Mitwalli

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WALID ESMAT MITWALLI, : Civil No. 1:24-CV-00336

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

DR. LAUREL HARRY, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this action

arguing that Walid Esmat Mitwalli (“Plaintiff”) did not exhaust his administrative

remedies. (Doc. 48.) Also pending are Defendants’ motion to bifurcate briefing so

as to allow additional dispositive motions should the claim survive the pending

motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery pertaining

to the cost of religious meals, and Plaintiff’s motion to extend the discovery

deadline in this action. (Docs. 46, 52, 53.) The court cannot make a determination

regarding exhaustion on the record as it currently stands and will deny the motion

for summary judgment without prejudice. The court will grant Defendants’ motion

to bifurcate the briefing schedule to address the issue of exhaustion prior to

considering the issues raised in the complaint on their merits. Plaintiff’s motion to

compel discovery pertaining to the cost of religious meals and motion for an

extension of time will be denied as Plaintiff’s requests are overly broad. However,

if the action survives Defendants’ affirmative defense of exhaustion, the court is

willing to entertain a motion to reopen discovery at that time.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at the State Correctional Institution in

Waymart, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Waymart”), initiated this action by filing a

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in February of 2024. (Doc. 1.) The complaint

named two defendants: (1) Dr. Laurel Harry (“Harry”), Secretary of the

Department of Corrections; and (2) Rev. Ulli Klemm (“Klemm”), Religious

Services Administrator. (Doc. 1, pp. 1–2.)1 Plaintiff alleged that the Acting

Security of the Department of the Corrections (“DOC”), George M. Little, issued a

memo on February 24, 2022, stating the following:

Beginning January 1, 2023, faith groups accommodated with

Ceremonial Meals will instead be accommodated with up to two (2)

Fellowship Meals a year. Fellowship Meals permit inmates from those

faith groups to provide input on the mainline “best meal” to be served

at two holy day observances per year; however, optional menu items

will no longer be available. Additionally, members of each faith group

will be able to eat together and afterwards engage in thirty (30) minutes

of fellowship, provided communal gatherings are permitted at that time.

(Id., p. 2.) Plaintiff alleged that he filed a religious accommodation request on

April 14, 2023, which was denied by Defendant Klemm on August 25, 2023. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleged that he filed a grievance on September 1, 2023. (Id., p. 3.) This

1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

grievance was denied on October 2, 2023, and Plaintiff appealed the denial. (Id.)

The grievance was ultimately denied by the Secretary’s Office of Inmate

Grievance Appeals on November 15, 2023. (Id.) Also on November 15, 2023,

Defendant Harry issued a policy modification memo that changed the overall limits

of Former Secretary Little’s memo. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) in both the issuance of the memo and

the failure to permit the Eid feasts to move forward in accordance with the Islamic

traditions and religious requirements. (Id., p. 3.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks

compensatory damages and injunctive relief. (Id., pp. 12–13.)

The court issued an order serving the complaint on Defendants on April 3,

2024. (Doc. 10.) On June 3, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to partially dismiss

the complaint. (Doc. 14.) On December 27, 2024, the court granted the motion

and dismissed all RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their individual capacities

and all claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities

under the RLUIPA. (Docs. 18, 19.) This leaves only the RLUIPA claims against

Defendants in their official capacities with only injunctive and declaratory relief

available. Defendants then answered the complaint regarding the remaining

claims. (Doc. 20.) The court entered a case management order setting forth the

deadlines for fact discovery and dispositive motions. (Doc. 21.)

On April 10, 2025, Defendants filed a suggestion of mootness alleging that

on March 5, 2025 Defendant Harry issued a policy modification memo that

approved the accommodation of two Religious Meals for all qualifying faith

groups, including Muslims, and Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief are now moot. (Doc. 23.) Attached to the filing were the updated Religious

Activities Procedures Manual and a Declaration by Defendant Harry. (Docs. 23-1,

23-2.) On July 8, 2025, the court entered an order denying Defendants’ suggestion

of mootness finding that Defendants did not meet their burden of showing that it is

absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be

expected to recur. (Docs. 29, 30.)

