VANIHEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

DION JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00426-JRS-MG

)

FRANK VANIHEL, )

KEVIN GILMORE, )

ASHLY MOSELEY, )

RANDALL PERCELL, )

KATHERINE FISCHER, )

JACQUELYNNE PORTER, )

MEEKS, )

JACK HENDRIX, )

MATTHEW LEOHR, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND

DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff Dion Johnson has brought claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments for his placement in solitary confinement without meaningful review

and for housing him in inhumane conditions. Defendants have moved for summary

judgment. Dkt. [31]. Defendants also ask the Court to strike a document Mr. Johnson

filed that has characteristics of both a motion for summary judgment and a summary

judgment response. Dkt. [36]. For the reasons below the Court denies the motion to

strike and grants the motion for summary judgment.

I.

Motion to Strike

Defendants ask the Court to strike Mr. Johnson's February 9, 2026, filing as

both untimely and improper under the applicable federal and local rules. The filing

is styled as a brief in support of Mr. Johnson's own motion requesting partial

summary judgment, but no such underlying motion exists. Mr. Johnson neither cites

evidence in support of his contentions made in the filing nor submits evidence to be

considered alongside his filing. If the Court were to construe the filing as a motion for

summary judgment, it would be properly denied for failure to comply with Southern

District of Indiana Local Rule 56-1. So, instead, in the interest of justice, the Court

construes the filing, dkt. [35], as Mr. Johnson's response to Defendants' motion for

summary judgment. Construed as a response brief, the filing is not untimely. Also,

construing the filing as a response does not prejudice Defendants because they

included their reply in support of their motion for summary judgment inside their

motion to strike.

Defendants also correctly identify that the filing does not comply with the

federal and local rules concerning summary judgment briefs. Instead of striking the

filing on this ground, however, the Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to

rule on Defendants' motion on the merits presented in the summary judgment

briefing submitted by the parties. See Eubanks v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d

893, 898 (N.D. Ind. 2012) ("While trial courts have the discretion to enforce rules

strictly, they also can allow some leeway." (citing Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 887

(7th Cir. 2011)); S.D. Ind. L.R. 1-1(c) ("The court may, on its own motion or at the

request of a party, suspend or modify any rule in a particular case in the interest of

justice.").

For these reasons, the Court denies the motion to strike. Dkt. [36].

II.

Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead,

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When

reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all

reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It

cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment

because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827

(7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be

relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned

up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis

for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the

party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record,

including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to

properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the

movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

III.

Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the

Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at

572–73.

A. Defendants

At times relevant to the Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant Jack Hendrix was

the Executive Director for Classification at the Indiana Department of Correction's

("IDOC") Central Office. Dkt. 32-4 at 1. In this role, Defendant Hendrix would review

recommendations from facilities that housed inmates currently on Department-Wide

Restrictive Housing, Administrative ("DWRH-A") classification status and make

recommendations to those individuals within IDOC who had the authority to

reclassify them. Id. at 2-3.

At times relevant to the Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant Frank Vanihel was

the Warden of Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash"). Dkt. 32-6 at 1. In this

role, Defendant Vanihel did not have the authority to approve or initiate an

interfacility transfer or removal of an individual from DWRH-A classification status.

Id. at 2. All decisions regarding classification status for DWRH-A came from IDOC

Central Office, following a recommendation from facility staff. Id. Once an individual

was released from DWRH-A, it was Warden Vanihel's decision if the individual would

be allowed to re-enter general population based on a variety of factors including:

security needs of the facility, the individual's known gang affiliations, and available

bed space. Id.

At times relevant to the Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant Kevin Gilmore was

the Deputy Warden of Re-Entry at Wabash and during most of his time in that role

served as the Warden's designee for all facility level classification decisions. Dkt. 32-

7 at 1. Defendant Matthew Leohr was the Classification Supervisor at Wabash. Id.

In those respective roles, Defendant Leohr would prepare a response to grant

or deny a classification appeal, based on policy and review of information, and

Defendant Gilmore would receive that draft response and either sign it or send it

back to Defendant Leohr. Id. at 2. For individuals on DWRH-A status, the only

authority that Defendants Leohr and Gilmore had was to make a recommendation to

IDOC Central Office regarding an individual's status. Id.

Defendants Meeks, Jacquelynne Porter-Marts, and Katherine Fischer were

Unit Team Managers at Wabash, though Fischer was promoted to a Deputy Warden

in January 2024. Dkt. 1 at 3; dkt. 32-8 at 1.

