Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

MASON ST. CLAIR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-01096

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

ARDAGH METAL PACKAGING USA )

CORP. and KEURIG )

MANUFACTURING, INC., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Mason St. Clair alleges that he was injured by an exploding soda can that the

defendants manufactured. Defendant Keurig Manufacturing, Inc. (“Keurig”) has filed a Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. No. 16). Defendant Ardagh Metal Packaging USA Corp. (“Ardagh”) has filed a

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 20). For the reasons set forth herein, both Motions

will be denied.

I. FACTS

On October 2, 2024, Mason St. Clair1 (“Mason”) and his mother, non-party Karren St.

Clair (“Karren”),2 stopped in Nashville while on a road trip they began in late September. (Doc.

No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 4–7.) Once inside their hotel room, they transferred beverages from a cooler to

their room’s mini refrigerator (the “mini-fridge”). (Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) The next day, Karren retrieved a

bottle of water from the mini-fridge, noticed that it was beginning to freeze, and suggested that

1 Mason is not a minor (Doc. No. 1 at 1).

2 For ease of reference, the court will uncharacteristically refer to the plaintiff and his

mother by their first names, as the plaintiff does throughout the Complaint.

they remove all of the beverages. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) Mason took a can of Schweppes ginger ale which

“felt like the contents had frozen,” from the mini-fridge and placed it in the cooler. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Immediately thereafter, the “top of the can exploded off striking Mason in the right eye,” which

“blinded Mason’s right eye vision, was very painful[,] and required emergency medical treatment.”

(Id. ¶¶ 14, 16–17.) The incident caused Mason “macular atrophy, optic nerve atrophy, distortion

due to retinal damage, and permanent vision impairment.” (Id. ¶ 49.)

Mason alleges that Ardagh “designed, manufactured[,] and produced” the can and that

Keurig bought the can, filled it with carbonated soda, and applied the top of the can, which it

separately sourced. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 29–30; see id. ¶ 26 (“[T]ops of the aluminum soda can[s] are

separately produced and sent to the suppliers using the cans for liquid drinks.”).) He further alleges

that, during the canning process, after a can is filled with liquid, the “top is stamped onto each

aluminum can and fixed with a double seam,” which a “scanner should inspect . . . for proper

sealing.” (Id ¶¶ 30–32.) As relevant here, the product had three constituent parts: the can—

designed, manufactured, and produced by Ardagh; the liquid soda poured into the can by Keurig;

and the top of the can, which Keurig procured from a non-party and then affixed to the can with a

double seam. Mason alleges that his injuries were “the fault of Ardagh and Keurig Manufacturing,

Inc. in producing and manufacturing a soda can with a defective double seam,” that the can of

ginger ale was “defective when it left the possession and control of” the defendants, and that he

would not have been injured if the “soda can at issue had a double seam properly attached.” (Id.

¶¶ 45–47.) Broadly, Mason alleges that the soda can should not have exploded when he took it out

of the mini-fridge. (Id. ¶¶ 36–47.) The Complaint does not clarify whether the flaw in the double

seam was due to a defect with the top, the can, or the manner in which the can was “fixed with

[the] double seam.” (Id. ¶ 31.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In his Complaint, Mason brings one unspecified cause of action, titled “Cause of Action

No. 1.” (Compl. ¶¶ 36–52.) He seeks unspecified damages in excess of $75,000 to compensate

him for medical treatment, pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, “[p]ermanent anatomical

impairment,” and loss of enjoyment of life. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 50.) Ardagh filed an Answer. (Doc. No. 11.)

Keurig filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (Doc. No. 16) and an accompanying Memorandum (Doc. No. 17), to which the plaintiff

filed a Response (Doc. No. 22). Keurig did not file a reply brief. Separately, Ardagh filed a Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 20), under Rule 12(c), and an accompanying

Memorandum (Doc. No. 21), to which the plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 23), and in further

support of which Ardagh filed a Reply (Doc. No. 24).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS – RULES 12(b)(6) & 12(c)

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (omission in Twombly). While

Rule 8 does not require details, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555).

The standards of review for Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions are the same. Fritz v.

Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc.,

249 F.3d 509, 511–12 (6th Cir. 2001)). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the complaint’s

legal sufficiency. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir.

1996). Such a motion is properly granted if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted

as true, are sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555–57. A complaint has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). But a complaint that “tenders ‘naked

assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the

complaint’s well-pleaded allegations as true, construes the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Eastep v. City of Nash.,

156 F.4th 819, 826 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 517

(6th Cir. 2016)), cert. denied sub nom. Eastep v. Carrick, 146 S. Ct. 1816 (2026).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Governing Law

The plaintiff invokes this court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Compl.

