Ganz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLE   RK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 8/24/2   026

--------------------------------------------------------------X U.S. DISTRICT COURT

DAVID GANZ and CHRISTINE GANZ, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiffs,

OPINION

AND ORDER

-against- 25-cv-02283 (JMW)

NASSAU COUNTY, NEW YORK, PATRICK

RYDER, Individually and Officially, MARC

TIMPANO, Individually, DAVID CAFARELLA,

Individually,

Defendants.

--------------------------------------------------------------X

A P P E A R A N C E S:

Amy L. Bellantoni

The Bellantoni Law Firm, PLLC

2 Overhill Road

Scarsdale, NY 10583

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Mohammad Tahir

Nassau County Attorney’s Office

1 West Street

Mineola, NY 11771

Jonathan M. Bernstein

Goldberg Segalla, LLP

8 Southwoods Blvd, Suite 300

Albany, NY 12211

-and-

Scott R. Green

Goldberg Segalla, LLP

200 Garden City Plaza, Suite 520

Garden City, NY 11530

Attorneys for Defendants

WICKS, Magistrate Judge:

The Second Amendment is the very product of an interest balancing by the people

and it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible

citizens to use arms for self-defense. It is this balance—struck by the traditions of

the American people—that demands our unqualified deference.1

David Ganz (“Mr. Ganz”) and Christine Ganz (“Ms. Ganz” and collectively, the

“Plaintiffs”) commenced this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Nassau

County, New York (the “County”), Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD”) Commissioner

Patrick Ryder (“Commissioner Ryder”), Lieutenant Marc Timpano (“Lt. Timpano”), head of the

NCPD’s Pistol License Section (“PLS”), and Nassau County Police Investigator David Cafarella

(“Cafarella” and collectively with the County, Commissioner Ryder, and Lt. Timpano, the

“Defendants”).2 Plaintiffs allege violations of the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth3 Amendments

of the United States Constitution stemming from NCPD’s and the PLS’s firearm disqualification

1 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26 (2022) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

2 Plaintiffs have withdrawn certain claims against the individual defendants. (See ECF No. 31 at 1 n.1.)

(“Plaintiffs withdraw their individual capacity claims against Parick Ryder (“Ryder”), as discovery

revealed no evidence of his personal involvement. Plaintiffs do not withdraw their official capacity claims

against Ryder, as he is the proper party to be named in connection with their declaratory and injunctive

relief claims. Plaintiffs withdraw their individual capacity claims against Marc Timpano, as testimony

reveals that he retired prior to September 2024 [].”) Thus, it appears that Lt. Timpano should be dismissed

as a party as he was sued “in his individual capacity only.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Whereas, Commissioner

Ryder remains sued in his official capacity, and Cafarella has always been sued solely in his individual

capacity. (See id. at ¶¶ 10, 19.)

3 While the Complaint does not contain a separate count for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, there are

allegations of Fourteenth Amendment violations. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 25, 81.) However, Plaintiffs are

not seeking summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment or on any other claims apart from the

Second Amendment as it is absent in their motion papers and Plaintiff conceded to this at oral argument.

(See Electronic Order dated 8/19/2026; ECF No. 34 at 8.) Thus, the claims are deemed abandoned. See

Williams v. Suffolk Cnty., 284 F. Supp. 3d 275, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Therefore, that claim is deemed

abandoned … Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's …

claims is granted.”); see also MacDonald v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 2:22-CV-188 (NJC) (AYS), 2026 WL

1453872, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2026) (“Further, MacDonald failed to oppose Defendants’ arguments

for summary judgment on the state law negligence claim and is therefore deemed to have abandoned that

claim.”) As such, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments against the Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendment.

policy. (See generally, ECF No. 1.) Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment

(ECF Nos. 26, 29), oppositions (ECF Nos. 31-32), and reply papers (ECF Nos. 34, 37). Oral

argument on the motions was held on August 19, 2026. (See Electronic Order dated 8/19/2026.)

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

No. 29) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are gleaned from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1(a) Statements and are

uncontested unless otherwise noted.4

I. The Parties and the Pistol Licenses

The Plaintiffs are residents of Nassau County, New York and have held New York State

pistol licenses since 2020. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 1-2.) The licenses were issued to Plaintiffs by the

4 The facts set forth above are taken from the parties’ respective Rule 56.1 statements and corresponding

responses. See ECF Nos. 26-9 (Plaintiffs’ 56.1 statement), 31-9 (Plaintiffs’ counterstatement of facts) and

32-8 (Defendants’ 56.1 responsive statement and statement of additional facts). The Court will not

reference ECF No. 29-10 which is labeled as Defendants’ 56.1 statement but appears to be Plaintiffs’ 56.1

statement instead.

Unless otherwise noted, a standalone citation to a party’s Rule 56.1 statement means that the Court has

deemed the underlying factual allegation undisputed. Any citation to a Rule 56.1 statement incorporates

by reference the documents cited in it. Where relevant, however, the Court may also cite directly to an

underlying document. The Court has deemed true undisputed facts averred in a party’s Rule 56.1

statement to which the opposing party cites no admissible evidence in rebuttal. See Stewart v. Fashion

Inst. of Tech., No. 18-CV-12297 (LJL), 2020 WL 6712267, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020) (“‘[P]ursuant

to Local Civil Rule 56.1 [the movant’s] statements are deemed to be admitted where [the non-moving

party] has failed to specifically controvert them with citations to the record.’”) (quoting Knight v. N.Y.C.

Hous. Auth., No. 03-CV-2746 (DAB), 2007 WL 313435, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2007)); Lumbermens

Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dinow, No. 06-CV-3881 (TCP), 2012 WL 4498827, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012)

(“Local Rule 56.1 requires . . . that disputed facts be specifically controverted by admissible evidence.

Mere denial of an opposing party’s statement or denial by general reference to an exhibit or affidavit does

not specifically controvert anything.”). “Additionally, to the extent [a party’s] 56.1 statement ‘improperly

interjects arguments and/or immaterial facts in response to facts asserted by [the opposing party] without

specifically controverting those facts,’ the Court has disregarded [such] statement[s.]” McFarlane v.

Harry’s Nurses Registry, No. 17-CV-06350 (PKC) (PK), 2020 WL 1643781, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,

2020).

NCPD PLS. (Id. at ¶ 3.) The PLS is an administrative agency in pistol licensing that decides on a

case-by-case basis whether to suspend an individual’s pistol licenses. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 85;

ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 42.) Cafarella has been employed as an investigator with the PLS since 2022.

(ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 86.) When Cafarella arrived in the PLS, his supervisors included Sergeant

William Russell (“Sgt. Russell”) and Lt. Timpano, who retired in approximately August 2024.

