Opinion

Hafez

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 19, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 44.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAEL HAFEZ, individually and —:

as Administrator of THE

ESTATE OF SHAHLA iIMAD :

AKKAD,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-474

Vv. (JUDGE MANNION)

POCONO MOUNTAIN

REGIONAL POLICE, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Pocono Mountain Regional Police’s

(“PMRP”), Officer Michael J. Cinamella’s, and Officer Martin Ksepka’s

(collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Wael Hafez’s (“Plaintiff’) first

amended complaint. (Doc. 7). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

motion will be GRANTED IN PART as to Count li of the first amended

complaint and otherwise DENIED.

1. BACKGROUND!

The underlying cause of action is brought before the Court pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §1983. Shahla Iman Akkad ("Decedent”) was the thirty-six-year-

old wife of Plaintiff, and the mother and primary caregiver of two young

children, T.H. (aged three) and M.H. (aged eight). (Doc. 6, 91-2, 12).

Decedent suffered from severe depression and attempted to commit suicide

on two occasions: (1) in 2021, when she contacted PMRP and advised that

she wished to kill herself; and (2) in 2022, when she attempted to jump out

of a moving vehicle while Plaintiff was driving. /d., F]9, 11.

On June 1, 2024, Decedent informed Plaintiff that she needed a break

and left home at approximately 10:30 AM to go shopping. /d., ]13. Decedent

asked Plaintiff to watch the children. /d. After tidying the house, Plaintiff

decided to take the children clothing shopping in Allentown. /d., 914. At

approximately 8:00 PM, Decedent started calling and texting Plaintiff, asking

where he and the children were. /d., ]15. At one point, Decedent sent a text

to Plaintiff indicating that the house was on fire, which was something

Decedent has falsely stated in the past. /d. After checking the security

' Because a motion to dismiss requires this Court to accept the facts

asserted in the operative complaint as true, the Court refers to such facts for

purposes of this motion.

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cameras and confirming that the home was not, in fact, on fire, he and the

children immediately returned home. /d., 16.

Plaintiff and the children arrived at the home at approximately 9:30 PM

to find that the house had been “torn apart” by Decedent. /d., 17. Decedent

destroyed the family’s belongings, shattered dishes, and flipped and broke

furniture, which had been strewn throughout the home. /d., 718. Decedent

shouted at Plaintiff, telling him to stay away from her because she intended

to kill herself by taking an overdose of her prescribed insulin. /d., 419. By

9:45 PM, Plaintiff contacted authorities and told the dispatcher that Decedent

destroyed the house, threatened to commit suicide, and had been suicidal in

the past. /d., 20. The dispatcher instructed Plaintiff not to speak to Decedent

until police officers arrived. /d., 21.

At approximately 10:18 PM, two uniformed police officers from PMRP

arrived at the home: Officers Cinamella and Ksepka. /d., |22. Upon their

arrival, Plaintiff informed the officers of Decedent’s history of mental illness,

suicidal ideations, treatment for suicidal ideations, and suicide attempts. /d.,

1123. Plaintiff also told the officers that he was concerned about Decedent’s

wellbeing, believed her to be suicidal, and that she required instant medical

care. /d., 9/24. Plaintiff asked the officers to call an ambulance for Decedent

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because he believed she was going to commit suicide by overdosing on her

insulin. /d., 925.

At the time of their arrival, Decedent locked herself in the bedroom. □□□□

126. As the officers approached the bedroom, Decedent's daughter, M.H.,

begged them to help her mother. /d., 27. Decedent allowed the officers in

the bedroom, and a fifteen-minute conversation between the officers and

Decedent ensued. /d., 728. When the conversation was over, the officers

told Plaintiff that they believed the matter to be a domestic issue and would

take no further action to assist Decedent or Plaintiff. /d., 730. The officers

told Plaintiff to let Decedent “cool down,” and not to have any contact with

her. /d., (29. Before leaving the home, Plaintiff and M.H. pleaded with the

officers, explaining their concerns that Decedent was going to kill herself—

M.H. stated, “Can you please call an ambulance for my mom?” and the

officers instructed her to stop talking. /d., 931. Officers left the home at

approximately 10:38 PM. /d., ]33.

