Bey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

CHAVA NIKE’ BEY (f/k/a DORIS ANN )

NETTLES), )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; )

No. 2:25-cv-03102-BCL-atc

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC )

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. )

(MERS); WILSON & ASSOCIATES, )

PLLC; LOGS LEGAL GROUP, LLP; )

AUCTION.COM, LLC; JOSEPHINE )

PROPERTIES, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT MOTION

TO DISMISS AND FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

On December 4, 2025, Plaintiff Chava Nike’ Bey (formerly known as Doris Ann Nettles)

filed a pro se complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) The Court

granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis on December 11, 2025. (ECF No. 14.) Pursuant

to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate

Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and

recommendation as appropriate.

Defendants Wilson & Associates, PLLC (“Wilson”) and Auction.com, LLC

(“Auction.com”) appeared and filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 5, 2026, alleging that Bey’s

claims against them are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (ECF No. 20.) Bey filed a

Response on January 16, 2026 (ECF No. 22), and Wilson and Auction.com filed a Reply on

January 20, 2026 (ECF No. 23).1

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Bey’s claims be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and sua sponte for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

Bey alleges various claims arising from the foreclosure of her home located at 1419

Singing Trees Drive, Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) She challenges the outcome of

the foreclosure proceedings themselves, a case filed in Shelby County Chancery Court that

became final in 2021 (the “Foreclosure Proceedings”), and also challenges aspects of an “eviction

action”—presumably, a forcible-entry-and-detainer action—filed in Shelby County General

Sessions Court that she has apparently appealed to Shelby County Circuit Court (the “FED

Proceedings”). (ECF No. 6, at 6‒7; ECF No. 11, at 3‒4.) When the Complaint was filed, the

FED Proceedings were ongoing, but the docket reveals that Bey’s claims have since been

dismissed with prejudice. See Bey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CT-5905-25, “Order Granting

Defendant Josephine Properties, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Certiorari and

Supersedeas with Prejudice” (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Shelby Cnty. June 9, 2025) (“This Order constitutes a

final and appealable order disposing of all claims against all parties in this proceeding.”).

Bey filed a motion for injunctive relief contemporaneously with the Complaint arising

from her assertion that the Circuit Court has required her to pay “$15,000 by Monday, December

1 Bey filed an additional unauthorized Response on February 3, 2026. (ECF No. 24.) Local

Rule 12.1 permits a nonmoving party to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss

and allows the moving party to file a reply. The Rule does not provide for a nonmoving party to

file a surreply or additional response, whether as a matter of right or with leave of court.

Accordingly, the Court declines to consider Bey’s second Response herein.

15, 2025, as a condition for review of Plaintiff’s claims,” after which the “eviction will proceed

immediately under a judgment that Plaintiff asserts is void.” (ECF No. 11, at 4.) She alleged that

eviction would cause her irreparable harm because it would create a “life-threatening medical

emergency” for her “severely disabled minor child” who resides with her in the home. (ECF No.

6, at 5.) The undersigned subsequently entered a Report and Recommendation for Denial of

Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Retraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on

December 11, 2025. (ECF No. 15.) The Report and Recommendation remains pending.

Defendants Wilson and Auction.com subsequently appeared and filed a Motion to Dismiss

on January 5, 2026, alleging that Bey’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (ECF

No. 20.) Bey’s Response argues that “[t]his action arises from continuing and post-dismissal

conduct, not from relitigation of claims previously adjudicated.” (ECF No. 22, at 1–2.) In their

Reply, Wilson and Auction.com point out that “res judicata applies to issues which were or

‘should have been litigated’ in the prior action.” (ECF No. 23, at 1 (quoting ECF No. 21, at 5).)

As outlined in the December 11th Report and Recommendation, two related cases are

worthy of note. The first is a complaint Bey filed on August 23, 2023, in the Shelby County

Chancery Court: Bey v. Scharf, No. CH-23-1113 (“Bey I”). Bey I involved many of the

Defendants (or their representatives) sued here: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”);

Auction.com LLC; and Wilson & Associates, PLLC. (Id.) Similar to Bey’s Complaint here, in

Bey I, she claimed that she was entitled to the invalidation of the Foreclosure Proceedings. (Id.)

