Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

MICHAEL PAUL DAVIS,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 8:23-cv-2105-CEH-SPF

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

/

O R D E R

Michael Paul Davis filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 together with a supporting memorandum of law. (Docs. 1, 2).

Respondent filed a response with supporting exhibits. (Doc. 11). Davis filed a reply

with exhibits. (Doc. 14). Upon consideration, Davis is not entitled to federal habeas

relief.

I. Background and Procedural History

Davis is in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections pursuant to

criminal judgments entered by the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and

for Pinellas County, Florida. He is serving concurrent twenty-year terms of

imprisonment followed by ten years of sex-offender probation. (Respondent’s Ex. 5).

On March 28, 2016, the State of Florida charged Davis by Information with

three counts of capital sexual battery upon a child under twelve years of age. The

offenses allegedly occurred during a charging period spanning approximately March

2013 through April 2014. (Resp. Ex. 3). Before trial, however, Davis and the State

reached a negotiated resolution under which the State agreed to reduce each count to

attempted capital sexual battery. In exchange, Davis agreed to plead guilty and accept

a negotiated sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment followed by ten years of sex-

offender probation. (Resp. Ex. 4).

At the change-of-plea hearing, defense counsel advised the trial court that he

had discussed the case and the negotiated plea agreement with Davis and that Davis

wished to accept the plea because he believed doing so was in his best interest. (Id. at

4–7). The trial court then conducted a thorough plea colloquy. Davis confirmed under

oath that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation, understood the rights he

would waive by pleading guilty, understood the maximum penalties associated with

the offenses and the negotiated sentence, and was entering the plea freely and

voluntarily. After finding that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

entered and supported by an independent factual basis, the trial court accepted the plea

and imposed the negotiated sentence. (Id. at 7–13.)

Davis appealed his convictions and sentences, and Florida’s Second District

Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. (Resp. Exs. 6–9).

Following the conclusion of his direct appeal, Davis sought collateral relief in

the state courts. He filed motions to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), which the trial court denied. The Second District

Court of Appeal affirmed. (Resp. Exs. 10–15). Davis subsequently filed an initial and

then an amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.850, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel arising from counsel’s investigation of the case and advice preceding the entry

of his guilty plea. The post-conviction court entered a written order denying relief on

each claim, and the Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed without a

written opinion. (Resp. Exs. 17–22).

Davis then filed the present habeas petition under Section 2254, raising four

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the state courts adjudicated each

habeas claim on the merits, this Court reviews Davis’s claims under the deferential

standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”).

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. AEDPA

This Court’s review of Davis’s claims is governed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, a federal court may

not grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies

a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court precedent or reaches a different result

on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000).

A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law only when its

application of Supreme Court precedent is objectively unreasonable, not merely

incorrect. Id. at 409–13.

AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard of review. Federal habeas relief

functions as “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems,” not as a substitute for ordinary error correction. Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, relief is unavailable unless the state

court’s decision was so lacking in justification that there was no possibility for fair-

minded disagreement. Id. at 103. In evaluating claims previously adjudicated on the

merits, review is generally limited to the record that was before the state court. Cullen

v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Each of Davis’s claims alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel and is

therefore governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail, a

petitioner must establish both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Id. at 687–88. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Courts

must avoid the distorting effects of hindsight and indulge a strong presumption that

counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689.

To establish prejudice, a petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Id. at 694. Because both deficient performance and

prejudice are required, a court may reject an ineffective-assistance claim upon

determining that either element has not been established. Id. at 697.

C. Guilty Pleas

Because Davis entered a negotiated guilty plea, the prejudice inquiry is

governed by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). In that context, a petitioner must

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he

would have rejected the plea agreement and insisted on proceeding to trial. Id. at 59.

A petitioner’s after-the-fact assertion that he would have insisted on trial is not,

standing alone, sufficient to establish prejudice. Rather, that assertion must be

evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, including

the strength of the State’s case and the likely consequences of proceeding to trial.

D. Double Deference

When a state court has rejected an ineffective-assistance claim on the merits,

federal habeas review is “doubly deferential.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013);

Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Accordingly, the question is not whether counsel performed

deficiently. Rather, the question is whether the post-conviction court unreasonably

concluded that Davis failed to satisfy Strickland. The Court applies these principles to

each of Davis’s claims below.

III. Discussion

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Davis contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to investigate and interview Dillon Hartley, the victim’s brother.

Davis alleges Hartley resided in the home during the relevant period, routinely awoke

before Davis on school mornings, accompanied Davis to school, never observed Davis

enter victim N.S.’s bedroom, and could have impeached portions of the victim’s

account. According to Davis, had counsel interviewed Hartley and advised him

concerning the significance of that testimony, he would have rejected the negotiated

plea and proceeded to trial.

