The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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8 JENNA EIDENMULLER,
9 Plaintiff, Case No. C26-1139-MLP
10 v. ORDER
11 UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
12 Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants the
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University of Washington (“UW”); former UW Health Sciences Immunization Program
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(“HSIP”) Manager Janice Hutson; UW Speech and Hearing Sciences Director of Clinical
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Education Amy Rodda; UW Senior Director of Environmental Health & Safety Katia Harb; and
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former UW President Ana Mari Cauce (the “Individual Defendants”; collectively with UW,
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“Defendants”). (Mot. (dkt. # 20).) Plaintiff Jenna Eidenmuller filed a response requesting oral
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argument. (Resp. (dkt. # 21).) Defendants filed a reply. (Reply (dkt. # 22).) The Court heard oral
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argument on August 6, 2026. (Dkt. # 23.)
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1 Having considered the parties’ arguments, the governing law, and the record, the Court
2 GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (dkt. # 20).1
3 II. LEGAL STANDARD
4 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted for “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the
5 absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Godecke v. Kinetic
6 Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). A complaint must plead
7 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
8 662, 697 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content
9 allowing the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
10 misconduct alleged. Id. at 678. The Court “must presume all factual allegations of the complaint
11 to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of
12 Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
13 the complaint, documents incorporated by reference, and matters subject to judicial notice.
14 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Leave to amend should
15 be granted unless amendment would be futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
16 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
17 III. BACKGROUND
18 Plaintiff attended UW from 2019 to 2023 and earned a Bachelor of Science in Speech
19 and Hearing Sciences. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (dkt. # 10), ¶¶ 33, 36.) In March
20 2023, UW admitted her to its two-year, full-time Master of Science in Medical Speech-Language
21 Pathology (“Med-SLP”) program, which requires patient-facing clinical practicums and
22 community rotations. (Id., ¶¶ 38-39.) Clinical placements are governed in part by affiliation
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1 The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. # 9.)
1 agreements and site-specific rules, including infection-control and immunization requirements,
2 which HSIP administers and verifies. (Id., ¶¶ 41-44, 82.)
3 During the COVID-19 pandemic, Washington’s Proclamation 21-14.1 required
4 healthcare workers (including student trainees) to be vaccinated for COVID-19, with disability
5 and religious exemptions.2 (FAC, ¶¶ 30-31.) UW adopted a student religious-accommodation
6 process and, on September 29, 2021, issued a form stating UW would provide reasonable
7 accommodation for sincerely held beliefs unless doing so posed an undue hardship; Section 2
8 addressed HSIP students. (Id., ¶¶ 45-49.)
9 Plaintiff alleges HSIP leadership decided to categorically deny religious exemptions for
10 clinical students, citing: (1) a January 25, 2022 email from Ms. Hutson describing a forthcoming
11 policy drafted “ambiguous[ly]” in order to “not accept [religious exemptions] going forward”
12 (FAC, ¶ 52); (2) a February 17, 2022 HSIP Policy Addendum on COVID-19 vaccination that, as
13 applied, resulted in blanket non-accommodation in clinical settings (id., ¶¶ 54-55); and (3) an
14 October 27, 2022 instruction from Ms. Hutson that “[r]eligious exemptions will not be
15 accommodated in a clinical setting.” (Id., ¶ 56.)
16 After her March 2023 admission, Plaintiff asked whether her undergraduate religious
17 exemption would carry over. (FAC, ¶ 66.) Before she submitted a written request, Ms. Hutson
18 allegedly stated by phone that it would be denied. (Id., ¶¶ 73-74.) Plaintiff submitted a written
19 request on March 30, 2023, explaining her Christian beliefs and proposing masking and weekly
20 testing at her expense. (Id., ¶¶ 75-77.) On April 4, 2023, UW denied the request, stating
21 infectious-disease experts had evaluated whether accommodation could mitigate risks for an
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2 Washington’s Proclamation 21-14.1 expired October 31, 2022. (FAC, ¶ 32.)
1 unvaccinated trainee and that UW individually evaluated her request without questioning
2 sincerity. (Id., ¶¶ 81-83.)
3 Plaintiff appealed on April 6, 2023, asserting UW performed only a perfunctory review—
4 citing affiliation agreements and HSIP guidelines as precluding accommodation rather than
5 investigating affiliate capacity to accommodate. (FAC, ¶¶ 85-109.) On May 8, 2023, UW
6 announced it would end its university-wide COVID-19 vaccination requirement; however,
7 students in UW’s clinic and community placements in healthcare settings were still required to
8 comply with HSIP policies, including COVID-19 vaccination, and with site-specific
9 immunization rules under affiliation agreements. (Id., ¶¶ 92, 107.) Internal communications
10 discussed a possible deferral or an exception in UW’s clinic for Plaintiff, but no accommodation
11 was granted. (Id., ¶¶ 95-107.)
12 On June 7, 2023, UW warned Plaintiff that she would be removed from the program if
13 she remained noncompliant with HSIP’s vaccination requirements applicable to clinical
14 placements; she objected on June 10, 2023. (FAC, ¶¶ 113-14.) UW then deemed her ineligible to
15 begin the program based on noncompliance. (Id., ¶¶ 115-19.) At the time UW removed Plaintiff
16 in June 2023, HSIP’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement for students in clinical placements
17 remained in effect. (Id., ¶¶ 82-119.)