Unit Team Managers are not involved in classification appeals or 7-day or 30-

day classification reviews aside from ensuring that those reviews were being

completed by the caseworkers and providing context regarding progress on

behavioral and educational programming. Dkt. 32-8 at 1.

At times relevant to the Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants Randall Purcell and

Ashly Moseley were caseworkers assigned to the Secured Confinement Unit ("SCU")

at Wabash. Dkt. 32-5 at 1–2.

B. Department-Wide Restrictive Housing, Administrative

DWRH-A is for individuals undergoing an inter-facility transfer who are

considered to represent threats to the secure operation of any IDOC facility that may

ultimately house them. Dkt. 32-4 at 2–3. When determining whether DWRH-A is

appropriate, the factors considered may include the individual's disciplinary history,

physical and mental health concerns, and release date. Id. at 1–2. The final

decisionmaker for DWRH-A status is the Deputy Commissioner of Operations, the

Regional Director, or their designee. Id. at 2–3.

Weekly and monthly reviews of classification status are done at the individual

IDOC facilities. Id. at 3. Upper-level appeals of the reviews go to the IDOC Central

Office, as do recommendations by facilities that an individual's DWRH-A status be

suspended. Id. at 4.

C. Classification and Facility History

Mr. Johnson was previously housed at New Castle Correctional Facility ("New

Castle"), and while there he pled guilty to fighting at the facility and was placed into

temporary restrictive housing. Dkt. 32-1 at 6; dkt. 32-3 at 10. Staff at New Castle

notified the IDOC Central Office of Mr. Johnson's disciplinary history and

recommended that Mr. Johnson be placed into DWRH-A status. Dkt. 32-3 at 10. In

their letter recommending this, they noted that "[h]e is identified as a member of the

Vice Lords security threat group with a high violence potential," had ten conduct

reports at his previous place of incarceration (eight of which were major), and was

found to not be at a risk of decompensation if placed in an SCU. Id.

Mr. Johnson was approved for DWRH-A status on March 5, 2023. Dkt. 32-3 at

12. He was then transferred from New Castle to Wabash on April 25, 2023, with

DWRH-A status. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 2. He was assigned to the SCU the entire time that

he was incarcerated at Wabash, and his caseworkers there were Defendants Purcell

and Moseley. Dkt. No. 32-5 at 1–2. Wabash's SCU caseworkers conduct classification

reviews for individuals in the SCU. Id. at 1.

Classification reviews involve review of the individual's recent conduct,

protective custody status, recent behavior towards IDOC staff, notes on the "offender

management system," and occasional discussions with the individuals themselves.

Id. at 2. For each subsequent review, this information is freshly examined to look for

updates and ensure the information is current. Id.

Mr. Johnson received a classification review on April 26, 2023. Dkt. 32-3 at 9.

He received another classification review (at his request) on June 27. Id. at 8.

Defendant Purcell recommended that Mr. Johnson remain DWRH-A pending a

status review. Id. On June 30, Mr. Johnson received a Behavior Modification Plan

listing expectations for his behavior. Dkt. 32-3 at 13. On July 27, the Unit Team

Manager, Deputy Warden, and Warden all chose not to recommend Mr. Johnson for

reclassification, citing his recent conduct. Id. at 22.

The November 27, 2023, report from Mr. Johnson's classification hearing

indicates that he was authorized to participate in educational programming available

to inmates within the SCU. Id. at 7. On December 1, Mr. Johnson was found guilty

of refusing an order while he was within the SCU. Id. at 14.

On January 16, 2024, Defendant Purcell reviewed Mr. Johnson's classification

status and did not recommend reclassification, noting a serious conduct violation that

had occurred just over a year prior and opining that Mr. Johnson needed positive

programming. Id. The supervisor of classification decided that Mr. Johnson would

remain on DWRH-A. Id. at 6. Mr. Johnson received a new Behavior Modification Plan

on January 29. Id. at 17.

On March 22, 2024, Defendant Moseley recommended Mr. Johnson be released

from DWRH-A. Id. at 4. The Classification Committee approved the recommendation,

indicating that Mr. Johnson would remain at DWRH-A status until he could be

transferred to a facility of the appropriate security level. Id. The Supervisor of

Classification approved the removal of Mr. Johnson's DWRH-A status on September

10. Id.

Because of Mr. Johnson's known affiliation with a prison gang active at

Wabash, Warden Vanihel determined that his placement into general population

while Mr. Johnson was still at Wabash could pose a security risk. Dkt. 32-6 at 2. Mr.

