Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

AMANDA LOIS BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:20-cv-838-ECM

) [WO]

CITY OF VALLEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case concerns the November 21, 2019 arrest of Amanda Lois Brown (“Brown”)

by City of Valley, Alabama (the “City”) police officers Dewayne Vallia (“Vallia”) and

Jaquarious Rashaan Lockhart (“Lockhart”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). Brown brings

two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, “excessive force” and “false arrest and imprisonment”

(Counts I and II), and two similar state claims, “assault and battery” and “false arrest and

imprisonment” (Counts III and IV). (See generally doc. 38).1

Brown filed this suit on October 15, 2020. (Doc. 1).2 This case was stayed from

March 11, 2021 to February 18, 2026, pending resolution of criminal proceedings against

Brown arising out of her arrest. (See docs. 19, 32; see also discussion infra Part III.C). On

March 6, 2026, Brown filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 38). The Defendants now move

1 Brown also sought injunctive relief against the City and equitable relief against all the Defendants on her

§ 1983 claims. Brown now concedes that she lacks standing to seek injunctive and equitable relief on

Counts I and II. (Doc. 47 at 45). The Court agrees and finds that Brown lacks standing to seek injunctive

and equitable relief on Counts I and II because she fails to allege facts that indicate “a sufficient likelihood

that [s]he will again be [injured] in a similar way.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983).

2 For clarity, the Court refers to the document and page numbers generated by CM/ECF.

to dismiss Brown’s amended complaint, asserting that she fails to state a claim as to every

count; Vallia and Lockhart raise qualified immunity as to the federal claims. (See generally

doc. 39). The motion is fully briefed, (docs. 40, 47, 50), and upon review, the Court finds

that Counts I and II are due to be dismissed with prejudice and Counts III and IV without

prejudice.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has jurisdiction over Brown’s federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court concludes that venue

properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-

specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Conclusory

allegations that are merely “conceivable” and fail to rise “above the speculative level” are

insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. This pleading standard “does not require

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, “[a] pleading that

offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. FACTS3

A. The Investigation

On November 19, 2019, the City’s police department received a call from Brown

(approximately forty-years-old), who stated she “was physically attacked by her [fifteen]-

year[-]old[] adopted brother.” (Doc. 38 at 2, para. 6). Lockhart responded to the call at

Brown’s residence. (Id. at 2, para. 7). The subsequent investigation and arrest were

captured by body cameras worn by Vallia and Lockhart. (See docs. 40-1–3).4

At the scene, Brown told Lockhart that “he . . . whooped my ass pretty good, but I

got my licks in too. I had to grab a stick to defend myself.” (Doc. 40-2 at 00:00–05). As

3 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court “must view the complaint in the light most favorable to [Brown]

and accept all of [Brown’s] well-pleaded facts as true.” Am. United Life Ins. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043,

1057 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

4 Generally, “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to

and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). One exception to this conversion rule is the incorporation-by-reference-doctrine.

Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Incorporation-by-

reference doctrine permits the consideration of documents attached to a complaint or motion to dismiss that

are “(1) central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed.” See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134

(11th Cir. 2002) (citing Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999)). “‘Undisputed’ in this

context means that the authenticity of the document is not challenged.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has

allowed the consideration of body camera footage from police officers which meets these requirements.

See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2024); Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277.

And “where a video is clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, [courts] accept the

video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account, and view the facts in the light depicted by the video.”

Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–78 (citing Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010);

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)).

Because the Defendants have appended body camera videos and related state court filings which are central

to Brown’s claim and undisputed, the Court too considers those materials, and—to the extent they are

ambiguous—the Court does so in the light most favorable to Brown. See Baker, F.4th at 1277 (citing

Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Lockhart turned away, she said, “he was a big boy . . . I had to do what I had to do.” (Id. at

00:13–16). She informed Lockhart that “he” was Brown’s brother who lived with her. (Id.

at 00:22–28).

