The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 KELVIN SCOTT CHESSMAN, Case No.: 3:26-cv-1049-WQH-DDL
CDCR #G35578,
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ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION
Plaintiff,
13 FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
v. AS MOOT [ECF No. 7]; AND
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C. PARKHILL, K. SANTANA, M.
15 (2) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
BURKE, ALONZO, R. ZAVALA, JOHN
WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR
16 DOE, Appeals Coordinator, JOHN DOE,
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
K-9 Handler,
17 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
Defendants. § 1915A(b)(1)
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HAYES, Judge:
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On February 6, 2026, Kelvin Scott Chessman (“Plaintiff” or “Chessman”), a state
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inmate proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with
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a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On February 17, 2026,
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Plaintiff filed a “supplement” to the complaint, including several exhibits. (ECF Nos. 5, 5-
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1.)
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On February 27, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismissed the
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action without prejudice because Plaintiff had sufficient funds available in his prison trust
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account to satisfy the $405 civil filing fee. (ECF No. 6.) The Court gave Plaintiff 45 days,
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1 On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment” pursuant to
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (ECF No. 7.) On April 2, 2026, Plaintiff paid the
3 $405 civil filing fee. (ECF No. 9.)
4 For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motion for relief from
5 judgment as moot and dismisses the complaint without prejudice, and with leave to amend,
6 for failure to state a claim.
7 I. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
8 In his motion for relief from judgment, Plaintiff asks the Court to set aside the
9 dismissal of his case because he was in the process of having the civil filing fee sent to the
10 Court. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) The fee was received by the Clerk of Court on April 2, 2026. (ECF
11 No. 9.) The case has been reopened and as such, the motion for relief from judgment is
12 denied as moot.
13 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
14 A. Legal Standard
15 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from governmental officers, the Court
16 must screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) before any of his claims may
17 proceed. Section 1915A(a) “mandates early review— ‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as
18 practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
19 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. Robinson,
20 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of § 1915A
21 apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental
22 entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446–47 (9th Cir.
23 2000). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
24 complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
25 be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
26 Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 28
27 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
28 “The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the ‘same as the
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.’” Long v.
2 Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
3 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain
4 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
5 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
6 complaint fails to state a claim if it lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts
7 . . . to support a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,
8 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th
9 Cir. 2001)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
10 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the court has an obligation “where the petitioner is pro se,
12 particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the
13 petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.
14 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply
15 essential elements [to] the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the
16 Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
17 B. Factual Allegations
18 The following facts are taken from allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint and
19 its supplement. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) Chessman states that on August 27, 2024 he was inside
20 his cell at Centinela State Prison when correctional officer Parkhill came to his cell door.
21 ECF No. 1 at 4. Parkhill instructed Chessman to exit the cell so it could be searched based
22 on information staff had received. Id. Parkhill did not elaborate about the source or content
23 of the “information.” Id. Parkhill was accompanied by correctional officers Santana, Burke,
24 and “John Doe, K-9 Handler.” Id. Chessman states the four officers “failed to articulate
25 specific facts giving rise to ‘reasonable suspicion’” for the search. Id.
26 After Chessman exited the cell, Parkhill conducted a “pat-down frisk” of Chessman
27 “without any constitutional justification.” Id. at 5. Burke and K-9 Handler Doe, along with
28 the canine, entered the cell. Id. At about the same time, Parkhill instructed Chessman to go
1 to the showers where Parkhill ordered Chessman to “strip naked and to open [his] mouth,
2 rake from front to back the genitals, show both hands and feet, spread both buttocks while
3 bending over, squat and cough.” Id. Santana, who was a supervisor, did nothing to prevent
4 the strip search. Id.
5 Thereafter, Parkhill, Burke, and Santana entered Chessman’s cell and removed his
6 property, putting it on the walkway outside the cell. Id.at 6. Santana began searching the
7 property while the “K-9 dog was air-scan (sniffing) searching” the property. Id. at 6. In the
8 meantime, Parkhill and Burke conducted a search inside the cell. Id. After the property
9 search was completed with “negative results,” Plaintiff was allowed back into his cell. Id.
