The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNNIE MCCOLLUM,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-01710
v. (SAPORITO, J.)
GREGORY BRIGGS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Johnnie McCollum claims that defendant Gregory Briggs,
the warden of the Dauphin County Prison (“DCP”), violated McCollum’s
First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights by denying him access
to certain religious literature for approximately nine months. Briggs
moves for summary judgment (Doc. 88); McCollum, who has since
returned to the DCP, requests preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. 121).
For the following reasons, Briggs’s motion will be granted in part,
and the case will only proceed on McCollum’s First Amendment claim.
McCollum’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
As relevant here, the operative complaint (Doc. 46) alleges as
follows: Between August 2020 and October 2022, McCollum was
incarcerated at the DCP. To combat the smuggling of contraband, the
DCP did not allow prisoners to order their own books. The prison
digitized books pertaining to many religions, so prisoners could have
continual access to those books. However, McCollum’s religion is
Santeria, and the prison did not digitize any Santeria books. There was
at least one Santeria book available in the “general library,” but the
waiting list was nine months long. McCollum directed grievances about
the issue to Briggs, and specifically asked Briggs if he could order a book
“in [Briggs’s] name and have him photocopy it[,] but he refused.”
Following a motion to dismiss, McCollum was permitted to proceed
on a First Amendment free exercise claim and a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim against Briggs for damages only.1 (Doc. 56).
After the close of discovery, Briggs moved for summary judgment. (Doc.
88). McCollum filed a timely response (Docs. 98, 99) and, after several
extensions of time, a counterstatement of material facts (Doc. 126).
While this case has been pending, McCollum has returned to the
1 McCollum’s claims for permanent injunctive relief were dismissed
because he was no longer at the DCP when he filed the operative
complaint. Several other claims and defendants were also dismissed,
including a Fourteenth Amendment claim relating to overcrowding at the
prison. (Docs. 55, 56).
DCP and filed a series of motions for preliminary injunctive relief. Two
such motions (Docs. 112, 117) were denied because they were
unsupported by evidence and the relief requested was not relevant to the
case. One final motion, in which McCollum requests access to a tablet
with Santeria literature, remains pending. (Doc. 121).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
III. MATERIAL FACTS
McCollum’s statement of material facts does not comply with the
local rules of this district, because it does not directly address the facts
in Briggs’s own statement. (Doc. 126); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
Nonetheless, we have considered all the evidence and argument that the
parties have submitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Where McCollum has
not presented competent evidence to dispute Briggs’s statements of fact,
those facts are deemed undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
The summary judgment record indicates as follows: McCollum
attests that he has practiced Santeria since late 2016 or early 2017. (Doc.
126-5 at 3). Prior to June 2021, McCollum was intermittently
incarcerated at the DCP and within the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections. At that time, he identified himself within these prisons as
Muslim. McCollum now testifies that he did so because he feared
harassment from other prisoners and “because socially I would be able
to, you know, catch people from different blocks and stuff. But as far as
really adhering to the principles of Islam, no.” (Doc. 89-3 (McCollum
Dep.), 28:21-36:21, 41:21-43:17).
A. Santeria
On June 14, 2021, at the DCP, McCollum requested to change his
listed religion from Islam to Santeria. Santeria, as practiced by
McCollum, is a religion that incorporates African and Roman Catholic
traditions. A Santeria adherent is “required to learn the fundamental
principles/teachings . . . [T]here is no specific go to like Islam [has] the
Quran, so regular books such as the ones requested by [McCollum] . . .
[are] as fundamental as a Christian seeking out the Bible.” (Doc. 126-5
at 1-2).
McCollum was given a “Religion Request Form,” which he signed
on July 9. Therein, he stated that he practiced Santeria in his cell by
“mak[ing] food offerings to my saint/‘shango’’’ and “set[ting] up an altar
for my ancestors.” The requested change was reviewed and approved by
a prison chaplain. (Doc. 89-3 at 21-23 (Dep. Exs. 3-5)).
B. Access to Santeria Literature
Beginning in July 2021, McCollum submitted several inmate
request forms and grievances requesting access to Santeria literature.
Neither party has clearly explained the DCP’s policies regarding access
to religious literature. According to McCollum, the DCP did not allow
inmates to have physical books delivered to the prison. The DCP
“digitized all books” and created “a religious library and a regular one.”
Santeria books were not available in the religious library. In the “regular”
library, which was “owned by the Dauphin County Library,” an inmate
could check out a book for a 14-day period and renew it no more than
three times. Although there was some Santeria literature in the regular
library, there was a waiting list of six to nine months for these book(s).
(Doc. 126-5 at 4-5).
On April 18, 2022, approximately nine months after McCollum’s
initial requests, Briggs “approved [McCollum] to have physical paper
copies of approved Santeria religious material.” ( . at 30, Dep. Ex. 11).