¶ 3.) The court has jurisdiction over this case because the amount-in-controversy requirement has

been met, the plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio, one defendant is a citizen of Delaware and Texas, and

the other defendant is a citizen of an unspecified foreign country.3 (Compl. at 1, ¶¶ 1, 3.) Courts

sitting in diversity apply state substantive law. Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. 187, 192 (2026) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1652). As the parties agree, Tennessee law applies.

3 No party has filed a “Rule 7.1(a)(2) Disclosure Statement,” required of every party in

diversity cases. L.R. 7.02(b). And neither defendant has filed a “Business Entity Disclosure

Statement,” required of business entities in every case. L.R. 7.02(a); see also Doc. No. 4 (Notice

Regarding Business Entity Disclosure Statement). The parties will be ordered to comply with the

Local Rules.

B. The Tennessee Products Liability Act

While the Complaint does not recite the statute, in briefing, all parties construe its sole

claim as brought under the Tennessee Products Liability Act (“TPLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-

28-101, et seq., which sets forth the statutory scheme “for all claims arising from injuries alleged

to have been caused by products” and “supersede[s] common law claims for personal injuries

stemming from alleged defects in products or failures to warn of the dangers associated with a

product.” Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tenn. 2021) (citing Tenn. Code

Ann. § 29-28-102(6)).

To state a claim under the TPLA, a plaintiff must allege facts from which the court can

reasonably infer that: “(1) the product was defective and/or unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defect

existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control, and (3) the plaintiff’s injury was

proximately caused by the defective product.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483

(6th Cir. 2008) (citing King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). The

TPLA defines the term “defective condition” as “a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for

normal or anticipatable handling and consumption.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-28-102(2). And a

product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be

contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common

to the community as to its characteristics, or that the product because of its dangerous condition

would not be put on the market by a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, assuming that the

manufacturer or seller knew of its dangerous condition.” Id. § 29-28-102(8). In sum, to succeed

on a TPLA claim, a “plaintiff must show that there was something wrong with the product[] and

trace the plaintiff’s injury to the specific defect.” Spencer v. Clorox Servs. Co., No. 2:22-cv-02510-

TLP-CGC, 2023 WL 11891452, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. May 3, 2023) (quoting King, 37 S.W.3d at

435).

C. Analysis

Because the defendants make similar arguments and their respective motions are

adjudicated under the same standard, for the most part the court will consider their arguments

together. The defendants do not contend that the plaintiff fails to allege that his injury was caused

by the exploding soda can, so the court will focus on the first and second elements of a TPLA

claim, which, in this case, overlap. In addition, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to

comply with a further requirement of the TPLA, which the court will address first.

1. Failure to Comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-107

The Complaint does not comply with the TPLA’s requirement to “state an amount . . .

sought to be recovered from any defendant.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-107. That is, Mason does

not specify the amount of the damages he seeks, other than to allege that they suffice for diversity

jurisdiction. (Compl. ¶ 3.) The defendants briefly argue, with nearly identical language citing no

authority, that the plaintiff has thereby failed to state a claim and the case should be dismissed.

(Doc. No. 17 at 10; Doc. No. 21 at 7.) In response, the plaintiff cites an opinion by this court for

the proposition that such a failure constitutes a “minor shortcoming” that does not justify dismissal.

(Doc. No. 22 at 8 (quoting Jones v. Walgreen Co., No. 3:05-cv-0735, 2005 WL 8175476, at *2

(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 30, 2005); Doc. No. 23 at 8 (same).) Indeed, the plaintiff’s failure in this regard,

which can be swiftly cured by amendment, “certainly does not justify dismissal of the case.” Jones,

2005 WL 8175476, at *2. The plaintiff will be ordered to comply with § 29-28-107 by amending

the Complaint. Such amendment, which will be strictly limited to specifying an amount of

damages, will not permit or require additional Rule 12(b)(6) motions.

2. Defective or Unreasonably Dangerous When the product Left the Control

of the Manufacturers

To state a claim under the TPLA, the plaintiff must plead facts from which the court can

infer that the product was “in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left

the control of the manufacturer or seller.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a). A product is

“defective” if it is “unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption.” Id. § 29-28-

102(2). The TPLA expressly precludes manufacturer liability when the product was “made

unreasonably dangerous by subsequent unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance or

abnormal use.” Id. § 29-28-108.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff does not allege that the soda can was “defective for

normal or anticipated handling or consumption” because his injury did not occur “during the

expected use of the product.” (Doc. No. 17 at 6; Doc. No. 21 at 5 (same).) Instead, the defendants

argue, the Complaint at most alleges that the soda can “became unreasonably dangerous after

Plaintiff froze the can overnight.” (Doc. No. 17 at 10; Doc. No. 21 at 6 (same).) That is, the

defendants argue that the Complaint does not allege that the soda can was “defective,” under the

TPLA, because the plaintiff “does not argue that freezing the can is a normal or anticipated use.”