(Id. at ¶¶ 87-88.)

II. Plaintiffs’ Daughter’s Mental Health Incident

In February of 2024, the Plaintiffs’ daughter, who was enrolled in the SUNY Old

Westbury College (“SUNY”), was admitted to a Massachusetts hospital for mental health

treatment. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 8-9.) In September 2024, a patient at the Massachusetts hospital

contacted the SUNY school to report that Plaintiffs’ daughter had drawn threatening images. (Id.

at ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs’ daughter was then transported by the NCPD to Nassau University Medical

Center. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs’ daughter informed the police that the picture was not depicting

any type of shooting or threat. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

The SUNY college and its police force, after having been informed of the accusation,

handled the school-threat investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-37, 40, 41.) However, NCPD officers

responded to Plaintiffs’ home to ascertain the daughter’s condition. (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 40, 41.)

III. The Investigation

Plaintiffs came to Cafarella’s attention on September 18, 2024, after beginning his review

of a police incident report concerning the Plaintiffs’ daughter. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 91; ECF No.

32-8 at ¶¶ 6-7.) This was a result of Nassau County being notified by SUNY Old Westbury

Administration that Plaintiffs’ daughter was accused of drawing disturbing pictures of mass

shootings. (See ECF Nos. 32-1 at 6; 32-2 at 7.)

According to Cafarella, the PLS is responsible for background investigations for new

applicants and for investigations into when issues arise from police interaction or other events

involving current licensees. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 89.) Cafarella testified in his deposition that,

unless the matter involves an arrest, the mere fact that an assignment is entered into the PLS

assignment system does not mean that a suspension determination has already been made. (Id. at

¶ 90.)

Cafarella reviewed a written report indicating that a supervisor from the 1st Precinct

verified that Plaintiffs’ weapons were secured in a safe and that their daughter did not have

access to them. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 14.) The report also indicated that Plaintiffs were pistol

license holders, and that they “refused to surrender” their weapons. (Id. at ¶ 16.) A lieutenant in

the NCPD Homeland Security Unit, who was part of the daughter’s investigation, advised the

PLS that since there was “no direct message threatening a shooting,” he saw no issue with

Plaintiffs remaining in possession of their secured firearms. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18; see also ECF Nos.

32-1; 32-2; 32-3 at 28.) Despite that, Cafarella considered Plaintiffs’ daughter to be a member of

Plaintiffs’ household, suspended Plaintiffs’ pistol licenses under the direction of then-Sgt.

Russell of the PLS. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 20-21.) This suspension was due to a “volatile mental

situation” in Plaintiffs’ house where a household member was hospitalized for mental health

treatment, and because the Plaintiffs failed to notify the PLS of the hospitalization. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Defendants dispute the last sentence to the extent that it suggests the were no further reasons for

suspension, “which also arose from the totality of circumstances under administrative review,

including Plaintiffs’ decision to place their daughter in an inpatient program and safeguard their

weapons outside Nassau County.” (Id.)

At no time during Cafarella’s investigation between September 2024 and present date

was it ever alleged that Plaintiffs’ firearms were accessible by anyone other than themselves. (Id.

at ¶ 24.) After Plaintiffs provided Cafarella with photos of the biometric safes that contained

their weapons, Cafarella was satisfied that Plaintiffs’ weapons were properly stored. (ECF No.

31-9 at ¶ 93; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 26-27.) Cafarella did not speak with Plaintiffs’ daughter or the

girl who made the accusation as a part of his investigation. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 28.)

Plaintiffs contend that the PLS requires that when a licensee resides with a family

member that has mental health treatment or was transported for mental health evaluation, the

licensee must provide a letter from the treating physician that indicated that the family member is

safe to reside in a house with firearms. (Id. at ¶ 29.) However, Defendants contend that instead

under such circumstances, the PLS may request a letter from the treating physician or

psychologist as part of a case-specific administrative investigation and that, where such a letter

cannot be obtained, the matter is addressed on a case-by-case basis depending on the

circumstances. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶¶ 96-97; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 29.)

Cafarella required Plaintiffs to obtain a “letter of no objection” from their daughter’s

treating psychologist which stated their daughter’s actual diagnosis. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 30.) It

had to also state that the doctor was aware that Plaintiffs hold pistol licenses and that the doctor

had “no objection to firearms being in the house.” (Id.) Cafarella testified that the daughter’s

mental state was relevant to the PLS review. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Cafarella also testified that the school-

threat incident and public safety concerns were issues that the PLS sought to address as a part of

its review. (Id. at ¶ 32.)

IV. The Nassau County PLS Handbook and the Suspension

Under the terms of the PLS Handbook (the “Handbook”), Plaintiffs’ failure to notify PLS

that a member of their household received mental health treatment was grounds for suspension.

(ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 45.) Under the Handbook, “a pistol license may be suspended and/or revoked

based upon evidence of any disqualification pursuant to the Handbook or applicable law, and

that the policy of the Nassau County Police Department is to immediately suspend the pistol

license of any licensee who violates any term or condition of the license or the Handbook and

commence an investigation to determine whether the license should be revoked.” (ECF No. 31-9

at ¶ 104.) “The Handbook further provides that the licensee is responsible for making timely

notification to the PLS of any incidents or occurrences that may affect his or her standing as a

licensee and that the licensee should not assume that other law enforcement agencies or officers

will make such notification on the licensee’s behalf. Unless otherwise specifically noted, such

notifications must be made within three business days after occurrence.” (Id. at ¶ 105.)

The Handbook lists a number of reasons to suspend an individual’s pistol license

including the report of any domestic situation involving a licensee where violence is threatened

or alleged to have occurred in a domestic situation and failure to report to the PLS within 3

business days any domestic dispute involving a licensee and also involving police. (ECF No. 31-

9 at ¶ 106; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 78.) The Handbook defines “good moral character,” as having the

essential character, temperament, and judgment to possess a weapon in a manner that does not

endanger oneself or others. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 103.) The Handbook also requires a licensee to

report when either the licensee or a member of the licensee’s household receives professional

treatment for mental health issues. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 80.) Failure to report to the PLS any

domestic dispute involving the licensee and also involving police presence is also grounds for

suspension. (Id. at ¶ 81.) Under the Handbook, it is not just the reporting requirement that is

relevant to suspension, but the fact that a member of the licensee's household is receiving mental

health treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 83-84.) Nassau County does not maintain a policy under which the

mere fact that a household member receives mental-health treatment automatically warrants the

suspension of an individual’s license. (Id. at ¶¶ 83-84.) According to Defendants, the record

therefore reflects a temporary, case-specific administrative suspension followed by

reinstatement, not a permanent revocation of Plaintiffs’ licenses, and that the suspension arose

from the PLS’s review of Plaintiffs’ eligibility to continue having a license while failing to report

the household-member mental health events. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶¶ 119-20.)

Thus, pursuant to the policy, the Plaintiffs’ pistol licenses were suspended due to (i) a

volatile mental situation in their house where a household member was hospitalized for mental

health treatment, (ii) failure to report their daughter’s mental health treatment, (iii) failure to

report that their daughter was seeing a therapist for mental health issues and (iv) failure to report

their daughter’s hospitalization for mental health issues. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 22, 44.) In addition

to the failure to report, Cafarella testified that the suspension of Plaintiffs’ licenses was a result

of a case specific approach based on the totality of the circumstances. (Id.)

V. Surrendering the Firearms and the Duration of the Suspension

On October 16, 2024, and October 19, 2024, Plaintiffs surrendered their firearms to

federal firearms licensee (“FFL”), Dark Storm Industries (“Dark Storm”). (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 95;

ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 48; ECF No. 32-5.) Plaintiffs were unable to possess their handguns or

purchase new handguns until the PLS lifted the suspension of their pistol licenses. (ECF No. 32-

8 at ¶ 49.)

Cafarella testified that even if Plaintiffs’ daughter is only at the house a couple of times a

month, there was still a concern as to whether she can gain access to Plaintiffs’ weapons. (Id. at ¶

51.) However, Cafarella also testified that he did not consider Plaintiffs to be “dangerous” people

or “… threats to public safety.” (Id. at ¶¶ 54-55.) Cafarella continued Plaintiffs’ suspension

because the PLS was “waiting to see what comes of [the daughter’s] treatment and if there

[were] any further incidents.” (Id. at ¶ 59.)

In March of 2025, Mr. Ganz informed Cafarella that he was unable to obtain a letter from

their daughter’s treating physician as requested. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 109; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 60.)

Cafarella then updated then-Sgt. Russell and together, they reviewed the original documents and

decided to wait a number of months before reinstating the license. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 61.)

Cafarella explained that there is not a concrete timeline for reinstating licenses. (Id. at ¶ 63.)

Rather, the duration of the suspension is based on what both the investigator and supervisor feel

comfortable with and is viewed on the totality of the circumstances. (Id. ¶¶ at 63-64.)

VI. Reinstatement of Firearms

On March 18, 2025, Mr. Ganz sent an email to Cafarella stating that there was no reason

to impose the suspension because Plaintiffs “ha[d] not done anything wrong” and that Plaintiffs’

daughter did not have access to their weapons. (Id. at ¶ 66.) On April 3, 2025, Plaintiffs went to

Dark Storm to pick up their handguns but were prohibited from receiving them by the PLS. (Id.

at ¶ 68.) In April of 2025, Cafarella recommended to then-Sgt. Russell that Plaintiffs sign an

acknowledgement of wrongdoing as a condition of having their licenses reinstated. (Id. at ¶ 70.)

Through counsel, Plaintiffs informed Cafarella that they would not sign any such form. (ECF

No. 31-9 at ¶ 113; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 71.) Seven months later, on November 20th and 21st of

2025, Plaintiffs were issued a “verbal admonishment” for failing to notify PLS of police contact

within 3 business days. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶¶ 115-16; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶ 74.) Only after that, Ms.

Ganz’s pistol license was reinstated on November 20, 2025, and Mr. Ganz’s license was

reinstated on November 21, 2025. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 117; ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 75-76.)

VII. The Instant Action

On April 24, 2025, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendants bringing claims

for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments,

specifically challenging the policy of the PLS based on the “conduct, condition, and/or firearms

disqualification of a cohabitant.” (See generally, ECF No. 1.) The Complaint included three

claims for violations of the Second and Fourth Amendment, as well as Monell liability. (Id.)

Defendants filed their Answer on December 5, 2025, which included fourteen affirmative

defenses. (ECF No. 16.) Discovery in this action was completed as of February 6, 2026. (ECF

No. 17.) Shortly after, the parties consented to the undersigned and commenced first steps in

summary judgment motion practice. (ECF Nos. 18, 20, 22, 24.) Now, the cross motions for

summary judgment are before the Court. (ECF Nos. 26, 29.) Plaintiffs move for summary

judgment solely on the Second Amendment (see ECF No. 34 at 8), and request that the Court

“declare that the challenged Nassau County PLS policies and the PLS Handbook violate the

Second Amendment facially and as applied to Plaintiffs; permanently enjoin Defendants from

continuing to enforce them; and order such further relief as the Court deems just and proper,

including scheduling this matter for trial on compensatory and punitive damages.” (ECF No. 26-

10 at 14.) At the same time, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety. (See

generally, ECF No. 29-9.)

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

On a summary judgment motion, the movant must demonstrate there is “no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2022). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The initial burden is on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact, which can be met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the nonmovant’s claim.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett¸ 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138,

148 (2d Cir. 2004). Once the movant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts and the

nonmovant may defeat the motion only by adducing evidence of specific facts that raise a

genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Davis v. New York¸ 316

F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The burden on summary judgment is considered a procedural issue

and therefore the Federal Rules apply. Thus, unlike state court where the burden is on the

movant, “Defendant need not make any affirmative prima facie showing on this motion for

summary judgment, and may discharge its burden of proof merely ‘by pointing to an absence of

evidence to support an essential element of [Plaintiff's] claim.’” Vasquez v. United States, No.

14-CV-1510 (DF), 2016 WL 315879, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

“The Court is to believe the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable

inferences in her favor, but the non-movant must still do more than merely assert conclusions

that are unsupported by arguments or facts.” Sosa v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 406 F. Supp.

3d 266, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal citations omitted). The role of the court at the summary

judgment phase is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but only undertake an analysis to identify

whether triable issues of fact exist. See Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 167 (2d Cir.

2021). That is, the court’s function is “issue-finding,” not “issue-resolution.” Carolina Cas. Ins.

Co. v. Cap. Trucking Inc., 523 F. Supp.3d 661, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Gallo v. Prudential

Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d. Cir. 1994)). Au fond, the Court’s role is

to decide whether, “after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the

nonmovant, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.” Miller v. N.Y. State

Police, No. 20-3976, 2022 WL 1133010, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2022) (citing Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248 and Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 127, 129 (2d Cir. 2013)).