Following a status conference in this action on July 21, 2025, the court reset

the fact discovery deadline to September 30, 2025 and the dispositive motions

deadline to October 31, 2025. (Doc. 34.) On September 16, 2025, the court

received and docketed Plaintiff’s motion to compel production of documents and a

brief in support. (Doc. 37.) On October 31, 2025, the court extended the deadline

for dispositive motions to January 9, 2026. (Doc. 41.) On November 12, 2025, the

court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel, but reopened discovery until December

12, 2025 to gather evidence concerning costs and extended the dispositive motions

deadline to January 9, 2026. (Docs. 42, 43.)

On January 6, 2026, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment

and motion to bifurcate the issue of administrative exhaustion from the other issues

raised in the complaint. (Docs. 46, 48.) On January 27, 2026, the court received

and docketed Plaintiff’s motions to compel evidence concerning costs and filed

another motion for an extension of time and to reopen discovery. (Docs. 52, 53.)

The court will now address these pending motions.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter

jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Venue is proper in this district because the alleged acts and

omissions giving rise to the claims occurred at SCI-Waymart in Wayne County,

Pennsylvania, which is located in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b).

ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS

Presently before the court is the question of administrative exhaustion.

Therefore, the court will limit the facts addressed in this memorandum to resolve

the issue before the court.

A. Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts

According to Defendants’ statement of material facts, Plaintiff filed two

grievances concerning religious meals: (1) Grievance No. 1028334; and (2)

Grievance No. 1050534. (Doc. 51-2, 51-3, 51-4.) Grievance No. 1028334 was

appealed to final review before the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and

Appeals (“SOIGA”), but was dismissed on June 28, 2023 stating “[y]ou have not

provided this Office with required and/or legible documentation for proper

review.” (Doc. 51-2, 51-3.) The dismissal further states the following:

This office has not received any of the required documentation for a

proper appeal to final review. Therefore, your appeal to this office is

dismissed. Future correspondence regarding this matter may go filed

without action or response. You are encouraged to review the DC

ADM 804 in its entirety to ensure you are fully familiarized with the

grievance process and procedures.

(Doc. 51-3.) Defendants submitted copies of the Final Appeal Decision Dismissal

and the Inmate Appeal to Final Review Grievance with their motion. (Id.)

Similarly, Grievance No. 1050534 was appealed to final review before

SOIGA, but was dismissed on November 15, 2023 stating “[y]ou have not

provided this Office with required and/or legible documentation for proper

review.” (Doc. 51-4.) The dismissal further states the following:

This office has not received any of the required documentation for a

proper appeal to final review; specifically, a copy of your initial

grievance, the rejection notice, your resubmitted grievance, the initial

review response, your appeal to the Facility Manager or their response.

Therefore, your appeal to this office is dismissed. Future

correspondence regarding this matter may go filed without action or

response. You are encouraged to review the DC ADM 804 in its

entirety to ensure you are fully familiarized with the grievance process

and procedures.

B. (Id.) Defendants submitted copies of the Final Appeal Decision

Dismissal and the Inmate Appeal to Final Review Grievance with their

motion. (Id.)Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts

Plaintiff’s response to the statement of material facts concedes that he did

not provide the required materials on final appeal for Grievance No. 1028334.

(Doc. 57, p. 2; Doc. 58.) Plaintiff provides a wholistic timeline demonstrating that

both grievances were part of a continual process to address the February 24, 2022

memo making changes to the religious feasts. (Docs. 57, 58.)

Plaintiff has submitted evidence that he submitted Grievance No. 1028334

on April 8, 2023 challenging the February 24, 2022 changes to the celebration of

religious holidays. (Doc. 58-3.) This grievance was denied on April 14, 2023

because no formal religious accommodation request was filed. (Id.) Plaintiff then

filed a religious accommodation request form submitted on April 14, 2023. (Doc.

58-2, p. 2.) This religious accommodation request was denied on August 25, 2023.

(Id., p. 3.) Plaintiff then filed Grievance No. 1050534 on September 1, 2023. (Id.,

p. 4.) Grievance No. 1050534 was denied on September 26, 2023. (Id., p. 5.)

