Opinion

McCollum

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 24, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHNNIE MCCOLLUM,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-01710

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

GREGORY BRIGGS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Johnnie McCollum claims that defendant Gregory Briggs,

the warden of the Dauphin County Prison (“DCP”), violated McCollum’s

First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights by denying him access

to certain religious literature for approximately nine months. Briggs

moves for summary judgment (Doc. 88); McCollum, who has since

returned to the DCP, requests preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. 121).

For the following reasons, Briggs’s motion will be granted in part,

and the case will only proceed on McCollum’s First Amendment claim.

McCollum’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

As relevant here, the operative complaint (Doc. 46) alleges as

follows: Between August 2020 and October 2022, McCollum was

incarcerated at the DCP. To combat the smuggling of contraband, the

DCP did not allow prisoners to order their own books. The prison

digitized books pertaining to many religions, so prisoners could have

continual access to those books. However, McCollum’s religion is

Santeria, and the prison did not digitize any Santeria books. There was

at least one Santeria book available in the “general library,” but the

waiting list was nine months long. McCollum directed grievances about

the issue to Briggs, and specifically asked Briggs if he could order a book

“in [Briggs’s] name and have him photocopy it[,] but he refused.”

Following a motion to dismiss, McCollum was permitted to proceed

on a First Amendment free exercise claim and a Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim against Briggs for damages only.1 (Doc. 56).

After the close of discovery, Briggs moved for summary judgment. (Doc.

88). McCollum filed a timely response (Docs. 98, 99) and, after several

extensions of time, a counterstatement of material facts (Doc. 126).

While this case has been pending, McCollum has returned to the

1 McCollum’s claims for permanent injunctive relief were dismissed

because he was no longer at the DCP when he filed the operative

complaint. Several other claims and defendants were also dismissed,

including a Fourteenth Amendment claim relating to overcrowding at the

prison. (Docs. 55, 56).

DCP and filed a series of motions for preliminary injunctive relief. Two

such motions (Docs. 112, 117) were denied because they were

unsupported by evidence and the relief requested was not relevant to the

case. One final motion, in which McCollum requests access to a tablet

with Santeria literature, remains pending. (Doc. 121).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all

inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the

movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”

, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking

summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant

must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that

“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.

at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the

burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477

U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

III. MATERIAL FACTS

McCollum’s statement of material facts does not comply with the

local rules of this district, because it does not directly address the facts

in Briggs’s own statement. (Doc. 126); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.

Nonetheless, we have considered all the evidence and argument that the

parties have submitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Where McCollum has

not presented competent evidence to dispute Briggs’s statements of fact,

those facts are deemed undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

The summary judgment record indicates as follows: McCollum

attests that he has practiced Santeria since late 2016 or early 2017. (Doc.

126-5 at 3). Prior to June 2021, McCollum was intermittently

incarcerated at the DCP and within the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections. At that time, he identified himself within these prisons as

Muslim. McCollum now testifies that he did so because he feared

harassment from other prisoners and “because socially I would be able

to, you know, catch people from different blocks and stuff. But as far as

really adhering to the principles of Islam, no.” (Doc. 89-3 (McCollum

Dep.), 28:21-36:21, 41:21-43:17).

A. Santeria

On June 14, 2021, at the DCP, McCollum requested to change his

listed religion from Islam to Santeria. Santeria, as practiced by

McCollum, is a religion that incorporates African and Roman Catholic

traditions. A Santeria adherent is “required to learn the fundamental

principles/teachings . . . [T]here is no specific go to like Islam [has] the

Quran, so regular books such as the ones requested by [McCollum] . . .

[are] as fundamental as a Christian seeking out the Bible.” (Doc. 126-5

at 1-2).

McCollum was given a “Religion Request Form,” which he signed

on July 9. Therein, he stated that he practiced Santeria in his cell by

“mak[ing] food offerings to my saint/‘shango’’’ and “set[ting] up an altar

for my ancestors.” The requested change was reviewed and approved by

a prison chaplain. (Doc. 89-3 at 21-23 (Dep. Exs. 3-5)).