It is within this framework that the Court considers the cross motions for summary

judgment.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. However, Plaintiffs conceded –

both at oral argument and in their motion papers -- that their motion is in solely in support of

their Second Amendment claim on liability. Accordingly, all other claims are deemed

abandoned. (ECF No. 34 at 8.) See Williams, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 284 (“Therefore, that claim is

deemed abandoned … Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing

the Plaintiff's … claims is granted.”); see also MacDonald, 2026 WL 1453872, at *1

(“MacDonald failed to oppose Defendants’ arguments for summary judgment on the state law

negligence claim and is therefore deemed to have abandoned that claim.”)

A. The Second Amendment

The Second Amendment provides, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. While the Second Amendment confers an individual right to

bear arms, this right is not unbridled or unlimited. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). The

individual right to bear arms, as interpreted by Heller, is incorporated into the Fourteenth

Amendment through the Due Process Clause and therefore, is fully applicable to the States.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). The Supreme Court provides a two-

step framework for analyzing whether a firearm regulation violates the Second Amendment.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19-24; Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941, 964 (2d Cir. 2024). First, courts

must analyze whether the “Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.”

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 964. If the court finds that it does, the Constitution

presumptively protects that conduct. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 964. At the

second step, the burden shifts and the government must “affirmatively prove that its firearms

regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and

bear arms.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19; see Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 964. When establishing that a

regulation is a part of the nation’s historical tradition, the government need only identify a “well-

established and representative historical analogue,” rather than a “historical twin.” Antonyuk, 120

F.4th at 971 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).

Plaintiffs contend that their conduct – possessing handguns for self-defense – falls

squarely within the plain text of the Second Amendment and that there is no historical tradition

to justify the challenged policies. (ECF No. 26-10 at 7.) Defendants argue that their policy is

constitutional as the suspension of Plaintiffs’ pistol licenses was the result of a case-by-case

review, rather than a policy that categorically prohibits individuals from obtaining firearms on

the basis of a cohabitant’s mental health treatments. (ECF No. 29-9 at 6-9.)

Here, neither party argues that Plaintiffs’ right to bear arms is not protected under the

Second Amendment. Thus, the presumption that this conduct is constitutionally protected

attaches. So, a determination on whether Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights were violated

therefore turns on the analysis under the second step of the Bruen framework. That is, whether

Nassau County’s policy is part of the historical tradition that may limit or in this case, suspend

Plaintiffs’ licenses, and Defendants bear that burden. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19; Antonyuk, 120

F.4th at 964.

New York’s Penal Law § 400.00(11) which deals with the suspension and revocation of

firearms provides that “a license may be revoked and cancelled at any time in the city of New

York, and in the counties of Nassau and Suffolk, by the licensing officer, and elsewhere than in

the city of New York by any judge or justice of a court of record. … In any instance in which a

person's license is suspended or revoked under paragraph (a) or (b) of this subdivision, such

person shall surrender such license to the appropriate licensing official and any and all

firearms….” N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (11)(a)-(c). The Handbook provides that the Nassau

County Police Commissioner is endowed with the exclusive authority to issue and revoke pistol

licenses pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00. (ECF No. 31-8 at 1, 21.) Further, under N.Y.

Penal Law § 400.00(1), an individual is eligible for a pistol license only upon an investigation

finding that the applicant is of good moral character. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1). Chapter 1,

Section I(2)(d) of the Handbook provides that it is “the policy of the Nassau County Police

Department … to immediately suspend the pistol license of any licensee who violates any of the

terms and conditions of the license or this Handbook.” (ECF No. 31-8 at 22 (emphasis in

original).) Such violations include but are not limited to…

“[(d)] Report of any domestic situation involving a licensee where violence is

threatened or alleged to have occurred or the existence of a volatile domestic

situation and [(f)] Failure to report any of the following to the Pistol License Section

within (3) business days: … any domestic dispute/disturbance involving a licensee

and also involving police presence…. [(z)] A licensee’s failure to comply with any

of the regulations stated in this handbook.”

(Id. at 22-25.) (internal citations omitted).

In Rahimi, the Supreme Court upheld a statute empowering the government to disarm

individuals who are found to present a credible risk to the safety of others because the

disarmament of such individuals is rooted in the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm

regulation. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 700-01 (2024) (holding that the challenge to a

statute which bars someone from possessing a firearm if they are a credible threat did not survive

and is thus, constitutional as it applied to the challenger). The characteristics of a cohabitant of

an applicant for a pistol license may be considered to the extent that they provide insight into the

applicant’s own ability to be entrusted with a weapon, but a cohabitant’s inability to possess

firearms cannot in itself serve as a basis for prohibiting an applicant from obtaining a pistol

license. See Milau, 2025 WL 1029394, at *8; see also Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1001.

As an initial matter, to the extent that Plaintiffs argue a judicial adjudicative process was

required to suspend the licenses, that theory is misguided. (See ECF No. 31 at 8.) N.Y. Penal

Law § 400.00(11) empowers the NCPD Commissioner to suspend or revoke a license. Indeed,

Judge Garnett recently found the same. See Flaifel v. New York City, No. 24-CV-06838 (MMG),

2026 WL 866816, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026) (citations omitted) (“Plaintiff argues that

Rahimi requires a prior finding by a court that an individual poses a credible threat to the

physical safety of another person before a state may deny a firearm license. It does not. As the

Second Circuit recently explained, Rahimi recognized legislatures could identify certain groups

of people judged to be dangerous and prohibit them from possessing firearms.”)

Second, at oral argument the Court sought further clarity of whether Plaintiffs’ challenges

as to the Second Amendment are facial challenges or as-applied challenges. “[C]lassifying a

lawsuit as facial or as-applied affects the extent to which the invalidity of the challenged law

must be demonstrated ....[a] facial challenge is really just a claim that the law or policy at issue is

unconstitutional in all its applications.” Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 982–83 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). “[A]n as-applied challenge ... requires an analysis of the facts of a

particular case to determine whether the application of a statute, even one constitutional on its

face, deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a protected right.” Higbie v. James, 795

F. Supp. 3d 307, 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs

focused on Defendants’ conduct rather than the policy itself, i.e., the suspension, the cool-down

period, the doctor’s note requests. Notably, Plaintiffs conceded that the word cohabitant is absent

from the Handbook. Therefore, while Plaintiffs conclusorily state in their papers that this is a

facial challenge too, the Court finds that this is in fact an as-applied challenge through the

conduct of the Defendants when suspending Plaintiffs’ licenses.

Moving to the crux of the Second Amendment, the parties both attempt to compare and

distinguish the instant matter with that of the Antonyuk and Milau. In Antonyuk, the Second

Circuit vacated a district court’s preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a provision

requiring pistol license applicants to disclose the identities of their cohabitants as a part of

assessing the applicant’s own character. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1000-02. There, the Court

concluded that the cohabitant disclosure is consistent with background check procedures that

have already been recognized as constitutional. Id. Crucially, the Court reasoned that the

characteristics of an applicant’s cohabitants may be used to determine the applicant’s own ability

to “be entrusted with a weapon and to use it only in a manner that does not endanger [him]self or

others.” Id. at 1001 (quoting N.Y. Penal L. § 400.00(1)(b)).

