Erhinyo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHN ERHINYO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:25-cv-1308-WWB-SJH

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc.

15) and Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24). Plaintiff filed Responses in Opposition (Doc. Nos.

18, 27). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Transfer Venue will be denied

and the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2022, Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) received a search warrant

pertaining to accounts associated with Plaintiff John Erhinyo’s e-mail address. (Doc. 8,

¶ 12; see also Doc. 8-2 at 5–10). Several months later, and after the warrant’s execution

window lapsed, Google deleted a folder Erhinyo had been storing on Google Drive. (Doc.

8, ¶¶ 1, 13, 23). Erhinyo claims that the deleted folder contained “trade secrets and core

intellectual property for a breakthrough prototype” he created. (Id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶¶ 5,

14, 28). He therefore alleges that Google (1) unlawfully accessed his stored

communications in violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701; (2)

misappropriated his trade secrets in violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”),

18 U.S.C. § 1836; and committed (3) conversion and (4) negligence under Florida law.

(See generally Doc. 8).

Use of Google Drive is governed by Google’s Terms of Service (“Terms”), which

state that users agree to accept the Terms by using or accessing Google’s services.

(Doc. 15-1 at 2–3, 6, 27).1 Between January 5, 2022, and May 21, 2024, the Terms

provided that

California law will govern all disputes arising out of or relating to these

terms, service-specific additional terms, or any related services, regardless

of conflict of laws rules. These disputes will be resolved exclusively in the

federal or state courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA, and you and

Google consent to personal jurisdiction in those courts.

(Id. at 38; see also id. at 3). Consistent with the above, Google moves to transfer venue

to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Additionally, Google moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack

of standing and for failure to state a claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Transfer Venue

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been

brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). The Supreme Court has held that the application of § 1404(a) principles is the

appropriate means by which to analyze a valid forum-selection clause requiring transfer

1 In discussing Google’s Motion to Transfer Venue, the Court considers the

Declaration of Athas Nikolakakos (Doc. 15-1), Group Product Manager for Google, as

well as the Terms attached thereto. See Bachstein v. Discord, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 3d 1154,

1156 n.1 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (“On a motion to transfer venue, the Court is permitted to

consider materials outside the pleadings.” (quotation omitted)).

to another federal district court. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist.

of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013). Furthermore, “a proper application of § 1404(a) requires

that a forum-selection clause be ‘given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional

cases.’” Id. at 59–60 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988)

(Kennedy, J., concurring)). Therefore, “[w]hen the parties have agreed to a valid forum-

selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified

in that clause. Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of

the parties should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.” Id. at 62 (footnote omitted).

At the outset, a district court must determine whether the forum-selection clause

sought to be enforced is valid. See Loeffelholz v. Ascension Health, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d

1187, 1190–91 (M.D. Fla. 2014). “Forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid and

enforceable unless the plaintiff makes a ‘strong showing’ that enforcement would be

unfair or unreasonable under the circumstances.” Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd.,

579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009). “Consideration of whether to enforce a forum

selection clause in a diversity jurisdiction case is governed by federal law . . . not state

law.” P & S Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003).

“A forum-selection clause will be invalidated when: (1) its formation was induced by fraud

or overreaching; (2) the plaintiff would be deprived of its day in court because of

inconvenience or unfairness; (3) the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy;

or (4) enforcement of the clause would contravene public policy.” Krenkel, 579 F.3d at

1281. “The burden is on the party resisting the enforcement of a forum selection clause

to establish fraud or inequitable conduct sufficient to bar enforcement of the clause.”

Cornett v. Carrithers, 465 F. App’x 841, 843 (11th Cir. 2012).

If a valid forum-selection clause exists, the court must apply a modified § 1404(a)

analysis to determine if there is a reason not to transfer the case to the chosen forum.

Traditionally, courts in the Eleventh Circuit consider the following factors under § 1404(a):

(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents

and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of

the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to

compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the

parties; (7) a forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight

accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the

interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.

