The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WAEL HAFEZ, individually and —:
as Administrator of THE
ESTATE OF SHAHLA iIMAD :
AKKAD,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-474
Vv. (JUDGE MANNION)
POCONO MOUNTAIN
REGIONAL POLICE, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Pocono Mountain Regional Police’s
(“PMRP”), Officer Michael J. Cinamella’s, and Officer Martin Ksepka’s
(collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Wael Hafez’s (“Plaintiff’) first
amended complaint. (Doc. 7). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
motion will be GRANTED IN PART as to Count li of the first amended
complaint and otherwise DENIED.
1. BACKGROUND!
The underlying cause of action is brought before the Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §1983. Shahla Iman Akkad ("Decedent”) was the thirty-six-year-
old wife of Plaintiff, and the mother and primary caregiver of two young
children, T.H. (aged three) and M.H. (aged eight). (Doc. 6, 91-2, 12).
Decedent suffered from severe depression and attempted to commit suicide
on two occasions: (1) in 2021, when she contacted PMRP and advised that
she wished to kill herself; and (2) in 2022, when she attempted to jump out
of a moving vehicle while Plaintiff was driving. /d., F]9, 11.
On June 1, 2024, Decedent informed Plaintiff that she needed a break
and left home at approximately 10:30 AM to go shopping. /d., ]13. Decedent
asked Plaintiff to watch the children. /d. After tidying the house, Plaintiff
decided to take the children clothing shopping in Allentown. /d., 914. At
approximately 8:00 PM, Decedent started calling and texting Plaintiff, asking
where he and the children were. /d., ]15. At one point, Decedent sent a text
to Plaintiff indicating that the house was on fire, which was something
Decedent has falsely stated in the past. /d. After checking the security
' Because a motion to dismiss requires this Court to accept the facts
asserted in the operative complaint as true, the Court refers to such facts for
purposes of this motion.
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cameras and confirming that the home was not, in fact, on fire, he and the
children immediately returned home. /d., 16.
Plaintiff and the children arrived at the home at approximately 9:30 PM
to find that the house had been “torn apart” by Decedent. /d., 17. Decedent
destroyed the family’s belongings, shattered dishes, and flipped and broke
furniture, which had been strewn throughout the home. /d., 718. Decedent
shouted at Plaintiff, telling him to stay away from her because she intended
to kill herself by taking an overdose of her prescribed insulin. /d., 419. By
9:45 PM, Plaintiff contacted authorities and told the dispatcher that Decedent
destroyed the house, threatened to commit suicide, and had been suicidal in
the past. /d., 20. The dispatcher instructed Plaintiff not to speak to Decedent
until police officers arrived. /d., 21.
At approximately 10:18 PM, two uniformed police officers from PMRP
arrived at the home: Officers Cinamella and Ksepka. /d., |22. Upon their
arrival, Plaintiff informed the officers of Decedent’s history of mental illness,
suicidal ideations, treatment for suicidal ideations, and suicide attempts. /d.,
1123. Plaintiff also told the officers that he was concerned about Decedent’s
wellbeing, believed her to be suicidal, and that she required instant medical
care. /d., 9/24. Plaintiff asked the officers to call an ambulance for Decedent
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because he believed she was going to commit suicide by overdosing on her
insulin. /d., 925.
At the time of their arrival, Decedent locked herself in the bedroom. □□□□
126. As the officers approached the bedroom, Decedent's daughter, M.H.,
begged them to help her mother. /d., 27. Decedent allowed the officers in
the bedroom, and a fifteen-minute conversation between the officers and
Decedent ensued. /d., 728. When the conversation was over, the officers
told Plaintiff that they believed the matter to be a domestic issue and would
take no further action to assist Decedent or Plaintiff. /d., 730. The officers
told Plaintiff to let Decedent “cool down,” and not to have any contact with
her. /d., (29. Before leaving the home, Plaintiff and M.H. pleaded with the
officers, explaining their concerns that Decedent was going to kill herself—
M.H. stated, “Can you please call an ambulance for my mom?” and the
officers instructed her to stop talking. /d., 931. Officers left the home at
approximately 10:38 PM. /d., ]33.