By contrast, Suffolk County’s policy of denying pistol license applications because a

cohabitant of the applicant is prohibited from possessing firearms was recently found to be

unconstitutional. Milau, 2025 WL 1029394, at *9. There, the plaintiffs’ pistol licenses were

suspended after a domestic incident involving their son. Id at *4. Their son had a history of

significant drug use, multiple arrests, and had recently threatened the plaintiffs with physical

violence. Id. Their licenses were ultimately cancelled after a subsequent domestic dispute. Id. at

*3. While the parties in Milau acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ son’s misdemeanor rendered him

ineligible to possess a firearm, statements provided by the plaintiffs regarding their son’s erratic

behavior served as the basis for the cancellation of the plaintiffs’ licenses. Id. The court rejected

Suffolk County’s reliance on Antonyuk to justify this practice. Id. at *7-9. The court reasoned

that Antonyuk supports that the characteristics of a pistol license applicant’s cohabitants are

relevant insofar as they provide insight into the applicant’s own ability to possess a firearm. Id. at

*8-9. However, Antonyuk does not support the proposition that an applicant may be prohibited

from obtaining a pistol license simply because a cohabitant is prohibited from possessing

firearms. Id. The court concluded that Antonyuk is “inapposite,” and that there is not historical

analogue to support Suffolk County’s policy. Id. at *9.

Here, the PLS maintained Plaintiffs’ suspensions on the grounds that they failed to

submit a letter from their daughter’s mental-health specialist, failed to provide information about

their daughter’s mental health history, and concerns surrounding Plaintiffs’ prior application

responses. (ECF No. 29-9 at 8-9.) This review is distinct from categorical disqualification

described in Milau. Indeed, Milau had a written policy regarding suspension on grounds of a

cohabitant. 2025 WL 1029394, at *2, 7.5 Accordingly, Milau does not in itself provide a basis

for deeming the PLS’ case-by-case review unconstitutional.

Although Milau does not support the finding that the PLS policy is unconstitutional, more

recent case law does. Notably, the suspension of a pistol license stemming from a similar case-

by-case review was at issue in Wysocki v. Nassau County, et al. No. 23-CV-8790 (SJB)(AYS),

5 In Milau, there was a dispute as to whether that was the current policy because at some point in 2022,

the policy had changed. Id. at. *2. However, Defendants admitted that Plaintiff was still subject to that

policy. Id.

2026 WL 1965726, at *3-5 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2026). In Wysocki, the plaintiffs’ firearm licenses

were suspended after they failed to provide letters from their daughter’s mental health specialists

and purchase particular kinds of safes to store their weapons. Id. The court held that the criteria

for reinstating the plaintiffs’ licenses did not stem from any law or policy, but from the

defendants’ own determination which was unsupported by any historical analogue. Id. at *5.

Specifically, the court observed,

[d]efendants present zero evidence that the PLS's actions are consistent with the

Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. They provide no citation to law,

tradition, or any other evidence, nor do they provide a particular historical analogy

to match the practices employed against the Wysockis. Instead, they rely on Rahimi,

which is inapposite. … Instead, it was based on the Wysockis’ daughter's mental-

health emergency and her danger to herself, based on firearms owned by others.

And Defendants’ ongoing refusal to return the firearms or licenses appears to be

entirely arbitrary or unlawful—it is based not on any existence of mental health

treatment or even current threat that the daughter poses to herself or others.

Id.

Here, Defendants likewise fail to identify a single historical analogue to support this case-

by-case review. Their opposition is devoid of any justification that stems back to other consistent

historical traditions or case law to draw from. In short, Defendants have failed to carry their

burden under Bruen. Rather, Defendants focus on distinguishing its policy from that of Milau

and conclude that its policy is justified under Antonyuk. (ECF No. 32-9 at 7-9.) This is not

enough. Defendants cannot automatically suspend a license when it is based on a cohabitant’s

existence of a volatile situation and not that of the licensee. There is no historical analogue.

Cafarella himself testified that he did not believe that Plaintiffs were dangerous people, nor did

he find that they were threats to public safety. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 54-55.) Furthermore,

Cafarella found that Plaintiffs’ weapons were securely stored. (ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 93; ECF No.

32-8 at ¶¶ 26-27.) Relying on Plaintiffs’ failure to provide requested documentation from their

daughter’s mental health professional as a basis for maintaining a pistol licenses suspension after

already finding that Plaintiffs pose no threat directly runs contrary to the Second Circuit’s

decision in Antonyuk. Antonyuk makes clear that cohabitant status is relevant to an individual’s

pistol license application insofar as it provides insight into the applicant’s own character. See

Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1001. And, at oral argument Defendants’ sole attempt to articulate a

historical analogue failed as Defendants focused on the character and fitness of a licensee. In

other words, the reasonable inquiry that a licensee is of good moral character is not connected to

a cohabitant’s mental health circumstances.6 Simply put, Defendants have the burden to

overcome the presumption that Plaintiffs’ individual conduct is not protected, which they failed

to do.

B. Monell Liability

Having found that Defendants failed to overcome the constitutionally protected

presumption of the Second Amendment, the issue of liability as to Nassau County must be

analyzed next.

“[S]ection 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method

for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred[.]” Greenidge v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't,

No. 25-CV-03604 (SJB) (JMW), 2025 WL 2645549, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2025) (quoting

Schuloff v. Queens Coll. Found., Inc., 165 F.3d 183, 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Section 1983 provides in relevant part as follows:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

6 At oral argument, Defendants for the first time raised an incident with Plaintiffs’ daughter from 2017,

which was allegedly not reported as another basis for suspension. However, that is not in the record.

