The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
DECARLO A GARNER, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 3:25-CV-508-CEA-DCP
)
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying
Fees or Costs [Doc. 1] and his Complaint [Doc. 2]. For the reasons more fully stated below, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or
Costs [Doc. 1]. The Court will therefore allow Plaintiff to file his Complaint without the
prepayment of costs. The Court, however, RECOMMENDS that the District Judge dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
I. DETERMINATION ABOUT THE FILING FEE
Plaintiff has filed an Application [Doc. 1] with the required detailing of his financial
condition. Section 1915 allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court
without paying the administrative costs of the lawsuit. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27
(1992). The Court’s review of an application to proceed without paying the administrative costs of
the lawsuit is normally based solely on the affidavit of indigence. See Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co.,
915 F.2d 260, 262–63 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that “the filing of a complaint is conditioned
solely upon a person’s demonstration of poverty in his affidavit and the question of frivolousness
is taken up thereafter”). To proceed without paying the administrative costs, the plaintiff must
show by affidavit the inability to pay court fees and costs—it is a threshold requirement. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1). One need not be absolutely destitute, however, to enjoy the benefit of proceeding in
the manner of a pauper, or in forma pauperis. Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 335
U.S. 331, 342 (1948). An affidavit to proceed without paying the administrative costs is sufficient
if it states that the plaintiff cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of litigation and
still pay for the necessities of life. Id. at 339.
The Court finds the Application is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff has little income
and several liabilities and expenses. Considering Plaintiff’s Application, it appears to the Court
that his economic status is such that he cannot afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still pay
for the necessities of life. The Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed in the manner of a pauper. The
Court DIRECTS the Clerk to file the Complaint in this case without payment of costs or fees. The
Clerk SHALL NOT, however, issue process at this time.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to screen
complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 To accomplish this end, the Court must evaluate the litigant’s
indigence, but notwithstanding indigence, a court must dismiss a matter under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if [it] determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” To survive an initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient
1 Despite the reference to prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the Court to screen complaints
filed by non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601,
608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to
screening process required by § 1915A. The district court, however, must still screen the complaint
under § 1915(e)(2).”), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007)).
Specifically, under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must
provide:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction . . . ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleading
is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(3). Otherwise, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts
liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A. Summary of the Complaint
Plaintiff generally names the “Federal Government” and later names “Federal Officers of
the Eastern District of Tennessee 6 (unknown)” [Doc. 2 p. 3]. His Complaint consists of eleven
pages [See Doc. 2]. The Complaint appears to set forth a variety of individual claims against
different parties that are based on separate events with no common tie. Plaintiff first claims that
“[t]here was [a] federal security guard who on Sept[.] 15 . . . violated my privacy of information
act[] [b]y asking question[]s that violates my rights to privacy on 17th and 18th of September by
turning my phone back[] on after I turned it off” [Id. at 4].
Next, he alleges that on several dates after mailing documents or packages, he “never
received an email stating that [his] packages [were] delivered by Fed[E]x Shipping Center” [Id. at
6]. He asked a clerk for “a grievance document” and later a “breach of contract motion” but was
told that the clerk’s office did not have those documents [Id.]. Plaintiff further claims that on
August 15, he mailed documents to the Department of Justice, but he never received notification
by FedEx that it delivered his documents [Id. at 6]. He states that he “will be suing for mail fraud
and mail theft as well [as] c[yb]er crimes” [Id. at 7].
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that he “called and left messages about housing voucher[s] and
other program[s]” offered by the Knoxville’s Community Development Corporation (“KCDC”),
noting that “the office displayed discrimination towards [him] when [he] went to both offices back
[on] August 6, 7 and Oct[.] 13th” and that “[Michael] Hodges . . . acted racist and prejudice towards
[him] when [he] asked about [his] application for Section 8 Housing voucher” [Id. at 8–10].2
Plaintiff states that he seeks “disciplinary action for the federal officer[] that violated [his]
right[]s to privacy;” that he “will be suing for mail fraud and mail theft as well [as] [cybercrimes]
going into [his] computer and changing [information] without [his] consent;” and that he [will be
filing [a] lawsuit for discrimination and communication theft as well as bigotry” [Id. at 5, 7 9].
B. Screening of the Complaint
On June 10, 2026, the Court entered an order noting several issues with the Complaint
[Doc. 7]. At the outset, the Court explained:
A review of the Complaint reveals that Plaintiff alleges distinct acts
committed by unrelated parties at different times and places. The
undersigned cannot discern any single, coherent connection between
these various claims that would tie them together in any way.
Without some further articulation of a unifying thread connecting
these claims, the joinder of them in a single lawsuit is inappropriate
under Rule 20 given the varied proofs and defendants that will be
associated with the different claims. While “the requirements of
prescribed by Rule 20(a) are to liberally construed in the interest of
2 While Plaintiff does not specifically name FedEx or KCDC as defendants, he includes two
addresses for FedEx office as well as an address for KCDC at the end of his Complaint [Doc. 2 p.
11].
convenience and judicial economy[,] . . . Rule 20 is not a license to
join unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit” Proctor v.
Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting
Boretsky v. Corzine, No. 08-2265, 2008 WL 2512916, *4 (D.N.J.
2008)); see also Brown v. Chambers-Smith, No. 1:24-CV-690, 2025
WL 1833132, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 2025) (“[D]iscrete events
involving different parties have no bearing on one another and
cannot be grounds on which to join parties.”).
[Doc. 7 p. 4].
The Court instructed that further articulation of a “unifying thread” was needed to make
joinder of the claims appropriate under Rule 20 [Id.]. With respect to the improperly joined claims,
the Court explained,
[T]o the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a housing
discrimination claim, his general claims of discrimination and
bigotry are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment based on race. To demonstrate a plausible federal housing
discrimination claim, a plaintiff must “make out a prima facie case
by showing ‘(1) that he or she is a member of a racial minority, (2)
that he or she applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase
certain property or housing, (3) that he or she was rejected, and (4)
that the housing or rental property remained available thereafter.’”
Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Mencer v. Princeton Square Apts., 228 F.3d 631, 634–35 (6th Cir.
2000)).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring any federal criminal
charges for mail fraud, mail theft, or cybercrimes under statutes not
providing a right to civil relief through the initiation of a private
action, his efforts are misplaced. Kafele v. Frank & Wooldridge Co.,
108 F. App’x 307, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] private citizen . . .
has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution of the
defendants for their alleged unlawful acts.”).
[Doc. 7 pp. 6–7].
The Court also noted deficiencies related to what appears to be the focus of his
Complaint—an alleged violation of privacy by a federal court security officer—whom he does not
name, but, instead, names the Federal Government as a Defendant [Doc. 2 pp. 1–5]. The Court
explained:
“[T]o the extent [Plaintiff] sues the United States, his suit [may be]
barred by sovereign immunity.” Miller v. Fed. Gov’t, No. 1:13-CV-
967, 2013 WL 5329758, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2013). The
Sixth Circuit has provided that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign
immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from
suit.” Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 544 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Dep’t
of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 259 (1999); see Richards
v. F.B.I., No. 1:12-cv-1027, 2012 WL 5386563, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 1, 2012) (quoting Gao for same). “A waiver of sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign.”
Richards, 2012 WL 5386563, at *2 (citing Gao, 185 F.3d at 544)).
Furthermore, “a waiver of sovereign immunity must also be
‘unequivocally expressed’ in the statutory text.” Id. Here, Plaintiff
has neither identified a specific governmental entity he is attempting
to sue nor a waiver of sovereign immunity for his claim. Further,
while he names “6 (unknown)” individuals who he contends are
“federal officers of the Eastern [D]istrict of Tennessee” [Doc. 2 p.
3], he includes no allegations of how each officer was personally
involved in the activities form the basis of his claim. “A complaint
must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the
alleged deprivation of federal rights to state a § 1983 claim.” Frazier
v. Mich., 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002).