B. Access to Santeria Literature

Beginning in July 2021, McCollum submitted several inmate

request forms and grievances requesting access to Santeria literature.

Neither party has clearly explained the DCP’s policies regarding access

to religious literature. According to McCollum, the DCP did not allow

inmates to have physical books delivered to the prison. The DCP

“digitized all books” and created “a religious library and a regular one.”

Santeria books were not available in the religious library. In the “regular”

library, which was “owned by the Dauphin County Library,” an inmate

could check out a book for a 14-day period and renew it no more than

three times. Although there was some Santeria literature in the regular

library, there was a waiting list of six to nine months for these book(s).

(Doc. 126-5 at 4-5).

On April 18, 2022, approximately nine months after McCollum’s

initial requests, Briggs “approved [McCollum] to have physical paper

copies of approved Santeria religious material.” ( . at 30, Dep. Ex. 11).

The reasons for the delay between July 2021 and April 2022 are not

entirely clear from the record. In response to McCollum’s requests and

grievances about this issue, various prison officials responded as follows:

• On August 3, in response to one such request, the prison chaplain

wrote: “I plan to check on this about . . . suggested books, then

contact the Dauphin Co. Library to see if any are available as

[ebooks]. It is your responsibility to name particular books

specifically. We do not have the time to search generally.”

• In an undated response to a July 24 request, the chaplain wrote: “I

located a book called Santeria The Religion by Migene Gonzalez and

submitted a request . . . for it to be placed on the tablet.”

• On September 19, apparently in response to a request dated July

12, the chaplain wrote: “We recently sent a request to the County

Library system with book suggestion(s) for Santeria. They are in

process of considering adding . . . books based on funding available

+ if it is in eBook form.”

• On October 19, a further grievance “about [McCollum] not being

[allowed] to have materials on the tablet to practice his religion”

was forwarded to Briggs.2

• On November 3, after McCollum complained in relevant part that

he had been “waiting to read a specific book since August 19 and

it[’]s November,” another prison employee responded: “Meeting

with Dauphin County library and requesting more titles . . .”

(Doc. 89-3 at 24-29; Doc. 126-2; Doc. 126-3). The record does not

explain what became of the inquiries to the Dauphin County library

system, but we infer that no Santeria books were added to the prison

libraries. After Briggs received his paper copies, a prison chaplain wrote

the following memorandum:

I spoke with [McCollum] regarding his request to have

literature on Santeria placed on the tablet. I explained

that the religion of Santeria has no prescribed religious

books. That Santeria combines elements of Catholicism

with enslaved Africans[’] beliefs, and he can identify

with Catholic traditions and their ceremonies. That

there is plenty of information regarding Catholicism on

the tablet.

I have also spoken with the staff at Viapath regarding

the necessity of being able to add various religions that

are not considered mainstream to the electronic tablet.

That Dauphin County Prison has a small population of

residents that have no religious information available to

access on the electronic tablet. The staff at Viapath

stated that they were not sure if they could add entire

2 Although the corresponding grievance is in the record (Doc. 126-

3), we are unable to locate the response to that grievance (if any).

religious history books or lengthy PDF to the tablet, they

would investigate it and provide feedback when they

had an answer. To date that issue has not been resolved.

(Doc. 126-9).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Involvement

As an initial matter, Briggs claims that he cannot be held liable for

any constitutional violation because he was not personally involved in

depriving McCollum of Santeria literature. Liability for a constitutional

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a defendant’s personal

involvement, which can be shown by “personal direction [or] actual

knowledge and acquiescence.” , 845 F.2d 1195, 1207

(3d Cir. 1988). “[A] supervisor may be personally liable . . . if he or she

participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate

them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his

subordinates’ violations.”

