Pike

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT PIERCE DIVISION

CASE NO. 25-14267-CIV-CANNON/McCabe

JUSTIN PIKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FORT PIERCE, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; DISMISSING COMPLAINT; AND CLOSING CASE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Magistrate Judge Ryon M. McCabe’s Report

and Recommendation (“Report”) on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [ECF No. 74 (Report);

ECF No. 60 (Private Citizen Defendants’ Motion); ECF No. 61 (Law Enforcement Defendants’

Motion)]. The Report recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)

with prejudice [ECF No. 32]. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed Objections to the Report [ECF No.

81].1

The Court has reviewed the Report [ECF No. 74], Plaintiff’s Objections (deemed timely

filed) [ECF No. 81] and Defendants’ response thereto [ECF No. 83], Defendants’ Motions and

related briefing [ECF Nos. 60, 61, 64–68], and the full record. For the reasons set forth below, the

Report [ECF No. 74] is ACCEPTED, and the Motions [ECF Nos. 60, 61] are GRANTED.

1 Plaintiff filed his Objections a day late and thereafter filed a Motion to Accept Late-Filed

Objections, citing an unforeseen traffic accident outside the courthouse which prevented their

timely submission [ECF No. 82]. Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept Late-Filed Objections is

GRANTED, and the Court will consider them herein [ECF No. 82].

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a pro se civil rights case. The Court hereby incorporates Magistrate Judge

McCabe’s exhaustive recount of Plaintiff’s allegations in this case [ECF No. 74 pp. 1–10].2 To

give some abbreviated context, Plaintiff’s claims all arise out of the following four groups of

allegations:

• A personal dispute with a private acquaintance (Caroline Whiddon):

Plaintiff alleges that Whiddon struck Plaintiff multiple times without

provocation at a veterinary appointment, and then that she repeatedly called the

police to make false reports regarding Plaintiff—claiming that Plaintiff stole

her iPad and had no right to reside in a home they presumably shared—despite

a written settlement agreement the two had executed to resolve their ownership

disputes over the residence and a vehicle (a 2009 BMW).

• Two arrests on fabricated or unsupported charges: On June 21, 2025,

several Fort Pierce Police Department officers arrested Plaintiff for grand theft

auto at a gas station while he was fueling the aforementioned BMW, despite his

presentation of the settlement agreement establishing his ownership—charges

the state attorney later dropped following review of that agreement. Plaintiff

was again arrested on September 2, 2025, pursuant to a warrant he alleges was

fabricated, and remained jailed for over three weeks before the State Attorney

again declined to prosecute.

• A pattern of alleged police harassment and property seizure: Officers

conducted an unannounced welfare check at Plaintiff’s home, made threats of

arrest, and ultimately entered Plaintiff’s home without a warrant or eviction

order while standing by as Whiddon and movers removed nearly all of

Plaintiff’s belongings. Police also refused to return Plaintiff’s seized firearms

even after the first criminal case was dismissed.

• Alleged misconduct by a jailhouse inmate (Brigham Miller) acting in

coordination with Whiddon: While incarcerated, Miller repeatedly called

Plaintiff demanding he surrender the BMW and other property, threatening to

have him arrested or placed in violation of his bond—conduct Plaintiff alleges

was part of a broader conspiracy with Whiddon and certain law enforcement

officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

[ECF No. 74 pp. 1–10; see generally ECF No. 32].

2 No party takes issue with Magistrate Judge McCabe’s recitation of the facts.

There are three “buckets” of defendants in this case: (A) municipal entities (the City and

the Sheriff); (B) individual municipal employees (Officers Lopez, McWilliams, and Lewis as well

as Deputy Cruz); and (C) private actors (Whiddon and Miller) [ECF No. 32]. The operative SAC

alleges various constitutional violations against several different combinations of those

defendants: False Arrest and Unlawful Seizure against Officers Lopez, McWilliams, and Lewis

(in their individual capacities) and the City (Count 1); Malicious Prosecution against Officers

Lopez, McWilliams, and Lewis (in their individual capacities) and the City (Count 2); Deprivation

of Property and Firearms without Due Process against Officers Lopez, McWilliams, and Lewis (in

their individual capacities) and the City (Count 3); Unreasonable Search and Excessive Force

against Officers Lopez, McWilliams, and Lewis (in their individual capacities) and the City (Count

4); First Amendment Retaliation against Whiddon, Miller, Officer Lopez (in his individual

capacity), and the City (Count 5); Equal Protection and Denial of Justice against Officer Lopez

and Deputy Cruz (in their individual capacities), the City, and the Sheriff (Count 6); Failure to

Intervene against Officers McWilliams and Lewis (in their individual capacities), and the City

(Count 7); Civil Conspiracy against Officers Lopez, McWilliams, Lewis, and Deputy Cruz (in

their individual capacities), Whiddon and Miller, the City, and the Sheriff (Count 8); Municipal

Liability under Monell against the City and the Sheriff (Count 9); and Retaliatory Arrest against

the City and the Sheriff (Count 10) [ECF No. 32 pp. 25–43].