Once back in his police car, Lockhart “drove past [Brown]’s residence to the

residence of . . . [Brown]’s grandmother,” (id. at 3, para. 7), exited the vehicle, and began

to speak with Brown’s brother, (id. at 00:59–01:02). Brown’s brother, crying, told

Lockhart, “I just got the shit beat out of me.” (Id. at 01:00–01:04). He further stated that,

“I wasn’t trying to fight, . . . she has me running and then she started hitting me, and I

grabbed the stick from her and then she hit me in the head. She started screaming [that] I

was trying to hit her.” (Id. at 01:05–30).

After Lockhart’s arrival at her grandmother’s house, Brown walked over and

attempted to talk to Lockhart; Lockhart told her to stay where she was before. (Id. at 01:30–

42; doc. 38 at 3, para. 8). Brown’s brother, sobbing, shouted, “please get away.” (Doc. 40-

2 at 01:35–38). After Lockhart turned back to Brown’s brother, he told Lockhart, “she

stabbed me”; Brown’s brother can be seen bleeding from scratches on his arm as Brown’s

mother attempted to treat his wounds. (Id. at 01:40–02:35). Lockhart verbally noted “a

knot on his head.” (Id. at 02:32–35). Brown’s brother stated, “I had pieces of wood stuck

in my arm that I pulled out.” (Id. at 02:35–39). Brown’s mother requested emergency

medical services for him. (Id. at 02:40–45). Lockhart then walked back toward Brown, “to

get her side of the story,” meeting up with Vallia who had just arrived. (Id. at 02:46–03:25;

doc. 40-1 at 00:10–14). Vallia remarked that he was told that “she was hitting him in the

. . . head with a broomstick,” to which Lockhart responded, “yeah, that’s what he [was]

saying.” (Doc. 40-1 at 00:10–17).

Then, Vallia and Lockhart met Brown, who explained to them:

[W]e started our routine yesterday, we start exercising around

four o’clock or so. . . . I told him to sit in the chair and I’ll be

right down. . . . I said, “okay, let’s get started.” I take this little

bitty stick right there to tap on the ground, like, “that’s the time

to run.” Well, we get out there and [I] say “alright, that’s the

time to run.” Then we run, then we stop. Then we run then we

stop. He turned around, talking [a]bout, “no I ain’t doing

nothing” . . . . I said, “well, okay, then we need to sit down and

calm down” . . . . Well, he didn’t want to sit down. He . . .

reached his hand out . . . he got a little hold to me but I took a

lick and I said, “now look, sit down.” He finally sat down over

here, but then he got right back up and he come at me. . . . he

was grabbing at me, trying to get me down, so I grabbed that

stick and I was doing what I had to do. The stick broke and he

was still coming at me. Well, hell, he’s a big ass boy. I did

what I had to do to get the hell out from him.

(Doc. 40-2 at 03:30–04:40). Another family member of Brown’s, standing nearby, told

the officers that Brown’s brother had attacked him in the past. (Id. at 05:06–05:13). Brown

then admitted to having “popped” her brother when he put his arm up. (Id. at 06:10–16).

The officers walked back to Brown’s brother. (Id. at 06:40–07:00; doc. 38 at 3–4,

para. 11). Still crying, he told them:

As I started running, cause she told me to run, she started

hitting me in the back of the leg. . . . I was running and she

catched up and she started beating me. And then, I turned

around and grabbed the stick and slung it down, and she

scream[ed], “don’t hit me.” So I back[ed] down like five feet.

(Doc. 40-2 at 08:00–23). He further told the officers that two of his friends, as well as his

cousins and family, saw it happen. (Id. at 08:24–42).

Brown’s mother told the officers that Brown’s brother had attacked her before and

was difficult to deal with. (Id. at 09:30–50). She said he had anger issues, to which Brown’s

brother interrupted, stating, “yes sir, but I was not on her, I swear to God.” (Id. at 10:45–

51). Brown’s mother informed the officers that Brown “has Asperger’s.”5 (Doc. 40-1 at

16:28–32). Vallia and Lockhart explained to Brown’s mother that they were going to arrest

both Brown and Brown’s brother for “domestic violence.” (Id. at 16:50–17:10). They

arrested Brown’s brother and placed him in a police car. (Id. at 16:55–17:10; doc. 40-3 at

00:00–30).

B. The Arrest

Vallia and Lockhart walked over to Brown’s home, and Vallia told Brown, who was

outside, to approach them. (Doc. 40-3 at 02:00–10). Brown moved toward the officers and

her mother told her that Vallia and Lockhart were going to arrest her. (Id. at 02:24–40).

Brown turned around and walked away; she entered her house and shut the door as Vallia

and her mother called to her to stay outside. (Id. at 02:41–48). Brown’s mother then entered

the house. (Id. at 02:55–03:33). Brown’s mother later exited the house without Brown and

told Vallia and Lockhart that Brown was not inside. (Id. at 04:18–39). Vallia and Lockhart

waited outside for several more minutes (Id. at 04:40–10:40).

Eventually, Brown emerged from the house and told Vallia and Lockhart, “I have

a right to defend myself. I’m not go[ing] to sit there and get my ass whooped. He came at

5 Asperger’s is “a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by severe and enduring impairment in

social skills and restrictive and repetitive behaviors and interests, leading to impaired social and

occupational functioning but without significant delays in language development . . . .” Asperger Disorder,

STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (Jan. 2025 ed.).

me and I did the best I could do.” (Id. at 10:47–11:04). Contemporaneously, Brown’s

mother told the officers, “she took a butt load . . . of pills . . . that’s all I can tell you,” (id.

at 10:53–11:01), and Vallia indicated to Lockhart to arrest Brown, (id. at 10:58–11:03).

Lockhart then approached Brown and told her to provide her hands to him. (Id. at

11:03–11:07). As he approached, Brown turned, said “nuh uh,” and walked back toward

her house. (Id. at 11:05–09). Vallia told Brown, “take your hands out of your pockets” and

drew his taser. (Id. at 11:09–12). Brown lowered herself to the ground with her hands out

of view, in front of her chest. (Id. at 11:13–22). Simultaneously, Vallia told her to put her

hands behind her back and warned her that he would tase her if she did not comply. (Id. at

11:18–22). Brown then yelled at officers, faced toward the ground, “I have autism, please

back up” and “if you tase me, I’m taking you to court.” (Id. at 11:22–35). Vallia then

holstered his taser and Lockhart drew his. (Id. at 11:33–36). Brown’s mother knelt on the

ground to Brown’s right, urging Brown to comply. (Id. at 11:30–36).

Vallia grabbed Brown’s left arm; Lockhart pressed his taser against her back and

told Brown to place her hands behind her back. (Id. at 11:35–37). Brown had her right

hand behind her back and Vallia held Brown’s left arm; Vallia fastened a cuff on her left

wrist. (Id. at 11:34–38). Lockhart again told Brown to put her hands behind her back. (Id.

at 11:38–42). Vallia attempted to pull both of Brown’s wrists together. (Id. at 11:44–46).

Brown stated, “I can’t take this,” and began to rise. (Id. at 11:46–47). Lockhart engaged

his taser on Brown’s back for approximately four seconds. (Id. at 11:47–51). Brown shook

and was pushed prone against the ground by Vallia. (Id. at 11:50–53). She turned on her

side and brought her right arm to the ground, and said, “please don’t do that again.” (Id. at

11:53–57). She moved both arms in front of her; Vallia pulled her left arm back and Brown

moved her right arm behind her back; Vallia finished successfully handcuffing Brown. (Id.

at 11:58–12:09).

Lockhart attempted to lift Brown by her handcuffs, and Brown screamed in pain.

(Id. at 12:15–34; see doc. 38 at 5, para. 16). Lockhart left Brown on the ground and she

complained that her handcuffs were too tight. (Doc. 40-3 at 12:40–13:10). Lockhart and

an off-duty officer—Brown’s neighbor who had arrived during the struggle—loosened the

handcuffs. (Id. at 13:01–13:20; doc. 38 at 5, para. 16).

Brown stated that she took “about three . . . Seroquel, ten Klonopin, and all [her]

other medicine.” (Doc. 40-3 at 13:30–36). Lockhart instructed Brown to roll over and get

on her knees. (Id. at 13:43–54). Lockhart helped Brown to stand. (Id. at 13:55–14:14).

Lockhart walked Brown over to his police car and opened the door. (Id. at 14:44–15:35).

Brown saw her brother in the car, and turned and walked away, stating, “I ain’t getting in

there with him.” (Id. at 15:36–43). Vallia told her, “you don’t have a choice,” and Brown

complied, turning around and getting in the vehicle. (Id. at 15:40–55).

On the way to the police station, Brown “lost consciousness as a result of the pain

she was suffering from the tasing and her . . . treatment by . . . Lockhart and Vallia, which

caused her to go into tachycardia.” (Doc. 38 at 5, para. 18). “One of the police officers

called an ambulance” which “transported [her] to East Alabama Medical Center,” (Id. at

5–6, para. 18).

Brown suffered a back sprain and “an arm/wrist sprain” and later “obtained mental

health treatment . . . for emotional and psychological issues resulting from her . . . arrest

and the . . . force [used to effectuate it].” (Id. at 6, 9, paras. 19, 28).

C. Subsequent Proceedings

Brown was charged in state court with “Domestic Violence Third Degree.” (Id. at

6, para. 21). On August 26, 2020, prosecutors dismissed the case “but [had her] re-arrested

. . . the following day on the charges of Resisting Arrest and Obstructing Governmental

Operations.” (Id.). A warrant was issued for Brown’s arrest, noting that “[p]robable cause

has been found.” (Doc. 40-4). On April 16, 2021, a state district court judge found Brown

guilty. (Doc. 40-5). Then on November 17, 2025, after an apparently successful appeal or

trial de novo, Brown prevailed upon a motion for acquittal presented to a state circuit court

judge. (Doc. 38 at 9, para. 29; doc. 40-5; doc. 40-6).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Vallia and Lockhart

Brown brings two federal claims against Vallia and Lockhart, false arrest (Count II)

and excessive force (Count I).6 Vallia and Lockhart assert that they are entitled to qualified

immunity on those claims. Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit

when they perform “discretionary functions” and “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Where a defendant asserts

6 The Court addresses the claims in this reverse order because the facts relevant to Brown’s false arrest

claim chronologically precede those relevant to her excessive force claim.

qualified immunity, “the public official [must] first show[] that []he was acting within the

scope of h[is] discretionary authority.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th

Cir. 2013). If the public official makes that showing, the burden then falls on the plaintiff

“to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. To do so, a

plaintiff must show a violation of clearly established rights. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

741 (2002). This clearly established rights requirement entails that “officers receive

qualified immunity unless they could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent beforehand and

‘know[n]’ that it proscribed their specific conduct. Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930

(2026) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting City and County of San Francisco v.

Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616 (2015)).

Both Vallia and Lockhart contend they were state officers who responded to an

emergency call and decided to arrest Brown. (See generally doc. 40 at 4). The Court does

not doubt—nor does Brown contend otherwise—that the act of arresting was within the

scope of the officers’ discretionary authority. Accordingly, the officers are entitled to

qualified immunity unless “the allegations . . . establish a constitutional violation and that

the constitutional violation was clearly established.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1251

(11th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1307

(11th Cir. 2019)). Ultimately, the Court finds that no Fourth Amendment violation of false

arrest or excessive force was plausibly alleged and that the officers’ actions did not violate

clearly established law, so they are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and II.

1. False Arrest7

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. An arrest of a

person without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d

1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). “To succeed on a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish

(1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180

(11th Cir. 2022). An arrest “occurs when the government applies physical force to seize a

person or asserts lawful authority to which the subject accedes.” Id. (citing California v.

Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 626–27 (1991)); accord Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7

(1985) (“Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized

that person.” (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).

Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s

knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a

prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed,

is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578

(11th Cir. 1990); see Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180 (“Probable cause exists when ‘a

reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there [is] a substantial chance of criminal

activity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th

Cir. 2022))); accord Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983).

7 Though Brown labels her claim as “false arrest and false imprisonment,” she addresses the two issues as

single claim, alleging that the imprisonment was unlawful because of the arrest. (See doc. 38 at 13–14, para.

41–43). The Court treats the claim accordingly. See Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 790 (5th Cir. 1968)

(“False arrest is merely one means of committing a false imprisonment.” (quotation omitted)).

Importantly, “[n]o officer has a duty to prove every element of a crime before

making an arrest.” Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted); cf. Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.8 (2001) (“Police officers are not

expected to be lawyers or prosecutors.” (citation omitted)). In the same vein, “probable

cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious

facts.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018). And finally, “when the

government has probable cause to arrest someone, a false arrest claim necessarily fails.”

Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180 (citing Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th Cir.

2021)); see Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023) (“The existence

of probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim of false arrest . . . .” (citing Marx v.

Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505–06 (11th Cir. 1990))).

No party disputes that an arrest occurred, and thus the outstanding issue as to

Brown’s false arrest claim is whether there was probable cause for her arrest. See

Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180. The Court finds that the investigation by Vallia and Lockhart

“would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that [Brown]

. . . committed . . . an offense.” Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 578. Put another way, the

circumstances known to the officers were ones from which “a reasonable officer could

conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.” Washington, 25 F.4th at

899 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, there was probable cause.8

8 Because the Court ultimately finds that Vallia and Lockhart had probable cause without considering that

an arrest warrant later issued and that Brown was later convicted, the Court does not address the parties’

arguments about whether a later-issued warrant and initially successful prosecution indicate probable cause.

When Lockhart arrived, Brown recounted that she had both hit and been hit by her

brother. (Doc. 40-2 at 00:00–00:28). Lockhart then went and talked to Brown’s brother,

who was in a visibly worse state than Brown. Crying, he told Lockhart that he was beaten

and that Brown started hitting him with a stick after forcing him to run. (Id. at 00:59–

01:30). Brown’s brother was bleeding from scratches on his arm, and he had a knot on his

head; Brown’s mother was attempting to treat his wounds. (Id. at 01:40–02:35). Brown’s

brother told Lockhart that he “had pieces of wood stuck in [his] arm that [he] pulled out

[(himself)].” (Id. at 02:35–39). Brown’s mother requested emergency medical services for

him. (Id. at 02:40–45).

Brown then told both Vallia and Lockhart that she was directing her brother to

exercise and that she eventually “took a lick” from him after “he got a little hold to [her]”;

she also informed the officers that she “popped” her brother when he put his arm up. (Doc.

40-2 at 3:30–06:16). Then, both Vallia and Lockhart met with Brown’s brother, who was

still crying and reiterated his story, again stating that Brown forced him to run and hit him

first. (Id. at 06:40–08:42). The officers then began taking steps to arrest Brown and her

brother.

Plainly, the facts of which the officers were apprised were ones that from which

reasonable officers “could conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal

activity.” Washington, 25 F.4th at 899; see Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 968 (11th

Cir. 2018) (“[Probable cause] does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even by

a preponderance of the evidence.” (citations omitted)). Both Vallia and Lockhart were

made aware that Brown—in part by her own admission—had hit her much younger brother

with a stick. They could see that her brother’s skin was broken, he was bleeding, and he

had a lump on his head. Both Brown and her brother made statements that could lead a

reasonable officer to believe that Brown was the first aggressor.

The officers were not, as Brown suggests in her briefing, (see doc. 47 at 6–22),

required “to rule out [her] innocent explanation for suspicious facts,” Wesby, 583 U.S. at

61, by finding that she had engaged in self-defense, see Davis, 78 F.4th at 1334 (“Whatever

[the plaintiff] may speculate about the information the officers could have uncovered if

they had done more investigating at the scene, the officers were not required to refute his

self-serving explanation that he had acted in self-defense.” (citations omitted)). Nor were

they required to make credibility determinations in the face of conflicting testimony by her

and her brother. See Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019). And under

these circumstances, the officers did not need to consult the Alabama Code and determine

whether Brown could mount a meritorious defense (or appeal) to a charge of domestic

violence, obstruction of arrest for domestic violence, assault, menacing, reckless

endangerment, disorderly conduct, or child abuse. See id. (“[P]olice officers aren’t lawyers;

we do not expect them to resolve legal questions or to weigh the viability of most

affirmative defenses.”); Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (“No officer has a duty to prove every

element of a crime before making an arrest.” (citation omitted)); Scarbrough, 245 F.3d at

1303 n.8 (“Police officers are not expected to be lawyers or prosecutors.” (citation

omitted)).