The claims in Bey I were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on various dates in

March and April of 2024. The final Bey I defendants were dismissed and the case was closed on

April 24, 2024.

The second is a complaint Bey filed on April 17, 2024, in this Court: Nettles v. State of

Tennessee Government, No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc (“Bey II”). Bey II asserted many of the

same claims and theories against many of the same defendants as in Bey I (and in this case). No.

2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc, ECF No. 63, at 6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2025). The Court entered a

Report and Recommendation on February 4, 2025, recommending that Bey II be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine. Id. Judge Norris adopted

that recommendation over Bey’s objections on February 19, 2025, and dismissed Bey II with

prejudice. No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc, ECF Nos. 66 and 67 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2025).

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Legal Standards

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases

with non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction

after the Court conducts a screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the

Court shall dismiss the case at any time of it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” This Report and Recommendation

constitutes the Court’s screening.

B. Failure to State a Claim

To determine whether Bey’s Complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted,

the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as articulated in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations

and quotations omitted). The Court “construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the

plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether they plausibly

suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir.

2012).

Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket

assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to

see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature

of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards

than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir.

2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416

F. App’x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se

complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from

the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House,

783 F. App’x 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App’x 372,

376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)

(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf

of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the

courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are

properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not

encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”); Brown v.

Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a

plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,

518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)). “A pro se complaint must still ‘contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Shelby v.

Greystar Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 2:17-cv-02650-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 386647, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.

Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011)).

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) if the facts, accepted as true and

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Nesselrode v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-4206, 2018 WL 6975166, at *2

(6th Cir. June 18, 2018). “Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally construed.” Woodson v. Woodson, No. 2:22-

mc-00003-TLP-tmp, 2022 WL 16985602, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16963997 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022) (citing Williams v.

Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out in

a pleading.” Id. (citations omitted).

“At any time in a case and of its own volition, a district court may examine whether a

complaint lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Coleman v. Juv. Ct. of Memphis & Shelby Cnty.

TN, No. 2:17-cv-2524-SHL-tmp, 2017 WL 10607262, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2017), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-02524-SHL-tmp, 2018 WL 5298155 (W.D. Tenn.

Oct. 25, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Coleman v. Juv. Ct. of Memphis, No. 18-6245, 2019 WL 2298965

(6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019); see also Coleman v. Juvenile Court of Memphis, No. 18-6245, 2019

WL 2298965, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine); Squire v. Coughlan, 469

F.3d 551, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Younger abstention).

II. Res Judicata2

Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have

been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky Brand

Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). Parties may not

“relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even if certain issues were not litigated in the

prior action.” Brownback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3; see also J.Z.G., 84 F.3d at 214 (“Claim

preclusion applies not only to bar the parties from relitigating issues that were actually litigated

but also to bar them from relitigating issues that could have been raised in an earlier action.”).

“Suits involve the same claim or cause of action if the later suit arises from the same transaction

2 The term “res judicata” has become ambiguous due its usage as both a synonym for, and a type

of, preclusion. See, e.g., Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021) (“The terms res

judicata and claim preclusion often are used interchangeably. But res judicata comprises two

distinct doctrines. The first is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel . . . . The

second doctrine is claim preclusion, sometimes itself called res judicata.” (quotations and

citations omitted)); J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996)

(describing “true res judicata” as one of the two doctrines of res judicata). As used herein, res

judicata refers only to claim preclusion, distinct from the doctrine of issue preclusion/collateral

estoppel.

or involves a common nucleus of operative facts.” Brownback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3 (internal

quotations omitted).

If a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he weight of authority supports

dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Owens v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:18-cv-

02345-JTF-dkv, 2018 WL 4374238, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jul. 18, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4179076 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2018) (collecting Sixth

Circuit cases affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on res judicata). Courts are “empowered

to raise res judicata sua sponte . . . in the interests of, inter alia, the promotion of judicial

economy.” Holloway Const. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1989)

(citations omitted). Furthermore, res judicata is an appropriate basis to dismiss for failure to

state a claim during the initial screening of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). See Smith v.