On March 31, 2026, after both the Law Enforcement Defendants and the Private Citizen

Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 60, 61], Magistrate Judge McCabe issued the

instant Report, which recommends dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiff’s claims

[ECF No. 74]. At a high level, the Report concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a

Monell claim against the City or the Sheriff (Counts 1–10); that the law enforcement officers

(Lopez, McWilliams, Lewis, and Cruz) possess qualified immunity as to all of Plaintiff’s alleged

constitutional violations because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for stealing

Whiddon’s BMW (Counts 1–8); and that the Private Citizen defendants are not state actors subject

to section 1983 liability (Counts 5 and 8) [see generally ECF No. 74].

Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report [ECF No. 81], making three principal objections.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Report errs by: (1) concluding that the law enforcement

officers are entitled to qualified immunity; (2) concluding that Whiddon and Miller are not state

actors subject to constitutional standards; and (3) misinterpreting and misanalysing several of

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims [ECF No. 81]. The Report is ripe for adjudication.

LEGAL STANDARDS ON REFERRAL

To challenge the recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written

objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which

objection is made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir.

1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de

novo those portions to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DISCUSSION

Upon de novo review of the Report and the full record, the Court agrees with the well-

reasoned Report and rejects Plaintiff’s numerous objections, addressed in turn below in the order

in which they are presented.3

3 Initially, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to voluntarily dismiss several of his claims without

prejudice (an embedded request within his Objections) [ECF No. 81 pp. 2–3]. First, Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41, which supplies the standards for voluntary dismissal, requires plaintiffs to

file a “notice of dismissal” to voluntarily dismiss claims before an Answer or Summary Judgment

motion is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Here, Plaintiff has not filed a notice of dismissal,

nor has he even cited Rule 41 in his embedded request [ECF No. 81 pp. 2–3]. Second, Plaintiff

may use Rule 41 only to dismiss “a defendant in its entirety (i.e., they dismiss all of the claims

brought against that defendant).” In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664, 677 (11th Cir. 2023). But Plaintiff

purports to voluntarily dismiss Count 4, which is asserted against Officers Lopez, McWilliams,

A. The Report properly concludes that, based on the allegations in the SAC, the

officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on June 21, 2025.

Plaintiff’s main objection to the Report is that it improperly finds “that Defendants had

arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff” on June 21, 2025, a conclusion that, according to

Plaintiff, “infects the Report’s treatment of the entire pleading” [ECF No. 81 pp. 1–2]. As noted

above, the Report determines that the law enforcement officers had arguable probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff on June 21, 2025, the consequence of which is that virtually all of Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims warrant dismissal [ECF No. 74 pp. 16–17 (explaining why arguable probable

cause defeats Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against the officers (Count 1)); pp. 18–20 (same for

malicious prosecution (Count 2)); pp. 20–21 (same for the initial seizure of property (Count 3));

pp. 23–24 (same for an unreasonable search) (Count 4)); p. 27 (same for retaliatory arrest (Count

5)); p. 30 (same for failure to intervene (Count 7)); pp. 30–31 (same for civil conspiracy (Count

8))].4

Plaintiff argues that, because the SAC alleges that, when he was arrested on June 21, 2025,

(1) he presented documentary proof of lawful ownership of the BMW; (2) the BMW had never

and Lewis, while keeping other claims against those same defendants—which would be an

impermissible use of Rule 41, even if Plaintiff had properly invoked it [ECF No. 81 pp. 2–3].

4 Plaintiff spends some time arguing that the Report “improperly treats probable cause as a

universal answer to every claim in the SAC,” citing malicious prosecution and retaliatory arrest

claims as those on which he thinks arguable probable cause is not dispositive in this case [ECF No.