A municipality is subject to liability under § 1983 when that government’s policy or

custom causes a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of- New York, 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A plaintiff may establish a policy or custom in one of four ways: “by

alleging the existence of (1) a formal policy; (2) actions taken or decisions made by final

municipal policymakers that caused the violation of plaintiff's rights; (3) a practice so persistent

and widespread that it constitutes a custom or usage and implies the constructive knowledge of

policymakers; or (4) a failure to properly train or supervise municipal employees that amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of those whom municipal employees will come into

contact.” Aquino v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-1577 (GHW), 2017 WL 384354, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2017). “[A]bsent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be

held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee.” Jones v. Town of East

Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Hall v. New York City Dep't of Corr., No. 22-

CV-5738 (AMD) (MMH), 2022 WL 17811474, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,

2022) (quoting Halperin v. New York City Dep't of Correction, No. 19-CV-6266, 2019 WL

6328775, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019)). Because Monell prohibits respondeat superior

liability, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was

the moving force behind the injury alleged.” Wysocki, 2026 WL 1965726, at *7 (quoting Agosto,

982 F.3d at 97). “In order to prove Monell liability based on a custom theory, the plaintiff must

establish an unwritten practice that is so widespread as to have the force of law.” MacDonald,

2026 WL 1453872 at *13 (citations modified) (citing Agosto, 982 F.3d at 98).

Here, Defendants’ contention that there was no policy because the review was “case-

specific” fails, because it ignores the independent ways in which Monell liability is established,

and the Handbook itself is a policy that serves as a basis for liability. (ECF No. 26-10 at 13-14;

ECF No. 31 at 14.) Second, Cafarella’s testimony that the mental health status of a household

member of a pistol licensee has served as the basis for suspending other individual’s pistol

licenses is sufficient for establishing a “persistent and widespread” custom. (ECF No. 26-10 at

13-14; ECF No. 31 at 14.) Finally, the suspension was carried out by officials with final

policymaking authority over pistol licensing. (ECF No. 26-10 at 14; ECF No. 31 at 15.)

The Handbook contains a written policy that states,

[a] pistol license may be suspended and/or revoked based upon evidence of any

disqualification pursuant to this Handbook or applicable law. The policy of the

Nassau County Police Department is to immediately suspend the pistol license of

any licensee who violates any of the terms and conditions of the license or this

Handbook and commence an investigation to determine whether or not the license

should be revoked. Violations of the terms and conditions of the pistol license

include, but are not limited to….

(ECF No. 31-8 at 22.)

Defendants’ stated policy is to suspend immediately if a licensee violates the terms and

conditions of the license or the Handbook.

The Handbook further provides that a licensee is required to report when “the licensee or

a member of the licensee’s household “receives professional treatment for mental health issues,”

“is admitted to any public or private hospital for the treatment of mental health issues” or “[a]ny

incident involving a licensee where there is police response, whether it involves the licensee or

any other resident or guest in or at their home or place of business. This includes police response

to any location that is non-domestic whereby a licensee is the subject, witness or third party

involved.” (Id. at 31-32 (Handbook, Ch. 2 §§ F(13)–(14), (19).)

The remaining analysis is dependent on whether Cafarella’s testimony is too speculative

to serve as the basis for establishing that a custom exists. Recently, Judge Bulsara found that

testimony stating that a license suspension based a cohabitant’s mental health treatment “ha[ve]

happened” and “could happen” was not enough to establish a “general practice”. Wysocki, 2026

WL 1965726, at *8 (“Nor have the Wysockis established that there is a general practice to

interpret or implement the Handbook in the way it was implemented against them. … [The

officers’] testimony is hardly as definitive as the Wysockis suggest, and certainly insufficient to

sustain a Monell claim.”)7 Interestingly though, the above illustrates that this is at least the

second time that a similar scenario has occurred.

Courts have routinely found that officer testimony is sufficient for establishing a custom

or policy. See, e.g., Torcivia v. Suffolk County, 17 F.4th 342, 355–56 (2d Cir. 2021) (finding that

deposition testimony of a responding officer on the policy at issue was sufficient for a reasonable

jury to conclude that it was the “standard procedure” of the County); Kellner v. County of

Nassau, No. 21-CV-3990 (AMD) (ST), 2026 WL 879662 at *13 (describing that the defendant’s

statement conceding to a procedure in Court was sufficient to establish the existence of a Monell

policy where defendant admitted to a “procedure . . . [f]or good or bad” that was followed in all

cases); Milau, 2025 WL 1029394 at *11 (“Moreover, the testimony of multiple Suffolk County

employees establishes the existence of a formal policy prohibiting an applicant from receiving a

pistol license if he lives with someone who is prohibited from owning a firearm.”). However, the

officers affirmatively testified that a policy existed in the aforementioned cases unlike in

Wysocki, where Judge Bulsara found the testimony too speculative. The following page excerpts

of relevant portions from Cafarella’s testimony and from the testimony of the investigating

officer in Wysocki.

7 The Court notes that the Plaintiffs in Wysocki have moved for reconsideration of Judge Bulsara’s

decision. (See Wysocki, Case No. 2:23-cv-08790(SJB)(AYS), ECF Nos. 43, 47.) However, that

application is not fully briefed.

Cafarella’s Testimony

33

grounds for suspension in -- withdrawn.

Under the terms of the

handbook then, failure to notify the

pistol license section that a member of

the household has mental health treatment

is grounds for suspension?

A Yes. It could be considered

grounds for suspension.

oO Okay. And it has been

grounds for suspension in the past?

A As far as I Know, yes.

O It was grounds for suspension

for the Ganz's?

A Yes.

oO What was the first thing that

you did when you received the information

about the Ganz's in your mailbox?

A The first thing I did, I know

I, I believe, within a couple of a days,

I reached out to Mr. Ganz, just to go

over the events.

I know I did ask him for a

letter of explanation.

S50 generally, when we get

((ECF No. 31-4 at 33:1-25.)

23

Scaglione’s Testimony from Wysocki

Scaglione 60

the time in February of 2023?

A Who were my supervisors in

the pistol license section?

Qo Right.

A That would be Lieutenant

Timpano and Sergeant Russell.

QO I'm going to say was it

common or was it the practice generally

in the pistol license section if there

was a family member or cohabitant who had

mental health issues or was suicidal or

was transported for evaluation or was

hospitalized or had some other

disqualifying condition that the

licensee's pistol licenses be suspended?

A That has happened, yes.

Oo So can we agree then that

there was an understanding and that's I

guess what you were acting on in the

pistol license section, that if there was

a household member or cohabitant who was

disqualified from possessing firearms or

who had mental health issues that the

pistol licenses would be suspended and

Rich Moffeti Cour Reporting, Inc.————_

(Wysocki v. Nassau County, et al., No. 23-CV-8790(SJB)(AYS) (ECF No. 32-11 at 60:1-25.)

24

Scagliane 62

your training in the pistol License

section that if a licensee lived with a

person who had a mental health issue or

was getting mental health treatment ofr

Was Suicidal that the licensee's pistol

license would be suspended and their guns

would be confiscated?

A That could happen, yes.

oO Have you ever seen it not

happen?

A I don't -- I don't remember.

(Id. at 62:1-12.)