10 Santana then gave Chessman a “cell search worksheet.” Id.; see also ECF No. 5 at 9.
11 Chessman states the worksheet contained “forgery fraudulent wordings” indicating a cell
12 phone and chargers had been found during the cell search. ECF No. 1 at 6; see also ECF
13 No. 5 at 10–11. A photograph taken of the items did not show where they were found. ECF
14 No. 1 at 7. Chessman alleges Santana is “responsible for planting evidence.” Id. at 6.
15 Plaintiff states that on October 13, 2023 (10 months prior to the search discussed
16 above), he had submitted a complaint regarding “sexual misconduct during a[n] unclothed
17 body search.” Id. at 7. He alleges the August 27, 2024 search was “staged” and conducted
18 by Parkhill, Burke, Santana and K-9 Handler Doe with “retaliatory state[s] of mind,” as a
19 result of the October 13, 2023 staff complaint. Id. at 7–8.
20 After the August 27, 2024 search, Santana prepared a “false” Rule Violation Report
21 (“RVR”) which Plaintiff alleges contained several inaccurate statements and was based on
22 “planted evidence.” Id. at 9. The RVR included allegations that a bag of “beef crumbles”
23 had been previously opened and “retaped” closed to conceal a cellular device. Id. at 9. It
24 also noted that a “mackerel fillet” bag had been opened and taped closed to hide two phone
25 chargers. Id. at 10. In addition, it referenced finding a USB cord and “charging block”
26 concealed in bottles of seasoning. Id.; see also ECF No. 5-1 at 13. Chessman states all of
27 this information was “false” and that California Department of Corrections and
28 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) regulations were not followed when inventorying and
1 photographing the items. ECF No. 1 at 10. Specifically, there were no photographs taken
2 of the items in the location where they were found inside the cell. Id.
3 On September 11, 2024, Lieutenant Alonzo presided over the RVR hearing related
4 to the August 27, 2024 search. Id. at 12. Chessman provided a written statement denying
5 the allegations in the RVR and asserting that the officers involved in the search had not
6 followed proper CDCR procedures. Id. The hearing, however, was ultimately postponed
7 because Alonzo sought to question witnesses who were unavailable. Id. at 13. The RVR
8 hearing was rescheduled for September 13, 2024 and, after hearing from witnesses,
9 considering the evidence and Chessman’s objections, Alonzo found Chessman guilty of
10 the RVR. Id.; see also ECF No. 5-1 at 10–13. As a result, Chessman was assessed a 90-
11 days deduction of custody credits and a 90-day loss-of-privileges. See ECF No. 5-1 at 14.
12 Plaintiff states that on September 19, 2024, he filed a “staff misconduct complaint”
13 against the Parkhill, Burke, Santana and Alonzo, but Defendant “John Doe, Appeals
14 Coordinator” “refus[ed] to process the complaint.” ECF No. 1 at 17.
15 Chessman appealed the result of the RVR hearing and on October 28, 2024, Zavala,
16 the “Chief Disciplinary Officer,” affirmed Alonzo’s ruling. Id. at 15. Plaintiff states Zavala
17 failed to properly consider the evidence and failed to reasonably investigate the matter. Id.
18 C. Discussion
19 Plaintiff names seven Defendants: Parkhill, Santana, Burke, Alonzo, Zavala, John
20 Doe, K-9 Handler (“K-9 Handler Doe”) and John Doe, Appeals Coordinator (“Appeals
21 Doe”), all in both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 1–3. He raises claims
22 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging: (1) the searches conducted by Parkhill, Burke,
23 Santana and K-9 Handler Doe were in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
24 rights, and were “retaliatory;” (2) the RVR prepared by Santana was “false,” in violation
25 of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (3) Alonzo found him guilty of the
26 RVR in violation of his right to due process; (4) Zavala affirmed his RVR on appeal in
27 violation of his right to due process; and (5) Appeals Doe failed to properly process his
28 staff misconduct complaint in violation of his right to due process. See id. at 5–17. He seeks
1 money damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 21.
