The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 LOUIE AGUILAR, JR., Case No.: 26-CV-389 JLS (SBC)
CDCR# CB-8065,
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ORDER SCREENING FIRST
Plaintiff,
13 AMDENDED COMPLAINT
vs. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
14
IMPERIAL COUNTY SHERIFF’S
15 (ECF No. 5)
DEP’T, CORPORAL SNYDER,
16 DEPUTY J. BUSTAMONTE, DEPUTY
J. BENAVIDEZ, LT. VOORIS, DANIEL
17
VELIZ, IMPERIAL COUNTY BOARD
18 OF SUPERVISORS, PARAMEDIC
JOHN DOE,
19
Defendants.
20
21 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Louie Aguilar, Jr.’s First Amended Complaint
22 (“FAC,” ECF No. 5), in which he alleges Defendants violated his rights under 42 U.S.C.
23 §§ 1981, 1985, 1986 and 1983. For the reasons explained below, the Court screens the
24 FAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and concludes it alleges plausible excessive force-related
25 claims against some of the individual defendants. Beyond those claims, Plaintiff fails to
26 state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986. The Court therefore gives Plaintiff
27 the option to either amend his pleading or proceed with only the Fourth Amendment
28 excessive force-related claims that survive screening, as discussed below.
1 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
2 I. Legal Standard
3 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from governmental officers, his FAC
4 requires screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) before any of his claims may proceed.
5 Section 1915A(a) “mandates early review— ‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as
6 practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v.
8 Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
9 § 1915A(a)). The mandatory screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no
10 matter their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee.
11 See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446–47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court
12 shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous,
13 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary
14 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept.
15 of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
16 “The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the ‘same as the
17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.’” Long v.
18 Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
19 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual
20 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to
22 state a claim if it lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts . . . to support a
23 cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035,
24 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)).
25 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
26 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
27 at 678. And while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly
28 in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the
1 benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
2 Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential
3 elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
4 Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
5 II. Factual Allegations
6 In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that in December of 2023, he was living at his mother’s
7 house. FAC at 4. Over the course of a week, Plaintiff had three “interactions” with
8 Imperial County Sheriff’s Department deputies, stemming from mental health issues
9 Plaintiff was experiencing. Id. at 4, 13. Before the third interaction, deputies were called
10 to the residence by neighbors who heard arguing. Id. When deputies (later identified as
11 Bustamante, Benavidez and Snyder) arrived, Plaintiff’s mother let them inside. Id. at 4.
12 At the time, Plaintiff was sitting on the couch. Id. “All three sheriff’s deputies asked if
13 Plaintiff wanted to go outside and talk and Plaintiff said, ‘no.’” Id. The deputies then
14 approached Plaintiff “aggressively” and told him to get up. Plaintiff said “ok,” but asked
15 for “a little space,” after which he was “thrown/slammed on his stomach, on the floor.” Id.
16 Shortly thereafter, one of the deputies punched Plaintiff in the back of the head. Id. at 4,
17 14. “Seconds later,” Plaintiff was also “tased” in the back by one of the deputies “under
18 the command Snyder, [an] Imperial County Sheriff Corporal.” Id. at 14.
19 At some point, a paramedic arrived. Although Plaintiff asked the paramedic for a
20 “CAT-scan at a hospital,” id. at 14, the paramedic evaluated Plaintiff and determined he
21 did not need to be taken to the hospital. Id. at 5. Plaintiff was then taken to jail and accused
22 of “pushing or shoving his mother.” Id. Plaintiff alleges it was his mother who was the
23 aggressor, but he did not want to tell that to law enforcement because he feared she would
24 be arrested. Id. At some point, Plaintiff “took a plea to avoid embarrassing his mother.”
25 Id. at 5. After his plea, Plaintiff was “in and out of custody” and during this time he began
26 to work on “hold[ing] the officers responsible.” Id. While in custody, Plaintiff attempted
27 to send a “complaint” to internal affairs. Lieutenant Vooris, however, admitted he took the
28 mail and hand delivered it “directly to Internal Affairs [deputy] Veliz” instead of putting it
1 in the “regular mail.” Id.