The testimony in this case is less speculative than that proffered in Wysocki. Thus, this is

more in line with those other cases that have relied on officer testimony. See, e.g., Torcivia, 17

F 4th at 355-56; Kellner, 2026 WL 879662 at *13; Milau, 2025 WL 1029394 at *11. A policy or

custom does exist. (ECF No. 31-4 at 33:1-25; see also ECF No. 31-8.)

Defendants’ arguments as to a case-by-case review fail because it stems from their

custom, nonetheless. Defendants’ conduct — suspension due to a cohabitant’s mental health

treatment which was not reported — 1s causally connected to Plaintiffs’ deprivation of their

constitutional rights for thirteen months.* Indeed, the immediate suspension policy is

While Plaintiffs no longer move for summary judgment on a Fourteenth Amendment claim or any due

process claim, it is worth noting that “Courts in this district have held, and the Second Circuit has

affirmed, that the NCPD's policy for the return of confiscated long guns provided inadequate post-

deprivation process.” Kellner, 2026 WL 879662, at *11 (collecting cases on the issue). This would likely

be an issue as Plaintiffs immensely disagree with Defendants’ “lengthy cool down period”. (See ECF

Nos. 26-10 12, 14; 31 at 9.)

25

problematic. It allows the PLS to suspend licenses and then take their time with “investigating”

the circumstances that led to the suspension. The Handbook states, that the “policy of the Nassau

County Police Department is to immediately suspend the pistol license of any licensee who

violates any of the terms and conditions of the license or this Handbook and commence an

investigation to determine whether or not the license should be revoked.” (ECF No. 31-8 at 22

(Handbook, Ch. 1 § I (2).) Therefore, Plaintiffs have made the required showing for Monell

liability. See Jones v. Westchester Cnty. Dep't of Corr. Med. Dep't, 557 F. Supp. 2d 408, 417

(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (“First, the plaintiff ‘must prove the existence of a

municipal policy or custom’ that caused his injuries. Second, the plaintiff must establish a causal

connection between the policy and the alleged civil rights violation.”)

C. Qualified Immunity

The concept of qualified immunity “shields government actors, … from liability for

actions taken in their official capacity –– providing ‘ample protection to all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Sacaza v. City of New York, 169 F.4th

363, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir.

2017)). To determine whether a government official is protected, “courts consider: (1) whether

the facts evince that the police officer violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether

‘the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. (citations omitted).

“Courts may elect to address these elements in any order ….” O’Pharrow v. County of Suffolk, et

al., No. 22-CV-3773-SJB-JMW, 2026 WL 1948851, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2026) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing id.).

“Under the ‘clearly established’ prong, the focus is ‘whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Matusak v.

Daminski, 165 F.4th 702, 711 (2d Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). As to the second prong, “[e]ven

if an [official] violated a plaintiff's clearly established rights, [the official] will still be entitled to

qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his acts did not violate

those rights.” Shea v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 2:21-CV-5696 (NJC) (LGD), 2026 WL 948364,

at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2026) (quoting Baltas v. Chapdelaine, 153 F.4th 328, 335 (2d Cir.

2025)); see also Matusak, 165 F.4th at 711 (internal citation omitted) (“To that end, qualified

immunity's protections apply ‘regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake

of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’ Any mistake,

however, must be ‘reasonable.’”). Likewise, “[q]ualified immunity is usually a game of find-

that-case, but not always. Common sense still plays a role. This Court can examine, for example,

whether qualified immunity applies based on the ‘obviousness’ of the alleged Constitutional

violation—even in the absence of a controlling case exactly on point.” Seweid v. Cnty. of

Nassau, No. 21-CV-03712 (JMA)(AYS), 2024 WL 693981, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2024).

Plaintiffs withdrew their individual capacity claims against Commissioner Ryder while

maintaining their official capacity claims against him, “as he is the proper party to be named in

connection with their declaratory and injunctive relief claims.” (ECF No. 31 at 1 n.1.) Likewise,

Plaintiffs withdrew their individual capacity claims against Lt. Timpano, as he retired prior to the

relevant dates. (Id.) Thus, the two claims left are (i) the claim against Commissioner Ryder in his

official capacity and (ii) the claim against Cafarella in his individual capacity. (Id. at 18.)

Personal[ ]capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government

official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official[ ]capacity suits, in

contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent. see, e.g., Ware v. City of Lackawanna, 2009

WL 3464057, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (“It is settled that a suit against a

municipal officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against

the entity of which the officer is an agent.”) Thus, [a]s long as the government entity

receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official[ ]capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. And for that

reason, courts routinely dismiss official capacity claims ... as redundant or

duplicative of claims against the municipality itself.

Andrews v. Town of W. Seneca, No. 21-CV-746-LJV, 2025 WL 959658, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.

31, 2025) (most internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (dismissing claims against

individual defendants in their official capacities as duplicative); see also Schubert v. City of Rye,

775 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699–700 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal citations omitted) (dismissing official

capacity claims) (“[w]here the governmental entity can itself be held liable for damages as a result

of its official policy, a suit naming the legislators in their official capacity is redundant. … In other

words, the injuries that Plaintiffs have allegedly suffered came as a result of an alleged official

policy of the municipal entity.”)

“[A] plaintiff must establish a given defendant's personal involvement in the claimed

violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity under § 1983.” Curry v.

John Theos, et al., No. 24-CV-4603-GHW, 2026 WL 1948279, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2026)

(quoting Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Cases analyzing the Second Amendment and whether regulations and policies are

constitutional following Bruen have come to different conclusions on whether such regulations

or policy may continue or whether violations did in fact occur. See United States v. Hemani, 146

S. Ct. 1677, 1698 (2026) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“…it is unsurprising that Bruen’s test is

vulnerable to inconsistent and arbitrary application, as judges draw different conclusions from

the same historical evidence and reach divergent assessments of the same laws.”); see also

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29 (“[W]e do not now provide an exhaustive survey of the features that render

regulations relevantly similar under the Second Amendment[.]”) (citation modified) (emphasis

added); see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 741 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“This case highlights the

apparent difficulty faced by judges on the ground. Make no mistake: Today's effort to clear up

‘misunderstandings,’ is a tacit admission that lower courts are struggling.”) (citations omitted).

