Opinion

Sauls

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed: Aug 10, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

LAREINA A. SAULS, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05957-JHC

Plaintiff, ORDER

PIERCE COUNTY,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint. Dkt. # 40. The Court has considered the materials filed in support of and

in opposition to the motion, the rest of the case file, and the governing law. Being fully advised,

for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion.

1 II

BACKGROUND1

On April 10, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Lareina A. Sauls filed her Second Amended

Complaint (SAC) against Pierce County. Dkt. # 37. The SAC alleges violations of Plaintiffs’

disability-related rights in connection with judicial proceedings before Pierce County courts. Id.

¶ 1. Plaintiff says she has “cognitive impairments affecting executive functioning, processing

speed, memory, and information organization.” Id. ¶ 6. She says that she explained to

Defendant that “oral-only communication was ineffective for” her because of her disability.” Id.

¶ 15. She requested accommodations from Pierce County, specifically, “accessible written

communication of accommodation decisions and procedural expectations before hearings and

deadlines.” Id. ¶ 14. She says that the County misapplied the accommodation standards in

evaluating her request. Plaintiff contends that she did not receive the requested accommodation

and was required to participate in hearings and litigation procedures using oral-only

communications. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff says that because of her inability to manage litigation

proceedings without accommodations, she “lost her job, experienced financial collapse, and

became homeless.” Id. ¶ 49.

Based on the above, the SAC asserts a claim under Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and a claim under Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1.

1 As explained below, when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all

24 material allegations in the subject complaint as true.

1 //

2 III

DISCUSSION

Pierce County contends that dismissal is proper because: (1) res judicata bars the claims;

(2) judicial and quasi-judicial immunity also bar them; (3) under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; and (4) the SAC fails to sufficiently plead a factual

basis for the claims. See generally id.

A. Res Judicata

Pierce County argues that, because of a Washington State court dismissal of her claims,

res judicata bars her claims here. See Dkt. # 40 at 7; Dkt. # 41.

A defendant may raise res judicata as a defense in a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6). See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gunwall, 675 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1132 (W.D. Wash. 2023)

(citing Scott v. Kuhlman, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984)). The doctrine of res judicata, or

claim preclusion, “bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could

have been raised in [a] prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708,

713 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal courts “determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment by

applying that state’s preclusion principles.” Readylink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins.

Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Because Pierce County contends a

Washington court judgment bars Plaintiff’s claims, the Court looks to Washington law.

Under Washington law, res judicata applies when an earlier judgment overlaps with the

case at issue in four respects: “(1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and

(4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” Schroeder v. Excelsior

Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 297 P.3d 677, 684 (Wash. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

1 Res judicata does not bar plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s prior dismissed claims were under

2 neither Title II of the ADA nor Section 504. See Dkt. # 41 (claims for defamation, fraud on the

3 court, civil conspiracy, and interference with constitutionally protected parental rights). Nor

4 were those claims brought against Pierce County. See id.

5 B. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity

6 Pierce County next contends that judicial and quasi-judicial immunity bar Plaintiff’s

7 claims. Dkt. # 40 at 7. They say, “To the extent Plaintiff’s claims arise from acts performed by

8 judicial officers, court staff, guardians ad litem, or other participants under the authority of the

9 Superior Court, those acts are protected by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.” Id.

10 Under the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA, a Plaintiff may sue a municipality

11 (including a county) and ask a court to hold a “public entity [] liable for the vicarious acts of its

12 employees.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1141. Judicial immunity, however, prevents the county from

13 being liable for the actions committed by a judge in their judicial capacity. See Lund v. Cowan,

14 5 F.4th 964, 972-973 (9th Cir. 2021). Further, “[j]udicial immunity is extended to certain others

15 who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133

16 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

17 But judicial immunity applies only to judicial acts, and not to “the administrative,

18 legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to

19 perform.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). To determine whether an act is

20 judicial, courts consider whether “(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events

21 occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before

22 the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with

23 the judge in his or her official capacity.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133 (cleaned up).