Approximately one hour later, Plaintiff asked M.H. to check on
Decedent, who remained in the bedroom. /d., 934. M.H. discovered that
Decedent was not breathing and unconscious on her bed. /d Plaintiff
redialed 911, and an ambulance arrived at approximately 11:30 PM. /d.,
35-36. Decedent was taken to St. Luke’s Hospital in Bartonsville, and
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pronounced dead on June 2, 2024, at approximately 2:00 AM. /d., 936. The
Monroe County Coroner determined that the cause of death was mixed drug
toxicity, and the manner of death was suicide. /d., 37.
On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff brought the underlying cause of action
on behaif of himself and Decedent’s estate. (Doc. 1). On June 3, 2026, this
Court approved Plaintiff's request to file an amended complaint, which was
filed the next day. (Docs. 5, 6). Plaintiff's first amended complaint brings four
counts: (1) state created danger on the part of Officers Cinamella and
Ksepka; (2) state created danger on the part of PMRP; (3) a survival action
pursuant to Pa.C.S. §8302; and (4) a wrongful death action pursuant to
Pa.C.S. §8301. (Doc. 6).
On July 15, 2026, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss and
brief in support. (Docs. 7, 7-1). On July 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed a response to
the motion. (Doc. 10). Defendants did not file a reply brief. Accordingly, this
matter is now ripe for disposition.
ll. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require detailed
factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
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unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint that contains only “labels
and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” does not comply with Rule 8. /d.
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The moving
party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal is appropriate
only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff
has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(abrogating “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This
requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of’ necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause
of action. /d.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” [qbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility is achieved “when the
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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” □□□
Plausibility does not require probability but “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” /d. Facts “merely consistent with” liability
do not satisfy this standard. /d.
As noted above, the Court at this stage accepts the complaint's factual
allegations as true. This tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” /d.
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). “Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief’ is “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d. at
679.
The federal pleading standard just described requires that district
courts “conduct a two-part analysis.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s
well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other
words, a compiaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
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entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an
entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 570 F.3d at 210-11 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court generally relies on the
complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider
“undisputedly authentic documentfs] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached]
documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol, Indus., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are
alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which
are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However,
the Court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion
to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d
1250,1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Generally, the Court should grant leave to amend a complaint before
dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver,
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213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is
justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or
futility.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
i. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff failed to adequately plead a state
created danger theory against the officers; (2) Plaintiff failed to adequately
plead a Monell claim against PMRP; and (3) Officers Cinamella and Ksepka
are protected by qualified immunity. (Doc. 7-1). The Court addresses each
argument in turn.
A. §1983 Claims
Plaintiff brings Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants
through §1983, which is the statutory vehicle by which private citizens may
seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state
Officials. See 42 U.S.C. §1983; see also Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138
(3d Cir. 2020). This statute states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws, shall be
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liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redressf.]
42 U.S.C. §1983. “[§]1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely
a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by
state actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D.Pa.
2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To
state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
a. State Created Danger
“Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not generally guarantee an
‘affirmative right to governmental aid or protection,’ an exception exists when
state actors create a danger that causes a victim harm.” Poe v. Southeast
Delco Sch. Dist., 165 F.Supp.3d 271, 277 (E.D.Pa, 2015) (citing Ye v. United
States, 484 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2007)). The Third Circuit has “recognized
that a state actor may be held liable under the ‘state-created danger’ doctrine
for creating danger to an individual in certain circumstances.” Henry v. Cty.
of Erie, 728 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d
160, 176 (3d Cir. 2013)). Liability may attach under this doctrine “where the
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state acts to create or enhance a danger that deprives the plaintiff of his or
her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.” Morrow, 719
F.3d at 177 (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996)).
In order to prevail on astate created danger theory, Plaintiff must
establish the following elements: (1) the harm ultimately caused was
foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of
culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state
and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the
defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to
the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a
member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his
or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered
the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at
all. /d. (quoting Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir.
2006)).
Defendants argue that the first amended complaint should be
dismissed because Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead the last element. (Doc.
7-1 at 5). Specificaily, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently
allege that the officers took no affirmative acts which increased the danger
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to Decedent. (Doc. 7-1 at 5). However, this argument is flatly disputed by the
operative complaint.