18 Plaintiff also alleges UW granted numerous medical and religious exemptions from 2021
19 to 2024, including for students with clinical requirements. (FAC, ¶¶ 120-25.) She identifies
20 another Med-SLP student who received a temporary religious exemption in December 2023 and
21 a full exemption in February 2024, completed multiple affiliate clinical rotations, and graduated.
22 (Id., ¶¶ 126-39.)
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1 IV. DISCUSSION
2 Plaintiff asserts five causes of action: (1) free exercise pursuant to U.S. Const. amend. I,
3 and Wash. Const. Art. I, § 11, against all Defendants in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C.
4 § 1983 (FAC, ¶¶ 151-63); (2) equal protection pursuant to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and Wash.
5 Const. Art. I, § 12, against all Defendants in their personal capacities under § 1983 (id.,
6 ¶¶ 164-74); (3) religious discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Ch.
7 49.60 RCW, against all Defendants (id., ¶¶ 175-86); (4) breach of contract against UW (id.,
8 ¶¶ 187-94); and (5) breach of the implied covenant against UW (id., ¶¶ 195-99).
9 A. Federal Claims Against UW
10 Section 1983 provides the vehicle for federal constitutional claims for damages. See Azul-
11 Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992). To state a claim for
12 relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) they suffered a violation of rights protected by the
13 Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a
14 person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
15 To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against UW, those claims are barred by the
16 Eleventh Amendment. See Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022); Mitchell v.
17 Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff argues Defendants have not carried a
18 burden to establish UW is an arm of the state, citing Kohn v. State Bar of California, 87 F.4th
19 1021 (9th Cir. 2023), which refined the Ninth Circuit’s arm-of-the-state test. (Resp. at 11-14.)
20 But Kohn expressly stated its framework was “unlikely to substantially destabilize prior
21 decisions granting sovereign immunity” to state entities. Id. at 1032. Plaintiff’s reliance on out-
22 of-circuit cases addressing different entities under different schemes does not justify departing
23 from decades of binding and persuasive authority affirming that UW is an arm of the state
1 entitled to immunity. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Washington v. Employers Ins. Co. of
2 Wausau, 2023 WL 4863167, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2023) (collecting cases). UW is thus
3 entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on Plaintiff’s federal claims. Because the federal
4 claims against UW cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal is with prejudice.
5 B. Federal Claims Against the Individual Defendants
6 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants should
7 be dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds. (Mot. at 7-9.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity
8 protects government officials from liability for civil damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts
9 showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
10 clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757
11 (2014) (cleaned up). Courts may address these prongs in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
12 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes without deciding that
13 Plaintiff plausibly alleges federal constitutional violations against the Individual Defendants. The
14 claims fail at the second prong—whether a right was clearly established.
15 “A right is clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
16 would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,
17 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). A plaintiff need not cite
18 a case directly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
19 question beyond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of
20 the specific context of the case, not at a high level of generality. Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5-6.
21 Plaintiff identifies no precedent, existing at the time of Defendants’ conduct in 2023,
22 holding that a university official violates the Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clauses by
23 implementing a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for healthcare-providing student trainees in clinical
1 placements. (Resp. at 15-16.) The cases she cites—Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522
2 (2021), and Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021)—state general principles that do not resolve
3 the specific question here. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against defining clearly
4 established law at a high level of generality. See Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018).
5 Further, the weight of authority confirms that this constitutional question was not
6 “beyond debate” in 2023. The Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld COVID-19 vaccine
7 mandates for healthcare workers as constitutionally permissible and has cautioned courts against
8 second-guessing pandemic decision-making with hindsight. See, e.g., Health Freedom Def.
9 Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho, 148 F.4th 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2025); Curtis v. Inslee, 154 F.4th 678,
10 692 (9th Cir. 2025); Petersen v. Snohomish Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211, 1222 (9th Cir.
11 2025); see also Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021)
12 (approving vaccine requirement with no religious exemptions). Courts outside the Ninth Circuit
13 have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Bojicic v. DeWine, 569 F. Supp. 3d 669, 692 (N.D.
14 Ohio 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 3585636 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2022); Benner et al. v. Wolf et al., 2021
15 WL 4123973, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2021). Against this backdrop, reasonable university
16 officials could conclude that implementing UW’s vaccine mandate for healthcare student
17 trainees in clinical placements—including deeming masking and testing inadequate—was
18 constitutionally permissible. The Individual Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified
19 immunity on Plaintiff’s federal claims. Because the absence of clearly established law at the time
20 of the challenged conduct cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal is with prejudice.
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1 C. State Law Claims
2 Plaintiff has failed to state any federal claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the
3 Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims and dismisses
4 them without prejudice.
5 V. CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (dkt.
7 # 20). Counts I and II are dismissed with prejudice, and the remaining causes of action are
8 dismissed without prejudice.
9 Dated this 13th day of August, 2026.
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A
11 MICHELLE L. PETERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
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