TERRA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LA-QUN RASHEED WILLIAMS

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0662

JOE TERRA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BAYLSON, J. August 20, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff La-Qun Rasheed Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his constitutional rights related to the conditions of his

confinement at State Correctional Institution (SCI) Phoenix. (“Compl.,” ECF 1). After the

disposition of Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion, the remaining Defendants are the following SCI

Phoenix employees (collectively, “Defendants”): Joseph Terra, Makeba Fitzgerald-Young, Sean

Grady, John Muick, Nathan Wynder, Charles Hensley, Anthony Spagnoletti, and Morgan Harris.

The Complaint alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim, a Fourteenth Amendment procedural

due process claim, and an Eighth Amendment claim.1 The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint is

that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by delaying his progression in the Intensive

Management Unit (“IMU”) program by issuing him misconducts in retaliation for his filing of

grievances and lawsuits. Compl.

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot.,” ECF

67), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (“Opp.,” ECF 89), and Defendants’ Reply (“Rep.,” ECF

1 Although the Complaint includes a “preliminary statement” in which Plaintiff states that the Complaint also alleges

conspiracy and equal protection claims, such claims are not mentioned in the body of the Complaint and therefore

will not be addressed by the Court. Compl. at 1.

93). For the following reasons, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation

claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). The Court will GRANT Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process and Eighth

Amendment claims.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During the time period relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate at SCI Phoenix.

Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSUF,” ECF 68) ¶ 1; Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PSUF,” ECF 89) ¶ 1. On August, 6, 2021, Plaintiff

was placed in the Intensive Management Unit (IMU). Id. The goal of the IMU is to “house and

provide socialization opportunities for individuals confined to a Security Level 5 (SL5) setting”

through a phased progression program. SCI Phoenix IMU Inmate Handbook, Mot. Ex. 2 at 2. At

each phase, of which there are six, the inmate is provided “additional privileges and incentives.”

Id. at 3. Phase 6 of the IMU imposes the most restrictions, while Phase 1 is the least restrictive

phase. DSUF ¶ 3, PSUF ¶ 3.

On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff was moved by Defendants Grady, Spagnoletti, and Fitzgerald-

Young to L-C Pod and was told this was done because “he would not stop filing grievances and

Lawsuits.” DSUF ¶ 7; PSUF ¶ 7. On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff was cited for misconduct No.

B814672. DSUF ¶ 10; PSUF ¶ 10. On June 7, the Periodic Review Committee (PRC) progressed

Plaintiff from Phase 3 to Phase 2 in the IMU program. DSUF ¶ 8, PSUF ¶ 8. A hearing on

misconduct No. B814672 occurred on June 9, 2023, but the misconduct was ultimately dismissed.

DSUF ¶¶ 9–10, PSUF ¶¶ 9–10. On June 13, Plaintiff filed grievance No. 1038527 in which he

alleged he was being retaliated against by Defendant Grady for exercising his First Amendment

right to file “grievances and lawsuits against the IMU program.” Grievance No. 1038527, Mot.

Ex. 5 at 1. In Grievance No. 1038527, Plaintiff claims the retaliation took the form of a conspiracy

between Grady and a nonparty inmate named Yassin Mohamad to “set up” the Plaintiff. Id.; Opp.

at 1. On July 10, 2023, Defendant Muick dismissed Grievance No. 1038527. Grievance No.

1038527 at 3. Plaintiff then appealed to the facility manager. Id. at 4. On August 1, Defendant

Terra denied Plaintiff’s appeal. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he filed his “final grievance appeal” on

August 4, 2023. Opp. at 3. The office responsible for review and disposition of all final appeals

is the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA). Mot. at 4. Chief of SOIGA,

Keri Moore, claims never to have received Plaintiff’s final appeal regarding Grievance No.

1038527. Declaration of Keri Moore, Mot. Ex. 4. ¶ 14.

In late July 2023, Defendants Spagnoletti and Grady created a document that required

Plaintiff to be put in restraints. DSUF ¶ 11, PSUF ¶ 11. In August 2023, Defendant Harris told

Plaintiff that he would receive a misconduct for a previous lawsuit Plaintiff filed in which

Defendant Harris was also a named defendant. DSUF ¶¶ 12–13, PSUF ¶¶ 12–13. On August 30,

Defendant Harris cited Plaintiff with misconduct No. D941613 for allegedly threatening Harris.

