Rutledge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

PAULETTE RUTLEDGE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:24-cv-218

vs.

BOARD OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY District Judge Michael J. Newman

COMMISSIONERS,

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER: (1) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.

No. 18); AND (2) REFERRING THIS CASE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROLINE H.

GENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL MEDIATION

______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Paulette Rutledge is an African American female employed by Defendant Board

of Montgomery County Commissioners as a program specialist in its Child Support Enforcement

Agency (“CSEA”). Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2; Doc. No. 23 at PageID 258. She brings this case,

through counsel, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-2, et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1 Doc. No. 1 at PageID 1–3. She alleges Defendant

discriminated against her based on her race by declining to interview her for a CSEA social

program analyst position (and thus refusing to enter into another contractual employment

relationship in violation of § 1981). Id.; Doc. No. 23 at PageID 260–61. The case is before the

Court on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18), Plaintiff’s memorandum in

opposition (Doc. No. 23), and Defendant’s reply (Doc. No. 25). For the reasons stated herein, and

in light of Defendant’s failure to meet its initial burden under the standard set forth by Fed. R. Civ.

1 Race discrimination in employment claims under Title VII and § 1981 are reviewed under the same

standard. Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2018); Jackson v. Quanex Corp.,

191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).

P. 56, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment.

I.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court

demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact is present, and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A court

considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts and all inferences in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

At the summary-judgment stage, the burden is first on the moving party to conclusively

show no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v.

Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The moving party must either point to “particular parts

of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations or admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or

show “that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that

an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A) and (B) (citation modified). Once the moving party accomplishes this, “the non-

moving party may not rest upon [his or her] mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). “There is no

duty imposed upon the trial court to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation

modified). Instead, “the free-ranging search for supporting facts is a task for which attorneys . . .

are equipped and for which courts generally are not.” Id. at 406.

II.

Summary judgment is unwarranted in this case. To prevail on a motion for summary

judgment, as noted above, the moving party—here, the employer—has the burden to demonstrate

that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. That did not happen here for at least two reasons.

First, Defendant has failed to provide adequate Rule 56 materials which the Court could

have reviewed to consider whether or not Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Although Defendant discusses what the evidence shows, no such evidence, other than Plaintiff’s

deposition transcript, was provided to the Court for review. 2

Second, even if adequate Rule 56 material had been provided—which was not done here—

Defendant has not shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In its motion for summary

judgment, Defendant frames this case as a “failure to promote” and contends the dispute should

be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework (Doc. No. 18 at PageID

151–54). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). While the

McDonnell Douglas framework is likely the proper way to evaluate the evidence in this

discrimination case, see e.g., Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 308 n.2 (2025),

the Court questions whether the classic “failure to promote” prima facie case elements3 are

2 Although Defendant cites to certain Exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, those Exhibits

are not attached to the copy of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript filed in support of Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. See Doc. No. 18 at PageID 157–247.

3 “In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based upon a failure to promote, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for an was qualified

for a promotion[;] (3) he was considered for an denied the promotion; and (4) other employees of similar

qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions at the time the plaintiff’s

request for promotion was denied.” Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2000)

(citing Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1095 (6th Cir.1996) and Brown v. Tennessee, 693

F.2d 600, 603 (6th Cir.1982)).

applicable here. See Tartt v. Wilson Cty., Tenn., 592 Fed. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13) (“The elements of a prima facie case will depend on

the particular facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim . . .”); see also Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d

605, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)) (“[T]he precise

requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context . . .”). Defendant failed to

discuss, in detail, these threshold, framework-related issues for the Court’s consideration in its

summary judgment briefing. The Court also notes, in passing, that Plaintiff’s oppositional brief

was similarly lacking. Plaintiff did not address prongs two and three of the McDonnell Douglas

framework (i.e., burden-shifting and pretext) and failed to articulate any alternative legal

framework that should govern this dispute. Given these concerns, the motion for summary

judgment must be denied.

III.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Given that the

parties previously mediated with Magistrate Judge Gentry, this case is hereby REFERRED to

Judge Gentry solely for the purposes of conducting additional mediation. Both sides are

ORDERED to participate in good faith in the mediation conference(s). The date(s) for the

mediation conference(s) shall be arranged directly with Judge Gentry. If the case does not settle,

and Defendant chooses to again move for summary judgment, Defendant shall file a motion for

leave to amend the current scheduling Order and justify to the Court why a second review of the

matter is appropriate. If a second summary judgment motion is filed, both sides are ORDERED

to attach to the motion/response in opposition all Rule 56 evidence the Court is being asked to

consider and explain, in detail, how the McDonnell Douglas framework is or is not satisfied here.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 21, 2026 s/Michael J. Newman

Hon. Michael J. Newman

United States District Judge