Vaccianna

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Miami Division

Case Number: 25-24636-CIV-MORENO

TIANDRA VACCIANNA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI,

Defendant.

eee

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This case involves an employment discrimination action arising from Plaintiff Tiandra

Vaccianna’s allegations that Defendant University of Miami failed to accommodate her disability

and interfered with her use of medical leave. Plaintiff brings six claims under the Florida Civil

Rights Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act for failure

to accommodate, interference, and retaliation. The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts

I and II because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that she was a qualified individual capable of

performing the essential functions of her position, with or without accommodation. The Court

denies the Motion as to all remaining Counts.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant hired Plaintiff in October 2021 as a Customer Service Representative. In

August 2022, Plaintiff began working as a Contact Center Associate for Defendant. Plaintiff has

sickle-cell anemia, which she alleges substantially limits circulation, energy, and concentration

and requires ongoing treatment, monitoring, transfusions, hospitalization, and intermittent leave.

Plaintiff disclosed her condition to Defendant and sought intermittent medical leave.

By December 2022, Plaintiff alleges that she was eligible and approved for intermittent

leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). In June 2023, Plaintiff contends that

Supervisor Deana Oneto denied her protected medical-leave requests. Plaintiff complained to

Human Resources, and according to her Complaint, Human Resources agreed that the denials were

improper. Plaintiff was then reassigned to Supervisor Caral Avalos. Despite the reassignment,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continued requiring repeated and unnecessary medical

documentation, giving her attendance warnings, and treating her requests negatively.

In January 2024, Plaintiff suffered a medical emergency requiring hospitalization, a

cerebral angiogram, and a blood transfusion. She contends that her physician required a follow-up

appointment on January 25, 2024, to monitor for a delayed transfusion reaction. Plaintiff states

that Defendant refused to approve her absence because that date had not been specifically listed

on her earlier medical certification. According to Plaintiff, this omission was outside of her control

because of the nature of the medical emergency requiring the initial hospitalization. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant indicated the absence would be unprotected and subject to its attendance

point system, placing Plaintiff at risk of discipline and termination. Because she feared

accumulating attendance points and suffering disciplinary action, Plaintiff worked on January 25,

2024, rather than attending the follow up appointment. That night, Plaintiff alleges she suffered a

sickle-cell crisis and was hospitalized from January 26, 2024, through February 6, 2024, with life-

_ threatening complications.

During her hospitalization, Plaintiff alleges that Human Resources representatives

repeatedly called, texted, and emailed Plaintiff, demanding that she log into her work computer,

complete her timesheets, and submit additional medical paperwork. Plaintiff alleges that these

communications occurred while she was sedated and receiving treatment, interfering with her

recovery. On February 5, 2024, while Plaintiff was still hospitalized, Plaintiff emailed Human

Resources Representative Savoy Smith and complained about the communications, requesting an

accommodation to respond to all requests after she had recovered. Still, Plaintiff contends that the

demands continued. Fearing further interference of her rights and harm to her health and wellbeing,

Plaintiff resigned on February 12, 2024.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After her resignation, Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination and was issued a Right to Sue Letter. Plaintiff filed her

Complaint in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County

Florida. Defendant timely removed the action to this Court and filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, bringing six counts against

Defendant. Defendant filed the underlying Motion to Dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to

dismiss, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “While legal conclusions

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Jd. at

679. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a complaint must offer more than “labels

and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action.” Twombly, 550

USS. at 555 (citation omitted). The factual allegations must be enough to “raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” /d. (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues both that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and

that she fails to state a plausible cause of action as to each count of the Amended Complaint. The

Court addresses all arguments below.

I. Plaintiff Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's EEOC Charge is premised on claims of retaliation and

failure-to-accommodate during a six-week period in early 2024. Thus, Defendant contends,

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to all allegations outside the scope of

her EEOC Charge, i.e., as to all claims under the ADA and the Florida Civil Rights Act (““FCRA”)

that include allegations beyond the six-week period noted in her EEOC Charge. Plaintiff responds

that any facts alleged in the Complaint outside the six-week scope were included as background

evidence to illuminate the meaning of Defendant’s later actions.