DSUF ¶ 14; PSUF ¶ 14. Misconduct No. D941613 was dismissed due to a technical defect in

service of the misconduct charge. DSUF ¶ 1; PSUF ¶ 15. The misconduct charge was rewritten

and then subsequently dismissed again. DSUF ¶¶ 16–17, PSUF ¶¶ 16–17.

On September 12, 2023, nonparty officers cited Plaintiff for misconduct No. D780116 due

to an alleged altercation with another inmate, which Plaintiff denies. Misconduct D780116, Mot.

Ex. 9 at 5; DSUF ¶¶ 18–20, PSUF ¶¶ 18–20. Plaintiff contends that he was trying to save the other

inmate from harming himself. DSUF ¶ 19, PSUF ¶ 19. On September 16, Plaintiff filed Grievance

No. 1052643 on the grounds his due process rights were violated for improper service of process

regarding Misconduct No. D780116. Grievance No. 1052643, Mot. Ex. 6 at 2. On September 19,

a nonparty officer rejected Grievance No. 1052643. Id. at 1. On September 25, Plaintiff refiled an

amended version of Grievance No. 1052643. Id. at 16. On October 16, Misconduct No. D780116

was dismissed without prejudice by Defendant Terra. DSUF ¶ 23, PSUF ¶ 23. On October 31, a

misconduct charge for the actions of September 12th were rewritten as misconduct No. D785893,

but this charge was also dismissed without prejudice. Id. ¶ 24; Mot. Ex. 10. On November 1,

Plaintiff withdrew Grievance No. 1052643. Mot. Ex. 6 at 20.

On November 8, 2023, the PRC decided to regress Plaintiff from Phase 2 to Phase 3 in the

IMU program. DC-141 Form, Mot. Ex. 11. The regression went into effect November 18th. Opp.

at 14. Williams was not present at the PRC hearing when the committee made the decision to

regress Williams from Phase 2 back to Phase 3. DSUF ¶ 27, PSUF ¶ 27. Plaintiff was moved

from the IMU on June 25, 2024. DSUF ¶ 30, PSUF ¶ 30.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual

dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing

the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue

at trial, the moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

After the moving party has met its initial burden, the adverse party’s response must, by

“citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” show that a fact is “genuinely disputed.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by

making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most

favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) “mandates that an inmate exhaust ‘such

administrative remedies as are available’ before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions.”

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Inmates who fail to

complete the prison grievance process in a timely manner have not properly exhausted their claims

and are barred from litigating those claims in federal court. See, e.g., Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d

218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the PLRA is

an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the defendant. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d

287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete

the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ rules that

are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). “Completion of the

administrative review process means ‘substantial’ compliance with the prison's grievance

procedures.” DeFranco v. Miller, No. CV 20-368, 2023 WL 3876779, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 20-368, 2023 WL 3170400 (W.D. Pa. May

1, 2023) (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231).

1. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (“DOC”) has issued administrative directives

identified by the acronym “DC-ADM.” DC-ADM 804 sets out the policy and procedures

pertaining to the Inmate Grievance System.2 The DOC's Inmate Grievance System “is intended

to deal with a wide range of issues, procedures, or events that may be of concern to an inmate.”

DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(2). The DC-ADM 804 grievance process provides three stages of

adjudication. Initially, the inmate may submit their grievance to the “Facility Grievance

Coordinator” or their designee. DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(5). Next, the inmate may appeal the

response or rejection received by the initial reviewer to the “Facility Manager.” Id. § 2(A)(1)(a).

Finally, if the inmate remains dissatisfied, they may submit a final grievance appeal to the

Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA). Id. § 2(B)(1)(b). DC-ADM 804

requires that “[e]very appeal to Final Review must be addressed to the following: Chief,

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals[,] Department of Corrections[,] 1920

Technology Parkway[,] Mechanicsburg, PA 17050.” ADM 804 § 2(B)(1)(i).

For example, in DeFranco, a prisoner was deemed to have properly exhausted his

administrative remedies because he properly filed a grievance and followed the first two stages of

review and then mailed his final grievance appeal to the “Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals”

but did not receive a response. 2023 WL 3876779, at *1–*3. In that case, it was noted by the

2 DOC policies are publicly available on the DOC’s website, at

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf (last visited

August 19, 2026).

Assistant Chief Grievance Officer at SOIGA that “[i]nmates are required to mail their final appeals

to SOIGA, at Technology Parkway, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania . . . [as] several different DOC

offices occupy that building and utilize the same street address.” Id. at *4. The court held that

even though the inmate’s final grievance appeal was addressed to the “Office of Inmate Grievance

and Appeals” rather than the “Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals” as required

by DC-ADM 804, the inmate to be considered “in compliance with DC-ADM 804,” and had

exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at *6. Omission of the word “Secretary’s” did not

render the inmate out of substantial compliance with DC-ADM 804.

