Lu

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

YANQUI LU, a/k/a Yin Chiu Lu )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:26-cv-03424-MDH

)

DAVID VENTURELLA, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequent

to her order of supervision being revoked. Pending before the Court is her Verified Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) as well as Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 11). For the reasons outlined below, the Court concludes that

Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 should be DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Yanqui Lu is a citizen of China who is currently confined in Greene County Jail

in Springfield, Missouri. Petitioner arrived in the United States on or about March 19, 2000. She

entered without being admitted or paroled after inspection and without a valid immigrant visa or

other valid entry document. Immigration authorities arrested Petitioner upon entry and placed her

in removal proceedings, charging her as an inadmissible alien under 8 U.S.C. section

1182(a)(6)(A)(i).1 In September 2000, an immigration judge authorized Petitioner’s release on

1 Petitioner’s deportation officer maintains Petitioner was charged under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), while Petitioner’s

petition says Petitioner was charged under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Either charge results in the same conclusion, so it is

not necessary for the Court to address this discrepancy further.

bond. Petitioner posted bond and was released from custody. On June 30, 2003, an immigration

judge denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner timely appealed the decision to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, causing Petitioner to

become subject to a final order of removal. Petitioner was taken back into DHS custody on August

4, 2006, before being released one week later and placed on an order of supervision. Petitioner

remained in the United States in compliance with the conditions of her order of supervision for the

next nineteen years.

Petitioner’s order of supervision was revoked on December 23, 2025. At her next regular

reporting appointment on February 17, 2026, DHS took her back into custody, where she has since

remained.

Petitioner brought this proceeding, seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

section 2241, against (1) the acting field office director of ICE Kansas City, (2) the Secretary of

DHS, (3) the U.S. Attorney General, and (4), the Greene County Sheriff all in their official

capacities.2 She does not challenge the validity of her final order of removal; rather, she challenges

the legality of her continued detention, arguing that it violates the Immigration Nationality Act

(INA) and the Due Process Clause.3 Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to be

considered for release. The Court resolves the parties’ arguments below.

2 Petitioner’s Petition mistakenly lists Sheila Sauls, the warden of Greene Correctional Institution in North Carolina

instead of Jason Johnson, interim sheriff of the Greene County Jail in Springfield, Mo. Regardless of this error, the

Court construes the proper party holding Petitioner in custody as the Department of Homeland Security through

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As DHS and ICE are utilizing the Greene County Jail to hold Petitioner and

other detainees, the Court expects its ruling to apply to the Government and those aiding the Government regarding

this specific case.

3 The Eighth Circuit’s split decision in Herrera Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, is controlling until potential en banc

rehearing or review by the Supreme Court and forecloses Petitioner’s statutory claim. However, the Eighth Circuit

did not address, nor foreclose, Due Process claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that three statutory provisions—8 U.S.C. sections 1252(a)(5), 1252(g),

and (b)(9) deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider any of Petitioner’s claims that fall outside

of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The Court disagrees.

Section 1252(a)(5), entitled “Exclusive means of review,” limits judicial review of orders

of removal to “an appropriate court of appeals.” As stated above, Petitioner is “not challeng[ing]

the validity of her final order of removal.” Thus, section 1252(a)(5) does not strip this Court of

jurisdiction. See R.O.A. v. Edlow, 805 F.Supp.3d 565, 571–72 (D. Vt. 2025).

Sections 1252(g) and (b)(9) apply narrowly to systemic challenges to regulations

implementing expedited removal, review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or

the process by which removability will be determined—not to constitutional or statutory claims

which precede and are collateral to that process, including, as relevant here, unlawful arrest or

detention. See Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, No. 25-CV-493-LJV, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

135986, 2025 WL 1953796, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025); see also Hernandez-Cuevas v. Olson,

No. 4:25-cv-00830-BP, at 3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 05, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)); Cifuentes

Rivera v. Arnott, et al, 25-cv-00570-RK1, Doc.19 at 7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 07, 2025) (“[T]he narrow

scope of § 1252(g) does not cover ‘claims [that] are collateral to the Government’s decision to

execute the final order of removal,’ for instance, claims seeking relief based upon the

Government’s alleged failure to comply with its own regulations regarding the required

administrative processes after an alien is detained.”). Petitioner is challenging her unlawful

detention, not any removal decisions or actions, so the above provisions do not deprive the Court

of jurisdiction.

For those reasons, this Court concludes it has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas petition.

II. Permissibility of Continued Detention

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that the Attorney General “shall

remove” an alien within ninety days of entry of an order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

The alien must be held in the Government’s custody during these ninety days. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A);

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001). The INA authorizes extended detention if the

Government does not remove the alien within the ninety-day period; however, it is well settled

that this extension cannot be indefinite. 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 689;

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005).

The Supreme Court in Zadvydas clarified the boundaries of post-ninety-day detentions.

533 U.S. at 699–700, 701. Reasoning that “indefinite detention of [admitted] aliens . . . would

raise serious constitutional concerns,” the Court found that detentions after the ninety-day period

are presumptively limited to six months. Id. at 701; Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378. Once the six-

month period has passed, an alien detainee is eligible for conditional release if she “provides good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378. If the alien does so, the burden

shifts back to the Government to provide “sufficient evidence to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 701. The Court reaffirmed this scheme in Clark v. Martinez and extended it to include

not just admitted aliens but also aliens who have been ordered removed and are inadmissible under

8 U.S.C. section 1182. 543 U.S. at 378.

Here, Petitioner is inadmissible under section 1182, so the Zadvydas holding applies per

Martinez. First, Petitioner filed her petition for writ of habeas corpus before the presumptive six-

month period elapsed; indeed, the period still has not expired.4 The petition can be denied on that

ground alone. Even disregarding this, the petition can still be denied because Respondents have

proffered evidence sufficient to rebut Petitioner’s assertion that her removal is not likely “in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Respondents have submitted a travel document request for

Petitioner’s removal and are taking active steps to monitor the status of the request. At this time,

all Respondents are waiting on is a nationality determination by China immigration officials. This

creates a “significant likelihood” that Petitioner’s removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable

future. For these reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus must be

denied without prejudice.

III. Temporary Restraining Order

In the Petition, Petitioner filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order. The

Court finds this motion is moot in light of the Court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus.

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Pursuant to the Equal

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), a court shall award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses

incurred by that party in any civil action, brought by or against the United States, unless the court

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances

make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C § 2412(d)(1)(A).

4 Petitioner was taken into custody on February 17, 2026. The initial ninety-day period therefore elapsed on May 18,

2026. This results in the presumptively constitutional six-month detention period elapsing on November 18, 2026.

Here, Petitioner is not a prevailing party and therefore cannot pursue an award of

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the EAJA. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request must be

denied.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has not been violated, nor

has the INA, and she is not entitled to immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Petitioner’s motion for a temporary

restraining order is DENIED AS MOOT; Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is

DENIED; and Respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED

AS MOOT under the ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2026

/s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE