The opinion
1
FILED IN THE
2 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Aug 20, 2026
3
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
4
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
7 CHEYENNE C.,1 No. 1:26-CV-03046-MKD
8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING AND
REMANDING DECISION OF
9 v. COMMISSIONER
10 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 8, 10
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
11 SECURITY,
12 Defendant.
Before the Court are the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 8, 10. D. James Tree
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represents Plaintiff. Special Assistant United States Attorney Benjamin Groebner
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represents Defendant. The Court, having reviewed the administrative record and
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the parties’ briefing, is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
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reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands the case for the immediate
17
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19 1 To protect the privacy of plaintiffs in social security cases, the Court identifies
20 them by only their first names and the initial of their last names. See LCivR 5.2(c).
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1 calculation and award of benefits.
2 JURISDICTION
3 Plaintiff was found disabled as a child beginning May 11, 2011. Tr. 139-43.
4 Following a continuing disability review, the agency determined that Plaintiff’s
5 disability ended on June 1, 2015, and an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
6 upheld that determination on July 31, 2018. Tr. 21-36. On November 13, 2020,
7 this Court remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings. Tr. 1724-
8 42. On January 26, 2022, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision finding that
9 Plaintiff’s disability continued through March 2, 2021, but that Plaintiff was not
10 disabled under the rules applicable to adults beginning March 3, 2021, when she
11 attained age 18. Tr. 1758-77. On February 21, 2023, the Appeals Council
12 affirmed the finding that Plaintiff’s disability did not end before March 3, 2021,
13 but vacated the decision concerning the period beginning March 3, 2021, and
14 remanded for further proceedings. Tr. 1780-82. The ALJ issued another
15 unfavorable decision on December 13, 2024, Tr. 1791-1806, which the Appeals
16 Council again vacated and remanded on April 3, 2025, Tr. 1821-23. Following
17 another hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on December 17, 2025,
18 finding Plaintiff was not disabled beginning March 3, 2021. Tr. 1560-89. The
19 Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction, and the ALJ’s decision became the
20 final decision of the Commissioner after remand. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484(d).
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1 Plaintiff appealed this final decision on March 14, 2026. ECF No. 1.
2 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
3 STANDARD OF REVIEW
4 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
5 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is
6 limited; the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported
7 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153,
8 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant
9 evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
10 conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated
11 differently, substantial evidence equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less
12 than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining
13 whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire
14 record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id.
15 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its
16 judgment for that of the Commissioner. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152,
17 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh’g (Aug. 9, 2001). If the evidence in the
18 record “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must
19 uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn
20 from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012),
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1 superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902(a) (citation
2 omitted). Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account
3 of an error that is harmless.” Id. (citation omitted). An error is harmless “where it
4 is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115
5 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s decision
6 generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders,
7 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
8 FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS
9 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within
10 the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to
11 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
12 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
13 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
14 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be
15 “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot,
16 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
17 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
18 1382c(a)(3)(B).
19 Section 1614(a)(3)(H) of the Social Security Act requires the Commissioner
20 to redetermine the eligibility of an individual who was receiving supplemental
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1 security income as a child when the individual attains age 18. 42 U.S.C.
2 1382c(a)(3)(H). In conducting an age-18 redetermination, the Commissioner
3 applies the rules governing adults who file new applications for benefits, rather
4 than the rules governing continuing disability reviews. 20 C.F.R. § 416.987(b).
5 The Commissioner therefore applies the adult five-step sequential evaluation
6 process, except that the first step concerning substantial gainful activity does not
7 apply. Id.
8 At step two, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s
9 impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any
10 impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her]
11 physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to step
12 three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy this
13 severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not
14 disabled. Id.
15 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to
16 severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude
17 a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.
18 § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the
19 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and
20 award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
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1 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the
2 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess
3 the claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC),
4 defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work
5 activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. §
6 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.
7 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s
8 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in
9 the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is
10 capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the
11 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of
12 performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
13 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s
14 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy.
15 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner
16 must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education and
17 past work experience. Id. If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the
18 Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
19 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the
20 analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore
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1 entitled to benefits. Id.
2 If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner
3 to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such
4 work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §
5 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
6 ALJ’S FINDINGS
7 As a threshold matter, the ALJ found Plaintiff attained age 18 on March 3,
8 2021, and was eligible for supplemental security income benefits as a child for the
9 month preceding the month in which she attained age 18. Tr. 1566.
10 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe
11 impairments: borderline intellectual functioning; depression; anxiety disorder; and
12 learning disorder. Tr. 1566.
13 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
14 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed
15 impairment. Tr. 1566.
16 The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of
17 work at all exertional levels the following non-exertional limitations: Plaintiff
18 claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and make
19 simple. Plaintiff can respond appropriately to occasional changes in the work
20 setting. Plaintiff can have occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and
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1 the public. Plaintiff can perform tasks that do not involve a specific production
2 rate pace, such as assembly line work or an hourly production quota. Tr. 1567.
3 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 1573.
4 At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
5 experience, RFC, and testimony from the vocational expert, there were jobs that
6 existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
7 to include laundry worker, industrial sweeper, and industrial cleaner. Tr. 1574.
8 Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s disability ended on March 3, 2021, and
9 Plaintiff has not been disabled since that date. Tr. 1575.
10 ISSUES
11 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying
12 her supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security
13 Act. Plaintiff raises the following issues for review:
14 1. Whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s testimony; and
15 2. Whether the ALJ properly assessed the medical opinion evidence.
16 ECF No. 8 at 2.
17 DISCUSSION
18 A. Plaintiff’s Testimony
19 Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to rely on reasons that were clear and
20 convincing in discrediting her symptom claims. ECF No. 8 at 4-11. An ALJ
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1 engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether to discount a claimant’s
2 testimony regarding subjective symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2
3 (Mar. 16, 2016). “First, the ALJ must determine whether there is objective
4 medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be
5 expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Molina, 674 F.3d at
6 1112 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The claimant is not required to
7 show that [the claimant’s] impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the
8 severity of the symptom [the claimant] has alleged; [the claimant] need only show
9 that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v.
10 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
11 Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of
12 malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of
13 the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the
14 rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and
15 footnote omitted). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify
16 what symptom claims are being discounted and what evidence undermines these
17 claims. Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as
18 amended (Apr. 9, 1996)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002)
19 (requiring the ALJ to sufficiently explain why it discounted claimant’s symptom
20 claims). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in
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1 Social Security cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014)
2 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).
3 Factors to be considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting
4 effects of a claimant’s symptoms include: (1) daily activities; (2) the location,
5 duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that
6 precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and
7 side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or
8 other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has
9 received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures other than
10 treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7)
11 any other factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions
12 due to pain or other symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7; 20 C.F.R. §
13 416.929(c). The ALJ is instructed to “consider all of the evidence in an
14 individual’s record,” to “determine how symptoms limit ability to perform work-
15 related activities.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2.
16 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
17 reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s
18 statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her
19 symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence. Tr. 1568.
20 First, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with what the
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1 ALJ characterized as mostly normal mental status examinations. Tr. 1568-69. An
2 ALJ may reject a claimant’s symptom testimony when it is contradicted by the
3 medical evidence. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161
4 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ did not identify a meaningful contradiction here. See
5 Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024). The ALJ relied on
6 observations that Plaintiff had intact memory, fair attention, and “good” or “okay”
7 mood during appointments. Tr. 1568-69. Those observations concern Plaintiff’s
8 cognitive functioning and presentation during isolated encounters, not her ability to
9 manage anxiety and panic when exposed to unfamiliar people or workplace
10 demands. Cf. Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1200 (“The ALJ did not explain, and we do
11 not see, how the absence of neurological defects and a normal mood during a
12 medical exam are inconsistent with Ferguson’s testimony about the severity and
13 frequency of his headaches.”). As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, a person
14 may think clearly, remember well, and concentrate during an isolated examination
15 while remaining unable to function in a workplace eight hours per day, five days
16 per week. See Ortiz v. Bisignano, 179 F.4th 691, 703 (9th Cir. 2026). Likewise,
17 evidence of normal memory and concentration does not discredit testimony
18 concerning anxiety and other distinct mental health symptoms. Id. at 706.