Here, unlike in DeFranco, Plaintiff did not substantially comply with the applicable

procedures and so failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his First Amendment retaliation

claim. Defendants argue that Plaintiff never exhausted his remedies for Grievance No. 1038527,

wherein he grieves the alleged First Amendment retaliation, because he did not complete the third

and final stage of the DC-ADM 804 grievance process. Mot. at 9. Although Plaintiff claims to

have submitted a final grievance appeal for grievance No. 1038527, he never mentions SOIGA by

name. Opp. at 3. According to Plaintiff, he mailed his final grievance appeal to “Final Grievance

Appeal” located at “1920 Technology Parkway, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050.” Id. Exs. 11–12, 14.

While the street address matches that required by the policy, he addressed the mailing to “Final

Grievance Appeal” rather than “Chief, Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals,” as

required by the policy. ADM 804 § 2(B)(1)(i). Exhaustion requires “‘substantial’ compliance

with the prison's grievance procedures.” DeFranco, 2023 WL 3876779, at *6. Plaintiff addressing

the letter to “Final Grievance Appeal” when the policy plainly requires that “[e]very appeal to

Final Review must be addressed to . . . Chief, Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and

Appeals” does not satisfy substantial compliance with the procedures of DC-ADM 804. ADM

804 § 2(B)(1)(i).

Although the Court may sit as a finder of fact to resolve factual disputes relating to

exhaustion under the PLRA, this issue warrants no such factual determinations as there is no

dispute over any material facts. Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013). Seeing

as it is an undisputed fact that Plaintiff did not properly submit his final grievance appeal to

SOIGA, and so as a matter of law did not comply with DC-ADM 804 as required by the PLRA,

the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim without prejudice.

2. Procedural Due Process and Eighth Amendment Claims

As noted above, DC-ADM 804 sets out the policy and procedures pertaining to the Inmate

Grievance System and “is intended to deal with a wide range of issues, procedures, or events that

may be of concern to an inmate.” DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(2). However, “[i]ssues concerning a

specific inmate misconduct charge, conduct of hearing, statements written within a misconduct

and/or other report, a specific disciplinary sanction, and/or the reasons for placement in

administrative custody will not be addressed through the Inmate Grievance System and must be

addressed through Department policy DC-ADM 801, ‘Inmate Discipline’ and/or DC-ADM 802

‘Administrative Custody Procedures.’” Id. § 1(A)(7).

Plaintiff claims violation of both his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment and his right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth

Amendment. Opp. at 8, 12. Defendants rely on Plaintiff’s withdrawal of his DC-ADM 804

Grievance No. 1052643, wherein Plaintiff grieves a violation of his right to procedural due process,

to plead their exhaustion defense for these claims. Mot. at 6. However, as was noted in a recently

decided case—involving the same Plaintiff, one of the same defendants, and similar issues—a

grievance filed pursuant to DC-ADM 804 “is ultimately irrelevant to exhaustion” of Plaintiff’s

procedural due process and Eighth Amendment claims because DC-ADM 804 is not the relevant

policy by which Plaintiff was required to follow to exhaust these claims. See Williams v. Stickney,

No. CV 22-214, 2025 WL 2200911, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2025) (Pappert, J.), appeal docketed,

No. 25-2618 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2025).

Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim concerns his regression from Phase 2 to Phase 3

in the IMU program. Opp. at 14. Similarly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim concerns the

harms he suffered due to said regression. Opp. at 11. Since both claims relate to “a specific

disciplinary sanction” and the duration of Plaintiff’s stay in the IMU program, DC-ADM 804 is

not applicable here. DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(7). Because Defendants “offer evidence concerning

only the use of grievance procedures under ADM 804,” here as in Stickney, “the Court is unable

to conclude that Williams failed to exhaust his procedural due process [and Eighth Amendment]

claim[s].” See 2025 WL 2200911, at *10. As established above, it is Defendants’ burden to plead

and prove the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust. See Ray, 285 F.3d at 295. Due to the

dearth of evidence relating to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust under DC-ADM 801 and/or 802, the

Court will assume Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Thus,

the court will proceed to evaluating both the procedural due process and the Eighth Amendment

claims on their merits.

