The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ADRIAN JUAN LLOYD, Case No.: 1:24-cv-01086-JLT-CDB
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14 M. HOWARD, (Doc. 18)
15 Defendant.
16
17 Plaintiff Adrian Juan Lloyd is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s First Amendment free
19 exercise claim against Defendant Howard.
20 I. INTRODUCTION
21 On February 17, 2026, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment addressing the
22 merits of Plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. 18.) Following an extension of time, Plaintiff filed an opposition
23 to Defendant’s motion (Doc. 25)1 and Defendant replied (Doc 26).2
24
25
1 On April 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Addendum Declaration of Adrian Lloyd,” noting he “neglected
26 to address the issue of qualified immunity,” and proffering his opposition thereto. (Doc. 27.)
27 2 On April 29, 2026, the Court issued its Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Sur-reply to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29), directing the Clerk of the Court to strike Plaintiff’s filing of
1 II. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ BRIEFING
2 Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion (Doc. 18)
3 Defendant contends Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated because the
4 denial of Plaintiff’s request for peanut butter lunches did not burden the practice of his religion.
5 Further, Defendant argues that the denial of Plaintiff’s request for a modification of his diet to
6 include peanut butter lunches was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Finally,
7 Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant asks the Court to grant
8 summary judgment in his favor and to dismiss this case.
9 Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 25)
10 Plaintiff’s opposition is comprised of his responses to Defendant’s undisputed statement
11 of material facts (Doc. 25 at 1-16), an untitled one-page document presenting six questions (id. at
12 17), exhibits A through D3 (id. at 18-27), and multiple declarations in support of his opposition
13 (id. at 28-37). The Court will address Plaintiff’s specific arguments in its analysis where
14 appropriate.
15 Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 26)
16 Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was not denied a religious diet. The denial of Plaintiff’s
17 preferred peanut butter lunch diet did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because the
18 denial did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s religious practice and Plaintiff was already on a
19 vegetarian diet that conformed to his religious beliefs. Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to
20 present any evidence to demonstrate the applicable Turner factors weigh in his favor. Lastly,
21 Defendant asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity and that Plaintiff fails to identify case law
22 involving similar facts.
23 //
24 //
25 //
26
27 3 Exhibit D is unrelated to the issue before this Court. Exhibit D is a First Level Reviewer’s Response dated May 14,
2008, from California State Prison-Sacramento concerning Plaintiff’s request to receive prayer oil. (See Doc. 25 at
1 III. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
2 Parties
3 1. Plaintiff Adrian Lloyd (V00729) is a state prisoner in the custody of the California
4 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”).
5 2. Lloyd was housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) on A-Facility in 2019 and
6 2020.
7 3. Defendant Howard was a Chaplain at KVSP for all times relevant to the allegations in
8 the Complaint.
9 Available Religious Diets
10 4. In 2019, CDCR offered three religious alternative diets to the standard issued diet: a
11 kosher diet, a religious meat alternate (“RMA”), and a vegetarian diet.
12 5. In 2019, a plant-based diet was pending implementation in CDCR institutions.
13 6. The kosher diet and RMA diet contained meat.
14 7. The vegetarian diet was lacto-ovo, meaning that it normally included dairy and eggs.
15 8. There was a protein alternative for the vegetarian diet available every day at the
16 request of inmates receiving the vegetarian diet that switched out the dairy and the
17 eggs.
18 9. Inmates would need to show kitchen staff their religious diet card to obtain a protein
19 alternative.
20 CDCR Policy Regarding Religious Diets
21 10. Under CDCR regulations in effect during 2019, if an inmate wished to receive a
22 religious diet, or change between religious diets, the inmate had to complete and
23 submit a CDCR Form 3030, Religious Diet Program Request to a chaplain.
24 11. Upon receipt of a CDCR 3030 form, a chaplain would interview the inmate to
25 determine his or her eligibility for the diet.
26 12. Following the interview, the chaplain can approve the inmate’s request for a diet or
27 refer the request to the institution’s Religious Review Committee (“RRC”).
1 14. The RRC met monthly to review religious diet requests and generally consisted of a
2 combination of various members at the institution, including for example, the
3 Community Resource Manager, Food Manager, chaplains, Associate Wardens, and
4 sometimes other correctional staff.
5 15. The RRC, consisting of at least three members, would determine whether a particular
6 inmate qualified for a religious diet.
7 16. The RRC’s decision to deny a religious diet must be unanimous.
8 Scope of Defendant Howard’s Responsibilities
9 17. As a chaplain, Defendant Howard was only able to facilitate requests to switch
10 between the three religious diets available following the submission of a CDCR Form
11 3030.
12 18. Defendant Howard was not responsible for developing or implementing new diets.
13 19. Defendant Howard was unable to modify any of the existing diets.
14 20. If an inmate had medical issues or specific allergies related to a diet, Defendant
15 Howard would refer that inmate to medical services for modifications of any of the
16 available diets.
17 21. Defendant Howard had no control over whether an inmate received a protein
18 alternative for the vegetarian diet.
19 22. On December 26, 2019, Defendant Howard responded to Plaintiff’s request to modify
20 his diet to only peanut butter lunches to inform him that the request had been reviewed
21 by the RRC and was denied.