To begin, the Court notes that Plaintiffs EEOC Charge is not an attachment to her

Amended Complaint. Defendant attached Plaintiffs sworn EEOC Charge to its Motion as Exhibit

A. Plaintiff does not argue against the inclusion of the EEOC Charge. Further, the Court may

consider the EEOC Charge “without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment because it is “(1) central to the plaintiff's claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its

authenticity is not challenged.” Veritas v. Cable News Network, Inc., 121 F.4th 1267, 1272 n.5

(11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024)).

The EEOC Charge contains the following allegations:

I have a qualified disability. I was hired by the above-named Respondents

September 09, 2023, as a Call Center Associate. The company employs at least 15

employees.

I requested a reasonable accommodation in the form of FMLA to attend

appointments, and I was denied an accommodation. Due to me being denied an

accommodation and not allowed to attend my appointment, I suffered

complications from my disability in January 2024. After being denied an

accommodation that caused me to suffer a medical emergency, I [was]

constructively discharged February 12, 2024.

I believe I have been discriminated and retaliated against because of my disability,

in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Amendments Act of 2008.

(D.E. 11-1 at 2).

A plaintiff's judicial complaint is not strictly limited to her EEOC charge. Rather, a

plaintiff may pursue claims that “amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus” the allegations in the

charge, and claims are permitted if they are “like or related to, or grew out of, the allegations

contained in her EEOC charge.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80

(11th Cir. 2004). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give the EEOC “the first

opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices” and promote “conciliation efforts.”

Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1983). As such, courts are

“extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under [employment

discrimination statutes].” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,

431 F.2d 455, 460-61 (Sth Cir. 1970)).

Plaintiffs EEOC Charge alleged that she requested an accommodation to attend medically

necessary appointments, that Defendant denied her request in January 2024, that she then suffered

a medical emergency related to her disability, and that she was constructively discharged on

February 12, 2024. (D.E. 11-1 at 2). Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint assert failure-to-

accommodate claims under the FCRA and ADA/ADAA based on that same alleged denial of

medically necessary leave and the events resulting in Plaintiffs alleged constructive discharge.

Counts V and VI likewise assert FCRA and ADA retaliation claims arising from Defendant’s

alleged treatment of Plaintiff in connection with her requests for disability-related leave and the

circumstances resulting in her alleged constructive discharge. Although the Amended Complaint

provides substantially greater factual detail than the EEOC Charge, the claims asserted in Counts

I, Il, V, and VI arise from the same alleged course of conduct identified in the Charge and could

reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC’s investigation of those allegations. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies.

Nor does the Court find that the inclusion of allegations predating the period expressly

described in the EEOC Charge requires dismissal of Counts I, II, V, or VI. The Amended

Complaint alleges, among other things, that Plaintiff had requested intermittent medical leave and

encountered difficulties obtaining such leave. Those allegations provide background and context

for the disability-related conduct identified in the Charge. See Nat] R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (explaining that prior acts may be used “as background

evidence to support a timely claim”). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to impose liability under the

ADA or FCRA for a discrete act of discrimination or retaliation that falls outside the scope of her

EEOC Charge, however, any such claim is unexhausted. But the presence of those factual

allegations does not warrant dismissal of the properly exhausted claims asserted in Counts I, UJ, V,

and VI.

I. Constructive Discharge

Next, Defendant argues that each of Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice

because each Count is premised, at least in part, on Plaintiff's alleged constructive discharge.

According to Defendant, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and cannot satisfy the high bar required to

establish constructive discharge. In support, Defendant attached Plaintiff's February 12, 2024

resignation letter, in which Plaintiff stated that she was resigning effective immediately because

she had “decided it’s the best decision for me.” (D.E. 11 at 4). The Court is unpersuaded.