Kelling v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

(quoting Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005)).

However, where a valid forum-selection clause exists, the traditional analysis is altered in

three ways. “First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the party

defying the forum-selection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that

transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted.” Atl. Marine, 571

U.S. at 63.

“Second, a court evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to transfer . . . should

not consider arguments about the parties’ private interests.” Id. at 64. “Instead, a court

considers only arguments about public-interest factors which rarely will be sufficient to

defeat a motion to transfer to the agreed upon forum.” Cableview Commc'ns of

Jacksonville, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable Se. LLC, No. 3:13-cv-306-J, 2014 WL 1268584,

at *21 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2014). Finally, “a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry with

it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect

public-interest considerations.” Id. at 64–65.

B. Failure to State a Claim

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In

determining whether to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts the factual

allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party. See United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.

2009). Nonetheless, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, “[t]o survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Transfer Venue

Erhinyo argues that he is not bound by Google’s forum-selection clause because

Google fails to show that he assented to its Terms. The Court agrees. Again, “when the

parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily

transfer the case.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62. However, that “presupposes a

contractually valid forum-selection clause,” which presupposes that the parties have

mutually assented to the underlying contract. Id. at 62 n.5. Here, Google argues that,

pursuant to its Terms effective January 5, 2022, Erhinyo agreed to the Terms by creating

a Google account and by using Google Drive. But Google provides no evidence of when

Erhinyo created his account or began using Google Drive. See McCarthy v. Meta

Platforms, Inc., No. 24-14322-CIV, 2025 WL 3755430, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2025) (“By

completing the sign-up process, users are required to affirmatively agree to the Terms—

which Plaintiff did when he registered for Facebook in 2022.” (internal citations omitted));

Mishiyev v. Youtube, LLC, No. 8:24-cv-2675, 2024 WL 4932773, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2,

2024) (“Ms. Small states that YouTube’s records show Plaintiff agreed to the Terms of

Service when he signed up for YouTube’s services in 2006.”). Accordingly, no evidence

indicates which version of Google’s Terms were then in effect, whether that version

included the forum-selection clause Google seeks to enforce, or whether—and if so,

which—updates to those Terms were reasonably communicated to Erhinyo. See

Krenkel, 579 F.3d at 1281 (“In determining whether there was fraud or overreaching in a

non-negotiated forum-selection clause, we look to whether the clause was reasonably

communicated to the consumer.”). Nor does Erhinyo allege that he consented to

Google’s forum selection clause by agreeing to its Terms or performing his obligations

arising thereunder. Cf. Williams v. X Corp., No. CV 1:25-00058, 2025 WL 2801626, at *3

(S.D. Ala. Oct. 1, 2025); Muniz v. Fenix Int’l Ltd., No. 1:20-cv-03200, 2021 WL 3417581,

at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 2021). Indeed, as currently pleaded, none of Erhinyo’s claims

are premised upon the existence of contractual obligations between the parties.

Plaintiff may “bear[] the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for which

the parties bargained is unwarranted.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added).

Here, however, Google fails in the first instance to establish that the parties bargained for

its preferred forum. As movant, Google therefore “bears the burden of establishing that

the suggested alternate forum is more convenient” under the traditional § 1404(a) factors.

Kelling, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. Because Google relies exclusively on Atlantic Marine’s

modified § 1404(a) analysis, it fails to adequately address the parties’ private interests

and the weight accorded to Erhinyo’s choice of forum. Google’s Motion to Transfer Venue

will therefore be denied without prejudice. Should Erhinyo elect to file an amended

pleading that corrects the deficiencies discussed below, Google may file a renewed

motion to transfer venue.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Before arguing that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to

state a claim, Google briefly argues that Erhinyo lacks Article III standing because he is

not the “owner” of his alleged trade secrets as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).