1 The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s claims arise solely from judicial acts. Plaintiff

2 alleges that she submitted accommodation requests “before multiple court proceedings, including

3 civil protection-order hearings and a Civil Rule 11 sanctions hearing,” which were denied. See

4 Dkt. # 37 at 3. The SAC suggests only that Plaintiff’s accommodations were denied by “officials

5 responsible for ADA/GR-33 process” who had the “authority to grant accommodations and

6 modify communication methods.” Id. These allegations do not necessarily indicate that

7 Plaintiff’s accommodation requests related to the judicial process of her state court proceedings.

8 Because it is not apparent from the SAC that judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims, a

9 dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not proper. See Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735

10 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff need not plead on the subject of an

11 affirmative defense and that dismissal based on an affirmative defense is proper where the

12 defense is obvious on the face of the complaint). Thus, judicial and quasi-judicial immunity do

not bar Plaintiff’s claims.2

14 C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

15 Pierce County contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims because

16 she “is attempting to bring a collateral attack on the outcome of her family law matter

17 adjudicated before the Pierce County Superior Court.” Dkt. # 40 at 4. Specifically, Pierce

18 County says that “[a]djucating these claims would require this Court to review and second-guess

19 the procedures, rulings, and management of those proceedings.” Dkt. # 40 at 5. Plaintiff

20 responds that she “does not seek appellate review of family-court rulings []” and instead

2 To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim arises solely out of judicial acts, judicial and quasi-judicial

immunity would bar those claims. Lund, 5 F.4th at 972 (“[A]s a general matter, there can be no

respondeat superior liability where there is no underlying wrong by the employee, which includes

24 situations in which the employee is immune to suit.”).

1 “challenges Pierce County’s administration of disability access procedures, effective

2 communication practices, and meaningful-access obligations under federal law.” Dkt. # 43 at 3.

3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from considering “de facto

4 appeals” suits in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.”

5 Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d

6 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[W]hen the federal action constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal of a

7 state court judgment, the federal court must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that

8 is inextricably intertwined with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Id.

9 (quotations omitted). Claims are inextricably intertwined where “the relief requested in the

10 federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.” Cooper v.

11 Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).

12 The Ninth Circuit has instructed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “occupies narrow

13 ground” and applies only in “limited circumstances.” Searle, 148 F.th at 1128 (citation

14 modified). It “applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or

15 errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Miroth v.

16 County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

17 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s claims. Pierce County states that

18 Plaintiff is dissatisfied with her “state-court family law proceedings[.]” Dkt. # 40 at 1. But the

19 parties do not identify the state court judgment at issue. And Plaintiff is not claiming legal error

20 by the state court and requesting relief from those judgments.

21 Plaintiff says her injuries are due to Pierce County’s failure to provide reasonable

22 accommodations for her state court proceedings. See Dkt. # 37 at 2. While Plaintiff’s

23 accommodation requests were raised in those proceedings, this does not mean she is claiming

24 legal errors by the state court. See Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1154 (“Even if the [Plaintiff’s] are

1 raising matters that were raised or could have been raised in state court, that does not mean they

2 are alleging legal errors by the state court or seeking review and rejection of the state court

3 judgment itself.”).

4 Nor does it appear that Plaintiff seeks relief from the state court judgment itself. See Dkt.

5 # 37 at 10. Plaintiff requests declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief based on Pierce

6 County’s denial of reasonable accommodations during state court proceedings. See id.

7 D. Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim. To survive a such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all material

allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.

2013). In a pro se action, the court must also “construe the pleadings liberally and [ ] afford the

[pro se plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). But pro se or not,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And a

court can (and should) dismiss a complaint if it lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

2001). “In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations

1 contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to

judicial notice.”3 Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007).

3 Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities. 42 U.S.C. §

4 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly prohibits discrimination by recipients of

5 federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The two laws are “interpreted coextensively because there is no

6 significant difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created by the two Acts.” Payan v.

7 L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 737 (9th Cir. 2021).

8 Pierce County is a public entity under Title II of the ADA. See § 12131(1) (“‘public

9 entity’ means . . . any State or local government”). To prove that a Pierce County program or

10 service violated Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) [she] was a ‘qualified

11 individual with a disability’; (2) [she] was either excluded from participation in or denied the

12 benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated

13 against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by

14 reason of [her] disability.” Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017)

15 (quoting Duvall v. City of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)). “The elements of a

16 prima facie Section 504 claim are similar, with the additional requirement that the plaintiff prove

17 that the program receives federal financial assistance.” Payan, 11 F.4th at 738 (9th Cir. 2021)

18 (citation omitted).

19 “A disability discrimination claim may be based on ‘one of three theories of liability:

20 disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to make a reasonable accommodation.’” Id. at

3 Pierce County asks the Court to take judicial notice of documents pertaining to Plaintiff’s state

court action for purposes of res judicata. Dkt. # 40 at 3. Because Plaintiff’s claims arise from her prior

state court proceedings, the Court grants the request. See Dkt. # 41 (Exhibit A and B); see U.S. ex rel.