Even assuming Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged constructive discharge, Defendant has

not shown that dismissal of any Count necessarily follows. As to Counts I and I], Plaintiff’s failure-

to-accommodate claims under the ADA and FCRA do not depend exclusively on her alleged

discharge. See Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023)

(“[D]iscrimination in the form of a failure to reasonably accommodate is actionable under the

ADA only if that failure negatively impacts the employee’s hiring, advancement, discharge,

compensation, training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment.”); see □□□□□

Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining

that disability discrimination claims brought under the FCRA are analyzed under the same

framework as the ADA). The same is true for Count III as constructive discharge is not an element

of an FMLA interference claim. See Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1241

(11th Cir. 2021) (“To establish an FMLA interference claim, an employee must show she was

entitled to a benefit under the FMLA and her employer denied her that benefit.”). Count IV

likewise survives regardless of Plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. See Strickland v. Water

Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that

to succeed on a retaliation claim a plaintiff must demonstrate that his employer “intentionally

discriminated against him in the form of an adverse employment action for having exercised an

FMLA right’). Finally, the same reasoning applies to Counts V and VJ as a retaliation claim under

the FCRA and ADA requires a materially adverse action, but that action need not be an actual or

constructive discharge. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)

(explaining that an action is materially adverse if it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”).

Accordingly, Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiff's constructive discharge allegations does

not provide a basis for dismissal with prejudice as to all six Counts. Constructive discharge is not

an element of Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate or FMLA interference claims, and Plaintiff's

retaliation claims do not rely exclusively upon her resignation as the alleged materially adverse

action. Counts IV through VI allege retaliatory conduct preceding Plaintiff's resignation, and

Counts V and VI expressly identify unwarranted threats of discipline and denial of the full benefit

of Plaintiffs accommodations, in addition to constructive discharge, as materially adverse actions.

At most, a determination that Plaintiff was not constructively discharged would eliminate her

resignation as a basis for establishing an adverse employment consequence and require the Court

to consider whether the remaining conduct alleged in each Count independently satisfies the

applicable statutory standard.

Plaintiff has not filed an independent claim for constructive discharge in the Amended

Complaint, nor will she be permitted to do so. Given the Court’s determination above that none of

Plaintiff's claims rely on a successful claim of constructive discharge, the Court does not reach

Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for constructive discharge.

II. Counts Iand JI: Failure to Accommodate

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for failure to accommodate in

Counts J and II because Plaintiff merely alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that she is qualified and

disabled without any supporting facts. Plaintiff responds that she pleads a specific disability —

sickle cel] anemia — that substantially limits major life activities.

A failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA/FCRA requires Plaintiff to allege three

elements: “(1) she was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she made a specific request for

a reasonable accommodation; and (3) her employer [] failed to provide a reasonable

accommodation, or engage in the requisite interactive process in order to identify a reasonable

accommodation.” D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1021 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citing Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999)).

A person is considered to be disabled under the ADA if she has “(a) a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (b)

a record of such an impairment; or (c) [is] regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1). Plaintiff alleges more than the conclusory assertion that she is disabled. In her Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff states that she has sickle-cell anemia, and alleges that this is a lifelong blood

disorder that requires ongoing monitoring, intermittent leave, transfusions, and hospitalization, and

that substantially limits circulation, energy, and concentration. These allegations are more detailed

than those found to be insufficient in the cases Defendant cites. See, e.g., Garcia v. Goodwill Indu.

of S. Florida, Inc., No. 18-25042-CIV, 2019 WL 6052814, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2019)

(finding failure to allege disability when plaintiffs “sole contention” was that her “medical

condition substantially limited her ability to go to work, a major life activity”); Andrews v. City of

Hartford, 700 Fed. Appx. 924, 926—27 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of a disability claim

because the plaintiff relied on the “conclusory statement that he was fired because of his disability,

which was not sufficient to state a discrimination claim”); Simpson v. Stepp’s Towing Serv., Inc.,

No. 8:24-CV-02932, 2025 WL 2719234, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2025) (dismissing disability

claim, which merely recited that plaintiff was “a member of a protected class under the ADA” and

“suffered from a mental or physical impairment which substantially limited one or more of her

major life activities”). At the pleading stage, these factual allegations are sufficient to plausibly

allege a disability under the ADA.