, 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

Briggs argues that his involvement in this issue was “limited to

administrative approval and forwarding requests or grievances,” but the

record supports an inference that he was substantively involved.

McCollum directed one of his requests specifically to Briggs; another

request was forwarded directly to Briggs for his consideration; and it was

Briggs, specifically, who “approved [McCollum] to have physical paper

copies” in April 2022. (Doc. 89-3 at 27, 30; Doc. 126-2). A reasonable

jury could infer Briggs’s participation or acquiescence in the ongoing

decision not to allow McCollum Santeria literature until April 2022.

Accordingly, Briggs is not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

McCollum brings a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim

against Briggs. For an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that

he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated persons

because of membership in a particular protected class.

, 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). Persons are similarly

situated “when they are alike in all relevant aspects.”

, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Here, Briggs is entitled to summary judgment because McCollum

has not identified any similarly situated inmates. McCollum believes he

is similarly situated to any inmate at the DCP “who has religious beliefs”

(Doc. 126-5 at 5), but that broad similarity is insufficient. McCollum

offers no evidence that there was any demand for Santeria literature

when the prison digitized its library, so the fact that other religions’ books

were digitized at that time does not prove differential treatment of

Santeria or its adherents. , 295 F. App’x 479, 484 (3d

Cir. 2008) (an equal protection claim based on religion requires “similarly

situated faiths”); , 227 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 2000) (the

Constitution does not require that “every religious sect or group within a

prison . . . must have identical facilities”) (quoting , 405 U.S.

319, 322 n.2 (1972)).

On these facts, a similarly situated person would be one who, like

McCollum, made a later, request to digitize a book from a religion

that was not already represented. McCollum has not identified any such

individuals, and to the extent they existed at the DCP, there is no

evidence that they were treated differently from McCollum.3 Accordingly,

Briggs is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

3 In his affidavit, McCollum alludes to another inmate who “[went]

through the same process and received his book” (Doc. 126-5 at 4), but

this vague description does not show that the other inmate was similarly

situated. The chaplain’s May 2022 memorandum referred to a “small

population of residents that have no religious information available to

access on the electronic tablet” (Doc. 126-9); there is no evidence that

anyone in that group received anything that McCollum did not.

C. First Amendment

Next, McCollum proceeds on a First Amendment free exercise claim

against Briggs. “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First

Amendment . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free

exercise of religion.” , 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)

(citations omitted). For First Amendment protection to attach, a

plaintiff’s religious view must be “sincerely held,” and the regulation

must impose a “substantial burden” on the plaintiff’s religious exercise.

, 693 Fed. Appx. 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2017);

, 323 F.3d 236, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2003).

First, Briggs argues that McCollum’s inconsistent access to

Santeria literature did not constitute a substantial burden on his

religious practice. Briggs relies on , 497 F.3d 272 (3d

Cir. 2007), for the premise that “[d]elays or administrative policies do not

rise to a constitutional violation without coercion.” (Doc. 94 at 7-9). But

that is a misreading of , and the case squarely supports

McCollum’s argument on this point. concerned a religion for

which “[o]ne of the rituals requires a practitioner to read four different

Afro-centric books per day.” A prisoner was permitted to keep ten books

in his cell at one time; he could donate additional books to the library, but

he could only check out four books at a time, once per week. 497 F.3d at

275. In the context of a RLUIPA claim, the Third Circuit determined that

based on the religion’s requirements, the ten-book limit constituted a

substantial burden. . at 281-83. does not support the idea

that a substantial burden requires a showing of “coercion,” and the rules

imposed on McCollum were significantly more restrictive than the rules

at issue in .

Briggs further argues that there was no substantial burden because

McCollum “was able to practice Santeria privately in his cell,” but that is

not dispositive. Even if an inmate has some access to some form of

religious exercise, “limiting [his] access to the religious literature that he

is required to read as part of his practice constitutes a substantial

burden.”4 To the extent Briggs contends that Santeria literature could be

adequately replaced by “other religious texts relevant to Santeria ( ,

4 , 306 F. App’x 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2009); , ,

No. 1:20-CV-00235-SPB-RAL, 2021 WL 3610034 (W.D. Pa.

