Turay

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

AMIE JENNY TURAY CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-1246

SECTION P

VS.

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

UNKNOWN DEFENDANT, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE CAROL B.

WHITEHURST

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Amie Jenny Turay,1 a detainee in the custody of the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”), petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241.2 Respondents oppose the petition. [doc. # 10]. Petitioner filed a Reply.

[doc. # 13]. For reasons below, the Court should deny this petition.

Background

Petitioner is a citizen of Sierra Leone. “On January 15, 2022, the Petitioner

arrived in the United States near Eagle Pass, Texas after wading across the Rio

Grande River. The Petitioner was encountered by Border Patrol Agents who

1 Petitioner’s “A-Number” is 240-207-934.

2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and

recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

determined that she had not been admitted or paroled and that she was a citizen and

national of Sierra Leone.” [doc. # 10, p. 6].

“On February 16, 2022, the Petitioner was released from ICE Custody, at the

South Texas Family Residential Center. She was released on her own recognizance

with a Form I-220(A),which contained her reporting instructions to the nearest ICE/

ERO office and her intended destination.” [doc. # 10, pp. 6-7]. On December 15,

2025, the Government re-detained Petitioner. [doc. #s 1, p. 5; 10, p. 7].

“On January 10, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security filed a motion

to pretermit the petitioner’s Form I-589 Asylum Application. DHS’s Asylum

Cooperative Agreement, (ACA) agreement between the government of the United

States and the government of the Republic of Uganda, is a bilateral arrangement

between the United States and Uganda that would allow the United States to remove

the Petitioner to third country of Uganda. The motion to pretermit was to be heard

on January 15, 2026, at the Petitioner’s individual hearing. [] On January 15, 2026,

the Petitioner had an individual hearing before the immigration court. The

Petitioner’s claim for Asylum, Withholding of Removal Under INA § 241(b)(3),

Withholding of Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, and Deferral of

Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, were all denied. The Petitioner was

ordered removed to Uganda and in the alternative the Petitioner was ordered

removed to Sierra Leone.” [doc. # 10, p. 8].

Petitioner appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”); her appeal is pending. [doc. #s 1, p. 5; 1-2, p. 1].

Petitioner filed this proceeding on April 13, 2026. [doc. # 1, p. 8]. She claims

that the Government has detained her for a prolonged period and is not likely to

remove her in the near future. Id. at 6.

Respondents opposed the petition on June 25, 2026. [doc. # 10]. Petitioner

did not file a reply.

Law and Analysis

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), “when an alien is ordered removed, the

Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of

90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” Under Section

1231(a)(6), “An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible[,] . . . removable[,] . . .

or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community

or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the

removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in

paragraph (3).” In Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, the Supreme Court construed Section

1231(a)(6) “to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of

which is subject to federal-court review.”

“[T]he Court construed § 1231(a)(6) to mean that an alien who has been

ordered removed may not be detained beyond ‘a period reasonably necessary to

secure removal,’ 533 U.S., at 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491 and it further held that six months

is a presumptively reasonable period, id., at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. After that, the

Court concluded, if the alien ‘provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ the

Government must either rebut that showing [with evidence] or release the alien.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

699).3 If removal is not reasonably foreseeable, “the alien’s release may and should

be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate

in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a

violation of those conditions.” Id. at 700.

“[R]eview must take appropriate account of the greater immigration-related

expertise of the Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns

inherent in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and

the Nation’s need to ‘speak with one voice’ in immigration matters.” Id. at 700.

Here, Petitioner’s claim is premature because her appeal before the BIA is

pending and thus her order of removal is not final. See Lopez Acosta v. Rosen, 2021

WL 54772, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021) (“Because Lopez Acosta is currently

pursuing administrative remedies below, he is no longer subject to a final order of

3 “The alien bears the initial burden of proof in showing that no such likelihood of

removal exists.” Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006).

removal . . . .”); Castillo-Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 929 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The

order of the immigration judge, then, is not final when a timely appeal is taken to the

Board.”).

Under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(47), an “order of deportation” becomes final upon

the earlier of: “(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming

such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek

review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Likewise, under 8

C.F.R. § 1241.1, “An order of removal made by the immigration judge . . . shall

become final: (a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals

. . . .” See Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011).

The Court should dismiss this claim. Even if Petitioner’s claim was not

premature, she does not meet her initial burden of providing good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of her removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future. Petitioner’s claim is conclusory. She pleads only that the Government has

detained her for a prolonged period and is not likely to remove her in the near future.4

4 See Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006) (aliens must present

sufficient evidence establishing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in

the reasonably foreseeable future and not merely offer conclusory statements);

Ropati v. Lynch, No. 6:17-CV-0219, 2017 WL 5560656, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 18,

2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:17-CV-00219, 2017 WL 5614942

(W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2017).

The Court should dismiss this claim without prejudice to Petitioner’s right to

raise the claim again (i) when it is ripe and (ii) if she can provide good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of her removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Amie Jenny

Turay’s petition be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner’s right to

re-file it if she has good reason to believe, in light of any changes in circumstance or

new evidence, that her removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably

foreseeable future.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this

Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of

Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at

the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or

the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation

within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time

frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from

attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the

District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United

Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5" Cir. 1996).

In Chambers, Lafayette, Louisiana, this 20" day of July, 2026.

Carol B. Whitehurst

United States Magistrate Judge