Google’s standing argument is based on allegations Erhinyo made in his now-stricken

initial Complaint, (see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 4, 21), and is meritless for at least two reasons. First,

“since the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter

jurisdiction,” whether a litigant sufficiently alleges ownership of trade secrets under the

Defend Trade Secrets Act “is not [a question] of standing at all.” Highland Consulting

Grp., Inc. v. Minjares, 74 F.4th 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2023) (ellipsis in original) (quotations

omitted).2 Second, “[a]n amended pleading supersedes the former pleading; ‘the original

pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader’s

averments against his adversary.’” Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d

1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Proctor & Gamble Def. Corp. v. Bean, 146 F.2d 598,

601 n.7 (5th Cir. 1945)).3 Google argues for an exception recognized by Rubinstein v.

Keshet Inter Vivos Trust, No. 17-61019-Civ, 2018 WL 8899230, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17,

2018), stating that “Plaintiff cannot directly contradict facts alleged in his original

Complaint to avoid a dispositive defense.” (Doc. 24 at 7). But Rubinstein cites to two

opinions from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York as

authority and is thus unpersuasive in light of Dresdner Bank. See 463 F.3d at 1215 (“Even

if [the] original complaint could be construed to affirm the proposed contract, that pleading

was wholly superceded by the amended complaint which proceeded under a different

theory.”); see also Seiger ex rel. Seiger v. Philipp, 735 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2018)

(“[T]he Federal Rules do not prohibit contradictory pleadings.”). Google’s Motion will thus

be denied to the extent it seeks dismissal for lack of standing.

1. Unlawful Access Under the Stored Communications Act

18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) makes it unlawful to either “intentionally access[] without

authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided” or

“intentionally exceed[] an authorization to access that facility.” Erhinyo alleges that

2 Additionally, even if § 1836 somehow abrogated Article III with respect to

Erhinyo’s misappropriation claim, Google fails to explain why Erhinyo’s ownership status

would affect his standing to assert the Amended Complaint’s remaining claims.

3 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued on or before September 30, 1981, are binding

upon the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.

1981) (en banc).

“Google is a provider of electronic communication,” that it “maintained [his] Drive as a

facility providing those services,” and that it “intentionally exceeded [its]

authorization . . . by permanently deleting” his stored folder “without valid court

authorization.” (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 22–23).

Google argues that it is exempt from liability under § 2701(c)(1), which provides

that subsection (a) does not apply to conduct authorized “by the person or entity providing

a wire or electronic communications service.” Relying on Vista Marketing, LLC v. Burkett,

812 F.3d 954, 964 (11th Cir. 2016), Erhinyo counters that subsection (c)(1) provides an

affirmative defense that is not apparent on the face of the Amended Complaint and thus

cannot be resolved in Google’s favor at the pleading stage. Vista Marketing, however,

does not even cite to subsection (c)(1) and provides no apparent authority for Erhinyo’s

position. While statutory exemptions are generally classified as affirmative defenses, and

affirmative defenses generally will not support dismissal at the pleading stage, “[c]ourts

have consistently held that” § 2701(c)(1) delineates “an element of the offense.” In re

Consumer Vehicle Driving Data Tracking Collection, No. 1:24-md-3115, 2026 WL

1092882, at *22 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2026) (quoting CreditMax Holdings, LLC v. Kass, No.

11-81056-CIV, 2013 WL 12080227, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2013)). In other words, while

stating a claim under § 2701(a) requires allegations of unauthorized access, authorization

can be granted by the provider of the electronic communications service being accessed.

Because plaintiffs face obvious difficulty in plausibly alleging that a provider failed to

authorize its own access, courts routinely rely on § 2701(c)(1) to dismiss § 2701(a) claims

brought against communications service providers. See Mohamad v. Cent. Fla. Tax &

Acct., Inc., No. 6:24-cv-2354, 2025 WL 2695116, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2025);

Sargeant v. Maroil Trading Inc., No. 17-81070-CIV, 2018 WL 3031841, at *13–14 (S.D.