Morgan, 75 F. App’x 505, 506 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal “pursuant to § 1915(e)

because the doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of the instant complaint”); see also Leirer

v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App’x 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007)

(affirming dismissal based on res judicata pursuant to § 1915(e) because the plaintiff “could have

made all of the same allegations and claims he makes in his current lawsuit in that earlier second

lawsuit”). In the Sixth Circuit, claims are barred by res judicata if four elements are satisfied:

(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a

subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the

subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the

prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.

Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324 Pension Fund v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc., 919 F.3d 368,

380 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (June 20, 2019) (quoting Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771

(6th Cir. 2002)).

Bey’s claims against Wells Fargo,3 Wilson, and Auction.com are barred by res judicata.

The Court takes judicial notice that Bey has filed similar lawsuits against these Defendants in

this Court and the Shelby County Chancery Court asserting claims arising from the same

events.4 See Bey I, No. CH-23-1113; Bey II, No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc.

The first element of res judicata is satisfied because final decisions on the merits were

entered in the prior cases. Bey I was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Bey II was

dismissed both for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See ECF

No. 21, at 9–13.) Both dismissals therefore operate as adjudications on the merits.

The second element is satisfied because Bey named Wells Fargo, Wilson, and

Auction.com in Bey I and II. Bey I, No. CH-23-1113, “Complaint” (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Shelby Cnty.

Aug. 23, 2023); Bey II, No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2024).

The third and fourth elements are satisfied because the previous cases involved the same

issues and factual allegations as those raised in this case, at least in regard to the claims against

Wells Fargo, Wilson, and Auction.com. In determining whether an identity of causes of action

exists, courts in the Sixth Circuit evaluate whether “the claims arose out of the same transaction

or series of transactions, or if the claims arose out of the same core of operative facts.” Id. at 383

(quoting Winget, 537 F.3d at 580). This element is also satisfied if there is an affinity between

“the facts creating the right of action and . . . the evidence necessary to sustain each action,” with

“the evidentiary component looking to whether the same underlying factual evidence could

3 Though only Wilson and Auction.com have moved to dismiss, res judicata likewise precludes

Bey’s claims against Wells Fargo. Accordingly, dismissal of Bey’s claims against Wells Fargo

is also appropriate pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

4 “A court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L.

Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d

565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008)).

support and establish both claims.” Id. at 383–84 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

“[T]he critical consideration is operative ‘factual overlap’ between the claims.” Id. at 384 (citing

Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 573 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2014)).

Here, all of the claims against Wells Fargo, Wilson, and Auction.com arose from the

same core of operative facts as and were, or could have been, asserted in the prior cases. As

Wilson and Auction.com correctly argue, Bey’s claims against them seemingly arise solely from

issues and factual allegations which “were litigated, or which should have been previously

litigated” in either Bey I or Bey II, which sought to challenge the Foreclosure Proceeding. (ECF

No. 21, at 5.) From the Court’s independent review of the filings in Bey I, Bey II, and this case,

the same is true of the claims against Wells Fargo. Those cases thus share identity with this

cause of action, and all issues raised in this case were or should have been raised in those cases.

Because each element of res judicata is satisfied, it is recommended that Wilson and

Auction.com’s Motion to Dismiss be granted. The Court also extends the same analysis to Bey’s

claims against Wells Fargo as part of its screening pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and recommends that

all claims against Wells Fargo be dismissed as well.

III. Rooker‒Feldman Doctrine

“The [Rooker–Feldman] doctrine—coming from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)—restricts federal courts

from hearing claims seeking ‘relief from injury caused by the state court judgment.’” Robinson v.

Tansley, No. 2:23-cv-02589-SHL-atc, 2024 WL 4151160, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2024)

(quoting In re Hamilton, 540 F.3d 367, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2008)). “The Rooker‒Feldman doctrine

prohibits federal district courts from ‘consider[ing] cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments.’” Harvison v. Little, No.: 1:22-cv-

01103-JDB-jay, 2023 WL 3147905, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 28, 2023) (quoting Larry E. Parrish,

P.C. v. Bennett, 989 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2021)). “The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257, which ‘vests sole jurisdiction to conduct[] appellate review of final state-court judgments

in the Supreme Court.’” Id. (quoting Bennett, 989 F.3d at 456).