(Doc. No. 17 at 8; see also Doc. No. 21 at 5 (“Plaintiff never alleges any facts showing that freezing

pressurized soda cans is a normal or foreseeable use. Moreover, Plaintiff admits that he and his

mother knew the cans should not be frozen.” (citing Compl. ¶¶ 11–14)).)4

Further, the defendants argue that, if the soda can was ever dangerous, it only became

dangerous when the plaintiff froze it. As for the plaintiff’s allegation that the can was “defective

4 Ardagh misconstrues the Complaint’s allegation that Mason decided to remove a frozen

can of soda from the mini-fridge as an admission that he knew that cans of soda should not be

frozen.

when it left the possession and control of Defendants Ardagh . . . and Keurig,” (Compl. ¶ 47), the

defendants argue that this allegation is “conclusory.” (Doc. No. 17 at 8 (citing Compl. ¶ 47; Doc.

No. 21 at 5 (same).) And in any case, the defendants argue, Mason “cannot allege the product was

unreasonably dangerous at the time of manufacture, or the time of sale,” because he “alleges he

travelled cross-country with the product, for at least three days without issue.” (Doc. No. 17 at 9–

10 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 4–6); Doc. No. 21 at 6 (same).) The court construes this latter argument to be

that products cannot have latent defects, which neither defendant supports.

In their opening briefs, the defendants each cite precisely one product liability case

concerning a motion to dismiss: Maness v. Boston Scientific, 751 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Tenn.

2010). (Doc. No. 17 at 7; Doc. No. 21 at 4; accord Doc. No. 24 at 2 (“Maness squarely governs

here.”).) In Maness, the plaintiff alleged that, after having a medical device used to treat back pain

implanted, she suffered pain and an infection and had the device removed. 51 F. Supp. 2d at 964–

65. She sued several defendants, including the device’s manufacturers. Id. at 965. The court found

that the plaintiff had failed to state a TPLA claim. Id. at 969–70. Other than alleging her injuries,

the court found, the plaintiff made only conclusory allegations that the device was defective or

unreasonably dangerous, including, for example, that the “defective medical device . . . was not fit

for the purpose intended and was defective and therefore caused the plaintiff harm.” Id. at 969

(quoting the Complaint).

Similarly, in Tilden v. General Electric Company, cited by the plaintiff, part of an MRI

machine broke and fractured the plaintiff’s decedent’s arm. No. 3:11-cv-628, 2012 WL 1023617,

at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2012). As alleged, the decedent died “as result of illness and the fracture

to his forearm.” Id. The plaintiff alleged that the machine was in an “inoperable defective

condition” and was “unsafe and unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at *4. The court found for the

defendants, in part because the plaintiff had “not alleged any facts about how the MRI machine

was allegedly defective or unreasonably dangerous,” but rather merely “assert[ed] that it was so.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3).

In response, the plaintiff analogizes to several cases that distinguished Maness and denied

motions to dismiss TPLA claims. (Doc. No. 22 at 3–6; Doc. No. 23 at 3–6.) In Kelley v. Howard

Berger Company, for example, the plaintiff’s decedent was killed in a fire. No. 13-96-DLB-HBG,

2013 WL 4014748, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2013). The plaintiff—the decedent’s son—brought

a TPLA claim against the supplier of oxygen tanks and related medical devices his father used to

help him breathe. The plaintiff alleged that the devices leaked oxygen, which “caused, contributed

to, or intensified the fire that killed the Decedent.” Id. In response, the defendant argued that the

plaintiff had failed to state a claim because “he has not identified a specific defect or design flaw

in the equipment it supplied to the decedent,” and that the plaintiff “merely asserts in conclusory

fashion that the equipment was defective and/or unreasonably dangerous, and that the decedent

was subsequently harmed.” Id. at 2. The court distinguished Maness, where the plaintiff “alleged

no facts demonstrating that the device caused her injuries” and “had failed to offer any facts from

which the court could infer that the device was defective or unreasonably dangerous.” Id. By

contrast, in Kelley, the plaintiff “specifically allege[d] that the equipment supplied by Defendant

was defective or unreasonably dangerous because it leaked oxygen and because Defendant failed

to outfit the equipment with proper safety mechanisms.” Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The court explained, “[u]nlike the plaintiff in Maness, therefore, Plaintiff identifies a

specific product defect.” Id.