And it is of no consequence that some of the above crimes or their less serious

permutations are misdemeanors, for “the Fourth Amendment does not require a

misdemeanor to occur in an officer’s presence to conduct a warrantless arrest.” United

States v. Gonzalez, 107 F.4th 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 529

(2025). Vallia and Lockhart were faced with an adult suspect who undisputedly hit a child

with a stick to the extent that it caused the child visible injuries, and who lacked any

obvious injuries herself. There is no question that a reasonable officer at the scene could

conclude that Brown had committed any one of the above offenses.

In sum, the totality of the circumstances known to Vallia and Lockhart—including

Brown’s innocent explanation—were such that reasonable officers in their situation could

conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61.

And so, they had probable cause to arrest Brown. For that reason, Brown’s claim of false

arrest fails as a matter of law. Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180. By the same token, Vallia and

Lockhart could not have gleaned that their specific conduct was proscribed by clearly

established law, because it was not proscribed. See Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930; accord Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, Vallia and Lockhart are entitled to qualified immunity on Count II.

2. Excessive Force

“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures

encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of an

arrest.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989)). “In determining the reasonableness of the force applied,

[courts] look at the fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene

with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts, and balance the risk of bodily

harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.”

McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009). To make this assessment,

“a court must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Johnson, 107 F.4th at 1302

(quoting Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9).

Though “[t]here is no ‘easy-to-apply legal test’ or ‘on/off switch’ in this context,”

Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025), cases have identified non-exhaustive factors that

courts should consider, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396,

and “the need for application of force, the relationship between the need and amount of

force used, and the extent of the injury inflicted by the arresting officer.” Helm v. Rainbow

City, 989 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). And in evaluating the arrest,

courts must “consider the officers’ actions ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on

the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898

(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kesinger ex rel. Est. of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,

1249 (11th Cir. 2004)).

In examining the totality of the circumstances, Vallia and Lockhart’s actions were

reasonable, and thus Brown’s claim of excessive force fails. Here, Vallia and Lockhart

were arresting Brown for a crime of violence. Brown’s actions preceding and during her

arrest were erratic. Initially, when Brown was informed by her mother that she was going

to be arrested, Brown fled into her house against the requests of her mother and Vallia.

(Doc. 40-3 at 02:24–48). She was in the house for approximately eight minutes while the

officers waited outside. (Id. at 02:48–10:40). In the interim, Brown’s mother entered the

house and later exited without Brown, telling Vallia and Lockhart that she was not inside.

(Id. at 04:18–39).

When Brown emerged from the house, she immediately told Vallia and Lockhart,

“I have a right to defend myself. I’m not go[ing] to sit there and get my ass whooped. He

came at me and I did the best I could do.” (Id. at 10:47–11:04). At the same time, Brown’s

mother told the officers, “she took a butt load . . . of pills . . . that’s all I can tell you.” (Id.

at 10:53–11:01).

When Lockhart told Brown to present her hands for cuffing, she began to move

away from the officers, saying “nuh uh,” and walked toward her house. (Id. at 11:03–09).

She had her hands in front of her, out of the sight of the officers; Vallia yelled, “get your

hands out of your pockets.” (Id. at 11:09–12). Brown did not comply but instead partially

lowered herself to the ground with her hands still out of view. (Id. at 11:09–22). Vallia

again directed Brown to comply and put her hands behind her back, warning her that she

would be tased if she failed to comply. (Id. at 11:18–22). Brown then yelled at the officers,

“if you tase me, I’m taking you to court.” (Id. at 11:30–35).

