operations, Social Security June 19, 2012) (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765

Administration. (“Podraza Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 15-2). (1975)). A determination becomes “final” after the Appeals

*2 After holding a second hearing, the ALJ issued another Council has denied review or has decided the case after

unfavorable decision, which plaintiff appealed. (Def.’s Exs. review. Mathews v. Chater, 891 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y.

8, 9 at 2) (Dkt. Nos. 15-10, 15-11). On June 29, 2018, 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.981). Section 405(h) provides

the Appeals Council vacated the second hearing decision that no findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner shall

because the audio recording was again lost. (Id.) On June 17, be reviewed “by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency

2019, a different ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, except as herein provided.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

awarding plaintiff CIB under the insured status of his mother.

(Def.’s Ex. 10 at 6, 11) (Dkt. No. 15-12). The decision 3 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

stated that plaintiff would be entitled to begin receiving

benefits 12 months prior to his 2010 application, but not 4 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).

retroactively to 1993. (Def.’s Ex. 10 at 11). On August 14,

2019, the ALJ amended his June 17, 2019 decision to state B. Application

that plaintiff was only entitled to benefits beginning six month Plaintiff does not dispute that his claim is still pending before

prior to his 2010 application because his mother converted the Appeals Council. Rather he argues that because he was a

to retirement benefits in 2008, which was prior to plaintiff's “class member” in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), the

2010 CIB application. In such cases, the statute provided that court has jurisdiction over his claim. (Complaint (“Compl.”

individuals could only collect retroactive benefits beginning at 2, ¶ 8)). Plaintiff cites to a passage in Zebley, which

six months prior to the application date. (Def.’s Ex. 11 at 5, states that “[t]his court will retain jurisdiction of this case to

10) (Dkt. No. 15-13). oversee implementation of the terms of this Stipulation and

Order.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seems to be raising Constitutional

On August 30, 2019, plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's due process claims. (Compl. at 2, ¶ 7).

amended decision. (Def.’s Ex. 12) (Dkt. No. 15-14). Plaintiff

filed this federal action on November 25, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1). However, Zebley does not apply in plaintiff's case to confer

However, his administrative case is currently pending before jurisdiction over his current action. Zebley was a class action

the Appeals Council. (Podraza Decl. ¶ 3(d)). brought by plaintiffs claiming Child's benefits and was a

facial challenge to the method by which the Social Security

Administration determined a child's eligibility for benefits

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under the SSI program (Title XVI). 493 U.S. at 523. The court

in Zebley invalidated the method used by Social Security

A. Legal Standards

and maintained jurisdiction over the action “to oversee the

The United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit except

implementation” the Stipulation and Order that had been

as it consents to be sued. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer,

issued regarding a new procedure for determining eligibility.

510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Sovereign immunity applies to

The Regulations have long since been amended to conform

agencies of the United States. Id. Sovereign immunity is

with the proper method for such review.

jurisdictional in nature, and a waiver of sovereign immunity

must be unequivocally expressed. McCarthy v. Azar, No. 19-

*3 Plaintiff in this case is an adult and is not challenging his

CV-6683, 2020 WL 1697995, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020)

eligibility for SSI. Rather, he is challenging a 2010 decision,

(citations omitted). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the

be entitled to benefits. The only question in this case is plaintiff's claim is collateral to the demand for benefits; (2)

whether plaintiff is entitled to benefits dating back to 1993 or whether exhaustion would be futile, and (3) whether requiring

whether he is entitled to benefits beginning six months prior exhaustion would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff. Id.

to his 2010 application date. This determination is completely (citing Pavano, supra).

unrelated to Zebley, and Zebley does not provide jurisdiction

for plaintiff's action. None of the above factors weigh in plaintiff's favor. His claim

is not “collateral” to his claim for benefits. He claims that he

An exception to the exhaustion requirement may exist is entitled to benefits beginning earlier than defendant claims

when the plaintiff presents certain constitutional claims. See the statute allows. Thus, his claim is central to his request

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977). In Stieberger for more benefits, resulting from the favorable decision on

v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1997), the court held his 2010 application. There is no indication that exhaustion

that, notwithstanding the court's availability to review some would be futile. He has obtained a favorable decision from the

constitutional claims in the first instance, when the claim Appeals Council in the past, and this court cannot determine

is closely related to plaintiff's claim for benefits, “SSA what the outcome in the Appeals Council would be. Finally,

should be enlisted to make an initial determination, subject to requiring plaintiff to wait until the Appeals Council issues a

traditional judicial review to determine if an adverse decision decision will not cause irreparable harm. Plaintiff has already

is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. In this case, plaintiff obtained a favorable decision in the agency. The issue is

mentions “due process,” but there is no basis for such a the amount of back benefits, not his eligibility. Thus, there

claim. Plaintiff does not, and cannot claim, that he does not is no irreparable harm in requiring plaintiff to exhaust his

understand the Social Security administrative procedures.5 administrative remedies, and waiver is not appropriate.

Plaintiff has progressed through his administrative remedies

and has obtained a partially favorable decision. He claims that *4 Plaintiff somehow argues that the ALJ's decision will

the ALJ's decision is incorrect. He has simply failed to wait force plaintiff to “repay” 39 years of benefits. It is unclear

for the last administrative step to be complete, after he filed to what plaintiff is referring. The decision at issue granted

his appeal. Plaintiff's passing reference to due process does plaintiff's eligibility for CIB, but did not determine that

not suffice to establish jurisdiction over his claim. retroactive benefits would begin as far back as plaintiff

requested or believes to be appropriate. (Def.’s Ex. 11 at

5 7-10). Plaintiff is not being required to pay back any money

Cases such as Steiberger often have arisen when the

due to the ALJ's decision.

plaintiff claims that a mental impairment prevented

him from understanding the administrative

The cases cited by plaintiff in his response to defendant's

procedures and the plaintiff has missed his or

motion do not support his position. Plaintiff cites, inter alia,

her opportunity to utilize those procedures. See

Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 161, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1976) (Dkt.

e.g. Bortungno v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-

No. 17 at 2). However, Tatum was a class action, limited

CV-2344, 2018 WL 3650131, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

to Social Security applicants in Kentucky and involved a

1, 2018) (citations omitted). Even then, a plaintiff

constitutional question of whether individuals would require

would have to make a “particularized allegation of

notice and an opportunity to be heard if their benefits were

mental impairment plausibly of sufficient severity

terminated when Social Security instituted the SSI program.

to impair comprehension.” Id. (citing Byam v.

In any event, the pages cited by plaintiff state that a claim for

Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2003))

retroactive benefits was barred by sovereign immunity. Id.

(quoting Stieberger, 134 F.3d at 40–41). Plaintiff

does not make such a claim.

Because the Commissioner has yet to issue a final decision

In rare circumstances exhaustion may be waived, but in this case, conferring jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

exhaustion is the rule, “waiver is the exception.” Pavano v. and there is no basis for waiving the exhaustion requirement,

Shalala, 95 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Abbey v. this court must dismiss plaintiff's case at this time for lack of

Sullivan, 978 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1992)). See Johnson v. Saul, jurisdiction. When the Appeals Council issues a final decision

No. 1:19-CV-3749, 2020 WL 1140778, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. in plaintiff's case, if appropriate, he may return to this court

9, 2020) (quoting Abbey, 978 F.2d at 44). The court considers to challenge the Commissioner's finding.

WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

ORDERED, that defendant's motion to dismiss for lack

All Citations

of jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 15) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's

Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2020 WL 2079411

End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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