19 Moreover, the examinations were not uniformly normal in the respects
20 relevant to Plaintiff’s testimony. As the Appeals Council previously observed,
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1 many of the cited examinations also documented anxiety, panic attacks, agitation,
2 emotionality, stress, negative fixations, decreased judgment and insight, and
3 possibly tangential thought processes. Tr. 1822. The ALJ acknowledged many of
4 these findings but reasoned that, “regardless of the claimant’s emotional state,” her
5 mental status examinations remained mostly normal. Tr. 1569. This reasoning
6 does not explain how the normal portions of the examinations contradicted
7 Plaintiff’s testimony concerning anxiety and panic. The ALJ impermissibly
8 discounted the alleged symptoms because they were not consistently reflected in
9 other areas of mental functioning. See Ortiz, 179 F.4th at 706.
10 The ALJ also reasoned that Plaintiff “has had many counseling
11 appointments and healthcare appointments, but there is no indication of her having
12 an anxiety attack at each visit or having just had one.” Tr. 1569. However,
13 Plaintiff did not allege that she remained in a continuous panic attack throughout
14 every day. She testified that her panic was triggered by being in public without a
15 familiar person and attempting to work around unfamiliar people. Tr. 1627; see
16 also Tr. 3160 (reporting to healthcare provider that attempting to work would
17 trigger panic). A healthcare appointment did not necessarily expose Plaintiff to
18 either circumstance. The absence of a panic attack during a particular appointment
19 therefore does not contradict Plaintiff’s testimony concerning panic under different
20 conditions. On this record, the ALJ’s reliance on the mental status examinations
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1 was not a clear and convincing reason for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.
2 Second, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony based on her activities,
3 including visiting Tacoma and Seattle, planning a vacation to Louisiana, camping,
4 attending an Easter gathering, boating, helping with storage, caring for children
5 and a puppy, cooking, and storing photographs on a computer. Tr. 1570. An ALJ
6 may reject a plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on daily activities if the activities
7 either contradict her testimony or “meet the threshold for transferable work skills.”
8 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007).
9 Neither basis is satisfied here. Plaintiff traveled to Tacoma with her mother,
10 Tr. 2729, and visited Seattle with her siblings, Tr. 2742. These outings are
11 consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony that she could be in public when accompanied
12 by someone she knew. Tr. 1627. The cited Louisiana record referred only to a
13 planned vacation. Tr. 2746. When Plaintiff attended an Easter gathering with
14 unfamiliar people, she remained near her partner, experienced panic, and was
15 exhausted afterward. Tr. 2738. Rather than contradicting Plaintiff’s testimony, the
16 treatment note corroborates her account of needing a familiar person present when
17 she is around others.
18 Plaintiff’s childcare and household activities also do not establish that she
19 could sustain competitive employment. Plaintiff testified that her partner took over
20 childcare approximately every other day when Plaintiff became unable to function
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1 and cried for most of the day. Tr. 1670. The ALJ did not identify the frequency,
2 duration, demands, or assistance involved in Plaintiff’s remaining activities. Nor
3 did the ALJ explain how occasional cooking, boating, computer use, or helping
4 with storage demonstrated that Plaintiff could maintain regular attendance and
5 productivity throughout a full workweek. See Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 906
6 (9th Cir. 2017) (ALJ erred by failing to explain why the plaintiff’s activities
7 demonstrated an ability to maintain regular attendance at work). Activities that
8 have no bearing on the functional limitation at issue do not create a genuine
9 conflict. Ortiz, 179 F.4th at 703-04; see also Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634,
10 643 (9th Cir. 2017) (“House chores, cooking simple meals, self-grooming, paying
11 bills, writing checks, and caring for a cat in one’s own home, as well as occasional
12 shopping outside the home, are not similar to typical work responsibilities.”);
13 Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the mere
14 performance of ordinary activities does not detract from a plaintiff’s testimony
15 concerning her overall disability); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir.