Petitioner then appealed Grievance No. 1050534 to the Facility Manager on the

same date. (Id., p. 6.) The denial of Grievance No. 1050534 to the Facility

Manager was upheld on October 2, 2023. (Id., p. 7.) The following day, Plaintiff

appealed the October 2, 2023 decision on Grievance No. 1050534 to the SOIGA.

(Id., p. 8.) On November 15, 2023, the final appeal of Grievance No. 1050534 was

denied stating “[y]ou have not provided this Office with require and/or legible

documentation for proper review.” (Id., p. 9.) Attached to the complaint is a

November 15, 2023 memo from Defendant Harry adjusting the rules surrounding

religious meals. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 11–12.)

Plaintiff clearly asserts that he provided the required documents to SOIGA

in the appeal of Grievance No. 1050534. (Id.) Plaintiff attached an affidavit

stating that when he sent the final appeal to SOIGA, he enclosed copies of the

initial grievances, the initial response, the appeal to the Facility Manager, and the

decision of that appeal. (Doc. 58-1.) Plaintiff also attached the postage for the

appeal packet totaling $2.58. (Doc. 58-1, 58-2, pp. 11–12.)

Therefore, there appears to be an issue of material fact concerning what was

included in the appeal packet sent to the SOIGA in regards to Grievance No.

1050534.

STANDARD

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of

the dispute “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is

not precluded by “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary.” Id. “A

dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the

nonmovant’ and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thomas v.

Tice, 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh

Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in that party’s favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288

(3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher

Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)). The court may not “weigh the evidence”

or “determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the

court’s role in reviewing the facts of the case is “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Id.

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The non-moving party must then

oppose the motion, and in doing so “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [its] pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or

suspicions will not suffice.’” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent.

Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party “fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support

of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that while Plaintiff appealed the two grievances through to

the final level at the SOIGA, he did not fully exhaust administrative remedies

because he did not submit the required materials as part of the appeal with respect

to both grievances. (Doc. 50.) Plaintiff concedes that he did not submit all the

required documents in the initial Grievance No. 1028334, but asserts that he

submitted all the necessary documents in his final appeal of Grievance No.

1050534.

A. Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et

seq., requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing

prison officials for alleged constitutional violations. See id. § 1997e(a); Ross v.

Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only “available” remedies

must be exhausted). Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is seeking

relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the administrative

system. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). However, there are

situations in which a grievance procedure may be rendered “unavailable” to an

inmate, such as when a prison official thwarts an inmate’s ability to use it, Ross,

578 U.S. at 643–44, when intimidation by means of “serious threats of retaliation

and bodily harm” prevent an inmate from filing, Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d

257, 266–67 (3rd Cir. 2018), or when a prison has “rendered its administrative

remedies unavailable . . . when it failed to timely (by its own procedural rules)

respond to [an inmate’s] grievance and then repeatedly ignored his follow-up

requests for a decision on his claim,” Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI,

831 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2016).

B. DC-ADM 804

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ general grievance process is

set forth in policy number DC-ADM 804, which Defendants attached to their

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 51-1.) “DC-ADM 804 provides a general,

though rigorous, mechanism for inmate grievances.” Moore v. Lamas, No. 22-

1007, 2023 WL 371397, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2023). Among other requirements,

the grievance must be signed, dated, legible, understandable, and presented in a

courteous manner. DC-ADM 804, §§ 1.A.10, 11. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that:

ADM 804 creates the three-step Inmate Grievance System. First, an

inmate must submit a grievance to the Facility Grievance Coordinator.

The grievance must include the relevant facts, individuals involved,

claims alleged, and relief sought. A different official—the Grievance

Officer—reviews the grievance and submits an initial response. The

inmate may appeal the initial response to the Facility Manager, who

reviews it and issues a decision. The inmate may file a final appeal to

the Secretary of Corrections’ Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals.

. . . ADM 804 requires an inmate to specify in his grievance any alleged

violation of department regulations or other law as well as specify the

compensation or legal relief the inmate desires.