The reasons for the delay between July 2021 and April 2022 are not
entirely clear from the record. In response to McCollum’s requests and
grievances about this issue, various prison officials responded as follows:
• On August 3, in response to one such request, the prison chaplain
wrote: “I plan to check on this about . . . suggested books, then
contact the Dauphin Co. Library to see if any are available as
[ebooks]. It is your responsibility to name particular books
specifically. We do not have the time to search generally.”
• In an undated response to a July 24 request, the chaplain wrote: “I
located a book called Santeria The Religion by Migene Gonzalez and
submitted a request . . . for it to be placed on the tablet.”
• On September 19, apparently in response to a request dated July
12, the chaplain wrote: “We recently sent a request to the County
Library system with book suggestion(s) for Santeria. They are in
process of considering adding . . . books based on funding available
+ if it is in eBook form.”
• On October 19, a further grievance “about [McCollum] not being
[allowed] to have materials on the tablet to practice his religion”
was forwarded to Briggs.2
• On November 3, after McCollum complained in relevant part that
he had been “waiting to read a specific book since August 19 and
it[’]s November,” another prison employee responded: “Meeting
with Dauphin County library and requesting more titles . . .”
(Doc. 89-3 at 24-29; Doc. 126-2; Doc. 126-3). The record does not
explain what became of the inquiries to the Dauphin County library
system, but we infer that no Santeria books were added to the prison
libraries. After Briggs received his paper copies, a prison chaplain wrote
the following memorandum:
I spoke with [McCollum] regarding his request to have
literature on Santeria placed on the tablet. I explained
that the religion of Santeria has no prescribed religious
books. That Santeria combines elements of Catholicism
with enslaved Africans[’] beliefs, and he can identify
with Catholic traditions and their ceremonies. That
there is plenty of information regarding Catholicism on
the tablet.
I have also spoken with the staff at Viapath regarding
the necessity of being able to add various religions that
are not considered mainstream to the electronic tablet.
That Dauphin County Prison has a small population of
residents that have no religious information available to
access on the electronic tablet. The staff at Viapath
stated that they were not sure if they could add entire
2 Although the corresponding grievance is in the record (Doc. 126-
3), we are unable to locate the response to that grievance (if any).
religious history books or lengthy PDF to the tablet, they
would investigate it and provide feedback when they
had an answer. To date that issue has not been resolved.
(Doc. 126-9).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Personal Involvement
As an initial matter, Briggs claims that he cannot be held liable for
any constitutional violation because he was not personally involved in
depriving McCollum of Santeria literature. Liability for a constitutional
violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a defendant’s personal
involvement, which can be shown by “personal direction [or] actual
knowledge and acquiescence.” , 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988). “[A] supervisor may be personally liable . . . if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his
subordinates’ violations.”
, 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
Briggs argues that his involvement in this issue was “limited to
administrative approval and forwarding requests or grievances,” but the
record supports an inference that he was substantively involved.
McCollum directed one of his requests specifically to Briggs; another
request was forwarded directly to Briggs for his consideration; and it was
Briggs, specifically, who “approved [McCollum] to have physical paper
copies” in April 2022. (Doc. 89-3 at 27, 30; Doc. 126-2). A reasonable
jury could infer Briggs’s participation or acquiescence in the ongoing
decision not to allow McCollum Santeria literature until April 2022.
Accordingly, Briggs is not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
McCollum brings a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
against Briggs. For an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that
he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated persons
because of membership in a particular protected class.
, 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). Persons are similarly
situated “when they are alike in all relevant aspects.”
, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Here, Briggs is entitled to summary judgment because McCollum
has not identified any similarly situated inmates. McCollum believes he
is similarly situated to any inmate at the DCP “who has religious beliefs”
(Doc. 126-5 at 5), but that broad similarity is insufficient. McCollum
offers no evidence that there was any demand for Santeria literature
when the prison digitized its library, so the fact that other religions’ books
were digitized at that time does not prove differential treatment of
Santeria or its adherents. , 295 F. App’x 479, 484 (3d
Cir. 2008) (an equal protection claim based on religion requires “similarly
situated faiths”); , 227 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 2000) (the
Constitution does not require that “every religious sect or group within a
prison . . . must have identical facilities”) (quoting , 405 U.S.
319, 322 n.2 (1972)).
On these facts, a similarly situated person would be one who, like
McCollum, made a later, request to digitize a book from a religion
that was not already represented. McCollum has not identified any such
individuals, and to the extent they existed at the DCP, there is no
evidence that they were treated differently from McCollum.3 Accordingly,
Briggs is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
3 In his affidavit, McCollum alludes to another inmate who “[went]
through the same process and received his book” (Doc. 126-5 at 4), but
this vague description does not show that the other inmate was similarly
situated. The chaplain’s May 2022 memorandum referred to a “small
population of residents that have no religious information available to
access on the electronic tablet” (Doc. 126-9); there is no evidence that
anyone in that group received anything that McCollum did not.
C. First Amendment
Next, McCollum proceeds on a First Amendment free exercise claim
against Briggs. “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First
Amendment . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free
exercise of religion.” , 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)
(citations omitted). For First Amendment protection to attach, a
plaintiff’s religious view must be “sincerely held,” and the regulation
must impose a “substantial burden” on the plaintiff’s religious exercise.
, 693 Fed. Appx. 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2017);
, 323 F.3d 236, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2003).
First, Briggs argues that McCollum’s inconsistent access to
Santeria literature did not constitute a substantial burden on his
religious practice. Briggs relies on , 497 F.3d 272 (3d
Cir. 2007), for the premise that “[d]elays or administrative policies do not
rise to a constitutional violation without coercion.” (Doc. 94 at 7-9). But
that is a misreading of , and the case squarely supports
McCollum’s argument on this point. concerned a religion for
which “[o]ne of the rituals requires a practitioner to read four different
Afro-centric books per day.” A prisoner was permitted to keep ten books
in his cell at one time; he could donate additional books to the library, but
he could only check out four books at a time, once per week. 497 F.3d at
275. In the context of a RLUIPA claim, the Third Circuit determined that
based on the religion’s requirements, the ten-book limit constituted a
substantial burden. . at 281-83. does not support the idea
that a substantial burden requires a showing of “coercion,” and the rules
imposed on McCollum were significantly more restrictive than the rules
at issue in .
Briggs further argues that there was no substantial burden because
McCollum “was able to practice Santeria privately in his cell,” but that is
not dispositive. Even if an inmate has some access to some form of
religious exercise, “limiting [his] access to the religious literature that he
is required to read as part of his practice constitutes a substantial
burden.”4 To the extent Briggs contends that Santeria literature could be
adequately replaced by “other religious texts relevant to Santeria ( ,
4 , 306 F. App’x 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2009); , ,
No. 1:20-CV-00235-SPB-RAL, 2021 WL 3610034 (W.D. Pa.
July 19, 2021) (denial of access to religious literature during a stay of
unspecified length in the Restricted Housing Unit); ,
No. 1:09-CV-0267, 2010 WL 817398, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (denial
of access to the Bible during a three-week lockdown).
Roman Catholic)” (Doc. 94 at 4), the record shows a genuine dispute of
fact on that point. , 497 F.3d at 281-82 (inmate’s access
to “some books that would impart knowledge about his religion” was not
“a palatable alternative”).
Some of Briggs’s arguments are better understood as a claim that
the prison’s regulations were justified as a matter of law, but he is not
entitled to summary judgment on that basis. A prison regulation can
impinge on the right of free exercise only to the extent “reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” , 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987). Courts consider four factors determining whether the
regulation is reasonable: (1) whether the regulation bears a valid,
rational connection to a legitimate and neutral government objective; (2)
whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) the absence of ready
alternatives to the regulation. , 648 F. App’x 168, 173
(3d Cir. 2016) (citing , 482 U.S. at 89-90).
On this record, only one of these factors — the existence of
“alternative means of exercising the right” — clearly favors Briggs. For
this factor, the question is not whether McCollum had access to literature
specifically, but whether he had “alternative means of exercising [his]
beliefs generally ( , by prayer, worship, meditation, . . . etc.).”
, 227 F.3d at 54 (citing , 490 U.S. 401, 417-
18 (1989)). The record is clear that he did. , , (Doc. 89-3 at 23).
On the issue of whether the challenged policies promoted legitimate
objectives, the record is open to interpretation. Beyond the prison staff’s
, contradictory responses to McCollum’s complaints, Briggs has not
explained what the DCP’s policies actually were.5 Briggs, the party
seeking summary judgment, has the burden to explain the prison’s rules
and the penological interests they support; McCollum is not required to
read between the lines of grievance responses and “negat[e] every
conceivable legitimate penological interest which might support the
denial of his accommodation.” , 669 F.3d 144, 156-
58 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). Even accepting
5 For example, if we accept that a DCP ban on physical media
contributed to the delay, Briggs does not explain why McCollum was
ultimately given “physical paper copies” of a Santeria book, or why he
could not receive that accommodation more promptly.
Briggs’s argument that some delay was caused by “administrative
processing, library acquisition, or policy,” the record offers no explanation
for the roughly six-month delay from November 2021 through April
2022.6 Further, a jury could infer that McCollum was not permitted
Santeria-specific literature in part because the prison staff believed it
was sufficient for McCollum to “identify with Catholic traditions and
their ceremonies.” (Doc. 126-9).
