The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CECIL THOMPSON,
No. 4:22-CV-01159
Plaintiff,
(Chief Judge Brann)
v.
CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT and
JASON P. BOLT,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUGUST 21, 2026
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cecil Thompson was arrested for a burglary in which the perpetrator
threatened several children and their grandmother with a gun. He was in pre-trial
detention for several months before his bail was reduced based on the introduction
of exculpatory evidence. Eventually, enough evidence came to light that the state
prosecutor declined to continue the case and the charges were nolle prossed.
Thompson brought this federal civil rights lawsuit to recover damages for the arrest
and prosecution, which he contends were initiated and continued unconstitutionally.
Defendants Jason P. Bolt (the police officer who investigated the case and
applied for the arrest warrant) and the City of Williamsport have moved for summary
judgment on all remaining counts. After review of the record, the Court grants the
motion as to Williamsport and denies it as to Bolt.
II. LAW
A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 Material facts are those “that
could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person
with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”2 A defendant “meets this
standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s
case.”3 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to
admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie
case under applicable substantive law.”4
In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”5 the Court “must view the facts
and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.”6 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails
to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
3 Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).
4 Id.
5 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.
Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).
6 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).
Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”7 Finally,
although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may consider other
materials in the record.”8
B. Undisputed Facts
With that standard outlining the Court’s framework for review, I now turn to
the undisputed facts.
On May 18, 2020, Sherry Clark and her daughter, Dayna Sierra, returned to
their duplex at 951 High Street in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, after running some
errands.9 As they parked, they noticed a man nearby who was acting suspicious (the
“perpetrator”).10 He had a medical face mask around his chin, but he pulled it up
after making eye contact with Sierra.11 Sierra later testified that, in that time, the
perpetrator “really made an impression,” such that his face was “one that [she]
do[es]n’t forget.”12 Clark and Sierra brought their groceries into Clark’s half of the
duplex, and Sierra then checked outside for the perpetrator and, upon not noticing
him, returned to her half of the property to get her husband.13
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d
Cir. 2018).
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
9 Doc. 94 (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts) ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 14, 47(b).
10 Doc. 94-42 (Dayna Sierra Dep.) at 19:10-23:25; Doc. 94 ¶ 47.
11 Doc. 94-42 at 19:25-20:4, 23:12-25, 33:13-23. It is worth noting that this incident occurred
near the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, so a mask was not necessarily abnormal.
12 Id. at 27:6-28:8.
13 Id. at 21:18-22:20.
While Sierra was in her half of the duplex, the perpetrator approached Clark’s
side of the house from the rear and knocked.14 Clark’s grandchildren were
downstairs and answered the door.15 The perpetrator asked if “Lisa” was home, and,
when the children said that no one named Lisa lived there, the perpetrator forced his
way into the home and drew a small handgun.16 After the children explained that the
only other person in the home was Clark, who was upstairs, the perpetrator walked
them all upstairs at gunpoint17 and brought them to Clark’s room.
Though held at gunpoint, Clark surprised the perpetrator by producing a billy
club or heavy flashlight and began to beat him with it.18 She managed to drive him
down the stairs and out of her home without sustaining serious injuries.19 As he fled,
the perpetrator touched a doorknob and knocked down a picture frame—these items
and the billy club were processed for forensic testing of fingerprints and DNA.20
Additionally, Clark and Sierra had placed a number of surveillance cameras on the
exterior of the duplex which captured footage of the perpetrator skulking about,
walking past the house repeatedly and approaching from the rear, and, ultimately
fleeing.21
14 Doc. 94 ¶¶ 12, 15, 19-25, 50.
15 Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 50.
16 Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 50.
17 Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 47, 50.
18 Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 47, 50.
19 Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 47.
20 Id. ¶¶ 35-44.
21 Id. ¶ 19.
Police responded to the incident quickly, and Clark and Sierra gave an initial
description of the perpetrator as an approximately six-foot tall black male with a
skinny build, wearing black glasses, a grey hooded sweatshirt, and sweatpants,
carrying a plastic bag.22 One officer who responded reviewed the surveillance
footage and shared a picture of the perpetrator with other officers.23 A K-9 unit also
arrived on scene and tried but failed to track the perpetrator.24 After they were unable
to locate the perpetrator on the day of the incident, Williamsport Police shared the
photos and description of the perpetrator with other law enforcement agencies,
including the Lycoming County Sheriff’s Office.25
Three days later, on May 21, 2020, Lycoming County Sheriff’s Deputies were
serving process in the area of the incident when they encountered a man who largely
matched the perpetrator’s description.26 After a third deputy joined for support, the
three deputies approached the man and asked for his identification, explaining that
he matched the description of the perpetrator.27 The individual provided a driver’s
license identifying him as Plaintiff Cecil Thompson.28
Thompson explained that he was in the neighborhood because he was walking
from a nursing home on Rose Street (to the west of the duplex), where he worked in
22 Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 31-32, 53-57.
23 Id. ¶¶ 8-10.
24 Id. ¶ 16.
25 Id. ¶ 51.
26 Id. ¶¶ 58-60.
27 Id. ¶¶ 65-73.
28 Id. ¶¶ 74-75.
food services, to his home on Second Avenue (to the east of the duplex).29
Thompson’s appearance bore this explanation out: the Deputies observed that he
wore black chef pants and kitchen shoes.30 Although he looked somewhat younger
than the individual in the surveillance photos, Thompson otherwise matched the
perpetrator’s description.31 The encounter lasted approximately 7 minutes before
Thompson left and walked in the direction of his apartment.32
On June 5, 2020, Defendant Williamsport Police Agent Jason Bolt, who had
been assigned to investigate the case, received an email from Sierra’s husband,
Moises, reporting that they had seen a man they believed to be the perpetrator
walking by the duplex.33 They included a surveillance photo depicting a man who
appeared to match the perpetrator’s description wearing a grey kitchen worker’s
smock and black pants.34 Two days later, Clark called 911 and reported that she
believed she had just seen the perpetrator again.35 When police responded, Clark
stated that she had seen the same man as on June 5, wearing the same clothes.36
29 Id. ¶¶ 78-79.
30 Id. ¶ 77.
31 Id. ¶ 80.
32 Id. ¶ 82.
33 Id. ¶¶ 84-86. Thompson objects to this statement of fact only insofar as Defendants’ language
frames him as the perpetrator, which he denies. Doc. 104 (Response to SOUMF) ¶ 84. I have
reframed the language in Thompson’s favor, even though the email as described in the exhibits
was stated with more certainty. See Doc. 94-5 (Bolt Investigative Report) at 5.
34 Doc. 94 ¶¶ 85-86. After he was arrested, Thompson was shown this photo and agreed that he
was the man depicted. Id. ¶ 120.
35 Id. ¶ 87.
36 Id. ¶¶ 88-96.
On June 25, 2020, Bolt went to the nursing home where Thompson worked
and spoke with Zaria Cooper, a Human Resources employee.37 According to Cooper,
Bolt and several other officers entered with weapons drawn, but lowered them when
Bolt began to speak to Cooper.38 Bolt then showed Cooper a single photograph of
Thompson in his work uniform, and asked if she knew who he was.39 From the
record, it does not appear that this photo was one of the surveillance photos taken of
the perpetrator on the day of the invasion, or one of the post-incident photos sent to
Bolt by the victims.40 Cooper confirmed that she knew that it was Thompson
“[b]ased on his entire work uniform and his glasses.”41 Later that day, Cooper sent
Bolt a copy of Thompson’s May work schedule and time cards which showed that
he had not been working on May 18.42
Over the course of the next month, Clark, Sierra, and Moises continued to
contact Bolt with surveillance pictures of men they believed to be the perpetrator
walking past the duplex.43 They believed that it was the same man—the one who
walked by on June 5 and 7—each time.44
37 Id. ¶ 99.
38 Doc. 94-41 (Zaria Cooper Dep.) at 27:13-28:6. Cooper and Bolt’s recollections of this event
differ substantially, and I develop that dispute in the analysis below. For now, applying the
summary judgment standard, the Court describes the event from Cooper’s more Plaintiff-
friendly account and eschews discussion of Bolt’s recollection.
39 Doc. 104 ¶¶ 100-101; Doc. 94-41 at 17:2-18:3, 28:11-15, 30:17-24.
40 See Doc. 94-41 at 30:17-36:5; cf. Doc. 94-19 (Photos).
41 Doc. 94-41 at 28:11-15.
42 Doc. 94 ¶¶ 106-07.
43 Id. ¶¶ 108-09
44 See Doc. 94-42 at 44:6-51:6.
On July 28, 2020, the Lycoming County District Attorney approved charging
Thompson for the invasion.45 Bolt filed a criminal complaint charging Thompson
with relevant offenses later that day.46 The complaint included an Affidavit of
Probable Cause (the “Affidavit”) that stated, in full:
On Monday May 18th 2020 at 1336 hrs Williamsport Bureau of Police
were emergency dispatched to an armed home invasion/attempted
robbery that just occurred at 951 High St. Units quickly responded to
the scene and made contact with victim SHERRY CLARK, who stated
that B/M (later identified as CECIL THOMPSON, D.O.B. [redacted])
had knocked on the rear door and asked her 10-year old granddaughter
to see “Lisa.” When the juveniles replied that no one by that name lived
there and began to close the door, THOMPSON forced his way into the
door, pulled out a black/silver handgun, pointed it at the (3) juveniles
(a 9-yr old female, 10-yr old female and 15-yr old male) and told them
to “get on the ground and be quiet” or he would shoot them. After
asking about the other occupants in the residence, THOMPSON then
paraded the trio of juveniles to a second-floor bedroom where CLARK
was. THOMPSON then pointed the firearm at CLARK before telling
her and the juveniles to all “be quiet and sit down” inside the room. At
that time CLARK quickly grabbed a large nearby flashlight and began
swinging it repeatedly at THOMPSON, which then began a brief
altercation in which THOMPSON struck CLARK in the head,
knocking her to the floor. THOMPSON continuously told CLARK that
he would shoot her, however CLARK continued to strike THOMPSON
in the legs. THOMPSON eventually ran from the bedroom and fled out
of the residence.