16 1987) (noting that a disability claimant need not “vegetate in a dark room” in order
17 to be deemed eligible for benefits).
18 Defendant defends the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s mental status
19 examinations and activities, ECF No. 10 at 2-5, but does not respond to Plaintiff’s
20
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1 challenges to ALJ’s remaining rationales. The Court therefore treats those
2 rationales as conceded.
3 The ALJ accordingly erred by failing to provide clear and convincing
4 reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.
5 B. Medical Opinion Evidence
6 Because Plaintiff filed her application before March 27, 2017, the ALJ was
7 required to generally give a treating doctor’s opinion greater weight than an
8 examining doctor’s opinion, and an examining doctor’s opinion greater weight
9 than a non-examining doctor’s opinion. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. The ALJ
10 may only reject the contradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor by
11 giving “specific and legitimate” reasons. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654
12 (9th Cir. 2017). The Commissioner may reject the opinion of a non-examining
13 physician by reference to specific evidence in the medical record. Sousa v.
14 Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence identified by the
15 ALJ, however, must actually conflict with the limitation being rejected. Ortiz, 179
16 F.4th at 703-04.
17 Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly assessed two medical opinions. ECF
18 No. 8 at 12-19.
19 1. Dr. Bradford
20 Dr. Bradford testified as a medical expert at the January 2022 hearing. He
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1 opined that Plaintiff could perform simple, routine tasks, occasionally interact with
2 the public, frequently interact with coworkers, and interact with supervisors
3 without limitation. Tr. 1601-02. Asked on a more-probable-than-not basis
4 whether flareups or bad anxiety days would cause Plaintiff to miss work, Dr.
5 Bradford answered, “Yes, that would definitely be an issue.” Tr. 1603. When
6 asked about the cumulative effect of Plaintiff’s attention and anxiety limitations,
7 Dr. Bradford testified that Plaintiff “could be off task a third of the time.” Tr.
8 1603.
9 The ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Bradford’s opinions concerning off-task
10 behavior and absenteeism. Tr. 1571. The ALJ characterized those limitations as
11 an outlier that was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s largely normal mental status
12 examinations and activities such as attending appointments, addressing family
13 matters, using a computer, and traveling. Tr. 1571. The ALJ reasoned that these
14 activities demonstrated Plaintiff could remain on task while performing simple
15 work. Tr. 1571.
16 Substantial evidence does not support this analysis. As discussed above,
17 observations of intact memory, fair attention, and appropriate behavior during
18 isolated appointments do not contradict an inability to remain productive
19 throughout a normal workday and workweek. Ortiz, 179 F.4th at 703. Nor do
20 Plaintiff’s travel, attendance at healthcare appointments, computer use, and
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1 supported family activities have a meaningful bearing on her ability to remain on
2 task for eight hours per day, five days per week. Id. at 703-04.
3 The Appeals Council had already found substantially similar reasoning
4 unsupported. It observed that Plaintiff received assistance with childcare and
5 household chores and that the prior decision had not adequately explained how her
6 activities, as actually performed, undermined Dr. Bradford’s one-third off-task
7 opinion. Tr. 1821-22. Nevertheless, the ALJ again relied on substantially the
8 same mental status findings and activities without explaining how they conflicted
9 with the specific limitation Dr. Bradford assessed. The ALJ also cited Dr.
10 Malancharuvil’s contrary opinion. Tr. 1571. But the ALJ credited that opinion
11 based on the same largely normal mental status findings, as discussed above. Tr.
12 1572. Because those findings do not conflict with Dr. Bradford’s off-task
13 limitation, they do not explain why the ALJ credited Dr. Malancharuvil’s opinion
14 over Dr. Bradford’s.
15 Defendant argues the ALJ satisfied Sousa by referring to specific portions of
16 the record. ECF No. 10 at 6-7. But Sousa does not permit an ALJ to reject a non-
17 examining opinion merely by listing evidence that does not actually contradict the
18 assessed limitation. The ALJ did not identify a genuine inconsistency between Dr.