As Defendants aptly note, “it is the misuse of state authority, rather
than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.” (Doc. 7-1
at 5). Here, Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges that “Defendants were
aware, or should have been aware, of [D]ecedent’s past history and suicidal
ideations|,]” and that they failed to “appropriately assess and acknowledge
the danger which [D]ecedent posed to herself under the circumstances .. .
without providing any further assistance[, which] created the foreseeable and
direct harm which... occurred in [DJecedent taking her own life within hours
after their departure.” (Doc. 6, 39-40). More importantly, Plaintiff alleges
that “Defendants]’] action of leaving a clearly suicidal woman to her own
devices and further advising her husband to ‘leave her alone’ constituted an
affirmative act which precipitated and caused [D]ecedent’s death.” /d., 944.
Plaintiff is not alleging that the officers were “negligent in failing to
recognize a suicide risk, as opposed to a domestic situation,” as the
Defendants characterize. (Doc. 7-1 at 6). Rather, Plaintiff's facts, taken as
true, allege that the officers intervened a mental health crisis, were notified
of Decedent's mental health history, affirmatively decided not to call an
ambulance, and, most critically, advised Plaintiff to leave his wife alone.
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(Doc. 6 at 7). Deferring to the officers’ affirmative instructions, Plaintiff left
Decedent alone, during which time she took her own life. /d.
Because Defendants only challenge the fourth element of the state
created danger claim, and because that challenge is without merit, the Court
will deny the motion to dismiss with respect to the state created danger claim
contained in Count | of the first amended complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570; see also Hedges, 404 F.3d 750 (placing the burden on the moving party
to show the factual deficiency in the complaint).
b. Monell
Defendants next challenge Plaintiff's state created danger claim
against PMRP. (Doc. 7-1 at 7-8). Under the Supreme Court precedent
of Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., a municipality can be held liable
under §1983 only if the plaintiff shows that the violation of his federally
protected rights resulted from the enforcement of a “policy” or “custom” of
the local government. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A court may find that a
municipal policy exists when a “decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority
to establish municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. Cty. of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469,
1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. Cty. of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
481 (1986)).
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Acourt may also find the existence of a municipal policy in “the isolated
decision of an executive municipal policymaker.” Cty. of Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 139, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). "A
course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized
by law, ‘such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled’
as to virtually constitute law.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted).
There must be a “direct causal link” between the municipal policy or custom
and the alleged constitutional violation. Cty. of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Moreover, municipalities such as police departments are not liable
under §1983 merely for employing someone who violates a person's civil
rights; a municipality that does not directly violate a person's civil rights is
liable only where it has in place a policy or custom that led to the
violation. See Mann v. Palmerton Area Schoo! Dist., 33 F.Supp.3d 530, 540-
41 (M.D.Pa. 2014) (“Municipal liability only attaches when a plaintiff
demonstrates that an official policy or custom caused the asserted
constitutional deprivation.”) (internal citations omitted); Beck v. Cty. of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996) (municipal liability applies “to only
those constitutional torts actually caused by the municipality.”). The plaintiff
bears the burden of identifying the policy or custom. /d. This rule ensures
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that a municipality will only be liable where it is the “moving force” behind the
plaintiff's injury. /d. Plaintiff can also show a custom by “evidence of
knowledge and acquiescence.” Beck, 89 F.3d at 971.
“Additionally, if the policy at issue relates to a failure to train or
supervise municipal employees, liability under [§]1983 requires a showing
that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons
with whom those employees will come into contact.” Carter v. Cty. of Phila.,
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). As the court
in Poe explained, such a failure to train or supervise municipal employees
“can ordinarily be considered deliberate indifference only where the failure
has caused a pattern of violations.” Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,
276 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 165 F.Supp.3d at 276),
A plaintiff may also show deliberate indifference by presenting
evidence that officials were aware of the risk of constitutional violations and
the alternatives to preventing such harm, but either “deliberately chose not
to pursue these alternatives or acquiesced in a longstanding policy or custom
of inaction in this regard.” Simmons v. Cty. of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1064
(3d Cir. 1991). The plaintiff must show that the training deficiency has a
“causal nexus’ to their injuries[.]” Kobrick v. Stevens, No. 3:13-CV-2865,
2017 WL 3839946, at *11 (Sept. 1, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
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Further:
In order for a failure-to-train claim to support Monei/ liability, a
plaintiff must show that in light of the duties assigned to [the
relevant employees,] the need for more or different training is
so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the
[municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need.
Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Cntr., 722 Fed.App’x 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2018)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has not alleged any facts upon which
it can be concluded that a policy practice or custom of the police department
led to a violation of [Plaintiff]’s rights.” (Doc. 7-1). Reviewing Count Il of
Plaintiff's first amended complaint, it is unclear to the Court whether he is
claiming that PMRP’s policies, practices, and procedures violated
Decedent’s rights, or his own rights. Because Plaintiff is pleading in his
individual and estate-administrator capacities, (Doc. 6), the distinction is
important. Indeed, the first amended complaint states:
[PMRP] failed to develop policies, practices or procedures, or
developed and practiced policies or procedures with total
disregard to Plaintiff's Constitutional rights, resulting in the
violation of such rights ... As a direct and proximate result of
Defendant’s actions and failures to act, Defendant has
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fostered, incubated and promoted a conscious disregard for
the proper use of police powers, the proper response to the
special needs of citizens in danger by the failure to properly
train and supervise the individual officers involved in Plaintiff's
arrest, charging and criminal prosecution.
(Doc. 6 at 8) (emphasis added). Count Il of the first amended complaint
appears to be drafted for an entirely different Plaintiff, particularly given the
wrongful arrest allegation and the fact that Plaintiff's claims have nothing to
do with a wrongful arrest. Further, the Court cannot analyze whether PMRP’s
policies, practices, or procedures violated the rights of an unspecified
individual, Kobrick, 2017 WL 3839946, at *11. Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss Count I! of the first amended complaint and allow Plaintiff to leave to
amend it to the extent he seeks to assert a well-pleaded (and proofread)
Monell claim.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants finally argue that Officers Cinamella and Kspeka are
entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 7-1 at 6). The doctrine
of qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F. 4th 76,
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84 (3rd Cir. 2025) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
Whether qualified immunity can be invoked to shield an official from
personal liability turns on the “objective legal reasonableness’ of the official's
action, “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at
the time it was taken[.]” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85 (internal citations omitted).
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money
damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated
a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Here, Plaintiff
sufficiently pleaded a plausible basis for Decedent's Fourteenth Amendment
violation claim. Therefore, the inquiry turns on whether Plaintiff established
a plausible claim that Decedent's right was “clearly established” at the time
the officers intervened. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.
In Stringer v. County of Bucks, the Third Circuit considered whether to
deny a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint
sufficiently detailed a claim for a constitutional violation but was not specific
enough to assess whether the right was clearly established at the time it was
allegedly violated. 141 F.4th at 81. In that case, Kimberly, who had long
struggled with mental illness had been detained, pepper sprayed, and
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subjected to chair restraints after an altercation with a neighbor. See jd. The
District Court concluded that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a violation of
Kimberly’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, and denied the officers’ motion to
dismiss, reasoning that a “more developed factual record was needed to
ascertain whether the [officers] were entitled to qualified immunity.” /d. at 82.
The Third Circuit affirmed. /d.
Here, the facts are similar. At this stage, it is objectively plausible that
Decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were “clearly established” at the
time of the intervention. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735. Officers Cinamella and
Kspeka have not demonstrated that reasonable officers in their position
would have engaged in similar conduct. Therefore, a more factually
developed record is necessary to determine whether they are entitled to
qualified immunity. /d, at 82. Granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss based
on qualified immunity would be premature and a misapplication of ciearly
established caselaw. See /qba/, 556 U.S. at 678.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims upon
which relief can be granted. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be
GRANTED IN PART as to Count Il of Plaintiff's first amended complaint and
otherwise DENIED. Finding that a curative amended complaint would not be
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inequitable or futile, nor cause undue delay, A/ston, 363 F.3d at 236, Plaintiff
will be granted leave to amend the complaint as to the Monell claim (Count
An appropriate order follows.
wi E. MANNION
United States District Judge
26
DATE: gf if
26-474-01
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