22 Plaintiff’s Rastafarian Diet and Request to Defendant Howard
23 23. Plaintiff is a practicing Rastafarian, who alleges he does not consume fish, meat, or
24 eggs and prefers, but is not required, to not consume dairy.
25 24. Plaintiff was on the vegetarian diet from 2019-2022 at KVSP.
26 25. Plaintiff claims that on or around December 26, 2019, he requested that Defendant
27 Howard modify his diet to be only peanut butter lunches.
1 26. Plaintiff wanted only peanut butter lunches because it was “more convenient” and
2 “healthier than cheese and eggs.”
3 27. At the time of his request, Plaintiff was already on the vegetarian religious diet and
4 could obtain the protein alternate.
5 28. Defendant Howard did not unilaterally deny Plaintiff’s request for a diet of peanut
6 butter lunches.
7 29. Defendant Howard wrote a letter to Plaintiff on January 22, 2020 regarding Plaintiff’s
8 request for diet modification, explaining that Plaintiff was already on the vegetarian
9 diet but had purchased items in contravention of his religious agreement and alleged
10 religious beliefs.
11 30. Plaintiff repeatedly purchased food items at the canteen that violated his religious diet
12 agreement.
13 31. The RRC was unable to grant Plaintiff’s request to modify his diet to consist solely of
14 peanut butter sandwiches because it was not one of the available religious diets.
15 32. The vegetarian diet offered to Plaintiff in 2019 was the closest diet offered that
16 conformed to Plaintiff’s preferred diet.
17 33. While at KVSP in 2019 and 2020, Plaintiff could pray, attend services, engage in
18 religious study, and purchase religious items including clothing.
19 Legitimate Penological Interests
20 34. CDCR has a legitimate interest in providing religious diets to individuals with sincere
21 religious beliefs.
22 35. CDCR has a legitimate interest in controlling costs in a streamlined food service.
23 36. It would be incredibly expensive to provide inmates with the meals and diets of their
24 choice.
25 37. Prison resource allocation would be significantly impacted if individual modifications
26 of existing diets were permitted.
27 (Doc. 18-3 [UDF].)
1 IV. PLAINTIFF’S OPERATIVE COMPLAINT4
2 … Plaintiff states Defendant Howard is an institutional chaplain in
charge of religious diet issues. (Doc. 66 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that
3 on December 26, 2019, Howard “officially refused to do his assigned
duties in regards to Plaintiff’s religious dietary needs,” by denying
4 him access to a diet within “the dietary tenets of Rastafari when he
directed Plaintiff to ‘Health Services’ to resolve the issue.” (Id. at 3,
5 7.) Plaintiff contends the “DOM policy, section 54080.14” states that
“institutional chaplains oversee religious diets.” (Id. at 7.)
6
Plaintiff contends [Defendant Howard was] acting under color of
7 state law when [he] violated his “civil rights, CCR, and DOM
guidelines.” (Doc. 66 at 3.)
8
9 (See Doc. 3 at 4-5.) Liberally construing the complaint, the Court found Plaintiff stated a
10 cognizable First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim:
11 Plaintiff’s exhibits reveal that on December 26, 2019, Defendant
Howard advised him that because Plaintiff was then receiving a
12 Vegetarian based diet, that diet could be modified only “on a medical
basis through health services.” (Doc. 66 at 9.) Thereafter, following
13 submission of a health care grievance on the same issue, Plaintiff was
advised by California Correctional Health Care Services, in an
14 institutional level response dated April 17, 2020, that the “Institution
Religious Diet Program is not a matter over which” it “has
15 jurisdiction” and that “the local institution Chaplain or designee”
determines “an inmate’s religious diet eligibility.” (Id. at 10.)
16 Plaintiff was advised to contact the chaplain at his institution. (Id.)
Even if Howard’s December 26, 2019, correspondence to Plaintiff
17 indicating his request for a diet in accord with his Rastafarian beliefs
was a mistake or misunderstanding, at screening, Plaintiff has
18 plausibly alleged a free exercise claim against Howard based upon
Howard’s refusal to approve the requested religious diet.
19
20 (See Doc. 3 at 6.)
21 V. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
22 Motions for Summary Judgment
23 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there “is no genuine
24 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
25 Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by
26 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
27
4 The undersigned has omitted references to Plaintiff’s free exercise claim against Defendants Castillo and Anderson
1 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
2 purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....” Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
4 Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
5 against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
6 essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See
7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an
8 essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
9 Id. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party
10 to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec.
11 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
12 In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not
13 rely upon the allegations or denials of their pleadings but is required to tender evidence of
14 specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its
15 contention that the dispute exists or shows that the materials cited by the movant do not establish
16 the absence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The
17 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might
18 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
19 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630
20 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, the opposing party must also demonstrate that the dispute is genuine, i.e.,
21 the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See
22 Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In the endeavor to
23 establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue
24 of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to
25 require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec.
26 Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to
27 assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
1 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be
2 believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
3 facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475
4 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of “thin air,” and it is the opposing party’s
5 obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v.
6 Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902
7 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than
8 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record
9 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
10 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
11 First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion
12 To state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate must plausibly allege that a
13 prison official’s actions: (a) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate’s exercise of a sincerely-held
14 religious belief; and (b) did so in an unreasonable manner -- i.e., the official’s actions were not
15 “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
16 342, 348-50 (1987); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015); Shakur v.
17 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). A substantial burden places more than an
18 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must tend to coerce individuals into acting contrary to
19 their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
20 violate his beliefs. Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32. Plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials
21 prevented him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is required by his faith.
22 Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. The underlying religious belief must be “sincerely held.” Malik v.
23 Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (noting that the
24 “sincerity test,” not the “centrality test,” applies to a free exercise analysis).
25 “Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
26 privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”
27 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). “To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference
1 a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
2 fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. A prison regulation may therefore
3 impinge upon an inmate’s right to exercise his religion if the regulation is “reasonably related to
4 legitimate penological interests.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884. Thus, prisons may lawfully restrict
5 religious activities for security purposes and other legitimate penological reasons. Turner v.
6 Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir.
7 2008). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that generally-applicable laws that incidentally
8 burden a particular religion’s practices do not violate the First Amendment. Employment Div. v.
9 Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
10 VI. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS5 6
11 Plaintiff has reproduced and responded to Defendant’s UDFs in his opposition to
12 Defendant’s summary judgment motion. (See Doc. 25 at 1-16.) The Court finds Plaintiff admits
13 UDFs 1-7, 9-11, 17, 21, 22, 24, and 30; he denies UDFs 8, 12-16, 25, and 31. Further, the Court
14 observes that Plaintiff failed to either expressly admit or deny UDFs 18-20, 23, 26-29, and 32-37;
15 thus, the Court considers them to be denials.
16 The Court declines to rule on each objection. Capitol Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765
17 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1200 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“In motions for summary judgment with numerous
18 objections, it is often unnecessary and impractical for a court to methodically scrutinize each
19 objection and give a full analysis of each argument raised” [citation omitted]). Where material to
20 its analysis, the Court will address relevant objections. Where the Court does not address any
21 particular objection, it has determined the objection contains legal argument, does not challenge
22 the veracity of the underlying fact or facts asserted by Defendant, or is irrelevant.7 See, e.g.,
23 5 In arriving at these findings and recommendations, the Court carefully reviewed and considered all arguments,
points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections,
24 and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of reference to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be
construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. This Court
25 thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate.
26 6 To be clear, the undersigned considered Plaintiff’s operative complaint to the extent it was based on his personal
knowledge of admissible evidence rather than on his beliefs. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir.
27 1987) (per curium).
7
1 Burghardt-Cobb v. Inch, No. 1:17-cv-01563-DAD-SKO, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal.
2 Apr. 24, 2020) (“Here, although plaintiff submitted a statement of disputed facts, each of the
3 disputes noted by plaintiff therein are actually legal arguments, do not challenge the veracity of
4 the underlying facts, or are irrelevant ... [t]he court therefore considers the material facts of this
5 case to be undisputed”).
6 VII. DISCUSSION
7 Initially, the Court notes that Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s Rastafarian beliefs are
8 sincerely held. Thus, the relevant issues are whether Defendant’s actions substantially burdened
9 Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and whether those actions were rationally related to a legitimate
10 penological interest.
11 Defendant Did Not Substantially Burden Plaintiff’s Religious Beliefs
12 Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff was on the vegetarian diet at KVSP during
13 the relevant period. UDF 24, 27. That diet conformed with Plaintiff’s religious belief that he
14 could not consume meat, fish, or eggs. UDF 6, 7, 23. Defendant has also presented evidence that
15 the vegetarian diet was the closest diet available that conformed to Plaintiff’s preferred diet. UDF
16 32. Thus, Defendant has met his initial burden by demonstrating there is no genuine dispute as to
17 any material fact concerning substantial burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
18 Because Defendant met his initial burden, the burden shifts to Plaintiff as the non-moving
19 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita, 475
20 U.S. at 586.
21 Here, Plaintiff admitted UDF 6, 7, and 24. Therefore, there is no dispute that the
22 vegetarian diet was the only diet that did not include meat and that Plaintiff was on the vegetarian
23 diet while at KVSP.
24 Plaintiff denied or objected to UDF 23, 27, and 32. UDF 23 states: “Plaintiff is a
25 practicing Rastafarian, who alleges he does not consume, fish, meat, or eggs and prefers, but is
26 not required, to consume dairy.” In response to UDF 23, Plaintiff asserts he “never stated that he
27 prefers dairy as [Deputy] Attorney General Nordstrom claims in this declaration ….” Plaintiff
1 states that in February 2025 he began “consuming a bit more cheese and milk. That is the change
2 spoken of during the deposition.” Plaintiff goes on to explain that at “DSH Stockton there wasn’t
3 freedom to exchange food … so Plaintiff had to request a vegetarian diet for religious reasons”
4 and that a reasonable person would assume “someone requesting a vegetarian diet doesn’t eat, at
5 the least, meat.” Plaintiff’s objection to UDF 23 is overruled; his objection does not challenge the
6 veracity of the underlying facts or is irrelevant. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1.
7 UDF 27 states: “At the time of his request, Plaintiff was already on the vegetarian
8 religious diet and could obtain the protein alternate.” In response to UDF 27, Plaintiff challenges
9 Defendant Howard’s supporting declaration at paragraph 8 and “directs this Court back to page 8,
10 lines 10-21 and Exhibit C.” Paragraph 8 of Defendant Howard’s declaration provides as follows:
11 On January 22, 2020, I wrote to Mr. Lloyd in response to his follow
up to my letter dated December 26, 2019. Attached as Exhibit B is a
12 true and correct copy of the letter I sent to Mr. Lloyd on January 22,
2020. Prior to my writing of that letter and Mr. Lloyd’s request for a
13 diet modification in late 2019, Lloyd had repeatedly purchased food
items at the canteen, including various meat dishes that violated his
14 religious diet agreement.
15 (Doc. 18-4 at 2-3, ¶ 8.) Exhibit B referred to above is Howard’s letter dated January 22, 2020, in
16 response to an inquiry by Plaintiff; it covers a number of topics, but Plaintiff (1) complains that
17 Howard “failed to mention/forgot that Plaintiff showed him Exhibit C,”8 (2) states he does not eat
18 fish and then asks questions (e.g., “who are the staff that aren’t in this motion for summary
19 judgment?”), (3) states he has never received “a requested copy of his 2014 3030 CDC form
20 approval of a vegetarian religious diet, it didn’t start on November 5, 2018,” (4) states he never
21 claimed “to be under Ital dietary tenets …,” (5) acknowledges purchasing but not consuming
22 certain canteen items, (6) asserts that he “didn’t have issue with the so-called religious vegetarian
23 diets at CSP-LAC, DSH Stockton, nor CSP-Corcoran. But at KVSP [he’s] never seen that much
24 cheese and eggs in any diet …,” and (7) that “a plant diet is in accordance with a true vegetarian
25 diet as opposed to a lacto-ovo diet which isn’t.” Plaintiff’s objection to UDF 27 is overruled; it
26 does not challenge the veracity of the underlying fact or is irrelevant. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL
27
8
1 1974264, at *1 n.1. For example, the specific date upon which Plaintiff started consuming the
2 vegetarian diet is not relevant in light of the fact Plaintiff admits he was on the vegetarian diet
3 when his claim arose. See UDF 24. Further, Plaintiff’s response as concerns his assertion that the
4 “lacto-ovo diet” is not “a vegetarian diet” is argumentative. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of
5 California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“statements in declarations based on
6 speculation or improper legal conclusions, or argumentative statements, are not facts and likewise
7 will not be considered on a motion for summary judgment” [emphasis omitted]).
8 UDF 32 states: “The vegetarian diet offered to Plaintiff in 2019 was the closest diet
9 offered that conformed to Plaintiff’s preferred diet.” Plaintiff states “it boggles [his] mind that
10 Imam Howard believed that the [] lacto-ovo diet conformed to Plaintiff’s Rastafarian dietary
11 tenets.” Plaintiff contends that because the other two religious diets contained meat, “there isn’t ‘a
12 closest diet’ to compare” and maintains that “the so-called religious ‘vegetarian’ diet was not, and
13 is not, vegetarian in any form.” He further asserts that Defendant Howard “never mentioned a
14 fourth option on the religious diet, the protein option” in his December 26, 2019 or January 22,
15 2020 correspondence. Plaintiff’s objection to UDF 32 is overruled; his objection does not
16 challenge the veracity of the underlying facts or is irrelevant and includes legal conclusions or
17 argumentative statements. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1; Nelson v. Pima
18 Community College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (“mere allegation and speculation do
19 not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment”); Coverdell v. Dep't of Soc. &
20 Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1987) (recitations of unsworn factual allegations do not
21 adequately oppose competent evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment); Burch, 433
22 F.Supp.2d at 1119.
23 Plaintiff has not offered evidence to support his assertion that Defendant Howard “refused
24 to do his assigned duties in regards to Plaintiff’s religious dietary needs.” (See Doc. 1 at 3.)
25 Defendant’s undisputed evidence reveals that Howard addressed Plaintiff’s request for a dietary
26 modification to peanut butter lunches. UDF 10-11. That evidence further establishes that Howard
27 cannot deny a request for modification unilaterally (UDF 13); the request must be considered by
1 unanimous. UDF 14-16. On this record, it is clear that Plaintiff’s request for preferred peanut
2 butter lunches was considered by Howard, referred to the RRC, and unanimously denied by the
3 RRC.
4 In sum, Plaintiff’s fails to meet his burden of production and his objections are overruled.
5 Plaintiff fails to establish Defendant Howard substantially burdened his religious exercise by
6 denying his request for peanut butter lunches. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348-50; Jones, 791 F.3d at
7 1031-32; Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.
8 Defendant’s Actions Involved a Legitimate Penological Interest
9 Defendant has presented evidence that denial of Plaintiff’s request for a diet modification
10 was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
11 Specifically, applying the Turner factors, Defendant first argues that the CDCR has a
12 legitimate interest in controlling costs and a streamlined food service, citing UDFs 34 through 37.