19 Bradford’s opinion concerning sustained productivity and Plaintiff’s functioning
20 during isolated appointments or daily activities.
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1 The ALJ therefore erred in rejecting Dr. Bradford’s opinion that Plaintiff
2 could be off task for one-third of the workday. That limitation exceeds the
3 vocational expert’s testimony that a regular productivity reduction of 15 to 20
4 percent would preclude competitive employment. Tr. 1614. Because the ALJ’s
5 error concerning this limitation is sufficient for performing the credit-as-true
6 analysis, the Court need not resolve Plaintiff’s additional arguments concerning
7 Dr. Bradford’s unquantified absenteeism testimony.
8 2. LMHC Olson
9 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of treating
10 counselor Corrinne Olson, LMHC. ECF No. 8 at 15-19. The Court need not
11 determine whether the ALJ properly assessed Ms. Olson’s opinion because the
12 Court’s determinations regarding Plaintiff’s testimony and Dr. Bradford’s opinion
13 are sufficient to perform the credit-as-true analysis.
14 C. Scope of Remand
15 When the ALJ commits legal error in denying a claim for benefits, as here,
16 the Court “ordinarily must remand to the agency for further proceedings before
17 directing an award of benefits.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
18 2017). The Social Security Act, however, grants district courts flexibility in
19 certain circumstances to reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for an immediate
20 award of benefits rather than further administrative proceedings. Treichler v.
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1 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff seeks
2 such a remedy. ECF No. 8 at 20. Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not
3 established the rare circumstances warranting an award of benefits but fails to
4 meaningfully identify any outstanding factual issue or evidence that casts doubt as
5 to disability. ECF No. 10 at 9.
6 Remand for an immediate award of benefits is allowed only when three
7 requirements (collectively referred to as the “credit-as-true” rule) are satisfied: (1)
8 the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether
9 that evidence is claimant testimony or a medical opinion; (2) there are no
10 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be
11 made, the record is fully developed, and further administrative proceedings would
12 serve no useful purpose; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were
13 credited as true, the record as a whole would require the ALJ to find the claimant
14 disabled on remand. Leon, 880 F.3d at 1045; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even if
15 all three requirements are met, the decision whether to remand a case for further
16 proceedings or simply award benefits is in the Court’s discretion. Washington v.
17 Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may still remand for
18 further proceedings “when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to
19 whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021.
20 All three steps of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied here. First, as discussed
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1 above, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting
2 Plaintiff’s testimony and Dr. Bradford’s opinion.
3 Second, the record is fully developed, and further proceedings would serve
4 no useful purpose. The issue of Plaintiff’s disability under the adult standard has
5 been before the agency since March 2021. The agency has issued three decisions
6 denying disability under the adult standard, in January 2022, December 2024, and
7 December 2025. The Appeals Council twice remanded the adult disability
8 determination. The administrative record—exceeding 3,100 pages—includes
9 multiple hearings, testimony from medical experts and vocational experts, and
10 extensive longitudinal treatment records. Notably, the Appeals Council’s April
11 2025 order expressly identified the inadequate evaluation of the same evidence at
12 issue here. The Appeals Council explained that Plaintiff’s supported childcare and
13 household activities did not adequately undermine Dr. Bradford’s off-task opinion
14 and that the ALJ’s reliance on normal portions of mental status examinations failed
15 to account for observations of anxiety, panic, agitation, emotionality, stress,
16 decreased judgment and insight, and potentially tangential thinking. Tr. 1821-22.
17 The current decision again relied on largely normal mental status examinations and
18 substantially the same activities to reject Plaintiff’s testimony and Dr. Bradford’s
19 opinion. Tr. 1568-71.
20 Ortiz strongly supports an award of benefits in these circumstances. There,
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1 the Ninth Circuit found a record exceeding 2,500 pages, three hearing transcripts,
2 and repeated administrative errors sufficiently complete to permit an immediate
3 award. Ortiz, 179 F.4th at 706. By contrast, the record here is even larger, and the
4 challenged errors recurred after the Appeals Council specifically identified the
5 deficiencies requiring correction. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that precedent
6 “foreclose[s] the argument that a remand for the purpose of allowing the ALJ to
7 have a mulligan [to revisit the medical opinions and testimony that were
8 improperly rejected] qualifies as a remand for a ‘useful purpose’ under the ...