2 Plaintiff further states that the Imperial County Board of Supervisors have failed to
3 provide proper services for individuals experiencing mental health crises and that “more
4 funding is needed.” Id. at 9. He alleges the Board of Supervisors has failed to “direct[]
5 enough funding for the training of deputy sheriffs in not using excessive force and mental
6 health.” Id. at 21. He states the “lack of [mental health crisis] services result[s] in injuries
7 and a use of force way far beyond its legal purpose.” Id. at 9.
8 III. Discussion
9 In his FAC, Plaintiff names the following Defendants, both in their individual and
10 official capacities: Imperial County Sheriff’s Department (“ICSD”), the Imperial County
11 Board of Supervisors (“County Board”), Imperial County Sheriff Lieutenant Snyder,
12 Deputy Bustamante, Deputy Benavidez, Lieutenant Vooris, Internal Affairs Deputy Veliz,
13 and a “Paramedic Employee John Doe.” Id. at 2–3. He raises eight claims and seeks relief
14 against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. See id. at 19–21.
15 For the sake of clarity, the Court will discuss the grounds for relief in a different order than
16 presented in the FAC.
17 A. Official Capacity Claims Against Individuals
18 First, to the extent Plaintiff sues ICSD employees Bustamante, Benavidez, Snyder,
19 Veliz, and Vooris in their official capacities, his claims must be construed as claims against
20 the ICSD itself, and therefore Imperial County. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)
21 (“[T]he real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not
22 the named official.”). Because Plaintiff has named the ICSD as a Defendant, his official
23 capacity claims against the ICSD employees are redundant and should be dismissed. Ctr.
24 for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir.
25 2008) (“When both a municipal officer and a local government entity are named, and the
26 officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a
27 redundant defendant.”); Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal.
28 1996) (“[I]f individuals are being sued in their official capacity as municipal officials and
1 the municipal entity itself is also being sued, then the claims against the individuals are
2 duplicative and should be dismissed.”); Venegas v. Sniff, No. 518CV02293JLSSHK, 2020
3 WL 2574947, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No.
4 518CV02293JLSSHK, 2020 WL 2572458 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) (“Plaintiff sues all
5 Individual Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. However, Plaintiff
6 also sues the County and [its Sheriff’s Department]. Accordingly, the official capacity
7 claims against individual Defendants . . . should be dismissed ‘as duplicative and
8 redundant.’”). The Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims
9 against Defendants Bustamante, Benavidez, Snyder, Veliz, and Vooris.
10 B. Individual Capacity Claims Against County Entities
11 Plaintiff also names the ICSD and the County Board as Defendants in their
12 “individual capacities.” See FACT at 2–3. However, “the distinction between individual
13 and official capacity does not apply in the case of a direct suit against a government entity,
14 which should be sued in an official capacity only.” Hason v. County of Los Angeles, No.
15 11-cv-5382-SVW (JPR), 2012 WL 13123537, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012); Mora v.
16 Doe, No. 23-cv-0013-CJC (DFM), 2023 WL 8125767, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2023) (“In
17 a suit against a government entity or its department, the distinction between individual and
18 official-capacity suits does not apply; the entity should be sued in an official capacity
19 only.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against Defendants Imperial
20 County Sheriff’s Department and the Imperial County Board of Supervisors are
21 DISMISSED.
22 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
23 In his fourth ground for relief, Plaintiff alleges a violation of “equal protection of
24 rights/privileges under the Civil Rights Act [42 U.S.C. §] 1981,” but does not indicate
25 which Defendant or Defendants he seeks to hold liable or provide any additional facts. See
26 FAC at 19. Plaintiff also raises 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as one basis for his eighth ground for
27 relief against the County Board and ICSD. See id. at 21.
28 / / /
1 Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of
2 the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the
3 full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
4 as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In short, § 1981 protects the equal
5 right of persons to “make and enforce contracts without respect to race.” Domino’s Pizza,
6 Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006); see also Flores v. City of Westminster, 873
7 F.3d 739, 752 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Section] 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and
8 enforcement of contracts by reason of race, including color or national origin
9 differences.”). To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege intentional racial
10 discrimination. Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir.