2 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation
3 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the
4 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert
5 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
6 1. Official Capacity Claims
7 As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their official
8 capacities, he fails to state such a claim. An “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other
9 than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity” and as such are treated as claims against
10 the State. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844
11 F.2d 628, 631–32 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding claims against prison correctional officer,
12 warden, and other officials in official capacity to be claims against State). As such, the
13 Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s § 1983 claims for money damages against state
14 actors sued in their official capacities. Michigan State Police Dep’t v. Will, 491 U.S. 58,
15 66 (1989) (“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities
16 are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”); see also Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th
17 Cir. 1999) (“The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
18 with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court.”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff
19 is suing Defendants in their official capacities and is seeking monetary damages, the claims
20 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
21 2. Count One
22 In count one, Chessman alleges Defendants Parkhill, Santana, Burke and K-9
23 Handler Doe violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his cell and person
24 without “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause.” ECF No. 1 at 4. He also states that
25 the same Defendants violated his due process rights by failing to follow proper procedure
26 when conducting the cell search, and that they conducted the search with “retaliatory
27 state[s] of mind.” Id. at 6, 7–8.
28 / / /
1 a. Fourth Amendment
2 First, as to the search of his cell, Chessman cannot state a Fourth Amendment claim.
3 The Supreme Court has held “the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable
4 searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
5 517, 526 (1984). As such, prison officials need neither probable cause nor “reasonable
6 suspicion” to conduct a search of a prisoner’s cell. See id. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
7 state a Fourth Amendment claim against Parkhill, Burke, Santana, and K-9 Handler Doe,
8 based on the search of his cell.
9 Chessman also contends Parkhill violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
10 subjecting him to a visual strip search. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) The Fourth Amendment applies
11 to the invasion of bodily privacy in prisons. See Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco,
12 595 F.3d 964, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328,
13 333 (9th Cir. 1988). Prisoners may be subjected to strip searches and body cavity searches
14 if they are conducted in a reasonable manner. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979).
15 Strip searches that are limited to “visual inspection,” even if “invasive and embarrassing,”
16 are generally permissible. See Bull, 595 F.3d at 974–75 (holding that visual strip searches
17 that are held in a “professional manner and in a place that afforded privacy” and conducted
18 to prevent the smuggling of contraband did not violate Fourth Amendment); Thompson v.
19 Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding visual strip searches conducted
20 outside prisoner’s cell as reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest in
21 keeping contraband out of the prison). A strip search, however, may be unreasonable under
22 the Fourth Amendment where it is “excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any
23 legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332.
24 Here, Chessman alleges that after the search of his cell began, Parkhill escorted him
25 to the showers and had him undress, expose his genitals and “squat and cough.” (ECF No.
26 1 at 5.) While Chessman alleges that Parkhill lacked justification for the visual strip search,
27 he has failed to plausibly allege facts to suggest it was “excessive, vindictive, harassing”
28 or otherwise unreasonable. See id. The search occurred simultaneously with a cell search
1 for contraband and there are no facts alleged indicating it was overly invasive or
2 unprofessional. See Bull, 595 F.3d at 974–75. Therefore, Chessman has failed to state a
3 Fourth Amendment claim against Parkhill based on the visual strip search.
4 b. Due Process: Failure to Follow Regulations
5 Next, Chessman appears to allege Parkhill, Santana, Burke and K-9 Handler Doe
6 failed to follow prison regulations when conducting the searches of his cell and person, in
7 violation of his right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) A purported failure to adhere to
8 certain prison regulations and guidelines does not, without more, establish the violation a
9 federal constitutional right. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)
10 (“[S]tate departmental regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation.”);
11 Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations
12 omitted)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim based on a purported failure
13 of any Defendant to follow prison regulations. See Pettus v. Serrano, 2022 WL 3574417,
14 at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2022) (dismissing prisoner’s claims that “prison[] policies and
15 procedures regarding ‘body and cell searches’ were not followed” for failing to state a due
16 process claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
17 c. Retaliation
18 Chessman alleges Parkhill, Burke, Santana, and K-9 Handler Doe conducted the
19 search with “retaliatory state[s] of mind.” (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) While Chessman does not
20 reference the First Amendment, he appears to allege the search was in retaliation for a
21 previously filed staff complaint. Id. at 7. To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation,
22 a plaintiff must allege: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against
23 an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4)
24 chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not
25 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,
26 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005).