The state post-conviction court rejected this claim after concluding that

Hartley’s proposed testimony, even assuming it to be true, did not undermine the

factual basis for the offenses charged. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 9–10). The court explained that

Hartley’s observations were confined primarily to school mornings and therefore did

not account for the broader charging period. (Id.). Because the proposed testimony did

not establish that Davis could not have committed the offenses, the court concluded

Davis failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that additional investigation

would have altered his decision to plead guilty. (Id. at 9–10). That determination was

a reasonable application of Strickland and Hill. Although counsel has a duty to conduct

a reasonable investigation, the Sixth Amendment does not require relief whenever

additional evidence can be imagined after a guilty plea. In the plea context, the

dispositive question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

alleged deficiency, the defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial.

The post-conviction court reasonably concluded that Hartley’s testimony would

not have materially strengthened the defense. Even fully crediting Davis’s allegations,

Hartley’s proposed testimony did not foreclose the possibility that the offenses

occurred during times outside his observations. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 10). Thus, the court

reasonably determined that the testimony did not materially diminish the State’s case

or create a reasonable probability that Davis would have chosen trial instead of

accepting the negotiated disposition.

The plea colloquy reinforces that conclusion. Davis confirmed under oath that

he had sufficient time to consult with counsel, was satisfied with counsel’s

representation, understood the rights he was waiving, and wished to plead guilty.

(Resp. Ex. 4). Such sworn declarations carry a strong presumption of verity and weigh

heavily against his present assertion that he would have rejected the plea had counsel

conducted additional investigation.

Considering the limited value of Hartley’s proposed testimony, the substantial

benefit obtained through the negotiated plea, and the doubly deferential review

required by § 2254(d), the Court cannot conclude that the state court’s rejection of this

claim was objectively unreasonable. Ground One, therefore, affords no basis for

federal habeas relief.

B. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Davis contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

advising him that he could plead guilty, later withdraw his plea if he became

dissatisfied, and then pursue a direct appeal. According to Davis, counsel’s erroneous

advice induced him to accept the negotiated plea when he otherwise would have

insisted on proceeding to trial. Davis, therefore, contends his guilty plea was

involuntary.

The state post-conviction court rejected this claim on the merits. It found

Davis’s allegation unpersuasive because the plea colloquy demonstrated that he

knowingly and voluntarily entered the negotiated plea after being fully advised of the

rights he was relinquishing and the consequences of pleading guilty. The court further

concluded Davis failed to establish prejudice because the record did not support his

assertion that, absent counsel’s alleged advice, he would have rejected the plea and

insisted on proceeding to trial. The court also observed that, to the extent Davis

believed he could no longer afford retained counsel, he could have requested

appointment of counsel rather than entering a plea based upon incorrect legal advice.

(Ex. 18 at 8–9.) That determination was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.

As discussed above, to establish ineffective assistance in the guilty-plea context,

a petitioner must demonstrate both constitutionally deficient performance and a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, he would have rejected the

plea and insisted on proceeding to trial. The post-conviction court reasonably

concluded that Davis failed to satisfy this standard in light of his sworn colloquy and

the absence of objective evidence supporting his present allegations. Although Davis

now alleges counsel advised him that he could withdraw his plea after sentencing if he

became dissatisfied, the contemporaneous plea proceedings substantially undermine

that assertion. During the plea colloquy, Davis confirmed under oath that he had

discussed the case with counsel, understood the negotiated plea agreement and the

rights he was waiving, was satisfied with counsel’s representation, and was entering

the plea knowingly and voluntarily. He further confirmed that no one had forced,

threatened, or improperly induced him to plead guilty. (Resp. Ex. 4.) Such solemn

declarations “carry a strong presumption of verity” and constitute a formidable barrier

to subsequent collateral attacks based upon contrary allegations. Blackledge v. Allison,

431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

The post-conviction court likewise reasonably determined that Davis failed to

establish prejudice. Davis received the benefit of a negotiated disposition that

substantially reduced his sentencing exposure. Nothing in the record compelled the

state court to conclude there was a reasonable probability Davis would have rejected

that agreement and insisted on proceeding to trial had counsel not allegedly advised

him concerning withdrawal of the plea. Davis also has not shown that the state court

acted unreasonably in observing that, if financial concerns truly affected his ability to

continue with retained counsel, he could have sought appointment of counsel rather

than entering an involuntary plea. (Ex. 18 at 8–9.)

Under AEDPA’s doubly deferential standard, fair-minded jurists could agree

with the post-conviction court’s rejection of this ineffective-assistance claim. Davis has

not demonstrated that the state court’s adjudication was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill, or rested on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Ground Two, therefore, warrants no federal habeas relief.

C. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Davis argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to investigate and develop a defense based on his theory that the victim

previously had been abused by another individual, known as “Peanut,” and

psychologically transferred those memories to Davis. He contends counsel should

have investigated the prior abuse, interviewed additional witnesses, retained a

psychological expert, and presented expert testimony concerning psychological

transference. Davis maintains that, had counsel done so, he would have rejected the

plea agreement and proceeded to trial.

The post-conviction court reasonably rejected the claim, finding it rested on

speculation rather than competent evidence. Davis identified no qualified expert who

would have supported the proposed theory, alleged no facts demonstrating that such

testimony actually existed, and failed to establish that the proposed evidence would

have been admissible under Florida law. The court further concluded that Davis had

not shown a reasonable probability that additional investigation would have altered

his decision to plead guilty. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 6–8). That determination survives review

under AEDPA. Strickland does not require counsel to pursue speculative defenses

unsupported by competent evidence, nor does it require a court to assume that

unidentified experts would have supplied favorable testimony. Allegations that an

expert might have supported a defense are insufficient to establish deficient

performance or prejudice.