11 1995).
12 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support a claim under § 1981. He provides
13 no facts showing he attempted to contract services and was denied his right to do so. See
14 Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476 (“Any claim brought under § 1981 . . . must initially
15 identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship[ ]’ . . . under which the plaintiff has rights.”).
16 And nowhere in the FAC does Plaintiff assert that he was intentionally discriminated
17 against because of his race, which he also fails to specify. See Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d
18 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating § 1981 requires a plaintiff to show “show intentional
19 discrimination on account of race”). As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
20 § 1981 against any Defendant. Therefore, ground four and the portion of ground eight
21 seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are DISMISSED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
22 D. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986
23 Plaintiff alleges several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. In his fifth
24 ground for relief, he states that “all 3 deputies” (presumably a reference to Defendants
25 Bustamante, Benavidez and Snyder) “conspired” and violated § 1985 and § 1986 because
26 they had the “power to prevent or aid in preventing his injuries.” FAC at 20. In his sixth
27 cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy under §§ 1985 and 1986 among the three
28 deputies and Paramedic Doe. He states that the “dominant behavior” of the three deputies
1 led to Paramedic Doe denying Plaintiff adequate medical care. Id. at 20. In his seventh
2 claim, he alleges Defendants Vooris and Veliz violated his rights under these statutes when
3 Vooris “conspired” with Veliz to personally deliver mail from Plaintiff to Veliz instead of
4 sending it via the U.S. Postal Service. Id. at 21. Finally, in his eighth ground, Plaintiff
5 references §§ 1985 and 1986 as bases for relief.1 Id. at 21.
6 Plaintiff has not stated any claim as to any ground for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
7 While Plaintiff fails to specify which subsection of § 1985 his claims rely upon, it is clear
8 § 1985(1) does not apply because Plaintiff is not a federal officer. Canlis v. San Joaquin
9 Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that § 1985(1)’s
10 “protections extend exclusively to the benefit of federal officers”).
11 As for 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), it “has two separate parts.” Bagley v. CMC Real Est.
12 Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 1991). The first part addresses conspiracies “which
13 deter by force, intimidation, or threat a party or witness in federal court” and is therefore
14 inapplicable here because Plaintiff alleges no facts related to federal court proceedings.
15 See id. “The second part of the subsection creates a federal right of action for damages
16 against conspiracies which obstruct the due course of justice in any State or Territory with
17 intent to deny equal protection.” Id. While this portion of § 1985(2) applies to state
18 proceedings, to state a claim, there must be “an allegation of class-based animus.” Portman
19 v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted); see
20 also Bagley, 923 F.2d at 763 (stating that a “cognizable claim under [the second part of
21 § 1985(2)] requires an allegation of a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus”).
22 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant obstructed justice because he is a member
23 of a protected class or discriminatory animus. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
24 relief pursuant to §1985(2). See Bagley, 923 F.2d at 763 (concluding plaintiff had no cause
25 of action for denial of access to state court when he failed to allege that he was a member
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1 Plaintiff also alleges in claim eight that his rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the Court
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1 of a protected class).
2 Last, § 1985(3) provides a cause of action against persons who “conspire . . . , for
3 the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
4 equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.”
5 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are: (1) the existence of a
6 conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws; (2) an act in
7 furtherance of the conspiracy and (3) a resulting injury.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198
8 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). “A mere allegation of conspiracy [under § 1985(3)]
9 without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d
10 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show
11 “deprivation of a right motived by ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
12 invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.’” RK Ventures, Inc. v.
13 City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,
14 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).
15 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of “conspiracy” as to his excessive force, inadequate
16 medical care, and improper handling of his mail claims are wholly conclusory. The FAC
17 contains no specific facts to suggest any agreement between the deputies involved in his
18 arrest, between the deputies and paramedics who evaluated him, or between Vooris and
19 Veliz about delivery of the letter. Nor has Plaintiff alleged any agreement between the
20 individual deputies, the ICSD and/or the County Board. In addition, he fails to allege
21 membership in a protected class and fails to allege that any Defendant acted with class-
22 based animus. As such, Plaintiff fails to state any claim under § 1985(3).2
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2 Even if Plaintiff had raised his “conspiracy” allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he fails to state a claim.
26 A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires: “(1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among
the defendant officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those
27 rights resulting from that agreement.” See Avalos v. Bacca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010). “To state
a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must state
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1 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under any subsection of 42 U.S.C.
2 § 1985, he necessarily fails to state a claim under § 1986. Section 1986 imposes liability
3 on persons who know of an impending violation of § 1985 but neglect or refuse to prevent
4 the violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986. “A claim can be stated under [§] 1986 only if the
5 complaint contains a valid claim under [§] 1985.” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626; see also
6 Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 1991). As such, Plaintiff has
7 also failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
8 In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant under 42 U.S.C.
9 §§ 1985 and 1986. Accordingly, grounds five, six, seven, and the portion of ground eight
10 related to these sections are DISMISED for failure to state a claim.3 See 28 U.S.C.
11 § 1915A(b).
12 E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
13 In claims one, two, three and eight, Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983. FAC at 19, 21. “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show
15 both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
16 and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
17 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). A § 1983 claim also
18 requires proof of causation, and allegations regarding causation “must be individualized
19 and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or
20 omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844
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821 (9th Cir. 1989). And Plaintiff’s FAC lacks any facts suggesting the existence of an express or implied
23 agreement between Defendants.
3 Even if the Court construed Plaintiff’s claim as alleging an equal protection violation pursuant to 42
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U.S.C. § 1983, he has not stated a claim. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
25 broadly requires the government to treat similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must typically allege
26 “defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a
protected class,” such as a particular race or religion. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir.
27 2013). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s
protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). The FAC alleges no facts
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1 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
2 1. Claims One, Two, and Three: Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene
3 Claims one, two, and three involve Plaintiff’s allegations related to the purported
4 use of excessive force during his arrest. In ground one, Plaintiff states “all 3
5 defendants/sheriffs,” elsewhere identified as Bustamante, Benavidez and Snyder, used
6 excessive force when slamming him on his stomach, knocking his wind out, punching him
7 behind his head and tasing him in the back.” FAC at 19. In ground two, he alleges the “2
8 defendants that watched Plaintiff get punched in the back of his head” failed to intervene
9 to protect him. Id. And in ground three, he states “all 3 defendants especially whichever
10 officer punched Plaintiff” were “deliberate and indifferent” to his health and safety. Id.
11 As an initial matter, the Court must determine the law governing Plaintiff’s claims
12 related to the use of force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (“The validity
13 of the [excessive force] claim must . . . be judged by reference to the specific constitutional
14 standard which governs that right, rather than to some generalized ‘excessive force’
15 standard.”). As to grounds one and two, Plaintiff fails to identify what constitutional right
16 was purportedly violated. In ground three, he references the Eighth and Fourteenth
17 Amendments. But neither apply here because the incident took place during Plaintiff’s
18 seizure and arrest, during which the Fourth Amendment applies. See id. at 388 (stating
19 “claims for excessive force in an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free person
20 must be brought under the Fourth Amendment”).
21 The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures is violated when
22 the use of force is “objectively unreasonable.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119,
23 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–96). “Determining whether the force
24 used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a
25 careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
26 Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” See
27 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). In addition, officers may be held liable for
28 violating the Fourth Amendment if they had an opportunity to intercede when their fellow
1 officers use excessive force but fail to do so. Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1223
2 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2000)).
3 And law enforcement officers may be liable for excessive force under the Fourth
4 Amendment “on a theory of integral participation” if they participate “‘in some meaningful
5 way’ in the specific actions that constituted the violation.” Hughes, 31 F.4th at 1223
6 (quoting Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004)). In addition, when a
7 police officer violates a person’s constitutional rights, fellow officers on the scene have a
8 “duty to intercede” if they have a “realistic opportunity” to do so. Cunningham v. Gates,
9 229 F.3d 1271, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Lolli v. Cnty. of
10 Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment for a police
11 sergeant who admitted that he “observed [other] deputies struggling” with the plaintiff but
12 “did not become involved or give orders” for them to stop).