July 19, 2021) (denial of access to religious literature during a stay of

unspecified length in the Restricted Housing Unit); ,

No. 1:09-CV-0267, 2010 WL 817398, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (denial

of access to the Bible during a three-week lockdown).

Roman Catholic)” (Doc. 94 at 4), the record shows a genuine dispute of

fact on that point. , 497 F.3d at 281-82 (inmate’s access

to “some books that would impart knowledge about his religion” was not

“a palatable alternative”).

Some of Briggs’s arguments are better understood as a claim that

the prison’s regulations were justified as a matter of law, but he is not

entitled to summary judgment on that basis. A prison regulation can

impinge on the right of free exercise only to the extent “reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.” , 482 U.S. 78,

89 (1987). Courts consider four factors determining whether the

regulation is reasonable: (1) whether the regulation bears a valid,

rational connection to a legitimate and neutral government objective; (2)

whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain

open to prison inmates; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the

allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) the absence of ready

alternatives to the regulation. , 648 F. App’x 168, 173

(3d Cir. 2016) (citing , 482 U.S. at 89-90).

On this record, only one of these factors — the existence of

“alternative means of exercising the right” — clearly favors Briggs. For

this factor, the question is not whether McCollum had access to literature

specifically, but whether he had “alternative means of exercising [his]

beliefs generally ( , by prayer, worship, meditation, . . . etc.).”

, 227 F.3d at 54 (citing , 490 U.S. 401, 417-

18 (1989)). The record is clear that he did. , , (Doc. 89-3 at 23).

On the issue of whether the challenged policies promoted legitimate

objectives, the record is open to interpretation. Beyond the prison staff’s

, contradictory responses to McCollum’s complaints, Briggs has not

explained what the DCP’s policies actually were.5 Briggs, the party

seeking summary judgment, has the burden to explain the prison’s rules

and the penological interests they support; McCollum is not required to

read between the lines of grievance responses and “negat[e] every

conceivable legitimate penological interest which might support the

denial of his accommodation.” , 669 F.3d 144, 156-

58 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). Even accepting

5 For example, if we accept that a DCP ban on physical media

contributed to the delay, Briggs does not explain why McCollum was

ultimately given “physical paper copies” of a Santeria book, or why he

could not receive that accommodation more promptly.

Briggs’s argument that some delay was caused by “administrative

processing, library acquisition, or policy,” the record offers no explanation

for the roughly six-month delay from November 2021 through April

2022.6 Further, a jury could infer that McCollum was not permitted

Santeria-specific literature in part because the prison staff believed it

was sufficient for McCollum to “identify with Catholic traditions and

their ceremonies.” (Doc. 126-9).

The remaining factors — the impact on prison operations and the

alternative options that were available to the DCP — favor McCollum. It

appears that this issue was resolved, at least in part, when Briggs

authorized McCollum to receive photocopies of approved Santeria

literature. From the limited record, this seems to have been a cost-

effective alternative that would not have unduly disturbed the operation

of the prison. , 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If

an inmate can point to an alternative that would fully accommodate his

6 On November 3, a prison employee responded to McCollum by

describing a planned “meeting with the Dauphin County library” to

request more books, but McCollum’s request had already been made to

the library several months before. Whether or why the library requests

were denied is unclear, and the record shows no evidence of any further

attempt to obtain Santeria literature until Briggs approved the paper

copies on April 18.

or her rights at a ‘de minimis’ cost, we can consider that as evidence that

the challenged regulation is unreasonable.”). Accordingly, Briggs is not

entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

D. Qualified Immunity

Next, Briggs argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity applies to federal and state actors unless (1) the

“facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a

constitutional violation,” and (2) the alleged right was clearly established

at the time of the violation. , 88 F.4th 275,

281 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). At the summary judgment stage,

“the burden is on the defendants to establish they are entitled to qualified

immunity.” , 928 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2019).