The post-conviction court also reasonably considered the limits imposed by

Florida evidentiary law in evaluating the viability of Davis’s proposed defense.

Whether evidence concerning the victim’s prior abuse would have been admissible is

principally a matter of state law. A federal habeas court does not reexamine a state

court’s determination of state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68

(1991). The relevant federal question is whether the resulting application of Strickland

was objectively unreasonable. Davis has not made that showing.

Davis also has not demonstrated Hill prejudice. Even assuming counsel had

pursued the additional investigation Davis proposes, the post-conviction court

reasonably concluded that he failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would

have rejected the negotiated plea and insisted on trial. The plea colloquy reflects that

Davis knowingly accepted a negotiated disposition after consulting with counsel, and

nothing in the record renders the state court’s contrary conclusion unreasonable.

Because fair-minded jurists could agree with the post-conviction court’s resolution of

this ineffective-assistance claim, Section 2254(d) precludes relief. Ground Three is,

therefore, denied.

D. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Davis contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to investigate and advise him concerning the five additional

charges the State intended to file if he rejected the negotiated plea offer. He alleges

counsel failed to explain the nature of those charges, including their elements, dates,

locations, and factual circumstances, and improperly relied on the State’s intention to

pursue those charges to induce him to plead guilty. According to Davis, had counsel

adequately investigated and advised him concerning the additional charges, he would

have rejected the negotiated plea and proceeded to trial.

The state post-conviction court rejected this claim on the merits. It concluded

that the record refuted Davis’s allegation that counsel failed to explain the additional

charges or improperly coerced him into pleading guilty. The court noted that, during

the plea colloquy, Davis confirmed that no one was forcing or coercing him to enter

the plea, although he acknowledged that the State’s intention to pursue additional

charges influenced his decision. The court further found that counsel accurately

advised Davis that the State intended to file five additional charges if he rejected the

plea offer. It also relied on Davis’s contemporaneous motion to withdraw his plea, in

which he acknowledged that he knew the State intended to charge three additional

counts of capital sexual battery and two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation.

Finally, the court concluded that counsel could not have advised Davis on the specific

factual details of those offenses because the State had no obligation to provide

discovery regarding charges that had not yet been filed. (Ex. 18 at 5.)

That determination was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland and Hill. The post-conviction court reasonably concluded that Davis’s own

contemporaneous filings substantially undermined his present allegations. Although

Davis now asserts that counsel failed to explain the nature of the proposed charges,

his motion to withdraw the plea demonstrates that he understood the State intended

to pursue three additional counts of capital sexual battery and two counts of lewd or

lascivious molestation if plea negotiations failed. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 5). The state court

reasonably relied upon that contemporaneous filing in concluding that Davis’s present

assertions were unsupported by the record.

The post-conviction court likewise reasonably rejected Davis’s contention that

counsel performed deficiently by failing to explain the specific dates, locations, and

circumstances of the uncharged offenses. As the state court observed, the State was

not required to provide discovery concerning offenses that had not yet been charged.

(Resp. Ex. 18 at 5). Counsel, therefore, could not reasonably be expected to advise

Davis regarding factual details the State was not yet obligated to disclose. Counsel also

does not render ineffective assistance by accurately advising a defendant of the risks

attendant to rejecting a negotiated plea offer, including the possibility that the State

will pursue additional supported charges. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–

65 (1978). On this record, the post-conviction court reasonably concluded Davis failed

to establish deficient performance.

Nor did the post-conviction court unreasonably reject Davis’s claim of

prejudice. The plea colloquy reflects that Davis knowingly and voluntarily accepted

the negotiated plea after consulting with counsel and understanding the consequences

of his decision. The post-conviction court further noted that the victim had reported

more than fifty incidents of sexual abuse, while Davis was charged with only three

counts of capital sexual battery before the plea agreement. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 6). Thus,

the record supported counsel’s advice that the State intended to pursue additional

charges if negotiations proved unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, the post-

conviction court reasonably concluded that Davis failed to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, absent counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he would have rejected the

negotiated plea and insisted on proceeding to trial.

Under AEDPA’s doubly deferential standard, fair-minded jurists could agree

with the post-conviction court’s rejection of this ineffective-assistance claim.

Accordingly, Davis has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill, or rested

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Ground Four, therefore, does not

warrant federal habeas relief.

IV. Conclusion

1. Davis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is

DENIED. The CLERK is directed to enter judgment against Davis and to CLOSE

this case.

2. Davis is not entitled to a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Under Section

2253(c)(1), a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to

appeal a district court’s denial of his application. Instead, a district court must first

issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA “only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” To merit a COA, Davis

must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the

underlying claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d

926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001). Davis has not made the requisite showing. Finally, because

Davis is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he has no right to appeal in forma

pauperts.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 11, 2026.

Charlene Edwards Honeywell

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Pro se Petitioner

Counsel of record

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