13 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Bustamante, Benavidez, and Snyder were all acting
14 together when he was thrown to the ground, punched in the back of the head, and tased
15 during his seizure and arrest. While Plaintiff does not indicate knowledge of which deputy
16 was responsible for throwing him to the ground, punching him, and/or tasing him, the Court
17 finds he has nonetheless alleged sufficient facts to state a Fourth Amendment claim against
18 Bustamante, Benavidez, and Snyder based on the “integral participant” theory4 and for
19 failure to intercede. See Boyd, 374 F.3d at 780 (finding that officers providing backup
20 were integral participants in another officer’s use of excessive force); see also
21 Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 480 n.12 (concluding that an officer who helped handcuff the
22
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4 An official may only be deemed an “integral participant” if “(1) the defendant knew about and acquiesced
25 in the constitutionally defective conduct as part of a common plan with those whose conduct constituted
the violation, or (2) the defendant set in motion a series of acts by others which the defendant knew or
26 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Peck v. Montoya,
51 F.4th 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2022). “‘[I]ntegral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions
27 themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Boyd, 374 F.3d at 780. It instead requires “some
fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of
28
1 plaintiff was an integral participant in the other officers’ use of excessive force); Rutherford
2 v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding in police brutality case
3 that a jury could reasonably conclude that three officer defendants “were participants in
4 punching or kicking” plaintiff, even though defendants denied assaulting plaintiff and
5 plaintiff could not state that specific defendants punched or kicked him); United States v.
6 Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81
7 (1996) (“[A]n officer who failed to intercede when his colleagues were depriving a victim
8 of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force in the course of an arrest
9 would, like his colleagues, be responsible for subjecting the victim to a deprivation of his
10 Fourth Amendment rights.”).
11 In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations in claims one two and three are sufficient to meet the
12 “low threshold” required at this early state in the proceedings to state plausible Fourth
13 Amendment claims for excessive force and failure to intervene against Defendants
14 Bustamante, Benavidez, and Snyder.
15 2. Claim Eight: ICSD and the County Board
16 In his eighth ground, Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in addition to the
17 other federal statutes discussed above. Specifically, he alleges the “customs/policies” and
18 “lack of training” of the ICSD, under the direction of the County Board, “invoke[] a Monell
19 claim” pursuant to § 1983. See FAC at 16, 21.
20 A municipal entity may not be held liable for an injury inflicted solely by its
21 employees or agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
22 690–91 (1978). “[M]unicipalities, including counties and their sheriff’s departments, can
23 only be liable under § 1983 if an unconstitutional action ‘implements or executes a policy
24 statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
25 body’s officers.’” Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014)
26 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). In addition, a “[f]ailure to train may amount to a policy
27 of ‘deliberate indifference’ if the need to train was obvious and the failure to do so made a
28 violation of constitutional rights likely.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900
1 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (9189)). “To state a
2 section 1983 claim against a government unit, such as [a] County or [a] County Board of
3 Supervisors, the plaintiff must establish an affirmative causal link between a governmental
4 policy or practice and the alleged constitutional violation.” Stemmons v. Arpaio, No. 07-
5 01016 PHXNVWMEA, 2007 WL 3049073, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2007), report and
6 recommendation adopted, No. CV0701016PHX NVW MEA, 2007 WL 3054941 (D. Ariz.
7 Oct. 18, 2007) (citing City of Canton, 489 at 385–85).
8 Here, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim based on vague references to
9 “customs [and] policies” of the ICSD and County Board, he fails to state a claim because
10 “proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity,” or even a series of “isolated or
11 sporadic incidents,” will not give rise to § 1983 municipal liability. Grant v. Cnty. of Los
12 Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 1996); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (for an unwritten
13 policy or custom to form the basis of a claim, it must be so “persistent and widespread”
14 that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice). Rather, liability based on
15 custom, practice, or policy “must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration,
16 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying
17 out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Facts regarding the
18 specific nature of the policy, custom, or practice are required, as merely stating the subject
19 to which the policy relates is insufficient. See Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631,
20 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (a complaint with conclusory allegation of a municipal policy fails to
21 state a claim where it does not “put forth additional facts regarding the specific nature of
22 this alleged policy, custom or practice”).