Approximately one hour later, Plaintiff asked M.H. to check on

Decedent, who remained in the bedroom. /d., 934. M.H. discovered that

Decedent was not breathing and unconscious on her bed. /d Plaintiff

redialed 911, and an ambulance arrived at approximately 11:30 PM. /d.,

35-36. Decedent was taken to St. Luke’s Hospital in Bartonsville, and

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pronounced dead on June 2, 2024, at approximately 2:00 AM. /d., 936. The

Monroe County Coroner determined that the cause of death was mixed drug

toxicity, and the manner of death was suicide. /d., 37.

On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff brought the underlying cause of action

on behaif of himself and Decedent’s estate. (Doc. 1). On June 3, 2026, this

Court approved Plaintiff's request to file an amended complaint, which was

filed the next day. (Docs. 5, 6). Plaintiff's first amended complaint brings four

counts: (1) state created danger on the part of Officers Cinamella and

Ksepka; (2) state created danger on the part of PMRP; (3) a survival action

pursuant to Pa.C.S. §8302; and (4) a wrongful death action pursuant to

Pa.C.S. §8301. (Doc. 6).

On July 15, 2026, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss and

brief in support. (Docs. 7, 7-1). On July 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed a response to

the motion. (Doc. 10). Defendants did not file a reply brief. Accordingly, this

matter is now ripe for disposition.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require detailed

factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

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unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint that contains only “labels

and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” does not comply with Rule 8. /d.

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The moving

party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, Hedges v.

United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal is appropriate

only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff

has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)

(abrogating “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This

requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of’ necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause

of action. /d.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” [qbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility is achieved “when the

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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” □□□

Plausibility does not require probability but “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” /d. Facts “merely consistent with” liability

do not satisfy this standard. /d.

As noted above, the Court at this stage accepts the complaint's factual

allegations as true. This tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” /d.

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). “Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief’ is “a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d. at

679.

The federal pleading standard just described requires that district

courts “conduct a two-part analysis.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s

well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal

conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine

whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other

words, a compiaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's

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entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an

entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 570 F.3d at 210-11 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court generally relies on the

complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.

McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider

“undisputedly authentic documentfs] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit

to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached]

documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol, Indus., 998 F.2d

1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are

alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v.

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However,

the Court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion

to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250,1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

Generally, the Court should grant leave to amend a complaint before

dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote

Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver,

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213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is

justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or

futility.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

i. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff failed to adequately plead a state

created danger theory against the officers; (2) Plaintiff failed to adequately

plead a Monell claim against PMRP; and (3) Officers Cinamella and Ksepka

are protected by qualified immunity. (Doc. 7-1). The Court addresses each

argument in turn.

A. §1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants

through §1983, which is the statutory vehicle by which private citizens may

seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state

Officials. See 42 U.S.C. §1983; see also Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138

(3d Cir. 2020). This statute states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws, shall be

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liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redressf.]

42 U.S.C. §1983. “[§]1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely

a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by

state actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D.Pa.

2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To

state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

a. State Created Danger

“Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not generally guarantee an

‘affirmative right to governmental aid or protection,’ an exception exists when

state actors create a danger that causes a victim harm.” Poe v. Southeast

Delco Sch. Dist., 165 F.Supp.3d 271, 277 (E.D.Pa, 2015) (citing Ye v. United

States, 484 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2007)). The Third Circuit has “recognized

that a state actor may be held liable under the ‘state-created danger’ doctrine

for creating danger to an individual in certain circumstances.” Henry v. Cty.

of Erie, 728 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d

160, 176 (3d Cir. 2013)). Liability may attach under this doctrine “where the

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state acts to create or enhance a danger that deprives the plaintiff of his or

her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.” Morrow, 719

F.3d at 177 (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996)).

In order to prevail on astate created danger theory, Plaintiff must

establish the following elements: (1) the harm ultimately caused was

foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of

culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state

and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the

defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to

the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a

member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his

or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered

the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at

all. /d. (quoting Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir.

2006)).

Defendants argue that the first amended complaint should be

dismissed because Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead the last element. (Doc.

7-1 at 5). Specificaily, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently

allege that the officers took no affirmative acts which increased the danger

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to Decedent. (Doc. 7-1 at 5). However, this argument is flatly disputed by the

operative complaint.