B. Procedural Due Process Claim

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no state shall “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

“To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a litigant must show (1) that the state deprived him

of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property and (2) that the deprivation occurred without due

process of law.” Burns v. PA Dep't of Correction, 544 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008). An

incarcerated individual has a liberty interest in freedom from restraints that impose an “atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Shoats

v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).

When deciding whether an action rises to the level of “atypical and significant,” courts

must weigh both “the amount of time the prisoner was placed into disciplinary segregation” and

“whether the conditions of his confinement in disciplinary segregation were significantly more

restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates.” Id. at 144. The two inquires provide factors

then weighed on a sliding scale where the “typicality of the duration varies with the conditions of

confinement.” Wayne v. Wetzel, No. CV 21-4209, 2024 WL 3696467, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7,

2024) (Savage, J.), aff'd, No. 24-2816, 2026 WL 594906 (3d Cir. Mar. 3, 2026). That is, the “more

restrictive the conditions, the shorter the time spent under them will be atypical” and vice versa.

Id.

Here, Plaintiff claims his right to procedural due process was violated when the PRC—at

a hearing held on November 8, 2023, without Plaintiff present—regressed him from Phase 2 to

Phase 3 of the IMU program, effective November 18, 2023.3 Opp. at 14; Mot. at 12. In response,

Defendants argue that IMU phase demotion does “not amount to atypical or significant hardship

required to support a due process claim.” Rep. at 7. Seeing as Plaintiff’s IMU phase regression

occurred on November 18, 2023, and Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants on February

3 It is unclear whether Plaintiff asserts additional procedural due process claims on the grounds that on April 26,

2023, he was “given a phase modification,” “put back in restraints,” and had his status changed from administrative

confinement to disciplinary confinement without a PRC hearing. Opp. at 13; Compl. ¶ 78. However, Plaintiff

seemingly clarifies this confusion in his Opposition: “Clearly the Plaintiff is arguing the basis for his Fourteenth

Amendment claim is that he was entitled to his due process with respect to the opportunity to be heard so that he

could contest to the false allegation of the regression for the two misconducts that was dismissed.” Opp. at 15. The

“regression for the two misconducts that was dismissed” could only be referring to the November 18th regression

from Phase 2 to Phase 3 of the IMU program. Hence, the Court will not address this separate potential Fourteenth

Amendment claim regarding the events of April 26th.

12, 2024, the period complained of was approximately three months in duration. Opp. at 14;

Compl. at 1. Therefore, the initial question is if the three months Plaintiff spent in IMU Phase 3,

instead of in Phase 2, constitutes a violation of a protected liberty interest. The Court finds that it

does not.

Pennsylvania courts have not deemed IMU phase regression as violative of a protected

liberty interest. Laurensau v. Zaken, No. 2:25 CV 263, 2026 WL 403618, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Jan.

9, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-CV-263, 2026 WL 400720 (W.D. Pa. Feb.

12, 2026) (holding that “[t]o the extent Plaintiff challenges his IMU phase and program length,

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to any particular housing assignment”); Rosa-Diaz v.

Oberlander, No. 1:22-CV-239, 2023 WL 6795805, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2023) (citing

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, (2005) (finding that an inmate that was reassigned to the

IMU program did “not have a constitutional right to any particular security classification or the

right to a particular housing unit or facility.”).

First, we turn to the issue of the amount of time spent in confinement. In both cases

mentioned above, plaintiffs were facing lengthier stays than Plaintiff in this case: in Laurensau,

the plaintiff was facing demotion from Phase 3 to Phase 5 of the IMU program, 2026 WL 403618

at *4, while in Rosa-Diaz the plaintiff was placed in Phase 6 of the IMU program. 2023 WL

6795805 at *3. Given that the “IMU program involves thirty days at phase 6, nine months at phase

5, nine months at phase 4, [and] nine months at phase 3,” Plaintiff’s three months at Phase 3 in

this case constitutes a shorter length of confinement than either of the two cases above. Id.; see

also Mot. Ex. 2 at 3–4. Therefore, the duration factor in the “atypical and significant” calculus

weighs against finding a protected liberty interest here.

Next, we examine whether the “conditions of [Plaintiff’s] confinement” in IMU Phase 3

were “significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates.” Shoats, 213 F.3d at

144. Because Plaintiff complains only of his demotion from Phase 2 to Phase 3, the Court must

determine the difference in conditions of confinement between the two phases. Although Plaintiff

concludes that he “had to undergo atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary incidents

of prison life,” he provides no factual evidence to support his legal conclusion. Opp. at 14. As

Defendants point out, Plaintiff himself admitted in his sworn deposition testimony that there a

there are no differences in “privileges or activity restrictions” between Phases 2 and 3 of the IMU

program.”4 Mot. at 15, Ex. 1 at 10:20–25. Accordingly, the Court has no reason to find that

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement in IMU Phase 3 rather than Phase 2 were more restrictive

than those imposed upon other prisoners.