Fla. May 30, 2018). Erhinyo faces the same difficulty here. While he alleges that Google

exceeded its authorization by accessing his Google Drive folder, his allegation is

conclusory and implausible given that Google “plainly authorized actions that it took itself.”

In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol’y Litig., No. C-12-01382, 2013 WL 6248499, at *12 (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 3, 2013). Count I will be dismissed accordingly.

2. Misappropriation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act

“To plausibly allege a claim under the [DTSA], the plaintiff must adequately plead

three elements: (1) the plaintiff owns a valid trade secret; (2) the trade secret relates to a

product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate commerce; and (3) the

defendant misappropriated that trade secret.” It Works Mktg., Inc. v. Melaleuca, Inc., No.

8:20-cv-1743-T, 2021 WL 1650266, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2021).

Google argues that Erhinyo fails to allege the existence of a valid trade secret as

well as misappropriation. The DTSA defines trade secrets as “all forms and types of

financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including

patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,

techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes” that derive “independent

economic value” from not being generally known or readily ascertainable, and which “the

owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep . . . secret.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).

“With respect to the nature of the purported trade secrets, a plaintiff need only allege

sufficient facts to plausibly indicate that a trade secret was involved and to give the

defendant notice of the material that the plaintiff claims constitutes a trade secret.”

WWMAP, LLC v. Birth Your Way Midwifery, 711 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1319 (N.D. Fla. 2024).

Here, Erhinyo alleges that “[t]he designs, plans, and technical information

contained in [his] Google Drive folder . . . constituted trade secrets as defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 1839(3).” (Doc. 8, ¶ 28). This conclusory allegation falls short of the forgiving pleading

standard. “[T]he complaint need not spell out the details of the trade secret,” but it “must

describe the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient particularity to [distinguish

it] from matters of general knowledge in the trade.” ProV Int’l Inc. v. Lucca, No. 8:19-cv-

978-T, 2019 WL 5578880, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2019) (quotations omitted). By

vaguely alleging that designs, plans, and technical information related to an otherwise

undescribed “prototype” constitute trade secrets, (Doc. 8, ¶ 14), Erhinyo fails to

distinguish his alleged trade secrets from matters of general knowledge and “neither

notifies [Google] about the [information] allegedly misappropriated nor demonstrates that

the [information] constitute[s] a trade secret.” ProV Int’l, 2019 WL 5578880, at *3. Nor

do Erhinyo’s allegations plausibly suggest that whatever alleged trade secret he stored

on Google Drive derived independent economic value from its secrecy. While the

Amended Complaint describes Erhinyo’s Google Drive folder as containing “core

intellectual property for a breakthrough prototype, the most valuable asset of [his]

privately developed work,” (Doc. 8, ¶ 2), this conclusory allegation would remain

insufficient even if it had been incorporated into Count II.

Erhinyo also fails to plausibly allege misappropriation. “[M]isappropriation occurs

when: (1) a person acquires the trade secret while knowing or having reason to know that

he or she is doing so by improper means; (2) a person who has acquired or derived

knowledge of the trade secret discloses it without the owner’s consent; or (3) when a

person who has acquired or derived knowledge of the trade secret uses it without the

owner’s consent.” TB Food USA, LLC v. Am. Mariculture, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-9-FtM, 2021

WL 4690691, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2021) (quotation omitted). Thus, the DTSA

contemplates liability for misappropriation through either acquisition, disclosure, or use.

Id.; see also Fla. Beauty Flora Inc. v. Pro Intermodal L.L.C., No. 20-20966-CIV, 2021 WL

1945821, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2021).

Seemingly, Erhinyo alleges misappropriation by acquisition. (See Doc. 8, ¶ 30

(alleging that “Google acquired . . . [Erhinyo’s] trade secrets by accessing them without

authorization and interfering with [his] ability to use them, destroying their commercial

value”)). To be liable under this theory, Google must have known or had a reason to

know that it “acquired [the trade secret] by improper means.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A).