As Defendants aptly note, “it is the misuse of state authority, rather

than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.” (Doc. 7-1

at 5). Here, Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges that “Defendants were

aware, or should have been aware, of [D]ecedent’s past history and suicidal

ideations|,]” and that they failed to “appropriately assess and acknowledge

the danger which [D]ecedent posed to herself under the circumstances .. .

without providing any further assistance[, which] created the foreseeable and

direct harm which... occurred in [DJecedent taking her own life within hours

after their departure.” (Doc. 6, 39-40). More importantly, Plaintiff alleges

that “Defendants]’] action of leaving a clearly suicidal woman to her own

devices and further advising her husband to ‘leave her alone’ constituted an

affirmative act which precipitated and caused [D]ecedent’s death.” /d., 944.

Plaintiff is not alleging that the officers were “negligent in failing to

recognize a suicide risk, as opposed to a domestic situation,” as the

Defendants characterize. (Doc. 7-1 at 6). Rather, Plaintiff's facts, taken as

true, allege that the officers intervened a mental health crisis, were notified

of Decedent's mental health history, affirmatively decided not to call an

ambulance, and, most critically, advised Plaintiff to leave his wife alone.

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(Doc. 6 at 7). Deferring to the officers’ affirmative instructions, Plaintiff left

Decedent alone, during which time she took her own life. /d.

Because Defendants only challenge the fourth element of the state

created danger claim, and because that challenge is without merit, the Court

will deny the motion to dismiss with respect to the state created danger claim

contained in Count | of the first amended complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570; see also Hedges, 404 F.3d 750 (placing the burden on the moving party

to show the factual deficiency in the complaint).

b. Monell

Defendants next challenge Plaintiff's state created danger claim

against PMRP. (Doc. 7-1 at 7-8). Under the Supreme Court precedent

of Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., a municipality can be held liable

under §1983 only if the plaintiff shows that the violation of his federally

protected rights resulted from the enforcement of a “policy” or “custom” of

the local government. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A court may find that a

municipal policy exists when a “decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority

to establish municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an official

proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. Cty. of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469,

1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. Cty. of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

481 (1986)).

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Acourt may also find the existence of a municipal policy in “the isolated

decision of an executive municipal policymaker.” Cty. of Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 139, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). "A

course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized

by law, ‘such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled’

as to virtually constitute law.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted).

There must be a “direct causal link” between the municipal policy or custom

and the alleged constitutional violation. Cty. of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

Moreover, municipalities such as police departments are not liable

under §1983 merely for employing someone who violates a person's civil

rights; a municipality that does not directly violate a person's civil rights is

liable only where it has in place a policy or custom that led to the

violation. See Mann v. Palmerton Area Schoo! Dist., 33 F.Supp.3d 530, 540-

41 (M.D.Pa. 2014) (“Municipal liability only attaches when a plaintiff

demonstrates that an official policy or custom caused the asserted

constitutional deprivation.”) (internal citations omitted); Beck v. Cty. of

Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996) (municipal liability applies “to only

those constitutional torts actually caused by the municipality.”). The plaintiff

bears the burden of identifying the policy or custom. /d. This rule ensures

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that a municipality will only be liable where it is the “moving force” behind the

plaintiff's injury. /d. Plaintiff can also show a custom by “evidence of

knowledge and acquiescence.” Beck, 89 F.3d at 971.

“Additionally, if the policy at issue relates to a failure to train or

supervise municipal employees, liability under [§]1983 requires a showing

that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons

with whom those employees will come into contact.” Carter v. Cty. of Phila.,

181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). As the court

in Poe explained, such a failure to train or supervise municipal employees

“can ordinarily be considered deliberate indifference only where the failure

has caused a pattern of violations.” Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,

276 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 165 F.Supp.3d at 276),

A plaintiff may also show deliberate indifference by presenting

evidence that officials were aware of the risk of constitutional violations and

the alternatives to preventing such harm, but either “deliberately chose not

to pursue these alternatives or acquiesced in a longstanding policy or custom

of inaction in this regard.” Simmons v. Cty. of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1064

(3d Cir. 1991). The plaintiff must show that the training deficiency has a

“causal nexus’ to their injuries[.]” Kobrick v. Stevens, No. 3:13-CV-2865,

2017 WL 3839946, at *11 (Sept. 1, 2017) (internal citations omitted).

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Further:

In order for a failure-to-train claim to support Monei/ liability, a

plaintiff must show that in light of the duties assigned to [the

relevant employees,] the need for more or different training is

so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the

violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the

[municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately

indifferent to the need.

Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Cntr., 722 Fed.App’x 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2018)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has not alleged any facts upon which

it can be concluded that a policy practice or custom of the police department

led to a violation of [Plaintiff]’s rights.” (Doc. 7-1). Reviewing Count Il of

Plaintiff's first amended complaint, it is unclear to the Court whether he is

claiming that PMRP’s policies, practices, and procedures violated

Decedent’s rights, or his own rights. Because Plaintiff is pleading in his

individual and estate-administrator capacities, (Doc. 6), the distinction is

important. Indeed, the first amended complaint states:

[PMRP] failed to develop policies, practices or procedures, or

developed and practiced policies or procedures with total

disregard to Plaintiff's Constitutional rights, resulting in the

violation of such rights ... As a direct and proximate result of

Defendant’s actions and failures to act, Defendant has

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fostered, incubated and promoted a conscious disregard for

the proper use of police powers, the proper response to the

special needs of citizens in danger by the failure to properly

train and supervise the individual officers involved in Plaintiff's

arrest, charging and criminal prosecution.

(Doc. 6 at 8) (emphasis added). Count Il of the first amended complaint

appears to be drafted for an entirely different Plaintiff, particularly given the

wrongful arrest allegation and the fact that Plaintiff's claims have nothing to

do with a wrongful arrest. Further, the Court cannot analyze whether PMRP’s

policies, practices, or procedures violated the rights of an unspecified

individual, Kobrick, 2017 WL 3839946, at *11. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss Count I! of the first amended complaint and allow Plaintiff to leave to

amend it to the extent he seeks to assert a well-pleaded (and proofread)

Monell claim.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants finally argue that Officers Cinamella and Kspeka are

entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 7-1 at 6). The doctrine

of qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.” Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F. 4th 76,

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84 (3rd Cir. 2025) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

Whether qualified immunity can be invoked to shield an official from

personal liability turns on the “objective legal reasonableness’ of the official's

action, “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at

the time it was taken[.]” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85 (internal citations omitted).

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money

damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated

a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Here, Plaintiff

sufficiently pleaded a plausible basis for Decedent's Fourteenth Amendment

violation claim. Therefore, the inquiry turns on whether Plaintiff established

a plausible claim that Decedent's right was “clearly established” at the time

the officers intervened. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.

In Stringer v. County of Bucks, the Third Circuit considered whether to

deny a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint

sufficiently detailed a claim for a constitutional violation but was not specific

enough to assess whether the right was clearly established at the time it was

allegedly violated. 141 F.4th at 81. In that case, Kimberly, who had long

struggled with mental illness had been detained, pepper sprayed, and

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subjected to chair restraints after an altercation with a neighbor. See jd. The

District Court concluded that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a violation of

Kimberly’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, and denied the officers’ motion to

dismiss, reasoning that a “more developed factual record was needed to

ascertain whether the [officers] were entitled to qualified immunity.” /d. at 82.

The Third Circuit affirmed. /d.

Here, the facts are similar. At this stage, it is objectively plausible that

Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were “clearly established” at the

time of the intervention. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735. Officers Cinamella and

Kspeka have not demonstrated that reasonable officers in their position

would have engaged in similar conduct. Therefore, a more factually

developed record is necessary to determine whether they are entitled to

qualified immunity. /d, at 82. Granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss based

on qualified immunity would be premature and a misapplication of ciearly

established caselaw. See /qba/, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims upon

which relief can be granted. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

GRANTED IN PART as to Count Il of Plaintiff's first amended complaint and

otherwise DENIED. Finding that a curative amended complaint would not be

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inequitable or futile, nor cause undue delay, A/ston, 363 F.3d at 236, Plaintiff

will be granted leave to amend the complaint as to the Monell claim (Count

An appropriate order follows.

wi E. MANNION

United States District Judge

26

DATE: gf if

26-474-01

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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