Prater v. Dep't of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2023).

ADM 804, Section 2(B)(1)(j) requires an inmate appealing a grievance to

the Final Review to provide the SOIGA with all the required documentation

relevant to the appeal, including:

(1) a legible copy of the Initial Grievance;

(2) a copy of the initial review response/rejection and/or remanded initial

review response/rejection;

(3) a legible copy of the Inmate Appeal to the Facility Manager;

(4) a copy of the Facility Manager/designee’s decision and/or remanded

Facility Manager/designee’s decision;

(5) a written appeal to the SOIGA;

(6) failure to provide any of the documentation noted above may result in

the appeal being dismissed; and

(7) the copies of the initial review response/rejection and the Facility

Manager/designee’s decision cannot be handwritten.

DC-ADM 804 § 2(B)(1)(j). DC-ADM 804 also states that “[a]ny documentation

submitted in support of the appeal to final review will become part of the official

record and will not be returned.”

ADM 804 “is the exclusive means of exhaustion,” so failure to “follow the

full administrative review process under ADM 804” results in a failure to exhaust

under the PLRA. Prater, 76 F.4th at 204.

C. Analysis

Defendants have presented evidence in the form of a Declaration of Keri

Moore, the Chief Grievance Officer for the SOIGA, stating that Plaintiff did not

include the initial grievance, the initial response, the appeal to the Facility

Manager, or the decision or remand of that appeal in his appeal to the SOIGA.

(Doc. 51-2, p. 4.) Therefore, Defendants have met their initial burden of

presenting evidence that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative

remedies as an inmate’s failure to submit the required documents to SOIGA results

in the inmate failing to exhaust administrative remedies. See, e.g., Mack v.

Klopotoski, 540 F. App'x 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (affirming

dismissal for inmate’s failure to properly exhaust because inmate had failed to

include photocopies of his appeals to the Facility Manager and rejecting substantial

compliance argument that inmate filed handwritten copies since DC-ADM 804

specifically required photocopies); Brown v. Smith, No. 18-193, 2021 WL

4429847, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021), aff'd on other grounds, No. 21-3127,

2022 WL 2383609 (3d Cir. July 1, 2022) (collecting cases and holding that,

because ADM 804 § 2.B.1.j.1 requires that an appeal include a “legible copy of the

Initial Grievance,” “courts have held that including illegible documents violates the

rule and constitutes a procedural default.” (citations omitted)). In Brown, the

district court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies

because he failed to include a legible copy of his initial grievance with his appeal

to the SOIGA while acknowledging that doing so “may appear harsh.” Brown,

2021 WL 4429847, at *8. The court concluded, nonetheless, that it was “bound by

the PLRA to apply the prison’s available administrative exhaustion rules, however

stringent.” Id.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, Plaintiff, to establish that

there is an issue of material fact. Plaintiff has submitted his own affidavit stating

that he enclosed copies of the initial grievance, the initial response, the appeal to

the Facility Manger, and the decision of that appeal and paid $2.58 postage based

on the weight of the mailing. (Doc. 58-1, p. 1.) The Third Circuit has recently

held that affidavits by plaintiff-prisoners are sufficient to establish the existence of

an issue of material facts on the issue of exhaustion. See Timmons v. Bohinski, --

F.4th --, 2026 WL 2331684 (3d Cir. 2026)

Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the

court finds that there is an issue of material fact concerning what was included in

the final appeal packet sent to SOIGA. This issue of material fact is vital to

resolving whether or not Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies.

Therefore, the motion for summary judgment will be denied. However, this denial

will be without prejudice.

D. The Court Will Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on the Issue of Exhaustion

Very recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the four

options available to district courts to resolve the issue of exhaustion:

Option 1: A District Court may dismiss an inmate’s claim pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) if the “failure to exhaust under the PLRA is apparent

from the face of the complaint.” Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 264

(3d Cir. 2024); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 216, 127 S.Ct. 910 (“[T]he

failure of Congress to include exhaustion in terms among the

enumerated grounds justifying dismissal upon early screening ... is not

to say that failure to exhaust cannot be a basis for dismissal for failure

to state a claim.”).