Improper means include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a

breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage” but not “reverse engineering,

independent derivation, or any other lawful means of acquisition.” Id. § 1839(6)(A)–(B).

Erhinyo fails to allege any improper means by which Google acquired his files, and his

conclusory assertion that Google accessed the files without his authorization fails to state

a plausible claim of misappropriation by acquisition. See Flexpand, LLC v. CREAM, Inc.,

No. C 19-0878, 2020 WL 13504975, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020). Erhinyo’s sole

rebuttal—that “the relevant logs and internal records are in Google’s exclusive

possession”—is irrelevant. (Doc. 27 at 6). Contrary to Erhinyo’s apparent suggestion,

Google’s alleged possession of the relevant records does not alter the pleading standard.

Count II will be dismissed accordingly.

3. Conversion and Negligence

Google argues that Erhinyo’s common law claims are preempted regardless of

whether California or Florida law is applied.4 The Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act

(“FUTSA”) “displace[s] conflicting tort, restitutory, and other [Florida laws] providing civil

remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” Fla. Stat. § 688.008(1). “Thus, as a

general proposition[,] other torts involving the same underlying factual allegations as a

claim for trade secret misappropriation will be preempted by FUTSA.” New Lenox Indus.,

Inc. v. Fenton, 510 F. Supp. 2d 893, 908 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Developmental

Techs., LLC v. Valmont Indus., Inc., No. 8:14-cv-2796, 2016 WL 7320908, at *4 (M.D.

Fla. July 18, 2016) (collecting cases); Mortg. Now, Inc. v. Stone, No. 3:09cv80, 2009 WL

4262877, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009) (finding civil theft claim preempted by FUTSA

despite plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead a trade secret).

Likewise, the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) “preempts common

law claims that are ‘based on the same nucleus of facts as the misappropriation of trade

secrets claim for relief.’” K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc.,

90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 247, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Digit. Envoy, Inc. v. Google,

Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2005)). “To survive preemption, [plaintiffs]

must allege wrongdoing that is materially distinct from the wrongdoing alleged in a

CUTSA claim.” Prostar Wireless Grp., LLC v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 994,

1006 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs cannot avoid the preclusive effect of

4 The Court declines to address Google’s other arguments for dismissal of

Erhinyo’s state claims because they depend upon Erhinyo assenting to Google’s Terms

of Service.

CUTSA by failing to allege a claim thereunder. See SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp.,

No. 12-CV-00694, 2012 WL 6160472, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012).

Erhinyo’s common law claims cannot survive under either standard, as the same

factual allegations form the foundation of all four of his pleaded claims. (See Doc. 8,

¶¶ 5–7, 12–17, 21, 23, 27, 30, 33, 35, 37, 39). Additionally, Erhinyo’s common law claims

are not clearly pleaded upon the alternative theory that his Google Drive folder did not, in

fact, contain trade secrets. See Weaver v. Mateer & Harbert, P.A., No. 5:09-cv-514-Oc,

2012 WL 3065362, at *11 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2012) (“Plaintiff may be entitled to plead in

the alternative, [but] that is not what Plaintiff has done in this case.”).

The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed.

However, Google’s request for dismissal with prejudice is premature at this juncture. See

Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). The Court

also notes that all future filings must comply with the Local Rules and the Court’s January

13, 2021 and April 2, 2026 Standing Orders.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Google’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 15) is DENIED without

prejudice.

2. Google’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED to the extent provided

herein.

3. The Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) is DISMISSED without prejudice.

4. Erhinyo may file an amended pleading on or before September 4, 2026.

Failure to timely file an amended pleading will likely result in this action

being dismissed with prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on August 24, 2026.

WENDY W.B

UNITED STATES T JUDG

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party