Johnson was transferred out of Wabash on December 12, 2024. Dkt. 32-2 at 1.

IV.

Discussion

A. Injury

Defendants argue that Mr. Johnson's complaint fails to state a claim because

he did not allege that he was physically injured by the claims at issue in this lawsuit.

They claim that this omission is fatal to his entire lawsuit. This is not the law. The

Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes a "limitation on recovery," stating that "[n]o

Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without

a prior showing of physical injury[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Seventh Circuit has

continuously interpreted this provision to mean that "a prisoner cannot

obtain compensatory damages without proving a physical injury." Thomas v. Illinois,

697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, psychological

harms alone may still give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation and provide a basis

for a civil action for nominal and punitive damages as well as injunctive

relief. Id. (citing Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Byrd

v. Hobart, 761 F. App'x 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2019). Therefore, Mr. Johnson's claims can

survive even without an allegation that he suffered a physical injury.

B. Eighth Amendment – Conditions of Confinement

Mr. Johnson alleges inhumane conditions of confinement. While in restricted

housing, he remained in his cell for 23 hours every day, and when he was allowed to

leave for recreation, he was placed in a filthy recreation cage. He also alleges that he

had problems with lighting, plumbing, heating, and ventilation while in the SCU.

Under the Eighth Amendment, "prisoners cannot be confined in inhumane

conditions." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). A conditions-of-confinement claim includes both

an objective and subjective component. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th

Cir. 2019). Under the objective component, a prisoner must show that the conditions

were objectively serious and created "an excessive risk to his health and safety." Id.

(cleaned up). Under the subjective component, a prisoner must establish that the

defendants had a culpable state of mind — that they "were subjectively aware of these

conditions and refused to take steps to correct them, showing deliberate indifference."

Thomas, 2 F.4th at 720. Proving the subjective component is a "high hurdle" that

"requires something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner's welfare in the

face of serious risks." Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458

(7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Neither "negligence [n]or even gross

negligence is enough[.]" Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008).

Defendants argue that they should receive summary judgment in their favor

on Mr. Johnson's conditions-of-confinement claim because they were not personally

responsible for the alleged conditions. "'To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff

must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a

constitutional right.'" Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). Indeed, "inaction following

receipt of a complaint about someone else's conduct is [insufficient]." Est. of Miller by

Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425 428 (7th Cir. 2017). In considering personal

responsibility, each defendant is considered independently. Whitfield, 76 F.4th at

706.

Mr. Johnson has designated no evidence to suggest that any of the defendants

bore responsibility for the conditions that led him to file suit. He also provides no

argument or even bare assertion in his response that summary judgment in favor of

Defendants should not issue on this claim. Because no evidence is identified to show

that any Defendant is personally responsible for the conditions of confinement giving

rise to the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court grants summary judgment in favor

of Defendants as to this claim.

C. Fourteenth Amendment – Administrative Segregation

Mr. Johnson alleges that he was not provided due process in regard to his long-

term stay in restricted housing at Wabash. He asserts that he was not given timely

and meaningful periodic reviews.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not create a due process

liberty interest in avoiding transfer within a correctional facility or remaining in the

general prison population. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222 (2005); Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Instead, an inmate will be entitled to due process

protections only when the more restrictive conditions pose an "atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. After Sandin, inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding

short-term transfer to segregation for administrative, protective, or investigative

purposes, even when they are subjected to harsher conditions as a result. See, e.g.,

Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 2008); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602,

608-09 (7th Cir. 2005). However, placement in long-term segregation approaching a

year or more can implicate a liberty interest, requiring further inquiry into whether

the conditions of confinement impose an atypical, significant hardship. See Marion v.

Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 2009) (determination of whether

240 days in segregation imposed an atypical, significant hardship could not be made

at the pleading stage); see also Atwater v. Nickels, No. 21-2510, 2022 WL 1468698, at

*1 (7th Cir. May 10, 2022) (citing Marion, 559 F.3d at 694-98) (same).