9 credit-as-true analysis.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021-22 (citations omitted); see
10 also Knorr v. Berryhill, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
11 (“[R]emanding for the ALJ to reconsider this evidence, which the ALJ already had
12 an opportunity to review, would simply be allowing the ALJ to have a second bite
13 at the apple.”). The record does not require further proceedings.
14 Third, crediting the improperly rejected evidence would require the
15 Commissioner to find Plaintiff disabled. Dr. Bradford estimated that the
16 cumulative effect of Plaintiff’s limitations could leave her off task for one-third of
17 the workday. Tr. 1603. Although Dr. Bradford used the word “could,” both the
18 ALJ and Appeals Council treated this estimate as an assessed limitation. Tr. 1570-
19 71, 1821-22. If credited, Dr. Bradford’s one-third off-task limitation would require
20 a finding of disability because the vocational expert testified that a regular
21
1 productivity reduction of 15 to 20 percent would preclude competitive
2 employment. Tr. 1614. Plaintiff’s credited testimony independently requires the
3 same conclusion. Plaintiff testified that she experiences approximately three bad
4 days per week during which she accomplishes nothing, that her partner regularly
5 must take over childcare when Plaintiff cannot function, and that anxiety caused
6 her to miss work and prevented her from completing simple stocking tasks at
7 Walmart. Tr. 1629-31, 1668-70. Those limitations exceed the vocational expert’s
8 tolerances for off-task behavior and absence. Tr. 1614.
9 Finally, the record does not create serious doubt that Plaintiff is disabled.
10 Plaintiff has borderline intellectual functioning, including an IQ score of 75. Tr.
11 1598. Her treatment records documented anxiety, panic attacks, agitation,
12 emotionality, stress, decreased judgment and insight, and potentially tangential
13 thinking. Tr. 1822. Her credited testimony is also consistent with her unsuccessful
14 attempt to perform simple stocking work during the relevant period. Plaintiff’s
15 anxiety caused missed work, daily crying, and an inability to complete assigned
16 tasks, after which Walmart asked her to leave. Tr. 1628, 1630-31, 1668-70. A
17 brief, unsuccessful work attempt attributable to Plaintiff’s impairments supports
18 her allegations. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1038-39 (9th Cir.
19 2007). The agency has already had multiple opportunities to assess this evidence,
20 and the current decision again relied on substantially similar reasoning the Appeals
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1 Council had found supported. The adult redetermination has now been pending for
2 more than five years. The credit-as-true rule is a “prophylactic measure” designed
3 to motivate Defendant to ensure that the record will be carefully assessed and to
4 justify “equitable concerns” about the length of time which has elapsed since a
5 claimant has filed their application. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100. The repeated
6 errors and resulting delay counsel against further administrative proceedings. See
7 Ortiz, 179 F.4th at 706 (“Two reviewing courts have already found errors in the
8 handling of his application for benefits, and some of those errors have recurred in
9 this latest denial of benefits. We decline to invite further repetition of this already
10 unfortunate administrative history.”).
11 Because the record is fully developed, crediting Dr. Bradford’s opinion and
12 Plaintiff’s testimony requires a finding of disability, and the record creates no
13 serious doubt that Plaintiff is disabled, the Court exercises its discretion to remand
14 this matter for an immediate calculation and award of benefits beginning March 3,
15 2021.
16 CONCLUSION
17 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court concludes the
18 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal
19 error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
20 1. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 8, is GRANTED.
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1 2. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 10, is DENIED.
2 3. The Clerk’s Office shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff
3 REVERSING and REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner of Social
4 Security for immediate calculation and award of benefits.
5 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to
6 counsel, and CLOSE THE FILE.
7 DATED August 20, 2026.
8 s/Mary K. Dimke
MARY K. DIMKE
9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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