In conclusion, weighing both the duration and conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement in IMU

Phase 3 as opposed to Phase 2, the Court finds that the prison’s action was not “atypical and

significant.” Since Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest regarding “his placement at

any phase of the IMU program,” there is no need to proceed to the second inquiry regarding

whether Plaintiff’s absence from his own regression hearing denied him procedural due process of

law. Laurensau, 2026 WL 403618 at *12. Viewing the undisputed factual evidence in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court does not recognize that there was, as a matter of law, a

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Hence, the Court will GRANT the Motion as to the

procedural due process claim.

4 In Plaintiff’s Opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is a “slight difference” in the phases. PSUF ¶ 5.

C. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment states, in relevant part, that “cruel and unusual punishments” shall

not be inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to challenge conditions of confinement on

Eighth Amendment grounds, a prisoner must show the punishment received was, objectively,

“sufficiently serious” and that it stemmed, subjectively, from “deliberate indifference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302–303 (1991).

The first (objective) element is satisfied “when the allegations depict conditions where the inmate

is denied ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’” Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 179

(3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299). The second (subjective) element is satisfied

when “an inmate shows officials knew of, but disregarded, that the prison conditions posed ‘an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,

133 (3d Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff provides a long list of grievances to support his Eighth Amendment claim. Opp.

at 9–12. The Court construes most of the harms described as immaterial factual background rather

than constituting the substance of the claim itself. The Court adopts this interpretation for two

reasons. First, the events described take place well before February 12, 2022, which would be the

earliest date a § 1983 claim could be litigated in Pennsylvania for a claim filed on February 12,

2024. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2))

(“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years”). Second,

nearly all the alleged harms mentioned do not appear in the original Complaint. See Bell v. City

of Philadelphia, 275 F. App'x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted) (“A plaintiff

may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment.”). Hence, we address the sole remaining claim mentioned in the original complaint and

not barred by the statute of limitations: the harms suffered due to Plaintiff’s regression from IMU

Phase 2 to Phase 3. Opp. at 11; Compl. ¶¶ 145, 147.

Here, Plaintiff provides no evidence to support a finding that he was denied “the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Clark, 55 F.4th at 179. Plaintiff claims a violation of

the Eighth Amendment due to his “Phase Modification” and his being put “in restraints.” Opp. at

11. However, it has been consistently held by the courts that “[p]lacement in an IMU alone does

not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson v. Henry, No. 2:23-CV-1686, 2024 WL 4336293,

at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2024); see also Batchelor v. Little, No. CV 22-1340, 2022 WL 16749039,

at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2022) (Kearney, J.) (finding that there was “no evidence the conditions of

[the plaintiff’s] confinement meets the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test” when the

plaintiff was in IMU Phase 4); Rosario v. Wetzel, No. 2:23-CV-966, 2025 WL 755516, at *5

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2025), aff'd, No. 25-1612, 2025 WL 2452464 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (holding

that an inmate placed in IMU Phase 3 was not “denied basic necessities” and so did not satisfy the

objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim); Wayne, 2024 WL 3696467, at *6

(concluding the limitations placed on inmates in the IMU “were not cruel and unusual”). Thus, the

objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test is not satisfied here.

Moving to the subjective prong, Plaintiff fails to supply evidence that Defendants knew

about, and disregarded, “an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” See Clark, 55 F.4th at 179.

Although Plaintiff claims Defendants unjustly regressed him to IMU Phase 3 for misconduct

charges that were dismissed, this does not indicate that doing so exposed Plaintiff to any risks

pertaining to his health and safety, nor that Defendants know of such risks. Opp. at 11.

In conclusion, on the basis of the undisputed facts, Plaintiff has failed to establish that

Defendants inflicted upon him cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the Court will

GRANT Defendant’s Motion as it relates to the Eighth Amendment Claim.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants contend that they are protected from suit via qualified immunity. Mot. at 17.

We will not decide whether Defendants are entitled to such qualified immunity due to the

preceding determinations that no unconstitutional actions have taken place.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED as to the procedural

due process and Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim is

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the

PLRA. An appropriate ORDER follows.

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