If placement in "administrative" segregation meets the "atypical and

significant hardship" standard, "the Due Process Clause mandates that prison

officials periodically review whether an inmate placed in administrative segregation

continues to pose a threat." Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983)). Although such periodic reviews need

not be formal and adversarial, they must be sufficient to ensure that administrative

segregation does not become a pretext for indefinite confinement. Id. The sufficiency

of periodic reviews is evaluated by considering "(1) the private interest (that is, [the

inmate's] interest) affected by a governmental decision, (2) the governmental

interests at stake, and (3) 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private]

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards.'" Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

335 (1976)). Although submission of new evidence or a full hearing may not be

necessary to meet the requirements of due process, "an actual review – i.e., one open

to the possibility of a different outcome – certainly is." Id. at 528.

Due process does not require periodic reviews to be formal or adversarial. Id.

at 472. Inmates are not ordinarily entitled to present evidence or statements. Id. at

477, n.9. Reviews may not be mere "meaningless, repetitive, and rote response[s]"

and must look to present and future conduct, as well as past. Id. at 527, 528 (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Similarly, due process does not require custodians to conduct their periodic

reviews according to rigid timelines. "The periodic review need only be sufficiently

frequent that administrative segregation does not become 'a pretext for indefinite

confinement of an inmate.'" Westerfer v. Neal, ,682 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477, n.9). Otherwise, the frequency of periodic reviews

"is committed to the discretion of the prison officials." Isby, 856 F.3d at 525.

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). "Once the defense of qualified immunity is

raised, a defendant is entitled to dismissal unless a plaintiff comes forward with facts

showing a constitutional violation and law showing his right was 'clearly established'

at the time of the alleged violation." Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th

Cir. 2026) (quoting Siddique v. Laliberte, 972 F.3d 898, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2020)). "The

plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a right was clearly established at

the time the alleged violation occurred." Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.

2017).

The "clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably . . .

anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646

(1987)). To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a sufficiently

clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S.

48, 63 (2018). Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law cannot be framed

at a "high level of generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). "A rule

is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct 'does not follow immediately

from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.'" Wesby, 583 U.S. at

64 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). While "a case directly on point" is not

required, "precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond

debate." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). Put slightly differently,

a right is clearly established only if "every reasonable official would have understood

that what he is doing violates that right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015).

"The Supreme Court's message is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in

terms granular enough to provide fair notice because qualified immunity 'protects all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Campbell v.

Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148,

1152 (2018) (quotation marks omitted)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two

important interests— the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

Here, Mr. Johnson's DWRH-A status was reviewed a few times during his time

at Wabash's SCU. The evidence submitted indicates that relevant considerations

were taken into account—his recent conduct, his need for education, and his

membership in a prison gang. Mr. Johnson offers no evidence that these reviews were

not meaningful. The reviews, in fact, led to a recommendation for his release from

DWRH-A status some 12 months after his designation to that status. Isby, 856 F.3d

at 527-28. No evidence has been adduced to show that the recommendation of release

was a fig leaf showing superficial progress toward release to the general population

while allowing Mr. Johnson to languish in segregation. The recommendation

progressed steadily, albeit with some delay due to a determination he first needed to

be transferred to another institution based on security concerns of his gang affiliation

at Wabash. He was afforded sufficient constitutional due process. Even so,

Defendants argue that, to the extent Mr. Johnson was due more process than what

they provided, they are protected by qualified immunity.

Mr. Johnson responds that it was clearly established that "prolonged

segregation requires meaningful review," "boilerplate reviews violated due process,"

"[security threat group] status alone is insufficient," and "indefinite confinement

without explanation is unconstitutional." Dkt. 35 at 4. The problem for Mr. Johnson,

however, is that he has defined the issue at too high a level of generality. Mr.

Johnson's periodic reviews were not plentiful, but it is unclear—and therefore not

"clearly established"—how frequently those reviews needed to be the required

"periodic" reviews. Mr. Johnson has not pointed to any legal authority suggesting that

the reviews had to occur more frequently than they did. He has also presented no

evidence that the reviews he received were not meaningful and instead were simply

boilerplate, and Defendants' evidence indicates that relevant information was

considered for each of his reviews. He has not shown that his membership in the Vice

Lords prison gang alone kept him in administrative segregation, nor has he presented

evidence that he was given no explanation for his continued placement in

administrative segregation.

Because Mr. Johnson has not shown the right to have received more

meaningful or frequent periodic reviews to be clearly established, Defendants are

protected by qualified immunity, and the Court grants summary judgment in their

favor on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.

V.

Conclusion

Defendants' motion to strike, dkt. [36], is denied.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [31], is granted.

Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/24/2026

J ES R. SWEENEY I, CHIEF JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

DION JOHNSON

275006

MIAMI - CF

MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

All electronically registered counsel

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