The opinion
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2
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 JANE STILLWATER, Case No. 25-cv-01995-ASK
Plaintiff,
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ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS
v.
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Re: Dkt. No. 40
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
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12 Plaintiff Jane Stillwater initiated this action against the United States for failing to repair
13 her mailbox lock and refusing to deliver her mail. Almost exactly a year later, the Supreme Court
14 held in United States Postal Service v. Konan that the federal government cannot be sued for
15 harms caused by mail that fails to arrive, regardless of the reason and regardless of where the mail
16 goes instead. 607 U.S. 391, 401 (2026). In light of Konan, Ms. Stillwater’s claims must be
17 dismissed.
18 I. BACKGROUND
19 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts Ms. Stillwater’s well-pled facts as true.
20 In August 2023, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) stopped delivering mail to Ms.
21 Stillwater’s Berkeley home, because her mailbox lock was broken. Dkt. 35 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 16-17.
22 Though USPS was responsible for replacing the lock, USPS failed to do so until February 2024.
23 Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 18, 20, 28. In the interim, Ms. Stillwater had to pick up her mail at a USPS facility
24 located approximately three miles from her home. Dkt. 35 ¶ 23. The alternative mail pickup
25 location was not reasonably accessible for Ms. Stillwater due to her disability, which causes her to
26 suffer from limited physical mobility and an inability to stand for prolonged periods without
27 physical pain. Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 12, 19, 23. Having to retrieve her mail by alternative means during this
1 mobility impairments, emotional distress, inconvenience, and loss of access to essential
2 communications.” Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 41, 46, 48-49. She seeks monetary damages in the amount of $8,000.
3 Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 50.
4 Ms. Stillwater alleges two claims: (1) negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act
5 (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 1346(b), and (2) discrimination under Section 504 of the
6 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 37-48. The United States moves to Ms.
7 Stillwater’s FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the postal exception—a
8 statutory carve-out to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).
9 Dkt. 40 (“Motion”) at 4-5. Although the United States asserted in its Motion that the discretionary
10 function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), also bars Ms. Stillwater’s FTCA claim, the United States
11 has since withdrawn this argument in a footnote of its Reply brief. Dkt. 40 at 7-9; Dkt. 43 at 2 n.1.
12 Additionally, the United States moves to dismiss Ms. Stillwater’s Rehabilitation Act claim on
13 mootness grounds. Dkt. 40 at 9.
14 II. LEGAL STANDARD
15 Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal of a case is
16 appropriate where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,
17 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The federal government’s “[s]overeign immunity is
18 jurisdictional in nature.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “[T]he United States, as
19 sovereign, is immune from suit, [unless] it consents to be sued.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S.
20 596, 608 (1990) (cleaned up). Waivers of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed
21 in statutory text,” Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996), and “must be construed strictly in favor
22 of the sovereign and not enlarged beyond what the [statutory] language requires,” United States v.
23 Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (cleaned up). Consequently, any suit brought against the
24 United States, without a waiver of immunity or consent to be sued, must be dismissed for lack of
25 subject matter jurisdiction. See FDIC, 510 U.S. at 475.
26 Waivers of sovereign immunity are not absolute or all encompassing. The FTCA is one
27 such waiver with several carve-outs: the United States retains sovereign immunity and declines
1 including the postal exception (see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b)). Likewise, Section 504 of the
2 Rehabilitation Act lacks “[t]he clarity of expression necessary to establish a waiver of the
3 Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages.” Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.
4 The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving it exists. McNutt v. Gen.
5 Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936). Ms. Stillwater cannot avoid the limits,
6 defenses, and exclusions of the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity by artful pleading. See
7 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985).
8 II. DISCUSSION
9 A. Negligence Claim
10 Under the FTCA, plaintiffs may bring certain tort suits against the United States based on
11 the conduct of its employees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 1346(b). But, according to the FTCA’s
12 postal exception, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider “[a]ny claim arising out of the
13 loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). This
14 postal exception applies to injuries “arising, directly or consequentially, because mail either fails
15 to arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal
16 Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
17 In United States Postal Service v. Konan, the Supreme Court recently held that the postal
18 exception also “covers suits against the United States for the intentional nondelivery of mail.” 607
19 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added); id. at 401 (“A ‘miscarriage of mail’ includes failure of the mail to
20 arrive at its intended destination, regardless of the carrier’s intent or where the mail goes
21 instead.” (emphasis added)). In explaining its reasoning, the Supreme Court made clear that the
22 term “miscarriage” is sufficiently broad such that the federal government’s sovereign immunity
23 extends to “lawsuits about failing to properly carry or deliver mail,” that is, for “any failure of
24 mail to arrive properly . . . regardless of why it happened” or “where the mail goes instead.” Id. at
25 395, 399-401.
26 The injuries that Ms. Stillwater alleges in her negligence claim—such as “physical pain,
27 loss of access to essential correspondence, and disruption of daily life” (Dkt. 35 ¶¶ 41)—all arise
] therefore applies to her claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). Accordingly, Ms. Stillwater’s FTCA
2 || claimis DIMISSED with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
3 A. Discrimination Claim
4 As to Ms. Stillwater’s disability discrimination claim, Section 504 provides that “[nJo
5 otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of
6 || her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
7 || subjected to discrimination ... under any program or activity conducted . . . by the United States
8 || Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). However, the United States retains “sovereign immunity
9 || against awards of monetary damages for violations” of this section. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. “In
10 || deciding a mootness issue, the question is not whether the precise relief sought at the time the
11 application for an injunction was filed is still available. The question is whether there can be any
12 || effective relief.” Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). If
13 a case becomes moot, we are required to dismiss it. Dufresne v. Veneman, 114 F.3d 952, 954 (9th
14 |} Cir. 1997).
15 Here, injunctive relief—the only relief to which Ms. Stillwater would be entitled under the
16 || Rehabilitation Act—is moot because her mail service has been restored. Dkt. 35 § 28. And, as
17 || discussed above, her damages claim is barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, Ms.
Zz 18 Stillwater’s disability discrimination claim is DISMISSED with prejudice as moot. See Lane, 518
19 || US. at 192.
20 IV. CONCLUSION
21 For the foregoing reasons, the United States’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED without
22 || leave to amend. The Clerk of Court shall terminate the case.
23 IT IS SO ORDERED.
24 || Dated: July 30, 2026
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26 :
27 A tu fe
Unitéd States Magistrate Judge
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