The opinion
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-10897 August 26, 2026
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Lester Lorenzo Rummans,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as Trustee for
MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-2; Specialized
Loan Servicing, L.L.C.; Northsky, L.L.C.,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:22-CV-2046
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
HSBC Bank USA foreclosed on Lester Lorenzo Rummans’s home
and sold it to Northsky, LLC. Rummans sued, alleging HSBC and its loan
servicer, Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS”), violated the VA
Servicing Guidelines by failing to contact him before foreclosure. 1
_____________________
1
The mortgage explicitly incorporated the VA Servicing Guidelines as terms of
the contract.
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court properly
applied the “mailbox rule” to presume HSBC and SLS mailed Rummans
the required information, rendering the foreclosure sale proper. Finding no
error, we AFFIRM.
I.
A.
In 2003, Rummans and his late wife financed their home with a VA
loan. They qualified because Rummans was an Army Reserve soldier from
December 2003 to December 2020. The loan was eventually assigned to
HSBC and serviced by SLS.
Rummans submitted no payments for at least a decade. HSBC
ultimately foreclosed in 2022. But first, the VA Servicing Guidelines
required HSBC to notify Rummans of the default and explore options for
him to cure it. 2 38 C.F.R. § 36.4350(h) requires loan servicers to “solicit
sufficient information to properly evaluate the prospects for curing [a]
default and whether the granting of forbearance or other relief assistance
would be appropriate.” SLS, acting on HSBC’s behalf, claims it satisfied
this provision by mailing Rummans numerous “Payoff Statements” starting
in August 2021, followed by a “Notice of Default and Intent to Accelerate”
in May 2022. Rummans alleges he never received these notices.
B.
Rummans sued HSBC, SLS, and Northsky in Texas state court,
alleging the defendants violated various provisions of federal and Texas law
and the foreclosure sale should be set aside. HSBC and SLS removed the
case.
_____________________
2
See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4350.
2
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
The district court denied Northsky’s motion to dismiss but granted
partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, leaving Rummans’s claims
for VA Servicing Guidelines violations, quiet title, and trespass to try title.
These claims proceeded to a bench trial. HSBC and SLS offered
circumstantial evidence that they contacted Rummans, invoking the mailbox
rule’s presumption of receipt. SLS introduced several letters to Rummans
taken from its business records. These letters were not stamped or
postmarked, but corporate representative Kevin Payne testified that based on
the way they were filed in SLS’s records, these letters were mailed in the
ordinary course of SLS’s business.
Payne worked for the company that later acquired SLS (NewRez,
LLC). 3 He testified that he had “looked at a lot of SLS files” over his career
and reviewed “hundreds in addition to the 110 or so that [he] worked
personally.” Payne, pointing to the postal barcodes on the letters in
Rummans’s file, explained that SLS’s mailing contractor Covius would not
add these barcodes until it actually put a letter in the mail. And as the letters
in Rummans’s file all had barcodes on them, Payne testified he was “fully
confident they went out,” explaining that SLS would not receive barcoded
copies of the letters in the ordinary course of its business unless Covius had
mailed them.
_____________________
3
SLS previously serviced Rummans’s loan, but NewRez later acquired SLS and
adopted its records. Payne worked only for NewRez; he never worked for SLS. However,
“[t]here is no requirement that the witness who lays the foundation be the author of the
[business] record or be able to personally attest to its accuracy,” nor is there any
“requirement that the records be created by the business having custody of them” as long
as the adopted materials “were themselves business records” otherwise admissible. United
States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 986 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). That is because “the
‘primary emphasis of rule 803(6) is on the reliability or trustworthiness of the records
sought to be introduced,’” id. (quoting United States v. Veytia-Bravo, 603 F.2d 1187, 1189
(5th Cir. 1979)), rather than which entity the records’ author or custodian is affiliated with.
3
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
The only evidence to the contrary was Rummans’ word that he never
received the letters, and he otherwise focused on attacking HSBC and
SLS’s evidence.
The district court held “[t]he circumstances establish that SLS
mailed to Plaintiff via first-class mail addressed to Plaintiff at the proper
address each of the letters” at issue. Applying the mailbox rule, the court
presumed Rummans received these letters. 4 And as Rummans failed to rebut
this presumption, the court found HSBC and SLS met their obligations
under the VA Servicing Guidelines and upheld the foreclosure sale.
Rummans timely appealed his two VA Servicing Guidelines-related
claims: the breach of contract claim and the TDCA section 392.301(a)(8)
claim.
II.
A.
On appeal from a bench trial, we review findings of fact for clear error
and mixed questions and conclusions of law de novo. 5 “A factual finding is
clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the
_____________________
4
See, e.g., Faciane v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 931 F.3d 412, 420–21 (5th
Cir. 2019) (“To conclude that Faciane received the March 31, 2008 letter, the district court
applied the ‘mailbox rule,’ under which proof that a letter properly directed was placed in
a U.S. post office mail receptacle creates a presumption that it reached its destination in
the usual time and was actually received by the person to whom it was addressed. (cleaned
up)).
Water Craft Mgmt. LLC v. Mercury Marine, 457 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006);
5
Dickerson v. Lexington Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing mixed
questions).
4
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 6
B.
We turn now to the mailbox rule. This rebuttable presumption
provides that “[a] letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed may be
presumed to have been received by the addressee in the due course of the
mail.” 7 “Placing letters in the mail may be proved by circumstantial
evidence, including customary mailing practices used in the sender’s
business.” 8 Sworn testimony from a business representative proves
customary mailing practices,9 and there is no “requirement that the
[testimony] be corroborated by independent evidence of mailing.” 10 “[T]o
be a competent witness” for this purpose, “at a minimum the [witness] must
have personal knowledge of the procedures in place at the time of mailing.” 11
_____________________
6
One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.