While on the scene your affiant was provided access to surveillance
recordings from cameras attached to the perimeter of the residence. In
reviewing recordings THOMPSON could be observed clad in a
grey/black hooded sweatshirt, blue jeans and white sneakers, and
walking with his mask below his face and head east on High Street
before turning south on 5th Ave. THOMPSON is observed to stop and
watch CLARK and another adult female carrying groceries into house,
45 Doc. 94 ¶ 111.
46 Id. ¶¶ 112-13.
after which he raises his mask onto his face and approaches the
residence.
On June 5th 2020 your affiant was contacted by CLARK’s family, who
stated that they again observed THOMPSON walking past the
residence in work clothing and immediately recognized him. A photo
of the suspect was later shown to his employer, who identified the
individual that entered the residence as THOMPSON.47
Magisterial District Judge Christian Frey issued an arrest warrant for Thompson later
that day.48
Williamsport Police executed the arrest warrant at approximately 3:00 p.m.
on July 28, 2020, while Thompson was at work.49 Thompson waived his Miranda
rights and agreed to sit for a post-arrest interview with Bolt.50 In the interview,
Thompson denied the charges and rejected the suggestion that he was depicted in
the surveillance photos from the incident, but agreed that he frequently walked down
High Street on his way to and from work and that the June 5 surveillance photo was
of him.51 Thompson further volunteered to provide a DNA sample after Bolt stated
that the perpetrator had touched items in the home during the invasion, and
consented to a search of his phone.52 A search warrant executed at Thompson’s home
47 Doc. 94-29 (Criminal Compl.) at 6.
48 Doc. 94 ¶ 116.
49 Id. ¶ 117.
50 Id. ¶ 118.
51 Id. ¶ 120.
52 Id.
resulted in the recovery of white shoes and black eyeglasses similar to those worn
by the perpetrator.53
Following Thompson’s arrest, Sierra identified him as the perpetrator in a
photo array.54 And at a preliminary hearing, Sierra and Clark’s grandson both
identified Thompson as the perpetrator.55 Sierra also detailed the instances of
individuals that she believed to be the perpetrator walking past her house after the
incident, and stated that she believed it was Thompson walking by each time.56
Notably, every witness at the preliminary hearing described the perpetrator as having
a distinctive forehead.57 Indeed, Bolt specifically acknowledged that “it would be
memorable, which is why everyone seems to remember it.”58 At the end of the
hearing, Judge Frey bound the charges over for trial.59
Despite the weight of the initial evidence against Thompson, exculpatory
evidence began to mount in the ensuing months. The Pennsylvania State Police
Bureau of Forensic Services analyzed the latent fingerprints gathered from the
duplex and on September 29, 2020, produced a report that excluded Thompson as a
53 Id. ¶¶ 121-23.
54 Id. ¶¶ 124-30.
55 Id. ¶¶ 138-39, 142. Thompson admits that these identifications occurred but denies that they
were correct. Doc. 104 ¶¶ 139, 142.
56 Doc. 94 ¶¶ 140-41. See Doc. 94-36 (Preliminary Hr’g Tr.) at 44:3-15. Thompson again admits
the content of Dayna’s statements but denies that she was correct. Doc. 104 ¶ 140.
57 Doc. 94-36 at 19:19-24, 20:6-7, 27:17-28:13, 48:17-49:9, 76:6-77:9, 80:8-19, 91:9-92:7.
58 Id. at 92:5-7.
59 Doc. 94 ¶ 144.
source of the prints.60 On this basis, Thompson’s bail was reduced, and he was
eventually released from pre-trial detention.61 On February 23, 2021, the Bureau of
Forensic Services produced a second report, this time excluding Thompson as a
source of the DNA recovered at the duplex.62 And, around the same time,
Thompson’s counsel produced records showing that Thompson’s account was
signed on to his Xbox at the time of the invasion.63 Approximately a year-and-a-half
later, the Lycoming County District Attorney entered a nolle prosequi in
Thompson’s case.64
After his criminal case ended, Thompson proceeded with this federal civil
rights lawsuit. He initially named the City of Williamsport, Lycoming County, Bolt,
Clark, Sierra, Cooper, and the nursing home where he worked as Defendants.65
Following motions to dismiss, Thompson stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice
of Cooper and the nursing home.66 The Court then granted the remaining
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, but provided Thompson leave to amend his
complaint.67 Thompson did so,68 and the Defendants again moved for dismissal. The