Option 2: Where exhaustion and the merits are not intertwined, a

District Court may engage in pretrial factfinding to address exhaustion

and unavailability. See Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 265. “It would make sense

from an efficiency standpoint that exhaustion determinations be made

before discovery, or with only limited discovery.” Small v. Camden

Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). This authority in Option

2 includes the ability to make credibility determinations and resolve

factual disputes. The parties are entitled to notice and an opportunity

to respond before a court employs this procedure. See Paladino v.

Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2018). Courts have wide latitude

to apply the Option 2 procedure based on the circumstances presented,

and a full hearing with live testimony is not required in this Circuit. See

id.

Option 3: When exhaustion is “intertwined with the merits of a claim

protected by the Seventh Amendment,” the “parties are entitled to a jury

trial” on exhaustion. Richards, 605 U.S. at 479, 145 S.Ct. 1793.

Richards does not foreclose summary judgment procedures, which are

permissible under the Act and do not implicate the Seventh

Amendment. See In re Trib. Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 397 (3d Cir.

2018). Whereas pretrial factfinding in connection with Option 2 is

discretionary, Option 3 is required by Richards when it is on the table

due to intertwinement. Richards, 605 U.S. at 479, 145 S.Ct. 1793. This

case does not require us to draw a definitional intertwinement line. But

we have been told that “common factual issues,” the “possibility” of an

“estoppel effect in a later jury trial,” and other circumstances that

“might prevent a full jury trial” are among the relevant considerations.

Id. at 472, 474-76, 145 S.Ct. 1793.

Option 4: Even in the absence of intertwinement, trial courts and

defendants may skip past Options 1 and 2 in order to address exhaustion

and unavailability by applying “the protections of Rule 56” and, if

necessary, resolving factual disputes at a trial. Dillon v. Rogers, 596

F.3d 260, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S.

729, 731, 143 S.Ct. 1382, 215 L.Ed.2d 636 (2023); Renchenski v.

Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2010).

Timmons, 2026 WL 2331684, at *2–3. In this case, the issue of exhaustion needs

to be resolved prior to the court addressing the merits of the claims raised in the

complaint because the question of exhaustion and the merits of the case are not

intertwined. Therefore, the court will proceed with Option 2 and order an

evidentiary hearing on the matter of exhaustion. The court highlights that DC-

ADM 804 states that “[a]ny documentation submitted in support of the appeal to

final review will become part of the official record and will not be returned,” and

expects Defendants to produce the entire appeal packet received by the SOIGA in

regard to Grievance No. 1050534.

E. Motion to Compel and Reopen Discovery

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to compel and a motion to reopen discovery.

(Docs. 52, 53.) In the motion to compel, Plaintiff is seeking the production of

documentation concerning the cost of religious feasts. However, Plaintiff’s

requests did not specify the facility that is the subject of his requests. (Doc. 56.)

Plaintiff argues that the location was obvious because he was housed at SCI-

Waymart. (Doc. 52, p. 2.) However, since Plaintiff is challenging a department-

wide change to the religious feast day celebrations, the lack of specificity is an

issue that results in the request being overly broad. Therefore, the court will deny

the motion to compel. However, this denial is without prejudice.

Plaintiff also filed a motion to reopen discovery following the court making

a decision on the motion to compel. (Doc. 53.) Considering that the court will

require additional briefing on the issue of exhaustion, the court will deny the

motion at this time, but is willing to entertain a motion to reopen discovery should

it determine that Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies.

CONCLUSION

As the record currently stands, the court finds that Plaintiff has conceded

that he did not exhaust Grievance No. 1028334. However, the court cannot make a

determination on the question of exhaustion of Grievance No. 1050534.

Therefore, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without

prejudice. However, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to bifurcate the

briefing in this action to allow the court to fully address the question of

administrative exhaustion. Since the court must make a determination regarding

exhaustion before the case can be addressed by a jury, the court will hold an

evidentiary hearing regarding exhaustion of Grievance No. 1050534. The court

will deny Plaintiff’s motion to compel and motion to reopen discovery.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: August 19, 2026