13 Defendants maintain the first Turner factor weighs in their favor.
14 Second, Defendant contends that because Plaintiff had alternatives to exercise his religion,
15 including prayer, religious study, attending services, and religious expression through clothing,
16 citing UDF 33, Plaintiff was not denied all means of religious expression. Defendants further
17 assert Plaintiff “had a vegetarian diet that met his restrictions, including the ability to a protein
18 alternative if he did not want eggs.” Therefore, Defendant maintains the second Turner factor
19 weighs in his favor.
20 Third, Defendant argues that accommodating Plaintiff’s request for a diet consisting of
21 only peanut butter lunches would have a significant impact on prison resources, citing UDFs 22
22 and 25 through 26. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not seeking to change his religious diet to
23 another religious diet; rather, Plaintiff sought to modify his existing vegetarian diet “because
24 peanut butter lunches were ‘more convenient’ and ‘healthier than cheese and eggs,’” citing UDFs
25 4 through 7, 22, and 25 through 26. Defendant contends that the “accommodation of individual
26 modifications to existing diets for ‘convenience’ and purported ‘health’ benefits would have a
27 significant ‘ripple effect’ on other inmates, staff, and the allocation of prison resources” and
1 streamlined food service, including religious diet options that meet the needs of the entire
2 religious population,” citing UDFs 36 and 37. The cost to provide individualized meals would be
3 “astronomically high,” citing UDF 36. To provide new diets, CDCR must consider vendor
4 sourcing, the cost of preparing menus, the overhead costs associated with “recording and
5 cataloguing every inmate’s preference,” and training and staffing costs, citing paragraph 3 of the
6 Philips declaration. Finally, Defendant avers that permitting individual modifications would
7 significantly impact prison resource allocation, citing UDF 37. Defendant contends the third
8 Turner factor weighs in his favor.
9 Finally, Defendant argues no obvious, easy alternative exists here because “Plaintiff
10 sought to have an entirely new personalized diet created for himself outside the scope of available
11 diets” and that to accommodate his request, “food staff would need to create a whole new diet for
12 Plaintiff,” citing UDFs 25 and 32, and paragraph 3 of the Philips declaration. Defendant contends
13 that “creating a diet just for Plaintiff would be [] costly and inefficient,” citing UDF 37.
14 Moreover, Defendant avers that the vegetarian diet was already the religious alternative to the
15 standard diet that satisfied the tenets of Plaintiff’s religion, citing UDF 32, and that “to the extent
16 modifications can be obtained through medical staff, such modifications are done through the
17 evaluation and approval of medical services – not a chaplain” and that Howard did not have the
18 “power or control to modify Plaintiff’s diet,” citing UDFs 18 through 22. Because no reasonably
19 available alternative existed, Defendant maintains the fourth Turner factor weighs in his favor.
20 Defendant has met his initial burden by demonstrating there is no genuine dispute as to
21 any material fact concerning a legitimate penological interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
22 Because Defendant met his initial burden, the burden shifts to Plaintiff as the non-moving
23 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita, 475
24 U.S. at 586.
25 First, the undersigned notes Plaintiff admits UDFs 4 through 7 and 22. Therefore, there is
26 no genuine issue of material dispute that during the relevant period CDCR provided three
27 religious alternatives to the standard diet – kosher, RMA, and vegetarian. Nor is there a genuine
1 kosher and RMA diets contained meat, and that the vegetarian diet was lacto-ovo, meaning it
2 contained dairy and eggs. And there is no dispute that Defendant Howard responded to Plaintiff’s
3 request to modify his diet to contain only peanut butter lunches on December 26, 2019, advising
4 Plaintiff his request had been reviewed and denied by the RRC.
5 Thus, the Court turns to an examination of the remaining relevant UDFs that Plaintiff
6 denied or were construed to be denied.
7 UDF 18 states: “Defendant Howard was not responsible for developing or implementing
8 new diets.” The entirety of Plaintiff’s response is as follows: “See Declaration.8” The Court
9 presumes Plaintiff’s response refers to paragraph 8 of his own declaration; it provides as follows:
10 Defendant Howard may not have been responsible for developing or
implementing new diets, but in light of his knowing Plaintiff told him
11 that the religious vegetarian (lacto-ovo) diet wasn’t vegetarian, nor
did it coincide with Plaintiff’s religious dietary tenets, Iman
12 Howard’s ‘could have’ recommended the PNB lunches (suggested
by Plaintiff) to the RRC, they would have abided by his decision in
13 light of there being no religious vegetarian diet available.
14 (Doc. 25 at 31.) Plaintiff’s objection is overruled; it includes argumentative statements and does
15 not challenge the veracity of Defendant’s fact – that Howard did not develop or implement new
16 diets. Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119; Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1. Notably,
17 Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges that Howard “officially refused to do his assigned duties in
18 regards to Plaintiff’s religious dietary needs” by denying Plaintiff “the right to access to a diet in
19 accordance with the dietary tenets of Rastafari when he directed Plaintiff to ‘health services’ to
20 resolve the issue, in direct violation of DOM Policy, section 54080.14 – institutional chaplains
21 oversee religious diets.” But Plaintiff has no personal knowledge that Defendant Howard was
22 responsible for developing or implementing new diets, nor does Plaintiff have personal
23 knowledge that the RRC “would have abided” any recommendation expressed by Howard.