Specifically, a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a
plaintiff to establish that a person acting under color of state law
deprived him a federal right, or in a Bivens3 context for actions of a
federal officer. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Sixth Circuit has explained,
courts analyze “Bivens and § 1983 actions under the same legal
principals, except for the requirement of federal action under Bivens
and state action under § 1983.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606,
614 (6th Cir. 2014). “A plaintiff must prove two elements to prevail
on either type of claim: (1) that he or she was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that
the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law.”
Id. As previously noted, Plaintiff does not identify the employing
3 “A Bivens action is analogous to an action under § 1983—the only difference being that
§ 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state, rather than federal officials.” See Evans v. Ball,
168 F.3d 856, 863 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352
F.3d 939, 948–49 & n.36 (5th Cir. 2003).
agency of the court security officer4 nor does he identify the alleged
actions of the six unknown officers that would allow a proper
analysis of his claim. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks disciplinary action
against the court security officer but cites no supporting authority
for that proposition.
[Doc. 7 pp. 4–6].
Instead of recommending dismissal, the Court allowed Plaintiff leave to file an amended
Complaint by July 10, 2026 [Id. at 7]. Plaintiff did not file an amended Complaint. The undersigned
therefore recommends dismissal of this case for the reasons explained above and in the Court’s
Order [Doc. 7].
C. Amendment
The Court has already allowed Plaintiff to file an amended Complaint to address the
deficiencies. He chose not to file one, and the undersigned does not discern any reason to allow
further opportunity to do so.
Further, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has filed nine complaints in this Court since
September 12, 2025, three of which have been dismissed [see Garner v. Spitzer, No. 3:25-cv-443,
[Doc. 15] (E.D. Tenn. May 5, 2026) (dismissing complaint sua sponte after failure to file amended
complaint); Garner v. SL Tennessee, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-451, 2026 WL 1967061 (E.D. Tenn. July
7, 2026) (dismissing complaint sua sponte at the initial screening process); and Garner v. Magna
Int’l, No. 3:26-cv-224 [Doc. 10] (E.D. Tenn. July 13, 2026) (dismissing complaint sua sponte after
failure to file amended complaint)]. Plaintiff’s other complaints remain pending before this Court.
4 Plaintiff does not identify whether the court security officer is a governmental or private
entity employee. See Buell ex rel. Buell v. Bruiser Ken, No. 97 CV 1131, 1999 WL 390642, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (“The Special Deputy Marshals, also known as Court Security Officers,
are not federal agents themselves, but employees of private security firms who are deputized by
the Director of the United States Marshals Service to provide courtroom security for the Federal
judiciary and to perform the functions of a Deputy U.S. Marshal.” (citing 28 C.F.R. § 0.112)).
Because a pattern of repetitive, vexatious, or frivolous litigation 1s an abuse of the legal
process, this may warrant a review of whether a filing injunction is appropriate. Daker v. Ward,
999 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021) (‘[A] plaintiffs duplicative complaint is an abuse of the
judicial process.”); Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 2013) (“When a pro se litigant
files complaints that are repetitive, duplicative of other filings, without merit, or frivolous, he
abuses the district court process.”).
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Doe. 1]. But no process shall issue until the District
Judge has ruled upon this Report and Recommendation? because the undersigned
RECOMMENDS‘ that the Complaint [Doc. 2] be DISMISSED in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
Debra C. Poplin \
United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is to be presented to the District Judge pursuant to this Report and
Recommendation under the authority of Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 263
(6th Cir. 1990), wherein the Court of Appeals states that such matters proceed automatically to a
district judge for examination of the complaint after a magistrate judge has granted the petition to
proceed without prepayment of costs.
6 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within
fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections must conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-54 (1985). “[T]he district court need
not provide de novo review where objections [to the Report and Recommendation] are ‘[f]rivolous,
conclusive or general.’” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (Sth Cir. 1982)). Only specific objections are reserved for
appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Fed. of Tchrs., 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).