27 Here, Chessman asserts that Parkhill, Burke, Santana and K-9 Handler Doe
28 conducted the August 27, 2024 search with a “retaliatory mental state” because he had
1 submitted a staff misconduct complaint on October 13, 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) A
2 grievance regarding staff misconduct constitutes protected conduct under the First
3 Amendment. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (finding the submission of an administrative
4 grievance to be protected conduct). However, Chessman alleges no facts indicating
5 Parkhill, Santana, Burke and/or K-9 Handler Doe were aware of the staff complaint,
6 submitted 10 months prior to the search, or that they conducted the search because of it.
7 Mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy,
8 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases) (affirming grant of summary judgment
9 where no evidence that defendants knew about plaintiff’s prior lawsuit or that defendants’
10 disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior lawsuit). Therefore, as pleaded,
11 Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against any Defendant.
12 d. Conclusion
13 Chessman has failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth
14 Amendment, or First Amendment against any Defendant as to count one. Therefore, the
15 Court dismisses count one in its entirety for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);
16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
17 3. Counts Two, Three, and Four
18 In the three following counts, Chessman alleges due process violations based on the
19 RVR and subsequent RVR proceedings. In the second count, Chessman alleges Santana
20 prepared a “false RVR” based on “false statements” and “planted evidence,” in violation
21 of his due process rights. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) In the third count, Chessman alleges Alonzo,
22 the hearing officer who presided over the RVR hearing, deprived him of due process when
23 he found Chessman guilty of the RVR based on false evidence. Id. at 12–13. Plaintiff states
24 that, as a result, he suffered “adverse consequences such as loss of credits, loss of privileges
25 and 10-day confinement to quarters.” Id. at 13. While Chessman does not specify how
26 many credits he lost in his complaint, exhibits in his supplement indicate he lost 90 days
27 of custody credits. (ECF No. 5-1, Ex. K at 14.) In the fourth count, Chessman alleges
28 Zavala, the chief disciplinary officer, improperly affirmed Alonzo’s decision as to the RVR
1 on appeal, in violation of Chessman’s due process rights. Id. at 15.
2 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being
3 deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
4 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized
5 liberty or property interest at stake.” Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir.
6 1989). A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, or from an expectation or
7 interest created by state law or prison regulations. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
8 (1995). With respect to liberty interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty
9 interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the
10 deprivation. Id. at 481–84. Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to
11 freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
12 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. If a liberty interest is at stake,
13 an inmate is entitled to certain procedural protections. Id. at 482.
14 Because Plaintiff lost custody credits as a result of his disciplinary conviction, his
15 relief under § 1983 is limited by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).1 State
16 prisoners may not challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a § 1983 action;
17 their remedy lies in habeas corpus instead. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005).
18 Often referred to as the “favorable termination rule” or the “Heck bar,” this limitation
19 applies whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement--
20 either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a
21
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23 1 The loss of other general privileges in prison, such as recreational time, visitation, and program
participation, generally do not amount to the kind of atypical or significant hardship required to give rise
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to a state-created a liberty interest. See Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir.) (stating
25 hardships “such as loss of recreational and rehabilitative programs or confinement to one’s cell for a
lengthy period of time” do not give rise to a liberty interest), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 75 F.3d
26 448 (9th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Small, 595 Fed. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no liberty interest
in telephone or yard privileges) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487); see also Baker v. Lugo, No. 2:16-cv-
27 3671-PAG-JS, 2017 WL 1428734, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (concluding loss of access to yard
privileges, dayroom privileges, telephone privileges, and vendor package privileges did not establish
28
1 judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Id.
2 at 81 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has held that where a § 1983 action alleges
3 constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or
4 sentence, the prisoner must first establish that the underlying sentence or conviction has
5 already been invalidated on appeal, by a habeas petition, or terminated in his favor via
6 some other similar proceeding. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (1994); see also Muhammad v.
7 Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004).