Defendant separately argues that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege she is a qualified

individual. Under the ADA, a “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that

such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Whether a plaintiff can perform the

essential functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation requires a fact-

intensive inquiry, and a court should consider the employer’s description of the job and “how the

job is actually performed in practice.” Samson vy. Fed. Exp. Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1201 (11th Cir.

2014) (citations omitted).

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts only that “[a]t all relevant times, [she] was

qualified to work for Defendant[].” (D.E. 9 12, 44, 77, 119, 160, 193). The Court does not

accept these legal conclusions as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Igbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Plaintiff states that she worked as a Contact Center Associate, but she does not explain what

the essential functions of her job are. Without more, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiffs

disability impacted her ability to perform the essential functions of a Contact Center Associate

with or without the accommodations she requested. Accordingly, Counts I and II must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim for failure to accommodate.

IV. Count Il: FMLA Interference

Next, Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that

Plaintiff was FMLA eligible but fails to support those allegations with facts. Plaintiff responds that

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she alleges entitlement and multiple denials and interference events, and thus states a claim for

FMLA interference with detailed factual allegations.

Under the FMLA, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the

exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided” by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

To state a claim for interference under the FMLA, “an employee must allege that he was entitled

to a benefit under the FMLA and was denied that benefit.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789

F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199,

1207 (11th Cir. 2001)). An eligible employee generally is one who has been employed by the

employer for at least twelve months and has completed at least 1,250 hours of service during the

twelve-month period preceding the requested leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).

Here, Plaintiff does more than assert in a conclusory fashion that she was FMLA eligible.

She alleges that she had been employed by Defendant since October 2021, had worked for

Defendant for at least twelve months and provided at least 1,250 hours of service during that

period, and that Defendant employed the requisite number of employees. (D.E. 9 81-82).

Plaintiff further alleges that she suffers from sickle-cell anemia, and that by December 2022, she

had become FMLA eligible and was approved for intermittent leave. (Ud. {| 83-84). Taken as true,

these allegations provide factual support for Plaintiffs assertions that she was an eligible employee

under the FMLA. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count III on this basis is denied.

V. Count IV: FMLA Retaliation

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim should be dismissed because she

fails to plead the requisite but-for causal connection between her alleged FMLA complaint and her

subsequent constructive discharge.' Plaintiff responds that she alleges a chain of retaliatory acts

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff fails to allege that she was an eligible employee under the FMLA. As stated

above, the Court finds that Plaintiff provides factual support for her assertions that she was an eligible employee.

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continuing after the June 2023 complaint and a renewed protected complaint on February 5, 2024,

just seven days before her resignation on February 12, 2024. Defendant replies that the clock for

temporal proximity begins to run from the earliest complaint—not the latest complaint, and as

such, her allegations of causation are not plausible.

To state a claim of retaliation under the FMLA, an employee must allege that: “(1) he

engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and

(3) that the decision was causally related to the protected activity.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207.

“The burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily

protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d

1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish causation based on temporal proximity

because the relevant period begins when Defendant first became aware of Plaintiff's protected

activity, rather than when Plaintiff most recently complained of FMLA interference. See Raspanti

v. Four Amigos Travel, Inc., 266 Fed. Appx. 820, 823 (11th Cir. 2008); Santiago v. Univ. of Miami,

No. 1:22-CV-23384, 2023 WL 3045417, at *11—12 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2023), R&R adopted, 2023

WL 3043414 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2023). But Plaintiffs retaliation claim is not premised solely on

her complaints concerning Defendant’s alleged FMLA violations. Plaintiff also alleges that she

requested FMLA leave in January 2024 and later exercised her FMLA rights “[w]hile hospitalized

and on protected medical leave” from January 26 through February 6, 2024. (D.E. 9 132-35).

The exercise of FMLA rights constitutes protected activity for purposes of an FMLA

retaliation claim. See Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1270-72 (11th

Cir. 2017). And where the alleged retaliation is based on an employee’s use of FMLA leave, the

Eleventh Circuit measures temporal proximity “from the last day of an employee’s FMLA leave

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until the adverse action at issue occurs.” Jd. at 1272. Here, Plaintiff alleges that her protected leave

continued through February 6, 2024, and that she was constructively discharged on February 12,

2024—six days later. At the pleading stage, that close temporal proximity is sufficient to plausibly

allege a causal connection between Plaintiff's exercise of FMLA rights and the alleged adverse

action. Accordingly, even assuming Plaintiff's renewed February 5 complaint does not

independently restart the temporal-proximity period under Raspaniti, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged

causation based on her exercise of FMLA-protected leave immediately preceding the alleged

adverse action.

VI. Counts V and VI: Disability Retaliation

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's EEOC Charge is premised solely on the alleged

denial of a “reasonable accommodation in the form of FMLA to attend appointments” which is

not protected activity as a matter of law. Plaintiff responds that her pleaded retaliation theory is

not limited to requesting leave—it is based on complaining about discrimination and unlawful

treatment. Defendant replies that Plaintiff's EEOC Charge does not reference any other request for

accommodation, nor does it reference any complaints of disability discrimination to support a

retaliation claim.

To state a claim for retaliation under the ADA and the FCRA, a plaintiff must allege “(1)

he engaged in statutorily protected expression, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) the adverse employment action causally was related to the protected expression.” Sicilia v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 279 Fed. Appx. 936, 939 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Higdon v. Jackson,

393 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege

the first element.

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Defendant’s argument appears to conflate the scope of Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge with the

sufficiency of the allegations in her Amended Complaint. The Charge determines the scope of the

claims Plaintiff administratively exhausted; it does not, once exhaustion is established, restrict

Plaintiff's complaint to the precise factual allegations contained therein. See Batson v. Salvation

Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327-31 (11th Cir. 2018) (considering the contents of plaintiff's EEOC

charge in determining the scope of administrative exhaustion and then separately evaluating the

merits of the retaliation claim). Rather, allegations in a judicial complaint may “amplify, clarify,

or more clearly focus” the allegations presented to the EEOC. Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279-80.

Accordingly, having concluded that Plaintiff exhausted the ADA and FCRA retaliation claims

asserted in Counts V and VI, the Court looks to the Amended Complaint to determine whether

Plaintiff plausibly alleges the elements of those claims.

The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by requesting

reasonable accommodations and by complaining about what she believed to be disability

discrimination and unlawful treatment related to her accommodations. A request for a reasonable

accommodation may itself constitute protected activity for purposes of an ADA retaliation claim.

Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendant responded to her protected activity by subjecting her to excessive documentation

demands, threats of discipline, continued obstacles, and ultimately constructive discharge. Thus,

Plaintiff does not merely rely upon Defendant’s denial of the requested accommodation as both

the underlying discrimination and the alleged retaliation, such that Counts V and VI are due to be

dismissed. See Calvo v. Walgreens Corp., 340 Fed. Appx. 618, 626 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining

that the denial of requested accommodations is not an unlawful act for the purposes of a retaliation

claim under the ADA).

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This conclusion does not alter the Court’s determination regarding the scope of Plaintiff's

administrative exhaustion. Although the Court considers the allegations of the Amended

Complaint in determining whether Plaintiff has plausibly stated a retaliation claim, those

allegations may not supply a new and independent basis for liability based on discrete acts falling

outside its scope. See Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279-80. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff relies on

earlier complaints or conduct not encompassed in the Charge, those allegations may provide

background and context for the retaliation claims properly before the Court, but they do not

independently support liability for an unexhausted act of retaliation. Counts V and VI therefore

proceed only to the extent they arise from the retaliation encompassed by Plaintiff's Charge.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is .

ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. Counts I and IT are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is further

ADJUDGED that Defendant shall file an Answer as to Counts ITI, IV, V, and VI no later

than September 24, 2026. we

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 2% of August 2026.

FEDERICO A. MORENO

UNITED STA’ DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

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