24 UDF 19 states: “Defendant Howard was unable to modify any of the existing diets.”
25 Plaintiff responded that he “doesn’t know that to be true” and cites ““See Declaration.9”
26 Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff’s declaration states:
27 Plaintiff believes that due to the fact that the RRC strongly sides with
“the chaplain,” to this Court, “Defendant Howard either
1 Howard recommended that Plaintiff doesn’t receive the requested
PNB lunches.” Your Honor in your decision to either grant or deny
2 this motion … ask Defendant Howard was his recommendation a
“yea” or a “nay”? to Plaintiff’s request for all PNB lunches when he
3 went before the RRC on that issue. Defendant Howard wasn’t helpful
in “any way” after Plaintiff told him, on several occasions, that
4 “lacto-ovo isn’t vegetarian,” but “peanut butter is.” Plaintiff needs to
eat so how did Imam Howard assist Plaintiff in acquiring sustenance
5 within Rastafari dietary tenets? Seeing that Defendant was the Imam,
the man in charge of inmate religious dietary needs.
6
7 (Doc. 25 at 31-32, underlining omitted.) Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. First, Plaintiff initially
8 responded that he did not know whether the statement was true. Second, the Court does not
9 conduct discovery. See, e.g., Womack v. Virga, No. 2:11-cv-1030 MCE EFB P, 2012 WL
10 4465372, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (“The role of the court is not to conduct discovery or
11 research for the parties”). If Plaintiff wished to inquire about Defendant’s recommendation to the
12 RRC in response to Plaintiff’s request, it was Plaintiff’s obligation to conduct discovery seeking
13 that information. Further, to the extent Plaintiff’s response asserts the vegetarian diet is not
14 vegetarian and does not accord with Rastafarian beliefs, his response does not challenge the
15 veracity of Defendant’s fact – that Defendant Howard was unable to modify any of the existing
16 diets. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1.
17 Next, UDF 20 provides: “If an inmate had medical issues or specific allergies related to a
18 diet, Defendant Howard would refer that inmate to medical services for modifications of any of
19 the available diets.” In his response to UDF 20, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Howard directed
20 Plaintiff “to health care/medical services,” that Plaintiff “never requested a diet via health care or
21 medical,” citing “Exhibit B.” Additionally, Plaintiff states he did not express or hint at a medical
22 issue or allergies when discussing “a proper religious ‘vegetarian diet’” with Defendant.
23 Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. It does not challenge the veracity of Defendant’s fact – that if an
24 inmate had medical issues or specific allergies, Howard would refer that inmate to medical
25 services. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1. The assertion that Plaintiff was
26 “directed … to health care/medical services” but “never requested a diet” modification due to “a
27 medical issue or allergies” changes the fact actually alleged by Defendant and is thus not relevant.
1 of the vegetarian diet, although Plaintiff did not have a medical issue or allergy, does not
2 overcome Defendant’s showing that inmates with medical issues or specific allergies are referred
3 to medical services for diet modifications.
4 UDF 21 states: “Defendant Howard had no control over whether an inmate received a
5 protein alternative for the vegetarian diet.” Here, Plaintiff responds as follows:
6 Ipso facto Defendant Howard did have control over an inmate
receiving a protein alternative. Religious diet cards are provided by
7 the chaplain, Exhibit A Page 492 under Inmate Responsibilities, see
Exhibit A Page 491, Defendant Howard was in control of a
8 vegetarian alternate.
9 Plaintiff’s Exhibit A is a copy of section 54080.14 and the CDCR Department Operations
10 Manual. (See Doc. 25 at 19-20.) As concerns the “Vegetarian Diet Program,” it provides in
11 relevant part: “Inmates with determined religious, personal, or ethical dietary needs and showing
12 a Religious Diet Card shall be provided with an approved vegetarian protein alternate, often from
13 that same days’ scheduled meal.” As concerns “Inmate Responsibilities,” the DOM provides that
14 inmates are responsible for: (1) completing a CDCR Religious Diet Request form and submitting
15 it to the appropriate Institution Chaplain or designee; (2) showing their Religious Diet Card
16 obtained from the Chaplain or designee; and (3) following the conditions in the signed Religious
17 Diet Program Agreement. Plaintiff confuses Defendant Howard’s duty to issue a Religious Diet
18 Card when an inmate participates in a religious diet program with the specific fact alleged: that
19 Defendant Howard did not control whether any inmate chose to receive a protein alternate as
20 permitted in the vegetarian diet program. Hence, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
21 Next, UDF 25 provides: “Plaintiff claims that on or around December 26, 2019, he
22 requested that Defendant Howard modify his diet to be only peanut butter lunches.” Plaintiff’s
23 denial states: “No that occurred months earlier if memory serves me correct via 602 action.” A
24 review of Plaintiff’s operative complaint reveals Plaintiff alleged that “Defendant Howard as an
25 institutional chaplain is in charge of the religious diet issues. On December 26, 2019 is the day
26 that Defendant Howard officially refused to do his assigned duties in regards to Plaintiff’s
27 religious dietary needs.” Plaintiff’s complaint also includes a copy of an Institutional Level