Court granted Lycoming County’s motion, and granted in part and denied in part
60 Id. ¶¶ 145-48.
61 See Doc. 94-44 (Cecil Thompson Dep.) at 119:4-121:1.
62 Doc. 94 ¶ 151.
63 Id. ¶ 150.
64 Doc. 6-1 (State Court Order of Dismissal).
65 Doc. 1 (Compl.); Doc. 37 (First Am. Compl.).
66 Doc. 58 (First Stipulation of Dismissal).
67 Doc. 60 (First Dismissal Op.).
68 Doc. 62 (Second Am. Compl.).
Williamsport and Bolt’s, permitting Thompson’s suit to continue on his Fourth
Amendment claims as well as several related state tort claims.69 Shortly thereafter,
Thompson voluntarily dismissed Clark and Sierra as Defendants.70 The case then
proceeded to discovery as to Williamsport and Bolt—the two remaining Defendants.
After discovery, Williamsport and Bolt moved for summary judgment on all
remaining claims.71 That motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the
following reasons, it is granted in part and denied in part.
C. Analysis
Still live in this suit are Thompson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Bolt
bringing theories of violations of the Fourth Amendment for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, parallel claims under Pennsylvania state
tort law, and a Section 1983 Monell liability claim against Williamsport for failing
to train officers on how to draft affidavits of probable cause.72 I will start with the
claims against Bolt and then turn to the claim against Williamsport.
1. Bolt
As I have explained twice before, the false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution claims all “share[] the core element that probable cause must
be lacking.”73 And, as has been the case with each dispositive motion, “probable
69 Doc. 74 (Second Dismissal Op.).
70 Doc. 76 (Second Stipulation of Dismissal).
71 Doc. 95 (Mot. for Summ. J.).
72 See Doc. 74 at 17-33 (denying motion to dismiss on these claims).
73 Doc. 74 at 17 (quoting Doc. 60 at 14).
cause is the only element of these torts disputed by the parties.”74 The pending
motion as to Bolt therefore turns solely on whether the Affidavit—properly
viewed—establishes probable cause.
Under Third Circuit precedent, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim for
false arrest (or imprisonment or malicious prosecution) in a case (like this one) where
the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant application that facially established
probable cause and was approved by an independent magistrate,75 the plaintiff must
demonstrate that: “(1) the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a
falsehood in applying for a warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’”76 In order to correctly
conduct the materiality analysis, the Court “must perform a word-by-word
reconstruction of the affidavit,” “includ[ing] both the recklessly omitted information
and . . . other information that gives it context.”77
74 Id.
75 See Doc. 74 at 18 (citing Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546-57 (2012)); Pinkney
v. Meadville, Pa., 95 F.4th 743, 747-48 (3d Cir. 2024).
76 Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113
F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)).
77 Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Frost,
999 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993)). This analysis is the first stage of a two-step inquiry for evaluating
a qualified immunity defense, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), and the steps of the
Saucier test can be conducted “in any order, at [the Court’s] discretion,” James v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009)).
When I previously considered whether the Affidavit contained false
statements or omissions, I determined that Thompson’s complaint, read in the light
most favorable to him, supported the “infer[ence] that Bolt intentionally or
recklessly omitted three key facts at the time of the arrest.”78 First, the complaint
alleged that Cooper identified Thompson in a situation where “[o]fficers confronted
[her] with ‘rifles drawn,’ showed her a pixelated image of the perpetrator, and asked
if it depicted Thompson.”79 Second, Bolt’s use of Thompson’s name when referring
to the perpetrator “misrepresent[ed] the footage’s quality and omit[ted] the
uncertainty clouding [his] review of the photographs and recordings.”80 And, third,
based on the frequency of statements regarding the perpetrator’s forehead, I found it
“plausible both that [it] was so unique that it was observed by and known to Bolt,
and so unique as to be materially exculpatory” such that it should have been included
in the Affidavit.81
After identifying these alleged omissions and misrepresentations, I added
them into a reconstructed version of the Affidavit and found that “it [was] plausible
that Bolt lacked probable cause to arrest Thompson.”82 I reached that conclusion
because, on the allegations of the complaint, “Cooper’s identification [was] so
78 Doc. 74 at 20.
79 Id. at 20-21.
80 Id. at 21.
81 Id. at 21-22.
82 Id. at 23-25.
suggestive that it cannot be considered reliable,” and, without that identification or
any other detail about how the victim eyewitnesses’ identifications were connected
to Thompson, “the reconstructed affidavit expose[d] that Bolt never described how
Thompson was identified.”83 Without that connection, there was no probable cause
to arrest Thompson.