“To ascertain whether the doctrine applies, the Court ‘look[s] to the source of the injury

the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’” Harvison, 2023 WL 3147905, at *2 (quoting

VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020)). “Other than the

Supreme Court of the United States, federal courts are barred from exercising appellate

jurisdiction over state courts’ decisions and proceedings, ‘including claims that are “inextricably

intertwined” with issues decided in state court proceedings.’” Robinson, 2024 WL 4151160, at *7

(quoting Exec. Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 391 F.3d 783, 793 (6th Cir. 2004)). In

making this determination, “Plaintiffs’ subjective characterization of their claims is not

determinative. The court must determine whether Rooker‒Feldman bars a claim ‘by looking to

the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’” Penn v. Ogg, No. 1:14-cv-

762014, 2014 WL 4450038, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2014) (quoting Evans v. Cordray, 424 F.

App’x 537, 538 (6th Cir. 2001)) (citations omitted) (finding that the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine

applied, even though the plaintiffs couched their federal case in terms of fraud and constitutional

violations, because it is the state-court proceeding and “corresponding judgment entry against

Plaintiffs that is the source of the injury alleged in the federal complaint . . . . This is precisely the

type of claim that is barred by Rooker–Feldman.”); see also Hicks-Bey v. Goodstein, 2:23-cv-

10771-TGB-eas, 2023 WL 3186945, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2023) (dismissing under Rooker‒

Feldman, even though the plaintiff made fraud and § 1983 claims, because the claims all

challenged state-court foreclosure proceedings).

When the claims in a subsequent federal case essentially seek to set aside a state-court

judgment and are “the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment,” the

Rooker‒Feldman doctrine applies, and the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Untied

v. CIT Grp. Consumer Fin., Inc., 23 F. App’x 233, 234–35 (6th. Cir. 2001) (“The district court

appropriately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Untied’s complaint because the claims

challenged the adequacy and result of state court proceedings that resolved the foreclosure sale of

the subject property.”); see also Givens v. Homecomings Fin., 278 F. App’x 607, 609 (6th Cir.

2008) (affirming dismissal of federal claims because the plaintiff was “effectively attempting to

appeal from the state order granting possession to [the mortgagee], [and thus] his suit was

properly dismissed under Rooker‒Feldman”); Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161

F. App’x 487, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal because, “[b]esides being utterly

frivolous, the plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on their conviction that the state courts were wrong

and, therefore, satisfy the very definition of a case requiring Rooker‒Feldman abstention”

(quotation omitted)); T. M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1753 (2026)

(“Federalism principles are thus best served by continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal

cases in which plaintiffs seek review of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those

judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court.”). “A federal

plaintiff may not sidestep this jurisdictional rule simply by casting the complaint in the form of a

federal civil rights action.” Shea v. State of Ohio, 110 F.3d 64, at *2 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished

table opinion).

The Court takes judicial notice of the FED Proceedings, which have been dismissed with

prejudice. See Bey, No. CT-5905-25, “Order Granting Defendant Josephine Properties, LLC’s

Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Supersedeas with Prejudice” (“This Order

constitutes a final and appealable order disposing of all claims against all parties in this

proceeding.”). Accordingly, Bey’s claims are barred by the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine. At its

core, this lawsuit is the functional equivalent of an appeal from the Foreclosure Proceedings that

gave rise to the subsequent FED Proceedings. This lawsuit also sought to interfere with the FED

Proceedings, which were ongoing when Bey filed the Complaint. Now that the FED

Proceedings have also been dismissed with prejudice, however, this case is nothing more than an

attempt to collaterally attack issues that have already been determined by the Shelby County

General Sessions Court and Circuit Court, first in the Foreclosure Proceedings, second in Bey I,

and again in the FED Proceedings. Any injury alleged by Bey flowed directly from the

outcomes of those proceedings and the consequences imposed as a result. Because the Rooker‒

Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from “consider[ing] cases brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments,” Bennett, 989 F.3d at 455,

it is recommended that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Wilson and Auction.com’s Motion to

Dismiss be granted. As part of its screening pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the Court also

recommends that all claims against Wells Fargo be dismissed. Further, it is recommended that

the Complaint be dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of July, 2026.

s/Annie T. Christoff

ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation

disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14)

days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within

fourteen (14) days may constitute waiver/forfeiture of objections, exceptions, and further

appeal.