1 document does not reference the date that the underlying grievance was submitted and Plaintiff
2 did not include the associated grievance as an exhibit to the complaint. In any event, UDF 25
3 includes the phrase “on or around” and the specific date upon which Plaintiff made his request to
4 Defendant Howard is not material to the dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv.,
5 Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. As concerns the substance of Plaintiff’s request – that he be provided only
6 peanut butter lunches, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirms as much. (See, e.g., Lloyd Depo.,
7 at 26-27 [“instead of like three times a day, okay, this is a vegetarian tray for Lloyd, vegetarian
8 tray, just give the guy - - knock all that out of the way and just give me four peanut butter
9 lunches”].) Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
10 UDF 26 states: “Plaintiff wanted only peanut butter lunches because it was ‘more
11 convenient’ and ‘healthier than cheese and eggs.’” In objecting to UDF 26, Plaintiff responded as
12 follows:
13 Ask any inmate assigned to kitchen duty or any housewife which is
more ‘convenient’ at serving time? 1. cook food and place it on a
14 tray/plate or 2. a prepackaged meal? A reasonable person with a
modicum of common sense “knows” that option number two is
15 “more convenient.” In highest regards to the basic, and humble,
peanut butter being more/much healthier than “cheese and eggs”
16 even Defendant Howard and AG Nordstrom, being the “highly”
reasonable people that they are, would agree with the Plaintiff on that
17 issue. But in the event that they’re in opposition to Plaintiff’s
aforementioned belief, Plaintiff, in almost 63 years of existence, has
18 never heard a medical doctor, nor anyone, say “ease off the peanut
butter – it’s killing you.” The same isn’t true for cow juice, cheese,
19 and embryos, eggs. Selah. Plaintiff doesn’t variate from what is
stated in the deposition. Rastafari.
20
21 Plaintiff’s objection is overruled because his response does not challenge the veracity of
22 Defendant’s fact – that Plaintiff wanted only peanut butter lunches because they were convenient
23 and healthier. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1. Whether Defendant or anyone else
24 disagreed with Plaintiff’s belief or whether peanut butter lunches are more convenient and
25 healthier is not the issue and is not a basis for a denial or objection to UDF 26.
26 UDF 32 provides: “The vegetarian diet offered to Plaintiff in 2019 was the closest diet
27 offered that conformed to Plaintiff’s preferred diet.” As previously found in its analysis regarding
1 not relevant, and includes legal conclusions or argumentative statements. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020
2 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1; Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d at 1081-82; Coverdell, 834
3 F.2d at 762; Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119. As such, the objection is overruled.
4 Finally, Plaintiff did not expressly admit or deny UDFs 34 through 37, therefore, the
5 undersigned treats his responses as denials. UDF 34 states: “CDCR has a legitimate interest in
6 providing religious diets to individuals with sincere religious beliefs.” Plaintiff argues the “lacto-
7 ovo religious diet isn’t vegetarian” and does not accord with his Rastafarian tenets or beliefs.
8 Stating he is “on the side of anyone who desires to save a buck for ‘pure and honest’ reasons as
9 opposed to ‘malicious’ reasons,” Plaintiff argues peanut butter lunches “are a ubiquitous
10 commodity” in CDCR, and because there is “no vegetarian diet in accordance with Rastafari
11 dietary tenets,” peanut butter lunches are “the most suitable religious diet option that is
12 ‘absolutely vegetarian.’” Plaintiff contends “Defendant Howard and the RRC could have, should
13 have, at the least approved Plaintiff’s request until their ‘plant based’ diet was established.” He
14 states that “Defendant Howard’s unilateral denial of a true vegetarian diet is tantamount to
15 dereliction of duty.” Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. First, Plaintiff’s response does not address
16 whether CDCR has a legitimate interest in providing religious diets to those with sincerely held
17 religious beliefs. Rather, it includes argumentative statements and improper legal conclusions.
18 Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119. To the extent Plaintiff’s response asserts the vegetarian diet is not
19 vegetarian and does not accord with Rastafarian beliefs or posits what Defendant Howard could
20 have or should have done, again, his response does not challenge the veracity of Defendant’s
21 fact – that CDCR has a legitimate interest in providing religious diets to those with sincerely held
22 religious beliefs. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1.
23 UDF 35 provides: “CDCR has a legitimate interest in controlling costs in a streamlined
24 food service.” Here, Plaintiff contends that “the overabundant ‘CDCR produced’ PNB lunches
25 are ‘well within’ [its] streamlined budget” and that CDCR does not offer a religious diet that
26 omits “eggs and fish;” thus it did not offer “a religious vegetarian diet” that comported with
27 Plaintiff’s religious dietary tenets. Plaintiff’s challenges amount to speculation and legal
1 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119. Further, the balance of Plaintiff’s response concerns the vegetarian diet;
2 therefore, it does not challenge the veracity of Defendant’s fact that it has a legitimate interest in
3 controlling costs as concerns food service. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1.