Following discovery, some of the relevant facts have changed. But the
Affidavit, reconstructed based on the summary judgment record, suffers from the
same defect as it did at the motion to dismiss stage—albeit for a slightly different
reason. After reviewing each alleged misrepresentation and omission and revising
the Affidavit, the Court again concludes that a jury could find that probable cause
was lacking, and summary judgment must therefore be denied.84
Beginning with the most important issue, Cooper’s photo identification,
Cooper’s testimony has clearly established that the officers did not suggest
Thompson’s name, and that Bolt instead “specifically said he needs to identify a
person who might be a suspect in an investigation that he’s doing. And then he
showed me [(Cooper)] the photo, and that’s when I identified the person as Cecil
Thompson. I was the one who said that in the photo that that was Cecil Thompson.”85
Moreover, the photo Bolt showed Cooper was not particularly blurry or pixelated: it
83 Id. at 26-28.
84 Dempsey, 534 F.3d at 467 (citing Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir.
1998)).
85 Doc. 94-41 at 32:3-16; see id. at 17:19-18:3.
“was very, very clear.”86 Although it is true that officers entered with guns drawn,87
Cooper’s identification occurred after she and Bolt had moved into her office and
the officers had lowered their weapons and were awaiting further instruction.88 So
the suggestive circumstances of the identification were significantly less severe than
previously alleged.
However, the parties genuinely dispute which photo Bolt showed to Cooper.
Bolt recalls that he first showed her a surveillance footage photo of the perpetrator
from the day of the incident, which she independently identified as Thompson.89 He
then showed her one of the post-incident surveillance footage photos of an individual
who the victims identified as the perpetrator, and Cooper confirmed that that photo
also depicted Thompson.90 Finally, Bolt showed her a driver’s license photo of
Thompson, which she agreed was Thompson.91 Cooper recalls the interaction
differently, and testified that she was only shown one photo which was different
from any of the three photos that Bolt identified in his deposition.92 She also denied
having seen any of the other photos that the victim eyewitnesses emailed to Bolt.93
The photo she does remember seeing depicted an individual in a work uniform like
86 Id. at 33:2-6.
87 Id. at 27:18-28:1.
88 Id. at 28:2-10.
89 Doc. 94-40 (Jason Bolt Dep.) at 19:2-13.
90 Id. at 19:14-24.
91 Id. at 19:24-20:5; see Docs. 94-19 – 94-21 (Photos).
92 Doc. 94-41 at 30:17-32:3 (denying having ever seen the photos depicted in Docs. 94-19 – 94-
21), 35:21-36:5 (denying having seen the photos before this litigation).
93 Id. at 33:12-34:23.
Thompson’s with a surgical mask on his chin and holding a bag, standing on a street
corner beside a light pole with flowers on it, with a red brick road in the
background.94 That description is similar, but not identical, to the post-incident photo
that Bolt says he showed to Cooper.95
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations.96 Instead, where the record contains two conflicting
accounts of the same event from witnesses with firsthand knowledge, the Court is
obligated to accept as true the account that is more favorable to the nonmovant and
“disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to
believe.”97 Under that standard, Cooper’s account, taken as true, indicates that Bolt
did not show her a picture of Thompson that the victims sent to him. The picture’s
source is entirely unclear.98 But if it did not come from the victims, then the same
disconnect between the victim eyewitnesses’ identification of the suspect and the
subsequent identification of Thompson highlighted at the motion to dismiss stage
persists at this point of the litigation.
94 Id. at 17:2-18.
95 See Doc. 94-19 (Photos).
96 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citing Lytle v.
Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1990)).
97 Id. at 151.
98 Defendants do not engage with this disconnect at all, and simply maintain, in contradiction to
the factual record, that “[t]he photo which Cooper identified was a photo that was supplied to
Officer Bolt by the victims of the home invasion which they represented was the person that
committed the home invasion.” Doc. 106 (Reply) at 1. As noted, counsel showed all of those
photos to Cooper at her deposition and she denied having ever seen any of them. See supra
note 92.
The evidence has also clarified the other alleged misrepresentations or
omissions, but they are less material for the determination of probable cause.
As to the quality of the security camera footage, the videos are now in the
record,99 and the Court has reviewed them. The footage, although not the clearest
imaginable, is of sufficient quality that some facial features can be discerned. I will
therefore adjust the language used in the reconstructed Affidavit to accurately
describe the security footage.
And, viewed in the light most favorable to Thompson, the record now includes
evidence from which a jury may be able to conclude that the victim eyewitnesses
described the perpetrator’s distinctive forehead to Bolt at some point before he
prepared the Affidavit.100 Accordingly, Bolt should have included that potentially
exculpatory information. However, the Court cannot conclude that Bolt acted
improperly by omitting any statement that Thompson lacked such a prominent
forehead. When the victim eyewitnesses discussed the perpetrator’s forehead at the
preliminary hearing, they did so in essentially the same breath as making in-court
identifications of Thompson as the perpetrator. Clearly, then, they believed that
Thompson’s forehead was sufficiently similar to the one they remembered from the
99 See Docs. 94-6 – 94-11.
100 See Doc. 94-40 at 55:2-21; but see id. at 57:18-58:4 (cannot recall mention of forehead before
the arrest), 58:8-59:10 (cannot recall specific mention of forehead before preliminary hearing),
66:23-67:17 (deferring to recordings of interviews regarding mention of forehead); Doc. 94-
14 (Sherry Clark Interview) (not mentioning forehead); Doc. 94-16 (C.R. Interview) (not
mentioning forehead).
incident. Moreover, no one but Thompson has ever stated that he lacks the prominent
forehead attributed to the perpetrator.101 So the Court cannot fairly say that this
discrepancy was within Bolt’s ken such that his failure to disclose it was a reckless
omission.102 At most, Bolt should have stated that it was unclear whether
Thompson’s forehead matched the perpetrator’s, and that is how I will reconstruct
the Affidavit.
Following development of the record, Thompson suggests one new omission:
that the perpetrator was left-handed, and he is not.103 The record definitively shows
that both Clark and C.R. told Bolt that they believed the perpetrator was left-handed
before he prepared the Affidavit.104 A reviewing judge would want to know this fact
given the witnesses’ insistence in reporting it. However, there is no evidence to
suggest that Bolt knew or had any way to know that Thompson was not left-handed
at the time he drafted the Affidavit. Because Thompson’s right-handedness was also
not “in [Bolt’s] ken” when he drafted the Affidavit, his failure to include that
information was not a “reckless” omission.105 The Court will reconstruct the
Affidavit accordingly.
101 See Doc. 94-44 at 155:12-20.
102 See Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788).
103 Doc. 103 at 18-20.
104 See Docs. 94-14, 94-16.
105 See Andrews, 853 F.3d at 698 (citing Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87).
The newly reconstructed Affidavit reads as follows:106
On Monday May 18th 2020 at 1336 hrs Williamsport Bureau of Police
were emergency dispatched to an armed home invasion/attempted
robbery that just occurred at 951 High St. Units quickly responded to
the scene and made contact with victim SHERRY CLARK, who stated
that B/M (later identified as CECIL THOMPSON, D.O.B. [redacted])
had knocked on the rear door and asked her 10-year old granddaughter
to see “Lisa.” When the juveniles replied that no one by that name lived
there and began to close the door, THOMPSON [the perpetrator]
forced his way into the door, pulled out a black/silver handgun, pointed
it at the (3) juveniles (a 9-yr old female, 10-yr old female and 15-yr old
male) and told them to “get on the ground and be quiet” or he would
shoot them. After asking about the other occupants in the residence,
THOMPSON [the perpetrator] then paraded the trio of juveniles to a
second-floor bedroom where CLARK was. THOMPSON [the
perpetrator] then pointed the firearm at CLARK before telling her and
the juveniles to all “be quiet and sit down” inside the room. At that time
CLARK quickly grabbed a large nearby flashlight and began swinging
it repeatedly at THOMPSON [the perpetrator], which then began a
brief altercation in which THOMPSON [the perpetrator] struck
CLARK in the head, knocking her to the floor. THOMPSON [The
perpetrator] continuously told CLARK that he would shoot her,
however CLARK continued to strike THOMPSON [the perpetrator]
in the legs. THOMPSON [the perpetrator] eventually ran from the
bedroom and fled out of the residence.
While on the scene your affiant was provided access to surveillance
recordings from cameras attached to the perimeter of the residence. In
reviewing recordings THOMPSON [the perpetrator] could be
observed clad in a grey/black hooded sweatshirt, blue jeans and white
sneakers, and walking with his mask below his face and head east on
High Street before turning south on 5th Ave. THOMPSON [The
perpetrator] is observed to stop and watch CLARK and another adult
female carrying groceries into house, after which he raises his mask
onto his face and approaches the residence. [The video footage was of
moderate quality, and at times it was difficult to make out
individuals’ facial features at a distance. And in much of the
footage, the perpetrator’s head was covered by his hood, and his
106 Insertions are bolded and bracketed. Deletions are marked with a strikethrough.
face was covered by a surgical face mask, so that only the upper
half of his face was visible. However, the footage was clear enough
that your affiant was able to observe some of the perpetrator’s
facial features, including a unique and prominent forehead. The
eyewitness victims also described the perpetrator as having such a
forehead, and believed that he was left-handed.]
On June 5th 2020 your affiant was contacted by CLARK’s family, who
stated that they again observed THOMPSON [the perpetrator]
walking past the residence in work clothing and immediately
recognized him. A photo of the suspect was later shown to his
employer, who identified the individual that entered the residence as
THOMPSON. [On June 25, 2020, your affiant and several other
officers raided CECIL THOMPSON’s place of employment, Rose
View nursing home, with weapons drawn. After lowering our
weapons and standing down, your affiant showed THOMPSON’s
employer a moderate-quality photograph of an individual wearing
a kitchen worker’s smock and pants and a surgical mask and asked
whether she could identify the subject. She stated that the
photograph depicted THOMPSON. Your affiant cannot
definitively say that THOMPSON has the same unique and
prominent forehead as the perpetrator, nor that he is left-handed.]
The problem with this reconstructed Affidavit is immediately apparent when
considered against my prior opinions in this matter. As I have noted before, “an
eyewitness identification . . . satisfies probable cause unless it is unreliable or
undermined by exculpatory evidence.”107 But here, although the victim eyewitnesses
identified the man who subsequently walked by their house and was captured in the
surveillance photos as the perpetrator, that identification lacks any connection to
Thompson. Cooper’s identification would provide that link and establish probable
cause if she had identified Thompson as the subject of one of those surveillance
107 Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 749 (citing Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790).
photos. But, given her deposition testimony that she had never seen any of the photos
provided by the victims, the bridge from the victims to Thompson is still absent: the
Affidavit is unable to explain how Bolt acquired the picture of Thompson that he
showed to Cooper, or how that photo has any relation to the crime. Thus, it remains
true that “the reconstructed affidavit exposes that Bolt never described how
Thompson was identified.”108 And a magistrate presented with this Affidavit would
therefore have “no basis on which to conclude that there is a ‘fair probability’ that
Thompson committed the crime.”109 So a jury who believed Cooper’s testimony
could reasonably find a lack of probable cause.
Defendants offer several other bits of information that they contend establish
probable cause, but none is cognizable in this analysis. First, they argue that the
Sherriff’s deputies’ stop was an independent identification of Thompson that
supports probable cause.110 But that stop only established that Thompson lived in the
general area of the crime and bore a resemblance to the perpetrator’s description—
information that is far too vague to establish probable cause to believe that he
committed the crime—and in any event it was not mentioned in the Affidavit, so I
will not consider it in analyzing whether the Affidavit was deficient.111 Second, they
108 Doc. 74 at 27.
109 Id. at 28.
110 Doc. 98 at 17, 20.
111 See Doc. 74 at 22-23 (noting that additional evidence should only be included when it adds
“context” to the recklessly omitted information).
contend that Magisterial District Judge Frey’s decision to bind the counts over for
trial after the preliminary hearing (and thus, the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing) establishes probable cause.112 But as I have explained before,
post-arrest information is irrelevant to this analysis because “a court does not
evaluate probable cause in hindsight.”113 Although not expressly argued, Sierra’s
identification of Thompson in a photo array and Thompson’s own agreement that he
is the person in the victims’ post-incident surveillance photos are irrelevant because
they also post-date the swearing of the Affidavit.114
Finally, as I have also previously noted, on these facts, qualified immunity
does not bar Thompson’s Section 1983 claims.115 An individual’s Constitutional
rights not to be arrested or prosecuted without probable cause are clearly established
in the Third Circuit, and “no reasonable officer would have covered up a lack of
probable cause by recklessly disregarding the truth in an affidavit.”116 Similarly,
given that there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that Bolt recklessly
112 Doc. 98 at 20-21.
113 Doc. 74 at 19 (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 249 (2013)); Brooks v. Kingsboro, No.
1:25-CV-0545, 2026 WL 1165783, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2026) (citing Alburg v. Jones, 784
F. Supp. 3d 775, 790 (E.D. Pa. 2025)); cf. Dempsey, 594 F.3d at 471 (“[W]e look only to the
information available to the officer at the time of the swearing of the affidavit of probable
cause.”).
114 The Court agrees with Defendants that these direct identifications by a victim eyewitness and
Thompson himself undoubtedly established probable cause to believe Thompson committed
the crime. The fact that probable cause was established shortly after Thompson’s arrest may
bear significantly on the damages that he can recover. But, again, the post-arrest proceedings
cannot rescue the arrest itself.
115 Doc. 74 at 28.
116 Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 749-50 (citing Andrews, 853 F.3d at 705 and Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d
1490, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993)).
disregarded the truth when he prepared the Affidavit, and therefore committed
“willful misconduct,”117 Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
immunity does not bar the related state tort claims either.118
Probable cause is a question for the jury unless the evidence is such that “a
reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause.”119 Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Thompson, a jury could find that the reconstructed
Affidavit failed to establish probable cause. Accordingly, the motion for summary
judgment as to Bolt is denied in its entirety.
2. Williamsport
A municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 if its municipal policy,
custom, or training, or lack thereof, was “the moving force of the constitutional
violation.”120 Where the claim is one for deficient training, as is the case here, the
plaintiff must show that “the [municipality’s] failure to train reflects deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.”121
117 See Thompson v. Wagner, 631 F. Supp. 2d 664, 688 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (reasoning that providing
false information in an affidavit of probable cause met the “willful misconduct” exception to
PSTCA immunity (citing Overstreet v. Borough of Yeadon, 475 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984))); cf. Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 515 (D.N.J. 2006)
(reaching similar conclusion applying New Jersey Tort Claims Act).