81 pp. 11–12]. Plaintiff is incorrect. The presence of arguable probable cause defeats a claim of

malicious prosecution, so long as the probable cause is not negated by falsified warrants or

omissions, which, as Judge McCabe explained, is not the case here. See Black v. Wigington, 811

F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016); see also infra pp. 7–8 (addressing Magistrate Judge McCabe’s

fulsome disposition of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim). And, as the Report correctly

concludes, “[t]he existence of arguable probable cause defeats the causation element of Plaintiff’s

First Amendment retaliation claim,” at least where the claim is based on an arrest (which it is here)

[ECF No. 74 pp. 26–27 (noting that arguable probable cause entitles the arresting officer to

qualified immunity on a claim for First Amendment retaliatory arrest (citing Prospero v. Sullivan,

153 F.4th 1171, 1183–84 (11th Cir. 2025)))].

been reported stolen; and (3) the officers “initially recognized the matter as civil before reversing

course and effectuating an arrest,” the existence of arguable probable cause cannot be resolved at

the Motion to Dismiss stage [ECF No. 81 p. 6]. This objection fails. As Magistrate Judge McCabe

thoroughly explains, the SAC alleges that police officers arrived at the scene on June 21, 2025,

radioing in a “stolen vehicle” stop, and calling for backup [ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 41–47]. At that point,

“the arresting officers faced two sets of conflicting evidence. On the one hand, the vehicle had

been reported stolen; on the other hand, Plaintiff gave the officers a settlement agreement that

purportedly gave him the right to ownership” [ECF No. 74 p. 18]. As the Report correctly explains,

law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment merely because they weigh the

conflicting evidence in favor of an arrest. See Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th

Cir. 2022) (noting that an officer is “not required to believe [exculpatory evidence] or to weigh the

evidence in such a way as to conclude that probable cause did not exist”). And while Plaintiff

argues in his objections that the BMW was never actually reported stolen, the Court finds no such

allegation in the SAC; instead, the SAC clearly states that Officer Lopez “radioed in a ‘stolen

vehicle’ stop” [ECF No. 32 ¶ 42]. The Court need not draw the unreasonable inference from the

SAC that officers conducted a “stolen vehicle” stop without any report a “stolen vehicle.” See

Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the Court need only draw

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor); cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354

(2001) (holding that even minor offenses, such as a misdemeanors or traffic violations, may be the

bases for full custodial arrests).5

5 The Court is likewise unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s claims that the report “draws impermissible

inferences against Plaintiff,” “improperly resolves factual disputes,” and “[i]mproperly imports a

summary judgment standard” [ECF No. 81 pp. 8–11, 18]. The allegations supporting the “stolen

vehicle” stop and the corresponding evidence in front of the arriving officers at the scene are drawn

straight from the SAC, with neither embellishment nor minimization [ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 41–47].

Plaintiff’s first objection fails.

B. The Report correctly concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that

Defendants Whiddon and Miller are state actors.

Plaintiff’s second objection is to the Report’s conclusion that Defendants Whiddon and

Miller are private actors not subject to suit under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff argues

that the “Report treats the private defendants as mere complainants and fails to credit Plaintiff’s

allegations of coordinated and influential participation” in conjunction with law enforcement

[ECF No. 81 pp. 15–17]. As best the Court can tell, Plaintiff rests his state action arguments on

the Eleventh Circuit’s “joint action” test, arguing that the state became so intertwined with

Whiddon and Miller that they together became joint participants in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct. See Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

relevant inquiry under the nexus/joint action test is whether the State has so far insinuated itself

into a position of interdependence with the private parties that it was a joint participant in the

enterprise.” (alteration adopted) (quotation omitted)). This objection also lacks merit. As to

Whiddon, Plaintiff’s state action allegations (as narrowed to the June 21, 2025, arrest by Plaintiff’s

objections) are that she (1) was physically present during the arrest, (2) provided information for

the arrest, and (3) was “conferring with [officers] as they decided Plaintiff’s fate” [ECF No. 32

¶¶ 53–55 (emphasis added)]. But presence and police reports by themselves are insufficient to

turn a private actor into a state actor, see Brivik v. Murray, No. 11-CV-2101-T-33, 2012 WL

4761367, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2012), aff’d, 545 F. App’x 804 (11th Cir. 2013) (collecting

cases), and Plaintiff even admits that the officers—not Whiddon—were “deciding Plaintiff’s fate”

[ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 53–55]. As to Miller, Plaintiff’s state action argument hangs on the fact that he

used a prison phone to call Plaintiff and threaten him [ECF No. 81 p. 17]. But Plaintiff cites no

caselaw to support the notion that the use of a telephone in a state facility turns a private actor into

a state actor, nor will this Court be the first to so hold. See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1131

(11th Cir. 1992) (noting that private parties can only be viewed as state actors “in rare

circumstances”). Even taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Whiddon and Miller are state actors.