It therefore follows, it would be quite harsh to hold individuals assessing a person’s right to carry

a firearm to a higher standard than those in the courts. See Milau, 2025 WL 1029394, at *11

(“The mere existence of Heller . . . did not render every licensing scheme unconstitutional,

and Heller was silent as to whether a cohabitant-based restriction like that at issue here would

survive any level of scrutiny”). While the Second Circuit provides a thorough analysis in

Antonyuk, the decision clearly leaves the exact bounds of officer discretion in connection with

“licensing regimes” as an open question. See Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 994-95. Simply put, until

the law on the discretion of officers in firearm licensing regimes is clearly defined and settled,

there is no clearly established right that has been violated in the qualified immunity context. See

Milau, 2025 WL 1029394, at *10 (granting summary judgment to all individual defendants as to

qualified immunity for the Second Amendment violation claim) ; see also id. (citing and

describing Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty., New York, 409 F. Supp. 3d 19, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), aff'd, 17

F.4th 342 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[I]n Torcivia … another court in this District concluded that Suffolk

County had an ‘important interest in limiting the ability of those individuals who suffer from

mental health issues or are involved in domestic incidents to access firearms.’ The Torcivia court

upheld Suffolk County's policy of revoking a pistol license when a licensee was transported by

the SCPD to a mental health facility. … [This] supports the Court's position that, prior to Bruen,

the constitutionality of the policy at issue here was not clear.”)). Also, the record demonstrates

that Cafarella suspended Plaintiffs’ pistol licenses under the direction of then-Sgt. Russell of the

PLS. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 20-21.) It is apparent that Cafarella believed that his actions were

reasonable and pursuant to the directions of his superiors. To hold otherwise would not allow

police investigators to conduct their investigations without the fear of civil liability rather than

determining the circumstances of a licensee properly. As Defendants put it, “[t]he same

allegations against the individual defendants are indistinguishable from those asserted against the

County.” (ECF No. 37 at 1.)

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claim against Commissioner Ryder in his official capacity likewise

fails. Courts have routinely dismissed official capacity suits against municipal officers when a

claim against the municipality itself also exists on the grounds that the official capacity claim is

redundant. See Schubert, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (finding a claim against a mayor to be redundant

to a claim against the municipality); see also Carmody v. Vill. of Rockville Ctr., 661 F.Supp.2d

299, 329 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (internal citations omitted) (“Based on the foregoing, to the extent the

individual defendants, McKeon and Burke, are being sued in their official capacities, any claims

against them are ‘merely duplicative of the action against the [Village].’”) As the statutory

licensing officer for Nassau County under N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00, Commissioner Ryder is an

executive official endowed with direct enforcement authority over the PLS Handbook. (ECF No.

32-7 at 1.) As Commission Ryder serves in an official capacity in matters pertaining to the PLS

Handbook, Plaintiffs’ claim against him in his official capacity is thus, redundant to Plaintiffs’

claim against Nassau County. Therefore, the official capacity claim against Commissioner Ryder

is dismissed.

Accordingly, following “the general purpose of qualified immunity” which is “to provide

government officials with the ability reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise

to liability for damages,” rather than to reward “incompetent” conduct, the Court grants

summary judgment as to the individual Defendants on the ground of qualified immunity.

McClarin v. City of New York, No. 23-7310, 2026 WL 2015063, at *12 (2d Cir. July 13, 2026)

(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)).

D. Permanent Injunction

“To obtain a permanent injunction, ‘a plaintiff must succeed on the merits and show the

absence of an adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm if the relief is not granted.’ The

decision of whether to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion

by the Court.” Superb Motors Inc. v. Deo, 776 F. Supp. 3d 21, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2025), adhered to

in part on reconsideration, No. 23-CV-6188 (JMW), 2025 WL 2178194 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1,

2025), and motion to certify appeal denied, No. 23-CV-6188 (JMW), 2026 WL 130912

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2026) (internal citations omitted); see also Nastri v. Dykes, 807 F. Supp. 3d

112, 130 (D. Conn. 2025) (“The standard for a permanent injunction is similar to the standard for

a preliminary injunction, except that the moving party must show actual success on the merits,

rather than a likelihood of success.”) In order for a court to grant a permanent injunction, a party

must satisfy each of the four factors:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such

as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy

in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a

permanent injunction.

Daniels v. Moores, No. 24-30-PR, 2025 WL 883035, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2025) (internal

citations omitted).

In order for the Court to grant a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs must establish all four of

the above factors, which they cannot do here.9 The second factor – that a remedy at law must be

inadequate – is simply not met. Here, Plaintiffs endured a year-long suspension of their pistol

licenses. (ECF No. 32-8 at ¶¶ 21, 75-76; ECF No. 31-9 at ¶ 117.) However, their licenses have

9 It has been found that “[i]mpairment of constitutional rights can undoubtedly constitute irreparable

injury.” Milau, 2025 WL 1029394, at *9 (quoting Time Warner Cable of New York City v. Bloomberg

L.P., 118 F.3d 917, 924 (2d Cir. 1997)); see Milau, 2025 WL 957533, at *3 (finding irreparable harm for

a Second Amendment violation). However, the Second Circuit has not yet ruled on whether a Second

Amendment violation causes irreparable injury. In the context of injunctions, the Second Circuit

“‘presume[s] irreparable harm for alleged deprivations of certain constitutional rights,’ namely in First,

Fourth, and Eighth Amendment contexts, but . . . declin[es] to decide whether Second Amendment

infringement presumptively causes irreparable harm.” Care One, LLC v. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd., 166 F.4th

335, 348 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting National Ass'n for Gun Rts. v. Lamont, 153 F.4th 213, 248 (2d Cir.

2025)).

been reinstated, and their argument that the County’s policy remains and can serve as a basis for

future unconstitutional suspensions, is not enough to grant a permanent injunction for an as-

applied violation as found here. There are other adequate remedies for the thirteen-month

suspension, namely, damages to be determined at trial. Also, there is no irreparable harm given

that the licenses are reinstated. Accordingly, since there is an adequate remedy at law, that could

adequately compensate Plaintiffs for their injury, the remaining factors need not be decided.10

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 29) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Having determined liability on

Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment Claim, trial on damages shall commence on March 1, 2027, at

9:30 a.m. The parties shall appear for an in-person Final Pretrial Conference on November 30,

2026, at 10:00 a.m., and shall file a Joint Pretrial Order in accordance with the undersigned’s

Individual Practice Rules on or before November 23, 2026.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

August 24, 2026

S O O R D E R E D:

James M. Wicks

/S/_

JAMES M. WICKS

United States Magistrate Judge

10 The Court having declined to enter a permanent injunction notes that in Wysocki , the Plaintffs’

firearms were revoked and Judge Bulsara found they were “entitled to an injunction requiring the return

of their firearms and the reinstatement of their pistol licenses,” which is entirely different than the facts at

hand. 2026 WL 1965726, at *6; see also Milau, 2025 WL 1029394, at *6 , 9 (granting a permanent

injunction for a facial challenge and finding that the formal policy “of denying pistol licenses to

individuals who live with someone who is legally barred from possessing a firearm,” was facially

unconstitutional).