The opinion
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 MAHMOUD IDRIS, Case No.: 26-CV-2494 JLS (SBC)
11 Petitioner,
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
12 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
13 WARDEN JEREMY CASEY, et al.,
(ECF No. 1)
14 Respondents.
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17 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Mahmoud Idris’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
18 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court are
19 Respondents’ Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 11)
20 and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the
21 Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
22 BACKGROUND
23 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Sudan, has been detained by the Department of
24 Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Imperial Regional
25 Detention Facility since October 1, 2025. Ret. at 1–2. Petitioner filed asylum applications
26 for relief from withholding. Id. at 2. DHS filed a Motion to Pretermit the Petitioner’s
27 applications for relief because Petitioner is subject to the Asylum Cooperative Agreement
28 (“ACA”) with Uganda. Id. On January 8, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied
1 Petitioner’s applications for relief, granted the Motion to Pretermit, and ordered Petitioner
2 removed to Uganda. Id. On February 7, 2026, the appeal period expired for Petitioner and
3 the Government to appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, making
4 his final order of removal administratively final. Id. Petitioner’s 90-day removal period
5 expired on May 8, 2026. Id. Petitioner claims that his continued detention violates
6 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
7 Amendment. See generally Pet.
8 LEGAL STANDARD
9 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
10 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
11 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
12 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
13 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
14 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
15 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
16 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
17 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
18 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
19 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
20 2018) (citations omitted).
21 DISCUSSION
22 When an alien is denied asylum, granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
23 1231(b)(3), and ordered removed, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending the
24 government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
25 This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the
26 removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period
27 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does
28 not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). A six-
1 month period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of
2 detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to
3 “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
4 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts
5 to the Government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the
6 period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably
7 foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer
8 reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699.
9 In that case, the alien’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of
10 conditioned release. Id. at 700.
11 “[T]he removal period begins when an alien is ‘ordered removed,’ and the removal
12 order becomes ‘administratively final.’” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534
13 (2021).
14 Section 1231(a)(1)(B) states that:
15 The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively
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final.
17 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court
orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s
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final order.
19 (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an
immigration process), the date the alien is released from
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detention or confinement.
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22 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).
23 The Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied his initial burden.1 Petitioner argues that
24 he has never been to Uganda, he has a credible fear of going to Uganda, he does not have
25 any family ties to Uganda, Uganda has a recent history of not accepting non-citizens, he
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1 Respondents do not contest that the six-month presumptively reasonable period has passed. See Ret. at
1 has been cooperative in facilitating his removal, and Respondents have not made any
2 efforts to remove. Pet. at 4; Traverse at 3. Because Petitioner has shown good reason to
3 believe he will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, the burden now shifts
4 to Respondents to rebut Petitioner’s showing. Zadvydas, 533 at 701.
5 Respondents have not provided any evidence that DHS has done anything to
6 facilitate Petitioner’s removal beyond cancelling his asylum application and ordering his
7 removal. See generally Ret. Respondents do not provide any evidence that Petitioner is
8 likely to be removed to Uganda or that anyone has been removed to Uganda pursuant to
9 the ACA. See Grishchenko v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3514-JES-JLB, 2025 WL 3675070, at *2
10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2025) (“Respondents do not identify any potential countries which
11 might accept Petitioner’s third country removal, or any factors related to Petitioner or
12 people like him which might make a future removal attempt successful when others have
13 failed.”); Elshourbagy v. Bondi, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“There
14 is no evidence that the Government has taken any steps, before or since that date, to remove
15 Petitioner to Uganda. There is no evidence that steps have been taken to obtain a Ugandan
16 travel document for Petitioner, that Uganda has any interest in accepting Petitioner, or even
17 that there has been any communication with Uganda regarding Petitioner at all.”).
18 As Petitioner contends, Respondents “make zero—really zero—attempt to claim that
19 they have taken any steps to facilitate [Petitioner’s] removal.” Traverse at 1. Respondents
20 have not updated the Court with any progress on Petitioner’s likelihood of removal, and
21 they do not claim to have reached out to Uganda’s consulate, nor have they provided any
22 data as to Uganda’s likelihood as a country of removal. See generally Ret. The Court
23 concludes that Respondents have failed to rebut Petitioner’s showing that there is no
24 significant likelihood of removal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
25 / / /
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27 / / /
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1 CONCLUSION
2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
3 ||Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
4 ||custody. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by August 14, 2026,
5 || confirming that Petitioner has been released. As this concludes the litigation in this case,
6 || the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 || Dated: August 11, 2026 ok
on. Janis L. Sammartino
10 United States District Judge
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