Powell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TERRY TYRONE POWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:26-cv-479-BL

)

STATE OF ALABAMA and )

CALHOUN COUNTY )

CIRCUIT COURT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Terry Tyrone Powell, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, initiated this action by filing a complaint on this court’s standard form

routinely used by inmates to file a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Upon

review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A,1 and for the

reasons explained below, this action will be DISMISSED with prejudice as time-

barred and frivolous.

I. THE COMPLAINT

The complaint alleges that, on March 15, 2004, the Plaintiff was charged with

sexual misconduct, and “pleading to that charge was a class ‘D’ misdemeanor with

1 Under these statutes, the court is required to dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

a fine.” (Doc. 1 at 3). The Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor and ordered to

pay a fine of $250.00. (Id.). On July 27, 2006, however, the laws were changed.

(Id.). In October of 2006, when the Plaintiff attempted to renew his pistol permit,

he was informed that he was now a felon and denied a permit. (Id.). Based on these

allegations, the Plaintiff believes he was subjected to ex post facto laws and double

jeopardy. (Id. at 2–3). For relief, he seeks “[t]he complete and unconductional [sic]

expunged of this record” as well as $36,000,000 in monetary damages. (Id. at 4).

The Plaintiff filed the complaint on or after June 11, 2026. (Id.).

II. DISCUSSION

Upon consideration of the allegations in the complaint, the court concludes

that the Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. “All

constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of

limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has

been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). The governing limitations period in Alabama is two years. Id. (citing Ala.

Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Accordingly, to have his claims heard by this court, the Plaintiff must have brought

them within two years from the date the limitations period began to run, which is

generally the date “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or

should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”

Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citing Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561–62 (11th Cir. 1996)).

The complaint repeatedly asserts that the events the Plaintiff challenges took

place from July 27, 2006 to October 31, 2006. (Doc. 1 at 2–3). Thus, by October

31, 2006, the facts supporting the Plaintiff’s cause of action were apparent or should

have been apparent to the Plaintiff, and the limitations period began to run.

However, the Plaintiff did not file the instant action until at least June 11, 2026,

nearly 18 years after the limitations period expired. As such, and because the

Plaintiff has provided no basis whatsoever for tolling the statute of limitations, it is

clear from the face of the complaint that his § 1983 claims are time-barred and should

be dismissed as frivolous. See Smith v. Shorstein, 217 F. App’x 877, 880 (11th Cir.

2007) (“The expiration of the statute of limitations warrants dismissing a complaint

as frivolous.”) (citing Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636,

641 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.

147, 152 (1984) (“Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining

access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague

sympathy for particular litigants.”).

III. CONCLUSION

Because the complaint is time-barred, the court concludes that any

amendment would be futile. See Patel v. Georgia Dep’t BHDD, 485 F. App’x 982,

982 (11th Cir. 2012) (‘Futility justifies the denial of leave to amend where the

complaint, as amended, would still be subject to dismissal.”) (citing Burger King

Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also, e.g, Bowhall v.

Dep’t of Def., No. 2:10-cv-607, 2010 WL 4806970, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2010)

(noting that, because the plaintiff's claims were clearly barred by Alabama’s two-

year statute of limitations, they warranted dismissal as frivolous and any amendment

to the pleading would be futile).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED that this case is

DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and

1915A(b)(1) as time-barred and frivolous.

Final Judgment will be entered separately.

DONE and ORDERED on this the 24th day of August, 2026.

BILL LEWIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE