Manning

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

DE’AMONTAE MANNING, CASE NO. 3:24 CV 1171

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

JOSHUA MULINIX,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendant. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Currently pending before the Court in this civil rights case is Defendant Joshua Mulinix’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 27). Pro se Plaintiff De’Amontae Manning opposes.

(Doc. 35).1 Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court grants Defendant’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

This suit arises out of Defendant’s use of a chemical agent against Plaintiff in his cell on

April 21, 2023, while he was housed at Toledo Correctional Institution.

Leading up to the incident at issue, while Plaintiff was in the shower, he “made numerous

requests for [his] Ramadan meal.” (Doc. 1, at 6).2 The “unit correctional officers” ignored him

and requested he exit the shower before they would contact a supervisor. Id. At that point, the

1. Defendant did not file a Reply brief and the time in which to do so has expired. See Loc. Civ.

R. 7.1(e).

2. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is verified, see Doc. 1, at 25, it serves as an Affidavit for

purposes of summary judgment. El Bel v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court

has modified the capitalization in quotations from Plaintiff’s filings for ease of readability.

“negotiating officers” arrived; Plaintiff also informed them he did not receive his Ramadan

meals. Id.

Due to Plaintiff’s refusal to exit the shower despite orders to do so, a procedure called

“Planned Use of Force” was triggered. (Doc. 27-2, at 1). This is a “supervisor-led procedure”

used in an attempt to deescalate when a prisoner refuses to move or threatens staff. Id. It involves

beginning with negotiation and verbal warnings—including an explanation of consequence—and

escalating to non-lethal options to gain compliance, including the use of chemical agents. Id. at

1-2. If unsuccessful, the supervisor then directs a physical extraction of the prisoner. Id. at 2.

This process is designed to gain compliance with the least force possible. Id.

Defendant and another officer entered the shower area and requested Plaintiff “to cuff

up.” (Doc. 1, at 7). Plaintiff “made repeated attempts to proclaim that [he] did not receive [his]

religious meals before [he] allowed” Defendant to handcuff him. Id.; see also UOF Video 7:44-

8:16.3

Plaintiff states that “in a non-aggressive manner, for peaceful protest, [he] attempted to

sit on the floor” and again request the meals. (Doc. 1, at 7). On the walk from the shower to

Plaintiff’s cell, at “several times he stopped walking willingly” and, at other times, “he refused to

hold up his bodyweight.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2). This is depicted on videos submitted by Defendant

that show Plaintiff turning, twisting, kneeling, and resisting the escort. See UOF Video 8:35-

9:50; Butts Video 2:36-3:46.

Plaintiff states that when he arrived at his cell, he “walked inside . . . and allowed [his]

cell door to be secured.” (Doc. 1, at 7). This is directly contradicted by the submitted videos,

3. Defendant submitted multiple video exhibits depicting the incident. The Court herein refers to

two of these videos which are entitled PLANNED_UOF_CAMERA.mp4 (“UOF Video”), and

BUTTS,_OJAY.mp4 (“Butts Video”).

which depict the officers struggling for over a minute to get Plaintiff inside his cell and to fully

close Plaintiff’s cell door. (UOF Video 9:30-10:44; Butts Video 3:26-4:35).4 Officer O’Jay Butts

accompanied Defendant to the cell and controlled the pepper ball gun. (Doc. 27-2, at 2); see also

generally Butts Video.

Shortly after the door is closed, Defendant directs Plaintiff to “uncuff” and Plaintiff

responds, “I ain’t uncuffing shit.” (UOF Video 10:43-:49).5 Defendant responds with, “Final

directive, uncuff,” and repeatedly instructs Plaintiff to uncuff for the next approximately thirty

seconds. (UOF Video 10:49-11:24). During this time, Plaintiff repeatedly requests to see

medical, complaining that his foot is bleeding from being shut in the door. Defendant tells

Plaintiff he will get him medical attention, but needs him to uncuff first. See id. When Plaintiff

does not follow the instruction to uncuff, Defendant orders Officer Butts to deploy a pepper ball.

(UOF Video 11:24-:25).6 Defendant continues to give Plaintiff repeated instructions to uncuff,

including stating “final directive” multiple times. (UOF Video 11:36-12:57). After another

statement of “final directive, uncuff,” Defendant directs Butts to “saturate the area” and Butts

shoots four pepper balls into Plaintiff’s cell. (UOF Video 12:14-:15; Butts Video 6:20-:23); see

also Doc. 27-2, at 2 (Officer Butts’s statement that he deployed the pepper ball system at

Defendant’s request). Plaintiff can be heard saying “now I can’t breathe.” (UOF Video 12:27-

:29). Defendant continues to give Plaintiff instructions and “final directive[s]” to uncuff. (UOF

4. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007). Regardless, any dispute about how Plaintiff got into his cell is not dispositive of the

claims decided herein, which are based solely on actions taken once Plaintiff was inside the cell.

5. For a prisoner to “uncuff”, he must back up toward his cell door and place his hands through

the cuff port so they can be removed by a correctional officer. See Doc. 27-2, at 2.

6. It is not entirely clear from the video, but it appears this first attempt to deploy pepper balls

was unsuccessful.

Video 12:29-:46). He then instructs Butts to direct a pepper ball near Plaintiff’s legs and Butts

does so. (UOF Video 12:45-:52; Butts Video 6:55-:59); see also Doc. 27-2, at 2. Following this,

Plaintiff put his hands through the cuff port and permitted Defendant to uncuff him. (UOF

Video, 12:57-13:09; Butts Video 7:00-7:15).

Officer Butts avers that the amount of chemical agent used “was a typical amount for the

circumstance.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2). He further states that permitting Plaintiff to retain the handcuffs

would have presented a danger to other prisoners. Id.

After he was uncuffed, Plaintiff “attempted to request for [his] cell to be

decontaminated.” (Doc. 1, at 12). Defendant “intentionally and deliberately, [and] blatantly ran

away with the assisting officer.” Id. The videos depict Defendant and other officers walking

away from Plaintiff’s cell after he is uncuffed. (UOF Video 13:26-13:46; Butts Video 7:33-53).

Plaintiff says he remained inside the same cell until April 25, 2023, and suffered

suffocation, migraines, dizziness, blurry vision, and runny nose. (Doc. 1, at 8).

Less than 30 minutes after the chemical agent was used, Michael Mathews, R.N.,

examined Plaintiff from the front of his cell. (Doc. 27-3, at 1) (stating he “verbally addressed and

examined Manning from his cell front”).7 Mathews observed Plaintiff “showed no signs of

trauma or injury, his respiration was even and not labored, he was speaking in complete

sentences without difficulty, and he showed no acute medical distress of any kind.” Id.; see also

Doc. 27-1, at 19-21 (medical examination report). Mathews therefore determined Plaintiff was

“safe to remain [in] his restrictive housing.” (Doc. 27-3).

7. The videos depict the pepper ball system was used at approximately 9:47 p.m. Nurse

Mathews’s examination report was completed at 10:17 p.m. and he states he examined Plaintiff

“some time before 10:17 p.m.” (Doc. 27-3, at 1).

Plaintiff’s cell “was equipped with air ventilation . . . and running water” and officers

ensured the “ventilation system in [Plaintiff’s] cell was functioning and would decontaminate the

area.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2-3). The “proper method for decontaminating a cell that ha[s] been

saturated with the pepper ball agent is to allow the area to naturally be ventilated” and “[i]f there

is a residue, then [prisoners] can also use water to clean up the area.” Id. at 2.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff lists a single legal claim, which he describes as: “Forcing me

to remain inside a ma[c]e contaminated cell is inhumane and violates Plaintiff[’s] . . rights and

constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” (Doc. 1, at 8). Elsewhere he describes his claim as “[Defendant] enforced for me

to be ma[c]ed while inside my cell and intentionally and deliberately left me inside a ma[c]e

contaminated cell without allowing me to decontaminate and have my cell decontaminated.” Id.

at 4, 10.8

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When

considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences from the record

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine

the truth of any factual matter in dispute; the Court determines only whether the case contains

sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

8. Plaintiff attaches extra pages to his Complaint such that this statement of his claim begins on

ECF page 4 and continues on ECF page 10.

The moving party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). This burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court

– that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. The

nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and “present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Further,

the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the Court’s attention to those specific

portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact. See

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (noting the court “need consider only the cited materials”).

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment because

Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation much less a clearly established constitutional

violation. (Doc. 27). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must identify the deprivation of a

right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States and demonstrate such

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

144 n.3 (1979). Plaintiff brings his claims under the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The

Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth

Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” against the States. See Robinson v.

California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). The Court has also long held that this ban does not just

cover the formal “punishment” that a state court metes out to criminal defendants. The Eighth

Amendment thus regulates, inter alia, informal harms that prison officials inflict on convicted

prisoners during their terms of incarceration, including the force that prison guards use on

prisoners, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits

the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on prisoners”), and the conditions of prisoners’

confinement, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (holding prison officials have a duty

to provide “humane conditions of confinement”).

Plaintiff brings two claims here – one regarding the use of the chemical agent and one

regarding the failure to decontaminate his cell. The first of these is properly analyzed as an

excessive force claim, while the latter is a conditions of confinement claim. The Court addresses

each below.

Use of Chemical Agent

Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment because

Plaintiff fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the use of the pepper ball

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not established a question of fact regarding the subjective

component of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.

The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” requirement “has objective and

subjective components, both of which follow from the Eighth Amendment’s text.” Johnson v.

Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2023).

Objectively, harm to a prisoner must rise to a sufficiently serious level because

the Eighth Amendment prohibits only “cruel and unusual” deprivations, not just

uncomfortable or “even harsh” ones. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392; see

Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534. Subjectively, harm to a prisoner must result from a

prison official’s sufficiently volitional actions because the Eighth Amendment

bars only willful conduct that “inflict[s]” “punishment,” not accidental conduct

that causes injury. See Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

294, 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)).

Id.

“As a subjective matter . . . prisoners who challenge a correctional officer’s use of force

must prove more than that the officer acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to whether the force

was necessary (the type of intent that prisoners must prove to challenge their conditions of

confinement or medical care).” Id. at 616 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992)).

“The Court has instead described the ‘core judicial inquiry’ in this use-of-force context as

distinguishing between force used in a ‘good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ and

force used ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.

34, 37 (2010) (per curiam)); see also Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1992).

“Only the latter kind of force—force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain—violates

the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616. “So even if an officer uses force because of

an ‘unreasonable’ belief that it is necessary to restrain a prisoner, the officer does not violate the

Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324). The Eighth Amendment

“necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force” so long

as the use of force is not the type of force that would be “repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). “The negligent use of

force—even the reckless use of force—does not establish an Eighth Amendment claim; [the

plaintiff] must prove the malicious use of force for the exclusive purpose to inflict pain.”

Johnson, 79 F.4th at 621.

To decide whether a jury could find that an officer acted with this malicious

intent, the Supreme Court has identified several factors to consider: What was the

extent of the prisoner’s injury? What was the nature of the threat that justified the

use of force? Was the amount of force proportional to the threat? And did the

officer take any actions designed to reduce the required amount of force?

Id. at 618. Courts also approach such claims with deference to avoid “unreasonable post hoc

judicial second-guessing” of officers’ conduct. Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir.

2008) (quoting Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Johnson, 79

F.4th at 618 (“[W]hile judges may review an encounter by slowing down, pausing, and replaying

a video, officers have no such luxury. They must make quick decisions in the heat of the

moment.”).

On review of the evidence presented in accordance with the above guidance, the Court

finds Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the subjective

component of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Even in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the evidence shows only the former here. Plaintiff was given repeated orders to present

his hands to be uncuffed and he did not do so. The pepper balls were only deployed after

Plaintiff failed repeatedly to comply with the officers’ orders and officers paused between the

first and second deployments to continue negotiations and allow Plaintiff time to comply.

Again, force “used in a ‘good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’” does not

violate constitutional principles. Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616 (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37).

“Only . . . force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain—violates the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. The use of the pepper balls on the facts presented here does not rise to the level

of the latter. See Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App’x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The defendant

corrections officers did not violate Jennings’s Eighth Amendment rights because the force used

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, not to maliciously cause pain.

The videotape squarely demonstrates that Jennings disobeyed repeated direct orders prior to the

use of pepper spray.”) (citation omitted); Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014)

(“We found no Eighth Amendment violation where a prisoner was sprayed with pepper spray

after repeatedly disobeying orders to exit the shower. Indeed, in numerous other cases we have

likewise concluded that the use of chemical agents against recalcitrant prisoners did not violate

the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation modified).

No reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the use of the pepper ball deployment

system against a defiant and recalcitrant prisoner such as Plaintiff violated the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff has thus not established a constitutional violation, much less a clearly

established constitutional violation.

Failure to Decontaminate Cell

Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s claims regarding the alleged failure to decontaminate

his cell fail for two independent reasons. First, Defendant contends Plaintiff made no specific

claim against him regarding cell decontamination. (Doc. 27, at 8-9). Second, he contends that

even if Plaintiff had brought such a claim, there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 9.

“To establish a § 1983 . . . claim against a public official in his personal capacity, a

plaintiff must show that the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged

unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659

(6th Cir. 2015)) (citation modified); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[A] plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution”).

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to provide “humane

conditions of confinement.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “[A] prison official’s deliberate

indifference to conditions that pose a substantial risk to an inmate’s health and safety violates the

Eighth Amendment.” Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 805 (6th Cir. 2024). There is both an

objective and subjective component for such a claim. Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953 (6th

Cir. 2010). To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff “must show that he is incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The

subjective component requires that the prison official act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). That is, the officer must “know[]

of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint states that after he was uncuffed he “attempted to request

for [his] cell to be decontaminated.” (Doc. 1, at 12). This is at least arguably enough to allege

Defendant’s personal involvement in Plaintiff’s prison conditions claim. Nevertheless, as with

his excessive force claim, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to satisfy the subjective component

of such a claim. The evidence before the Court demonstrates Plaintiff’s cell “was equipped with

air ventilation . . . and running water,” officers ensured the “ventilation system in [Plaintiff’s]

cell was functioning and would decontaminate the area,” the “proper method for

decontaminating a cell that ha[s] been saturated with the pepper ball agent is to allow the area to

naturally be ventilated” and “[i]f there is residue, then [prisoners] can also use water to clean up

the area.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2). Plaintiff has identified no evidence to the contrary. The video

evidence shows Defendant stated medical would be called. (Butts Video 7:59-8:03). Plaintiff was

provided with prompt medical attention and Nurse Mathews found Plaintiff was not in distress

and was “safe to remain in his restrictive housing.” (Doc. 27-3, at 1). Moreover, beyond

Plaintiff’s statement that he attempted to request decontamination from Defendant, he has

pointed to no evidence Defendant was involved in any subsequent decisionmaking regarding

where Plaintiff would be housed. Nor does Plaintiff demonstrate Defendant was aware of any

particular injury he had suffered (or would suffer) if not moved.

There is simply no evidence from which a jury could conclude that Defendant was

subjectively aware of, and disregarded, any excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety.

Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim regarding the

conditions in his cell after deployment of the chemical agent.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED; and it is

FURTHER CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 21, 2026