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts may take

notice of “proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

24 proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”).

1 738 (citing Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 260 (2d Cir. 2016)). Plaintiff bases her claim on failure

2 to make a reasonable accommodation. See Dkt. # 37 at 2–3. She alleges that Pierce County

3 failed to provide a reasonable accommodation because she was required “to participate in

4 hearings and litigation procedures” using communication methods she identified as ineffective.

5 Id. at 3. Pierce County says that Plaintiff’s ADA and Section 504 claims should be dismissed

because she “fails to allege facts showing that she was denied meaningful access to the courts.”4

7 Dkt. # 40 at 14. Specifically, it says that courts “are not required to provide accommodations in

8 the precise format requested” and a “procedural dissatisfaction, without resulting deprivation of

access,” does not state a claim under Title II of the ADA or Section 504.5 Id.

10 Failure-to-accommodate claims are “focused on an accommodation based on [the

11 plaintiff’s] individualized request or need.” Payan, 11 F.4th at 738. Whether an accommodation

12 is reasonable “depends on the individual circumstances of each case, and requires a fact-specific,

13 individualized analysis of the disabled individual’s circumstances and the accommodations that

14 might allow [her] to [enjoy meaningful access to the program.]” Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620

15 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002)).

16 But “[r]easonable accommodation does not require an organization to make fundamental or

17 substantial alterations to its programs.” Id.

4 Pierce County says that Plaintiff has not shown that the County receives federal financial

20 assistant to assert liability under Section 504. Dkt. # 40 at 15. But Plaintiff alleges that Pierce County

“receives federal financial assistance.” Dkt. # 37 at 9. This allegation suffices. Cf. Moore v. Greyhound

21 Bus Lines, Inc., 2015 WL 13660330, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015) (“[T]he vast majority of courts faced

with the issue of whether an entity receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of civil rights

22 laws have concluded that the resolution of the issue requires inquiry into factual matters outside the

complaint and accordingly, is a matter better suited for resolution after both sides have conducted

discovery on the issue.”).

23 5 Pierce County does not dispute that Plaintiff is a “qualified individual” under 42 U.S.C. §

12131(2). Pierce County also contends in passing that Plaintiff “fails to establish proximate causation[.]”

24 See Dkt. # 40 at 16. But they cite no legal authority to support this argument.

1 Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support her legal theory. She alleges that she

2 informed Pierce County that because of her “cognitive impairments,” she “cannot reliably

3 process procedural instructions communications only orally during litigation proceedings.” Dkt.

4 # 37 at 2. Based on this limitation, Plaintiff submitted multiple ADA/GR-333 requests seeking

5 modifications to communication methods and additional time before court proceedings. Id. at 3–

6 4. These requests were denied—one of which was treated “as a request for court-appointed

7 counsel rather than a communication accommodation.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges she spent

8 “additional time reviewing court dockets, recordings, and notes in an attempt to reconstruct oral

9 rulings and instructions.” Id. at 5. Pierce County does not dispute that she made these requests,

10 nor that it denied them. See generally Dkt. # 40. Instead, they maintain that denying these

11 requests did not prevent Plaintiff from meaningfully accessing her court proceedings. See id. at

12 14 (“Difficulty, inefficiency, or preference for written communication does not constitute denial

13 of access.”).

14 Pierce County is correct that it need not provide Plaintiff with these exact

15 accommodations; but Pierce County did have an obligation to investigate what, if any,

16 reasonable accommodations Plaintiff required. See Mont. Med. Ass’n v. Knudsen, 119 F.4th 618,

17 626 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We find instructive the Fifth Circuit’s decision … ‘plaintiffs are not entitled

18 to their preferred accommodation, but only a reasonable accommodation.’”); Updike, 870 F.3d at

19 954 (“It is well-settled that Title II and Section 504 [of the RA] create a duty to gather sufficient

20 information from the [disabled individual] and qualified experts as needed to determine what

21 accommodations are necessary.”). As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

22 construed her request as one for court-appointed counsel. Similarly, she alleges that Pierce

23 County improperly used a “severe cognitive impairment” threshold to evaluate her eligibility for

24 assistance. Dkt. # 37 at 4. Thus, construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to

1 Plaintiff—and given that this is a pro se action in which the court must construe the pleadings

2 || liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt—the Court finds that these allegations

3 suffice to support a claim under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

4 IV

5 CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES the motion (Dkt. # 40).

; Dated this 10th day of August, 2026.

8 CJok 4. Chu

9 J ohn H. Chun

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.