In Cash-Darling v. Recycling Equipment, Inc., also cited by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s

decedent died in a fire caused by an aluminum dust explosion at a recycling facility, where he

worked. No. 2:19-cv-00034-DCLC, 2020 WL 12846745, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2020). The

plaintiff alleged that a shredding machine, which the defendant manufactured, should have had a

dust collection system, which would have prevented the explosion. Id. The defendant argued that,

because “shredding machines do not always require a dust collection system . . . the product did

not become ‘defective’ as Plaintiff alleges until [the recycling facility] received the product and

began using it.” Id. at *3. The court distinguished Maness:

The instant case is more similar to Kelley than Maness. Rather than merely alleging

the shredding machine caused the explosion that killed the Decedent and was

therefore defective, Plaintiff specifically alleges that the shredding machine created

combustible dust that led to an explosion because the product lacked a dust

collection system, resulting in the Decedent’s death. Plaintiff identifies a particular

defect of lacking either a dust collection system or an adequate warning of the

potential for a combustible dust explosion. Plaintiff has further alleged these defects

were present at the time the shredding machine left Defendant’s control and that

they proximately caused the Decedent’s death. Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a claim under the TPLA.

Id. at *4.

Mason argues that this case is more like Kelley and Cash-Darling than Maness and Tilden.

(Doc. No. 22 at 4–6; Doc. No. 23 at 4–6.) He argues that he has stated a claim for relief because

the Complaint specifies a defect (the “improperly formed double seam”), a “specific component”

(the top of the can), and he alleges that the defect existed when it left the defendants’ control. (Doc.

No. 22 at 6–7; Doc. No. 23 at 6–7.) Ardagh responds that, as in Maness, and unlike in Cash-

Darling and Kelley, the plaintiff “identifies no manufacturing deviation, process failure, or

defect[ive] condition.” (Doc. No. 24 at 3; see also id. (“Plaintiff alleges no facts explaining how

the seam was defective, how it deviated from specifications, or how it rendered the can

unreasonably dangerous when it left Ardagh’s control.”).) Moreover, Ardagh argues, Cash-

Darling and Kelley “reinforce . . . rather than undermine” its argument. (Id. at 1.)

The court agrees that this case is more similar to Kelley and Cash-Darling than Maness

and Tilden. The plaintiff has not merely stated that the exploding ginger ale can caused his injury

and therefore was defective. Rather, Mason alleges that a can of soda exploded in his face. He

specifically alleges that the can’s double seam was defective, that this defect existed when the

product left the defendants’ control, and that it proximately caused his injuries.

In addition, the plaintiff argues that the defendants’ characterization that he pleads

abnormal use misconstrues the Complaint. (Doc. No. 22 at 7–8; Doc. No. 23 at 7–8.) Ardagh

replies that “[f]reezing a sealed, carbonated beverage is not normal use.” (Doc. No. 24 at 4.) It

argues that a “product is not ‘unreasonably dangerous’ when the risk arises from a condition the

consumer knowingly creates and controls.” (Id. at 5 (citing, generally, Greene v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)). But Greene concerned the

plaintiff’s husband’s death from lung cancer, which the plaintiff attributed to her husband’s

smoking cigarettes manufactured by the defendants. 72 F. Supp. 2d at 885. There, the court took

judicial notice of the “fact that, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, consumers were generally

aware that cigarette smoking poses serious health risks.” Id. at 890 (footnote omitted). This court

cannot take similar judicial notice regarding the risks associated with freezing cans of soda; nor

do the defendants ask it to. But even if the court were to accept the defendants’ contention that

freezing cans of soda constitutes abnormal use, the Complaint, construed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, does not allege that Mason froze the can of ginger ale. Rather, the

Complaint alleges that Mason placed the soda can in a mini-fridge that, unbeknownst to him, was

too cold. Putting soda in a hotel mini-fridge does not constitute abnormal use.

Separately, Ardagh argues that, even if the plaintiff had properly pleaded that the can’s

double seam had been misapplied, this would have happened “after the subject can left Ardagh’s

possession and control.” (Doc. No. 21 at 6.) The plaintiff does not respond to Ardagh’s two-

sentence argument on this point, which is not without some merit. Indeed, the Complaint alleges

that, after Keurig bought the can from Ardagh, Keurig filled the can with liquid and procured the

top from a third-party, which it “stamped onto [the] aluminum can and fixed with a double seam.”

(Compl. §] 26, 29-31.) At Keurig’s facility, a “gamma ray scanner should [have] inspect[ed]” the

can “for proper sealing.” (/d. § 32.) The plaintiff broadly alleges that his injury “was the fault of

Ardagh and Keurig . . . in producing and manufacturing a soda can with a defective double seam

that was not caught and removed.” (/d. 7 45.) As alleged, any failure to identify a faulty double

seam would have been Keurig’s. But, as the court has described, the Complaint does not clarify

how the double seam was defective—whether through its application or because of a defect in the

top or can itself, which might have prevented proper application of a double seam. Drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court will not dismiss the action against Ardagh

merely because, when the can left its control, no double seam had been applied.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Keurig’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 16) and Ardagh’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 20) will be denied. The plaintiff will be granted leave to

amend the Complaint solely to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-107. The filing of the

Amended Complaint, so limited, will not license further Rule 12(b)(6) motions.

An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

bag —_

United States District Judge

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