The remaining factors — the impact on prison operations and the
alternative options that were available to the DCP — favor McCollum. It
appears that this issue was resolved, at least in part, when Briggs
authorized McCollum to receive photocopies of approved Santeria
literature. From the limited record, this seems to have been a cost-
effective alternative that would not have unduly disturbed the operation
of the prison. , 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If
an inmate can point to an alternative that would fully accommodate his
6 On November 3, a prison employee responded to McCollum by
describing a planned “meeting with the Dauphin County library” to
request more books, but McCollum’s request had already been made to
the library several months before. Whether or why the library requests
were denied is unclear, and the record shows no evidence of any further
attempt to obtain Santeria literature until Briggs approved the paper
copies on April 18.
or her rights at a ‘de minimis’ cost, we can consider that as evidence that
the challenged regulation is unreasonable.”). Accordingly, Briggs is not
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
D. Qualified Immunity
Next, Briggs argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity applies to federal and state actors unless (1) the
“facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a
constitutional violation,” and (2) the alleged right was clearly established
at the time of the violation. , 88 F.4th 275,
281 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). At the summary judgment stage,
“the burden is on the defendants to establish they are entitled to qualified
immunity.” , 928 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2019).
Briggs argues, in part, that “[n]o precedent clearly establishes that
delays in providing religious texts under neutral policies violate
constitutional rights.”7 (Doc. 94 at 10). As explained above, the record
7 Briggs’s reliance on , 86 F.4th 987 (2d Cir. 2023),
is unpersuasive. (Doc. 94 at 10-11). In that case, a plaintiff was
denied access to religious services for more than five months due to
administrative error, creating a substantial burden on the prisoner’s
religious practice. 86 F.4th at 991-94. Qualified immunity was
granted to one of the four defendants who sought it. In part, held
does not sufficiently explain what the policies were, nor establish that
they were neutrally applied. There is evidence that prison staff did not
permit the literature because they took the position that the practice of
Santeria did not require it. While qualified immunity could apply based
on a reasonable official’s discretion in that regard, the record does not
clearly show that any such judgment was reasonable.8 The existence of a
material dispute on that issue forecloses any entitlement to qualified
immunity on McCollum’s First Amendment claim.
, 141 F.4th 76, 88 (3d Cir. 2025).
E. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Finally, McCollum has also sought preliminary injunctive relief.
His claim for permanent injunctive relief was dismissed as moot, because
that a defendant’s negligence is insufficient for First Amendment
liability, but a defendant who “would have known that [access to religious
services] depended on their input” and failed to act may be liable. .
at 995-98. Briggs has not presented evidence that resolves whether his
actions reflected deliberate indifference; as the party moving for
summary judgment, he is not entitled to that inference.
8 Aside from the chaplain’s conclusory statement in the May 2022
memorandum, we find no evidence countering McCollum’s attestation
that access to Santeria-specific literature is essential to practicing
Santeria. , , , 497 F.3d at 275 (religion required access
to unspecified “Afro-centric books”).
he left the DCP and made no showing or argument that he was going to
return. (Doc. 55 at 16, Doc. 56). However, he has since returned to
the DCP, and he now requests an order directing that he immediately
receives “a tablet with access to Santeria literature.”
A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must show by clear
evidence that there is a “reasonable probability” of success on the merits,
and that denial would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff.
, 39
F.4th 95, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2022). McCollum’s motion will be denied because
has not established either point by clear evidence.
First, McCollum has not explained why he needs a tablet to access
Santeria literature given the undisputed fact that Briggs permitted him
to have physical copies. To the extent McCollum was no longer authorized
to have physical copies after he returned to the DCP, he has not presented
clear evidence of that. Moreover, McCollum testified that when he
returned to the DCP in 2024, he was once again identifying as Muslim.
(Doc. 89-3, 63:7-15). Although he still claims to be practicing the
Santeria religion, prisons are not required to indulge a prisoner’s
attempts to constantly change religions or claim multiple religions,
whether for “social” reasons or other purposes.9 This fact would belie any
finding of a reasonable probability of success on any claim of ongoing
violation. Therefore, while McCollum’s First Amendment claim relating
to the period between July 2021 and April 2022 has survived summary
judgment, he is not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Briggs’s motion for summary judgment
will be granted in part, and McCollum’s motion for preliminary injunctive
relief will be denied. The case will proceed on McCollum’s First
Amendment free exercise claim. Unless one of the parties objects within
14 days, this case will be referred to the Court’s Prison Litigation
Settlement Program. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: August 24, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
9 , 227 F.3d at 52 n.3 (“[T]he asserted religious basis for
the request may be rejected as pretext.”); , No. 3:11-CV-
2022, 2016 WL 4988057, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2016) (inmate could
not establish a “sincerely held” belief in Islam when he declined to
indicate it on his prison’s religious preference form); , No.
3:14-CV-1436, 2016 WL 1128016, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2016) (prison
could restrict how often an inmate could change his stated religion).