118 See also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8550 (exception to immunity for acts done with “actual malice”);
Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa.
1988) (“Malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause.” (citing Hugee v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 101 A.2d 740, 743 (Pa. 1954))).
119 Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 466 (quoting Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 124).
120 Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978); City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989).
121 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.
Generally, to show such deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must identify
“[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.”122
Thompson briefly attempts to establish the existence of a “widespread custom of
officers recklessly making material omissions and false assertions in arrest warrant
affidavits” by asking the Court to infer that such conduct is common based on the
fact that Bolt is an experienced police officer but, reading the record in Thompson’s
favor, erred in this case and could not explain why.123 That argument is egregiously
wrong: “A policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from a single instance of illegality
such as a first arrest without probable cause.”124 Binding Circuit precedent prohibits
the drawing of such an inference,125 and to permit that argument to proceed would
also allow plaintiffs to end-run the distinct method of analyzing Monell claims under
a single-incident theory.126 Thompson’s attempt to establish a policy or custom
through inference fails.
122 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).
123 Doc. 103 at 25-26 (“If a detective with many years of experience claims that there is no
problem with such a deficient affidavit, it can be inferred that either the City’s training is
deficient, or else that there is an unofficial custom of recklessly omitting material information
and asserting falsehoods in affidavits for the purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant.”).
124 Doc. 74 at 31 (quoting Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1984)).
125 Losch, 736 F.2d 903; see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[I]f alleging
a custom, the plaintiff must evince a given course of conduct so well-settled and permanent as
to virtually constitute law.” (citing Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d
Cir. 2019)) (emphasis added)).
126 See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
Because Thompson identifies one possible constitutional violation, his claim
can only advance under the single-incident framework. For single-incident liability,
the plaintiff must show that “the situation [is likely to] recur and [it is] predictab[le]
that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens’
rights.”127 In my prior decision, I noted that a “failure to train on the warrant-creation
process” could meet this standard because it “would foreseeably cause similar
violations to recur as officers author more affidavits in the future.”128
At summary judgment, Thompson’s burden is to come forward with evidence
of an actual failure in the municipality’s training.129 But the only evidence in the
record indicates that Williamsport does provide training on “what information to put
in” an affidavit of probable cause, and the police academy trains on the same issue.130
Thompson cites two Williamsport Bureau of Police policy documents, and contends
that the document relating to “Arrest Warrants” is woefully inadequate because it
does not mention the term “probable cause.”131 But in the same breath he
acknowledges that the “search warrant policy provides clear guidance on how to
protect citizens’ constitutional rights and what to include in an affidavit.”132
127 Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409.
128 Doc. 74 at 32.
129 Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105-06; see Carter v. City of Phila., No. 20-CV-0545, 2021 WL 5822996,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2021) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 382).
130 Doc. 94-40 at 23:17-24:14.
131 Doc. 103 at 26; Doc. 103-3 (Arrest Warrant Policy).
132 Doc. 103 at 26; Doc. 103-2 (Search Warrant Policy).
The documents reflect that the “Arrest Warrant” policy is essentially entirely
concerned with the internal procedural steps for when to seek an arrest warrant, how
to serve an arrest warrant, and how to document those steps in a case file.133 The
Court agrees with Thompson that the “Search Warrant” policy provides ample
training on how to establish probable cause and the need to do so in a search warrant
application.134 But Thompson ignores that police officers have access to both of
these policy documents and that these three-page documents are just part of the
broader training that the officers receive. To assume that officers completely forget
the concededly adequate training on what constitutes probable cause for a search
warrant when they apply for an arrest warrant is entirely unrealistic and impractical.
This is all the truer considering that, when seeking an arrest warrant, an officer
transcribes the relevant facts on a document titled “AFFIDAVIT of PROBABLE
CAUSE.”135 Even if Williamsport has not put a full description of probable cause in
every document where it might be relevant, it does adequately train on the concept
in general, and the record indicates that officers are well aware of when they are
required to establish probable cause. On that basis, the Court cannot conclude that
the training Williamsport provides, even if inadequate, is so deficient that it was
“plainly obvious” that constitutional violations would result.136
133 Doc. 103-3.
134 Doc. 103-2.
135 Doc. 94-29 at 6.
136 See Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409-11.
Furthermore, Thompson agrees, as he must, that Williamsport provides at
least some training on this issue. So his contention is essentially “that a different
training program than the one in place would have been more effective.”137 To
succeed on that type of argument, Thompson must “identify a failure to provide
specific training”; simply arguing that the municipality “could have” provided
“better” or “additional training” is not enough.138 Thompson does not even attempt
to identify what specific better training Williamsport should provide. So his
argument fails for this additional reason.
Accordingly, Williamsport is not liable for a failure to train, and its motion
for summary judgment is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is granted in part and denied in part.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
137 Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2003).
138 Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1030 (3d Cir. 1991).