23 Plaintiff also alleges a “lack of training” among deputies with the ICSD and the
24 “need for more funding” to be allocated by the County Board for training deputies in
25 “mental health” and “in not using excessive force.” FAC at 21. To state a Monell claim
26 based on failure to train, a plaintiff must show (1) “the existing training program” is
27 inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform”; (2) the officials
28 have been deliberately indifferent “to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
1 contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “actually caused the deprivation of the
2 alleged constitutional right.” Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir.
3 1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient
4 facts to show the inadequacy of the existing training of Imperial County Sheriff’s deputies.
5 “[T]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten
6 liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other
7 than a faulty training program.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390–91; see also Blankenhorn
8 v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 485 (9th Cir. 2007). “Indeed, a single incident cannot
9 sustain a failure to train except in the ‘rare’ circumstance that ‘the unconstitutional
10 consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable
11 under § 1983 without proof of a preexisting pattern of violations.’” Burns v. City of
12 Concord, No. 14-cv-00535 LB, 2014 WL 5794629, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014)
13 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011)). Such circumstances are not
14 plausibly alleged here.
15 Thus, as currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Monell claims against Defendants ICSD and
16 the County Board lack the necessary specificity to state a claim. See Galindo v. City of
17 San Mateo, No. 16-CV-03651-EMC, 2016 WL 7116927, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016)
18 (“Monell allegations must be [pled] with specificity.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
19 against the Imperial County Board of Supervisors and Imperial County Sheriff’s
20 Department are DISMSSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
22 IV. Summary and Plaintiff’s Options
23 Because only Plaintiff’s individual-capacity Fourth Amendment excessive force
24 claims against Defendants Bustamonte, Benavidez, and Snyder are sufficiently pleaded,
25 and it is not “absolutely clear” no amendment could cure his remaining pleading
26 deficiencies, see Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015), he may proceed
27 either by: (1) notifying the Court of his intent to proceed only with the Fourth Amendment
28 excessive force claims he has adequately alleged against individual Defendants
1 Bustamonte, Benavidez, and Snyder; or (2) filing a second amended complaint that
2 includes all his adequately pleaded claims and corrects all the deficiencies of pleading
3 identified in this order. Plaintiff must choose one of those two options within sixty (60)
4 days of the date this Order is filed.
5 If Plaintiff notifies the Court that he wishes to proceed only with the excessive force
6 claims which have survived screening, the Court will issue an order directing the Clerk to
7 issue a summons upon Defendants Bustamonte, Benavidez, and Snyder, and will direct the
8 U.S. Marshal to effectuate service on his behalf pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed.
9 R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). But all remaining claims and remaining defendants will remain
10 dismissed from this action. If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, that
11 pleading will be subject to another preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
12 before the Court determines whether U.S. Marshal Service upon any defendant is
13 warranted. If Plaintiff does nothing, the Court will dismiss the case based on his failure to
14 prosecute in compliance with a court order.
15 CONCLUSION
16 For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
17 1. All claims in the complaint are DISMISSED, except for Plaintiff’s excessive
18 force claims against individual Defendants Bustamante, Benavidez, and Snyder, for failure
19 to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
20 2. Consistent with the above, all claims against Defendants Vooris, Veliz,
21 “Paramedic Doe,” the Imperial County Sheriff’s Department, and the Imperial County
22 Board of Supervisors are DISMISSED without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to
23 state a claim against them. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
24 3. Within sixty (60) days of the date this Order is filed, Plaintiff must either:
25 (a) notify the Court of his intent to proceed only with his surviving excessive force claims
26 against Defendants Bustamante, Benavidez, and Snyder; or (b) file a second amended
27 complaint that cures the deficiencies noted above. Defendants not named and any claim
28 not re-alleged in the amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR
1 || 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th
2 || Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,
3 || 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which
4 not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”)
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 Dated: August 13, 2026 . tt □
7 pen Janis L. Sammartino
8 United States District Judge
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