2011) (cleaned up).
7
Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 695 F.2d 940, 944 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citing Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 159 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. 1942)). Texas law
governed the mortgage.
8
Id. (citing Cooper v. Hall, 489 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d
n.r.e.)).
Id.; see also Duron v. Albertson’s LLC, 560 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2009)
9
(overturning summary judgment for defendants after they “submitted no affidavits in
support of the mailing”).
10
See Bassknight v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 3:12-cv-1412-M, 2014 WL
6769085, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2014) (collecting cases, and observing that similar
evidence “is exactly the type of evidence repeatedly found by courts to be sufficient to
constitute prima facie evidence that service by certified mail was completed in accordance
with Texas law.”).
11
Burton v. Banta Global Turnkey Ltd., 170 F. App’x 918, 924 (5th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished); cf. United States v. Wilson, 322 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
business representative was not a competent witness when “there really were no consistent
5
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
“If such evidence is presented and not rebutted,” we presume the addressee
received the letter. 12 “The presumption of delivered mail cannot be rebutted
simply by denying receipt; the very purpose of a presumption would be
undercut if all that were necessary to defeat a presumed fact were a party’s
uncorroborated statement.” 13
The presumption of receipt is best analyzed as a mixed question of fact
and law. 14 “The task is partly factual because it involves marshaling and
weighing evidence,” but the district court also had to “determine whether
the evidence satisfies a legal standard.” 15 Here, in deciding to apply the
presumption of receipt, most of the work was weighing evidence of mailing.
“That a mixed question requires a court to immerse itself in facts . . . suggests
a more deferential standard of review” 16—even more so here, where the
presumption rested on facts found at trial.
C.
Rummans argues “there was no evidence to support . . . mailing” and
the district court therefore “erred finding that the presumption of receipt
_____________________
procedures or practices [for mailing] during the time in question” and the witness “[did]
not know what the procedures were . . . in what they sent out”).
12
Wells Fargo, 695 F.2d at 944.
13
Ortega v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 31 F. App’x 152, 2001 WL 1747723, at *1 (5th
Cir. Dec. 6, 2001) (unpublished).
14
See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 394 (2018)
(“whether the historical facts found satisfy the legal test chosen” is a “so-called ‘mixed
question’ of law and fact” (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, n.19
(1982))).
15
Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 381–82 (2025).
16
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024).
6
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
was satisfied.” But we conclude the able district judge did not err in finding
HSBC and SLS adequately proved the required mailing.
We agree with the district court that Payne’s testimony was sufficient.
The presumption of receipt requires personal knowledge of the general
“customary mailing practices used in the sender’s business” (i.e., SLS). 17
Payne had this knowledge. He knew, from hundreds of cases involving SLS,
that the company’s “customary mailing practice[]” was to archive barcoded
letters only once they were actually mailed. That was adequate foundation
for his testimony that the barcoded letters in Rummans’s file were sent.
Payne did not know exactly how Covius delivered mailpieces to the postal
service, but such specific knowledge is not required. 18
Having established mailing, HSBC and SLS enjoy the presumption
of receipt. 19 Rummans must rebut it. He did not do so, offering no evidence
of non-receipt besides his own self-serving testimony. It is settled law that
“[a] ‘bare assertion of non-receipt’ is insufficient to rebut the
presumption.” 20 A contrast to Trammell v. AccentCare, Inc. illustrates the
kinds of evidence—missing here—that might have rebutted receipt: 21
Whatever the precise amount of evidence required to rebut the
mailbox rule’s presumption of receipt . . . Trammell has
_____________________
17
Wells Fargo, 695 F.2d at 944.
18
Burton, 170 F. App’x at 924 (“[A]t a minimum the [witness] must have personal
knowledge of the procedures in place at the time of mailing.” (emphasis added)).
19
See Wells Fargo, 695 F.2d at 944.
20
Faciane, 931 F.3d at 421 (quoting Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 F.3d 415,
421 (5th Cir. 2007)).
21
776 F. App’x 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (emphasis added). To be
clear, we cite Trammell only as an example. Our holding rests on the principle from Faciane,
Custer, and other cases that when the presumption of receipt is properly established, merely
claiming non-delivery cannot rebut that presumption without more evidence.
7
Case: 25-10897 Document: 58-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/26/2026
No. 25-10897
satisfied it here. Trammell has denied receipt in a sworn
affidavit, stating further that she notified three AccentCare
personnel about her problems sending and receiving mail at her
home, including mail from AccentCare, and that she began
driving her time slips to work since they were being lost in the
mail. Moreover, while there is no dispute that AccentCare
mailed the proposed arbitration agreement to Trammell, the
company admits that it cannot produce the signed agreement,
which tends to corroborate that she did not sign the agreement.
By contrast here, the evidence suggests Rummans did receive notice. Beyond
Payne’s testimony plus the barcoded letters, Rummans also testified that
“[s]everal times [he] tried to reach out and get help,” but SLS
representatives gave him no information “on how [he] could remedy this
loan.” That Rummans affirmatively contacted SLS to “remedy this loan”
makes plain he knew there was some looming issue to “remedy.”
III.
The district court found the evidence was sufficient to raise a
presumption of receipt and that Rummans failed to rebut it. Applying “a
more deferential standard of review” 22 to this fact-bound mixed question, we
find no error. We AFFIRM.
_____________________
22
Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222.
8