8 This “favorable termination” rule applies to prison disciplinary proceedings, if those
9 proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520
10 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1997) (holding that claim for monetary and declaratory relief
11 challenging validity of procedures used to deprive prisoner of good-time credits is not
12 cognizable under § 1983); see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82 (explaining that where
13 “success in a . . . [section] 1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of
14 conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of
15 his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction
16 or sentence”). Thus, such a due process claim would be barred unless the plaintiff can also
17 show his disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.
18 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648.
19 Here, Plaintiff alleges his right to due process was violated by Santana’s issuance of
20 the RVR, Alonzo’s finding him guilty after the RVR hearing, and Zavala affirming the
21 finding on appeal because they were all based on “false” evidence. As a result, he lost 90
22 days of custody credits and other privileges. (ECF No. 1 at 9, 13–14, 16.) If Chessman
23 were to succeed on these claims, it would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the
24 deprivation of his [custody] credits.” See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646. Because Chessman
25 has not further alleged his disciplinary conviction has already been reversed, expunged, or
26 otherwise invalidated, he does not state a plausible claim for relief, and his due process
27 claims related to the “false” RVR itself, the subsequent RVR hearing and the RVR appeal
28
1 must be dismissed. Id.; see also Coley v. Duffy, No. 1:13-cv-00912-BAM-PC, 2016 WL
2 1359799, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016) (dismissing prisoner’s § 1983 complaint alleging
3 loss of custody credits and of being falsely charged with a disciplinary violation pursuant
4 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A as barred by Heck). Accordingly, the Court
5 dismisses counts two, three and four for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);
6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
7 4. Count Five
8 In his fifth ground for relief, Chessman alleges Defendant Appeals Doe failed to
9 properly process his “staff misconduct complaint,” in violation of his right to due process.
10 (ECF No. 1 at 17.) As discussed above, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
11 Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who
12 seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at
13 stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Prisoners do not have a “separate
14 constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza,
15 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640
16 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating due process was not violated simply because a defendant fails
17 properly to process grievances submitted for consideration); see also Todd v. Cal. Dep’t of
18 Corr. and Rehab., 615 Fed. App’x 415, 415 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding the district court
19 properly dismissed claim based on improper “processing and handling of [...] prison
20 grievances,” since prisoners have no “constitutional entitlement to a specific prison
21
22
23 2 In addition, courts have generally found that the issuance of a false disciplinary charge does not, in and
of itself, violate due process. See Smith v. Albee, No. 15-cv-1598 KJN P, 2016 WL 6094471, at *4 (E.D.
24
Cal. Oct. 18, 2016) (stating the “falsification of disciplinary reports does not state a stand-alone
25 constitutional claim,” because “[t]here is no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or
wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest; Muhammad
26 v. Rubia, 2010 WL 1260425, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d, 453 Fed. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of
27 conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.” (citations omitted)); Cf.
Garrott v. Glebe, 600 Fed. App’x 540, 545 (9th Cir. April 22, 2015) (stating there is no clearly established
28
1 grievance procedure”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860) (quotation marks omitted);
2 Daniels v. Aguilera, No. 2:16-cv-00996-JAM-CKD P, 2018 WL 558658, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
3 Jan. 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. 2018 WL 1763311 (E.D.
4 Cal. Apr. 12, 2018) (“Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, it is
5 impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly process
6 prison grievances.”). Accordingly, Chessman has failed to state a plausible due process
7 claim against Defendant Appeals Doe and therefore the Court dismisses count five. See 28
8 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
9 D. Leave to Amend
10 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court grants him leave to amend his
11 complaint. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should
12 not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
13 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint
14 could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th
15 Cir. 2012)).
16 III. CONCLUSION
17 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court:
18 1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 7) as moot.
19 2. DISMISSES the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim against
20 any Defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
21 3. GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave from the date of this Order in which
22 to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this
23 Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his
24 original Complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner
25 & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the
26 original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims
27 dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be
28 “considered waived if not repled.”).
1 If Plaintiff fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a final
2 || Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state a claim upon which relief
3 ||can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1) and § 1915A(b)(1), and failure to
4 || prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427
5 || F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity
6 ||to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into
7 || dismissal of the entire action.’’).
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10 || Dated: August 7, 2026 BME: Me Z. Maa
11 Hon. William Q. Hayes
2 United States District Court
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