Plaintiff’s second objection fails.

C. The Report accurately addresses Plaintiff’s claims as pled by Plaintiff.

Last, Plaintiff faults the Report for failing to properly account for Plaintiff’s allegations of

post-arrest conduct, such as his faulty warrant allegations and the continuation of criminal

proceedings against him, instead relying “on the same probable-cause assumptions applied to the

[June 21, 2025] arrest itself” [ECF No. 81 pp. 18–19]. But the Report did address those allegations,

when necessary. For example, while Plaintiff says the Report neglected Plaintiff’s allegations of

post-arrest conduct (such as the falsifying of arrest reports) as to his malicious prosecution claim,

Magistrate Judge McCabe indisputably addressed “the arresting officers’ reports and affidavits,”

concluding that even if Plaintiff was correct that the officers had knowingly omitted or suppressed

exculpatory evidence from those reports—namely, Plaintiff’s settlement agreement for the BMW

with Whiddon—arguable probable cause remained for his arrest [ECF No. 74 pp. 18–20].

To the extent Plaintiff faults Magistrate Judge McCabe for failing to address certain

allegations as they relate to certain claims, that is Plaintiff’s fault—not Judge McCabe’s. On

October 28, 2025, while dismissing Plaintiff’s first Complaint as a “shotgun pleading,” the Court

warned Plaintiff that the SAC should “clearly explain what each particular defendant did in

reference to each claim, provide supporting facts to show why that person is being sued, and

identify clearly the legal basis underlying each count asserted” [ECF No. 30 p. 3]. Despite that

warning, each Count in the SAC incorporates all 140 paragraphs of factual allegations into all ten

causes of action [see generally ECF No. 32]; see Warren v. Devanguardia, No. 25-CV-1573, 2025

WL 2770882, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2025) (noting Plaintiffs should “incorporate into

each count only those factual allegations necessary to support the count”); Knight v. TransUnion,

LLC, No. 25-CV-691, 2025 WL 2770865, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2025) (same). Faced with

broad swaths of allegations seemingly unconnected to any particular count, Magistrate Judge

McCabe was tasked to “cull through the allegations, identify the claims, and, as to each claim

identified, select the allegations that appear to be germane to the claim.” Ledford v. Peeples, 657

F.3d 1222, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). To do so, he correctly relied upon the explicit factual content

pled within each Count to focus Plaintiff’s claims. So, for example, when Plaintiff limited Count

1 (False Arrest) to his June 21, 2025, arrest [ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 167–176], Magistrate Judge McCabe

correctly did the same [ECF No. 74 pp. 16–18]. But in Count 5 (First Amendment Retaliation),

when Plaintiff explicitly referenced an arrest “after he had filed written complaints against

Defendant Whiddon and Lopez” [ECF No. 32 ¶ 208], Magistrate Judge McCabe responded

accordingly, this time making sure to address “the arrest on September 2, 2025” [ECF No. 74

p. 27].

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s third objection fails.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 74] is ACCEPTED.

2. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 60, 61] are GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.6

4. Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept Late-Filed Objections [ECF No. 82] is GRANTED.

6 As Judge McCabe correctly explains, “Plaintiff should be given no further opportunities to amend

his pleadings as he has had multiple opportunities to do so in the past” [ECF No. 74 p. 34; see ECF

No. 1 (Complaint); ECF No. 11 (Amended Complaint); ECF No. 32 (Second Amended

Complaint)]. Additionally, on this record, the Court finds amendment would be futile. See Bryant

v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s claims are thus dismissed with

prejudice.

CASE NO. 25-14267-CIV-CANNON/McCabe

5. Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct the Docket/Record [ECF No. 77] is DENIED.’

6. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 21st day of August 2026.

XX, CANNON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

After the Report was issued, Plaintiff moved to “correct the docket,” explaining that he intended

to attach several exhibits accompanying the Temporary Restraining Order to his SAC, such that

the Court could consider them in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 77]. Aside from the

fact that a Court’s review at the Motion to Dismiss stage is generally “limited to the four corners

of the complaint,” St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), Plaintiff did

not cite to any of these exhibits in his objections to the Report or explain why they might be

considered at this stage. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Correct the Docket/Record

[ECF No. 77] is DENIED.

10