Noem

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 LIANG DING, No. 1:26-cv-01217-DJC-SCR

12

Petitioner,

13

v. ORDER

14

KRISTI NOEM, et al.,

15

Respondents.

16

17 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce this Court’s prior order. (ECF

18 No. 15.) For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Motion is granted. The Court

19 orders Respondents to release Petitioner.

20 BACKGROUND

21 Petitioner Liang Ding is an immigration detainee presently in the custody of

22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). While this fact was previously

23 unknown to the Court, it now appears that Petitioner entered the United States on

24 January 4, 2023. (Mot. (ECF No. 5) at 3.) Petitioner was subsequently detained by ICE

25 at a scheduled check-in on June 3, 2025. (Id.) In February 2026, Petitioner filed a

26 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, arguing that his eight-month detention without a

27 bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) The Court found

28 that Petitioner was properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) in part

1 based on the Government’s assertion that Petitioner “entered the United States in July

2 2025 and has been in continuously [sic] detained while his removal proceeding [sic].”

3 (ECF No. 11 at 1; ECF No. 12 at 1.) The Court ordered Respondents to provide

4 Petitioner a constitutionally adequate bond hearing based on the finding that his

5 prolonged detention without one violated the Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 12 at 5–

6 6.) The Court therefore ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing before an

7 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) at which the Government would bear the burden of

8 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner posed a danger to the

9 community or risk of flight. (Id.)

10 On February 11, 2026, Petitioner appeared before an IJ for the scheduled

11 hearing. (Mot. at 4.) Petitioner asserts, and Respondents do not dispute, that the

12 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “presented no witness,” “made no

13 argument that Petitioner presents a flight risk” and “made no argument that Petitioner

14 presents a danger to the community.” (See Mot. at 5; see generally Opp’n (ECF No.

15 17).)1 Nonetheless, the IJ denied Petitioner release on bond. The IJ requested that

16 Respondents supply Petitioner’s Form I-213 and ruled based on the facts contained

17 therein. (Mot. at 2.) The IJ then found Petitioner did not present a risk of danger to

18 the community but did present a risk of flight. (Bond Or. (ECF No. 17-1) at 1.)

19 Petitioner now argues that the hearing Respondents provided was insufficient

20 to satisfy his due process rights. (Mot. (ECF No. 15).) Petitioner requests that the

21 Court find that the hearing provided was not in compliance with the Court’s order and

22 that the Court order Petitioner released from Respondents’ custody. (Id. at 13.)

23 Respondents oppose Petitioner’s Motion. (Opp’n (ECF No. 17).)

24

25

26

1 The Court requested that Respondents “provide a transcript or lodge an audio recording of the

27 hearing, if one exists.” (ECF No. 16.) As neither party filed one, the Court relies solely on the

arguments made by the parties and the IJ’s written order in determining what occurred at the bond

28 hearing.

1 LEGAL STANDARD

2 The Court has jurisdiction to enforce its own orders. See Sub-Zero, Inv. v.

3 Wasserman, No. 2:18-cv-00428-JFW-MAR, 2025 WL 1111551, at *3 (C.D. Cal. March

4 27, 2025); see also Agtuca v. Reed, No. 86-cv-00331-RHW, 2006 WL 2009050, at *2

5 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 2006). Petitioner is seeking to enforce this Court’s Order as to the

6 standard imposed at the bond hearing. Petitioner argues that the Court ordered a

7 constitutionally adequate bond hearing with the burden on the Government to prove

8 dangerousness or risk of flight by clear and convincing evidence, but that the hearing

9 failed to comply with that Order. (Mot. at 2.) Given the nature of this argument,

10 Petitioner’s motion is simultaneously based on the adequacy of the hearing that was

11 provided. Thus, the Court’s analysis here is grounded in the legal standard for

12 reviewing IJ detention determinations.

13 When reviewing an IJ’s detention determination, the Court reviews mixed

14 questions of fact and law under an abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. Clark,

15 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024). Under this standard, the Court “cannot reweigh

16 evidence” but instead determines whether the Immigration Court “applied the correct

17 legal standard.” Id. (quoting Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014)).

18 Thus, the Court’s review is effectively limited to whether the IJ’s decision “reflects

19 ‘clear legal error’ or is unsupported by sufficient evidence.” Hilario Pankim v. Barr, No.

20 20-cv-02941-JSC, 2020 WL 2542022, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2020).

21 DISCUSSION

22 The Court finds Petitioner has shown the IJ’s determination that Petitioner was

23 such a flight risk that no amount of bond was appropriate was an abuse of discretion.

24 In its prior Order, the Court ordered that Respondents provide Petitioner with a

25 bond hearing where the Government bore the burden of establishing that detention

26 was necessary by clear and convincing evidence. (ECF No. 12 at 5–6.) This clear and

27 convincing standard requires DHS to present evidence that establishes “an abiding

28 conviction that the truth of its factual contentions at issue are highly probable.”

1 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (internal citation and quotation

2 omitted); see Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2015). This is only

3 the case where “the material it offered instantly tilted the evidentiary scales in the

4 affirmative when weighed against the evidence . . . offered in opposition.” Colorado,

5 467 U.S. at 316.

6 “According to the Board of Immigration Appeals, a noncitizen’s flight risk may

7 be evaluated based on a number of factors including (1) whether the individual has a

8 fixed address in the United States; (2) length of residence in the United States; (3) the

9 individual’s family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the

10 noncitizen to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the noncitizen’s

11 employment history; (5) the noncitizen’s record of appearance in court; (6) the

12 noncitizen’s criminal record; (7) the noncitizen’s history of immigration violations; (8)

13 any attempts by the noncitizen to flee prosecution or otherwise escape from the

14 authorities; and (9) the noncitizen’s manner of entry to the Unites States.” S.E. v.

15 Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 627456, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026),

16 findings and recommendations adopted in part by, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026

17 WL 836327 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (cleaned up) (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec.

18 37, *3 (BIA 2006)). Though the IJ considered these factors at Petitioner’s bond

19 hearing, the IJ’s finding that Petitioner is a risk of flight suffers multiple defects that

20 render it an abuse of discretion.

21 First, and most obviously, it cannot be said that the Government has met its

22 burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk where

23 it is undisputed that the Government made no argument at all to that effect. (See Mot.

24 at 5; see generally Opp’n.)

25 Second, the IJ’s reasoning with respect to the first and fifth factors merely

26 undercut the persuasiveness of Petitioner’s evidence; they do not affirmatively

27 establish Petitioner is a flight risk. Petitioner represented that, if released, he “believes

28 he will be able to reside with his friend Mr. Yau.” (Bond Or. at 2.) Petitioner also

1 supplied a letter of support from this individual. (Id.) The IJ reasoned that, the fact

2 that this letter of support “does not offer that as an option . . . calls into question

3 whether [Petitioner] has a proper fixed address.” (Id.) Petitioner also argued his

4 voluntary appearance for his asylum interview weighed in favor of his release as part

5 of his court appearance record. (Id.) However, the IJ reasoned that Petitioner lacked

6 “a track record of appearing in Immigration Court” as he had not been placed in

7 removal proceedings until after his current detention. (Id.) Therefore, according to

8 the IJ, that “voluntary appearance has little bearing on [Petitioner’s] flight risk” both

9 because his failure to appear at that interview would have resulted in automatic

10 referral of his application to the Immigration Court and because that avenue for relief

11 has now been denied. (Id.) However, neither of these arguments show by clear and

12 convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight. At best, these arguments

13 undercut the persuasiveness of two pieces of evidence supplied by Petitioner in

14 support of his release. But they do not meet the high bar of clear and convincing

15 proof.

16 Finally, the evidence the IJ considered with respect to the remaining Guerra

17 factors does not amount to clear and convincing evidence. The IJ found Petitioner is a

18 “relatively recent entrant” with “no direct family ties in the United States” that would

19 provide him with “more stable avenues of relief, such as adjustment of status.” (Bond

20 Or. at 2.) But the limited availability of relief alone does not remotely approach the

21 clear and convincing standard the IJ purported to apply.

22 Based on the above, it is apparent that, while the IJ stated the appropriate

23 burden in making the determination that Petitioner was a risk of flight (see Bond Or. at

24 1), that was mere “lip service” to the appropriate standard. See S.E. v. Noem, 2026 WL

25 627456, at *4 (citing Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Pritzker, 828 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th

26 Cir. 2016)). In actuality, the Government was not held to its burden, and the

27 appropriate standard was plainly not applied. Accordingly, the IJ’s determination that

28

1 Petitioner was such a flight risk that no amount of bond was appropriate was an abuse

2 of discretion.

3 The Court also notes that, based on the new evidence before the Court, the

4 prior conclusion that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention pursuant to

5 section 1225 is incorrect. Respondents previously represented that “Petitioner

6 entered the United States in July 2025 and has been in continuously [sic] detained

7 while his removal proceeding [sic].” (ECF No. 11 at 1.) However, the information

8 presented by Petitioner both in this Motion to Enforce and in the record in Petitioner’s

9 other habeas action now indicate Petitioner entered the United States in January 2023

10 and had contact with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services several times

11 prior to his present detention. (Mot. at 3.; Ding v. Warden, 1:26-cv-04685-DJC-SCR,

12 ECF No. 1 at 4, 7.) Accordingly, his detention is not governed by section 1225 but

13 rather by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Garcia Mariagua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01744-

14 DJC-CSK, 2025 WL 3551700 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025); Ortega v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-

15 01663-DJC-CKD, 2025 WL 3511914 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); Lopez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-

16 cv-03174-DJC-CKD, 2025 WL 3124116 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025). For the reasons

17 stated in this Court’s prior cases, Petitioner was therefore entitled to a bond hearing

18 prior to re-detention.

19 As the Government not only failed to provide Petitioner a bond hearing pre-

20 deprivation but also failed to conduct a constitutionally compliant bond hearing post-

21 deprivation in accordance with this Court’s Order, the Court finds Petitioner is entitled

22 to release.

23 CONCLUSION

24 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

25 1. Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.

26 2. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner Liang Ding

27 from their custody. Respondents shall not impose any additional

28 restrictions on Petitioner, unless that is determined to be necessary at a

1 future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. Respondents are permanently

2 ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining

3 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, which

4 include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation notice describing the change of

5 circumstances necessitating Petitioner's arrest and detention, and a

6 timely hearing. At any such hearing, the Government shall bear the

7 burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner

8 poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight, and Petitioner shall

9 be allowed to have their counsel present. This Order does not address

10 the circumstances in which Respondents may detain Petitioner in the

11 event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of

12 removal.

13 3. Respondents shall file a status report within five (5) days confirming

14 Petitioner's release.

15 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve the California City Corrections

16 Center with a copy of this Order.

17 5. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to close this case and enter

18 judgment for Petitioner. This Order resolves all pending motions.

19

50 IT IS SO ORDERED.

21 | Dated: _July 15, 2026 Donel J Cob □□□ tto—

Hon. Daniel alabretta

22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23

24

25 | DJC7 - Ding26cv01217.mte

26

27

28