4 UDF 36 states: “It would be incredibly expensive to provide inmates with the meals and
5 diets of their choice.” Here, Plaintiff contends: (1) declarant Philips “will attest to the fact that a
6 kosher meal is way more costly than a humble PNB lunch;” (2) that he was not “requesting a
7 meal of choice” because his choice would have involved “beans, rice, potatoes, vegetables, and
8 pancakes;” and (3) that his request “was in response” to [CDCR, RRC, Philips, and Howard] not
9 having a religious diet” that did not contain “eggs and fish, lacto ‘yuck’ ovo.” First, Plaintiff’s
10 contention that Food Manager Philips would “attest to the fact that a kosher meal” is more
11 expensive that peanut butter lunches is speculative, argumentative and unsupported by any
12 evidence. Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119. Second, whatever Plaintiff’s “meal of choice” would
13 have included does not challenge the veracity of Defendant’s fact – that providing “meals and
14 diets of” inmates’ choice would be expensive. Burghardt-Cobb, 2020 WL 1974264, at *1 n.1.
15 Moreover, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s request for all peanut butter lunches is indeed a
16 “meal of choice” because it reflects Plaintiff’s preference for peanut butter over cheese and eggs.
17 Finally, Plaintiff’s assertion that his request for peanut butter lunches was a response to a lack of
18 a religious diet that did not include eggs and fish also does not challenge the veracity of
19 Defendant’s fact that expenses would be prohibitive if inmates were to be provided with meals
20 and diets of their choice. Id.
21 UDF 37 states: “Prison resource allocation would be significantly impacted if individual
22 modifications of existing diets were permitted.” Plaintiff did not reproduce or respond to UDF 37.
23 Because Plaintiff has offered no response or evidence to challenge UDF 37, the presumed denial
24 is overruled.
25 The undersigned has reviewed the Declaration of T. Philips, Correctional Food Manager
26 II at KVSP. In relevant part, Philips declares as follows:
27 CDCR has a legitimate interest in controlling costs in a streamlined
food service. In particular, it would be incredibly expensive to
1 logistics of recording every incarcerated person’s modification and
personal preferences would be inefficient and the expense would be
2 astronomical. Specifically, the cost of sourcing foods from different
vendor, the cost of developing menus that provide sufficient
3 nutrition, the administrative overhead costs of recording and
cataloging every inmate’s preference, and the additional cost for
4 kitchen staff to prepare these different diets would be overwhelming.
In addition, certain modifications would not be feasible because they
5 do not satisfy nutrition requirements. Therefore, prison resource
allocation would be significantly impacted if individual
6 modifications of the existing diets (notwithstanding modifications on
a medical basis) were permitted. For these reasons, I believe that
7 CDCR has legitimate interests in providing streamlines and cost-
efficient food service while still providing religious diets to those
8 with sincere beliefs.
9 (See Doc. 18-6 at 2, ¶ 3.)
10 Courts consistently have held that a prison has a legitimate interest in limiting special
11 religious dietary options to save money. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993);
12 Sefeldeen v. Alameida, 238 F. App'x 204, 206 (9th Cir. 2007) (“the legitimate governmental
13 interest is to reasonably accommodate thousands of inmates’ religious dietary needs while also
14 considering budgetary, staff, and security limitations”); Curry v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., No. C-09-
15 3408 EMC (pr), 2013 WL 75769, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2013) (“The orderly administration of
16 a program that allows ... prisons to accommodate the religious dietary needs of thousands of
17 prisoners” is a legitimate governmental interest). Courts also have determined that denials of
18 individual food preferences do not amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Robinson v.
19 Jackson, 615 F. App'x 310 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here is no constitutional right for each prisoner to
20 be served the specific foods he desires—such as Halal meat—in prison”); Rains v. Wellman, No.
21 2:20-cv-32, 2022 WL 18587783, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2022) (“Rain’s preference for a
22 diet modification including an alternative source of protein does not state a First Amendment free
23 exercise … claim”). On this record, where Plaintiff sought an individualized modification of the
24 religious vegetarian diet to his preferred peanut butter lunches, the undersigned finds the four
25 Turner factors weigh in Defendant’s favor.
26 In short, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of production and his objections are overruled.
27 Therefore, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish Defendant Howard’s
1 Price, 334 U.S. at 285; Jones, 791 F.3d at 1033; Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884.
2 Summary of Findings
3 Defendant Howard met his initial burden of establishing that he did not violate Plaintiff’s
4 rights under the First Amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
5 322. And Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of production to establish that a genuine dispute of
6 material fact exists. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. In short, there is no genuine need for a trial
7 in this action as no reasonable jury would return a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. Matsushita, 475
8 U.S. at 587; Wool, 818 F.2d at 1436. Thus, Defendant Howard is entitled to summary judgment.
9 Id. at 587; Celotex Corp., at 322.
10 Because the Court has determined Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
11 Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise of religion claim, the undersigned declines to address
12 Defendant’s qualified immunity defense. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5
13 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is
14 raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional
15 right at all”).
16 VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
17 For the reasons given above, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that
18 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18) be GRANTED and that judgment be
19 entered in Defendant Howard’s favor.
20 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
21 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days
22 after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written
23 objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to
24 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without
25 leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the
26 Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the
27 exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise
1 | disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28
2 | US.C. § 636(b)()(C).
3 A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the waiver
4 | of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).
5 | ITIS ORDERED.
©} Dated: _ July 16, 2026 | wn D bo
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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