Briggs argues, in part, that “[n]o precedent clearly establishes that

delays in providing religious texts under neutral policies violate

constitutional rights.”7 (Doc. 94 at 10). As explained above, the record

7 Briggs’s reliance on , 86 F.4th 987 (2d Cir. 2023),

is unpersuasive. (Doc. 94 at 10-11). In that case, a plaintiff was

denied access to religious services for more than five months due to

administrative error, creating a substantial burden on the prisoner’s

religious practice. 86 F.4th at 991-94. Qualified immunity was

granted to one of the four defendants who sought it. In part, held

does not sufficiently explain what the policies were, nor establish that

they were neutrally applied. There is evidence that prison staff did not

permit the literature because they took the position that the practice of

Santeria did not require it. While qualified immunity could apply based

on a reasonable official’s discretion in that regard, the record does not

clearly show that any such judgment was reasonable.8 The existence of a

material dispute on that issue forecloses any entitlement to qualified

immunity on McCollum’s First Amendment claim.

, 141 F.4th 76, 88 (3d Cir. 2025).

E. Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Finally, McCollum has also sought preliminary injunctive relief.

His claim for permanent injunctive relief was dismissed as moot, because

that a defendant’s negligence is insufficient for First Amendment

liability, but a defendant who “would have known that [access to religious

services] depended on their input” and failed to act may be liable. .

at 995-98. Briggs has not presented evidence that resolves whether his

actions reflected deliberate indifference; as the party moving for

summary judgment, he is not entitled to that inference.

8 Aside from the chaplain’s conclusory statement in the May 2022

memorandum, we find no evidence countering McCollum’s attestation

that access to Santeria-specific literature is essential to practicing

Santeria. , , , 497 F.3d at 275 (religion required access

to unspecified “Afro-centric books”).

he left the DCP and made no showing or argument that he was going to

return. (Doc. 55 at 16, Doc. 56). However, he has since returned to

the DCP, and he now requests an order directing that he immediately

receives “a tablet with access to Santeria literature.”

A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must show by clear

evidence that there is a “reasonable probability” of success on the merits,

and that denial would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff.

, 39

F.4th 95, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2022). McCollum’s motion will be denied because

has not established either point by clear evidence.

First, McCollum has not explained why he needs a tablet to access

Santeria literature given the undisputed fact that Briggs permitted him

to have physical copies. To the extent McCollum was no longer authorized

to have physical copies after he returned to the DCP, he has not presented

clear evidence of that. Moreover, McCollum testified that when he

returned to the DCP in 2024, he was once again identifying as Muslim.

(Doc. 89-3, 63:7-15). Although he still claims to be practicing the

Santeria religion, prisons are not required to indulge a prisoner’s

attempts to constantly change religions or claim multiple religions,

whether for “social” reasons or other purposes.9 This fact would belie any

finding of a reasonable probability of success on any claim of ongoing

violation. Therefore, while McCollum’s First Amendment claim relating

to the period between July 2021 and April 2022 has survived summary

judgment, he is not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Briggs’s motion for summary judgment

will be granted in part, and McCollum’s motion for preliminary injunctive

relief will be denied. The case will proceed on McCollum’s First

Amendment free exercise claim. Unless one of the parties objects within

14 days, this case will be referred to the Court’s Prison Litigation

Settlement Program. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 24, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

9 , 227 F.3d at 52 n.3 (“[T]he asserted religious basis for

the request may be rejected as pretext.”); , No. 3:11-CV-

2022, 2016 WL 4988057, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2016) (inmate could

not establish a “sincerely held” belief in Islam when he declined to

indicate it on his prison’s religious preference form); , No.

3:14-CV-1436, 2016 WL 1128016, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2016) (prison

could restrict how often an inmate could change his stated religion).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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