Vallia grabbed Brown’s left arm; Lockhart pressed his taser against Brown’s back

and told her to place her hands behind her back. (Id. at 11:35–37). Brown placed her right

hand behind her back while Vallia fastened a cuff on her left wrist. (Id. at 11:34–38).

However, with the handcuff affixed to her left arm, Brown continued to struggle against

the officers. Lockhart again had to tell Brown to put her hands behind her back. (Id. at

11:38–42). And as Vallia attempted to pull both of Brown’s wrists together, (id. at 11:44–

46), Brown stated loudly, “I can’t take this,” and continued to resist the officers. (Id. at

11:46–47). At that point, Brown was tased.

So, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, before Lockhart engaged

his taser: Brown had twice moved away from officers, first by taking refuge in her house

for eight minutes and later by walking toward the house again. She was told to put her

hands behind her back three times and warned that her failure to comply would result in

her tasing. Throughout, she yelled exasperated statements that a reasonable officer could

perceive as threatening and indicative of motivation to resist further. Her physical

resistance to the arrest persisted until the deployment of the taser, as she yelled, “I can’t

take this” and continued to struggle with a single cuff on her left arm. See Hoyt v. Cooks,

672 F.3d 972, 979 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]ithout both hands shackled, the single handcuff

could be used as a weapon.”). These circumstances are not those where “a suspect has

been subdued, is not resisting, and poses no threat.” Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262,

1269–70 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, the officers were entitled to use force to effectuate

Brown’s arrest. See Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1021 (11th Cir. 2016)

(“[N]oncompliance or continued physical resistance to arrest justifies the use of force by a

law enforcement officer.” (citation omitted)).

After Lockhart engaged his taser,9 (doc. 40-3 at 11:47–51), the officers were quickly

able to effectuate Brown’s handcuffing without issue, and she was compliant for the

remainder of her arrest, (id. at 11:51–15:35, 15:40–55; but see id. at 15:36–43)). These

circumstances provide substantially similar justification to others where the Eleventh

Circuit has found the use of a taser was reasonable.

From the time [the suspect] met [the officer] at the back of the

truck [for a traffic stop for an unilluminated tag], [the suspect]

was hostile, belligerent, and uncooperative. No less than five

times, [the officer] asked [the suspect] to retrieve documents

from the truck cab, and each time [the suspect] refused to

comply. Rather, [the suspect] accused [the officer] of harassing

him and blinding him with the flashlight. [The suspect] used

profanity, moved around and paced in agitation, and repeatedly

yelled at [the officer]. Because [the suspect] repeatedly refused

to comply with [the officer’s] verbal commands, starting with

a verbal arrest command was not required in these particular

factual circumstances. More importantly, a verbal arrest

command accompanied by attempted physical handcuffing, in

these particular factual circumstances, may well have, or

would likely have, escalated a tense and difficult situation into

a serious physical struggle in which either [the suspect] or [the

officer] would be seriously hurt. Thus, there was a reasonable

need for some use of force in this arrest.

Although being struck by a taser gun is an unpleasant

experience, the amount of force [the officer] used—a single

use of the taser gun causing a one-time shocking—was

reasonably proportionate to the need for force and did not

inflict any serious injury. Indeed, the police video shows that

[the suspect] was standing up, handcuffed, and coherent

shortly after the taser gun stunned and calmed him. The single

use of the taser gun may well have prevented a physical

9 Brown states that the Court must credit her well-plead factual allegations in her complaint, specifically

that during her arrest she “was tased more than one time” and that she “was tased at least one time, and

possibly two times, while she was handcuffed with her hands behind her back.” (Doc. 47 at 28; doc. 4 at 7,

para. 22). However, because “[the] video is clear and obviously contradicts [Brown’s] alleged facts, [the

Court] accept[s] the video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account, and view[s] the facts in the light

depicted by the video.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–78 (citing Gee, 625 F.3d at 1315; Harris, 550 U.S. at 381).

struggle and serious harm to either [the suspect] or [the

officer]. Under the “totality of the circumstances,” [the

officer’s] use of the taser gun did not constitute excessive

force, and [the officer] did not violate [the suspect’s]

constitutional rights in this arrest.

Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004); see Buckley v. Haddock, 292

F. App’x 791, 794 (11th Cir. 2008)10 (no excessive force by two five-second tases of a

handcuffed suspect (for failing to sign traffic citation) lowered himself to the ground prone

and would not rise as ordered); Moore v. Gwinnett County, 805 F. App’x 802, 807 (11th

Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (no excessive force by a single five-second taser shock after

warning where suspect (for moving sublessee’s property from home) failed to put her hands

behind her back); Alday v. Groover, 601 F. App’x 775, 776–77, 779 (11th Cir. 2015) (per

curiam) (no violation of clearly established excessive force law by a five- to ten-second

tase to the neck of a handcuffed suspect (for driving under the influence) in the back of a

police vehicle when she did not exit as ordered); see also Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588

F.3d 1291, 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (no excessive force by three tases on a handcuffed

and leg shackled suspect in the back of police car who was kicking and slamming her head

against car doors).

One consideration that potentially weighs in Brown’s favor is “the extent of the

injury inflicted.” Helm, 989 F.3d at 1273. But Brown’s tachycardia and emotional-

psychological issues—assuming at this stage that they were caused by the tasing rather

than the large dose of pills consumed—were not predictable injuries of a single, four-

10 Here, and elsewhere in this Opinion, the Court cites nonbinding authority. While the Court acknowledges

these cases are nonprecedential, the Court finds them persuasive.

second tasing of the upper back. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir.

2002) (“What would ordinarily be considered reasonable force does not become excessive

force when the force aggravates (however severely) a pre-existing condition the extent of

which was unknown to the officer at the time.”); see also Mann, 588 F.3d at 1306 (not

excessive force where death resulted after three tases); Moore, 805 F. App’x at 809–10

(not excessive force where arrestee lost consciousness and had permanent scarring

following a single tase); cf. Marbut v. Phillips, 176 F.4th 1256, 1268 (11th Cir. 2026)

(“[D]e minimis force do[es] not cease to be de minimis when [it] produce[s] unexpected

injuries.”). And moreover, Brown does not plausibly allege that Vallia and Lockhart were

aware of any special conditions that would render the otherwise ordinary measure for

effectuating an arrest of a resisting suspect likely to cause the injuries she alleged later

manifested.11

11 Though Brown’s excessive force claim and subsequent briefing focus almost exclusively on the tasing,

(see doc. 38 at 10–12; doc. 40 at 15–17; doc. 47 at 28–31; doc. 50 at 19–20), she briefly mentions another

discrete use of force—Brown was allegedly lifted by her handcuffs by Officer Lockhart to effectuate her

transfer to the police car, (see doc. 38 at 5, para. 16; doc. 40-3 at 12:16–35). It does not appear to the Court

that this action forms the basis of any part of her excessive force claim. But even if it did, Brown’s claim

would fail. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, she was handcuffed, calmer, and appears

to present no threat to the officers. But the video does not show the “extremely rough treatment” alleged

in the complaint. (Doc. 38 at 7, para. 23). Instead, as Lockhart allegedly attempted to lift Brown and she

screamed, both the off-duty officer and her mother told her to “calm down” and “settle down.” (Doc. 40-3

at 12:28–34). The off-duty officer also told her “you have to be still.” (Id. at 12:38–45). Brown’s mother

showed Lockhart her own hand and laughed. (Id. at 12:53–57). And Lockhart ultimately loosened Brown’s

handcuffs. (Doc. 40-3 at 12:40–13:39; doc. 38 at 5, para. 16). Shortly thereafter, Lockhart helped Brown

stand without issue. (Doc. 40-3 at 13:40–14:03). Brown variously requested, in a calm tone, that her mother

“take the dip out of [her] pocket,” (id. at 13:15–20), call two different people whose contacts are in her

phone, (id. at 13:57–14:05), and “grab [her] pen from him,” (id. at 14:09–14:15). Brown does not allege

that any permanent physical injury resulted from the brief handcuffing incident. Here, “the actual force

used and the injury inflicted were both minor in nature.” Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460

(1997). Accordingly, it was not force—even paired with the single tase—violative of the Fourth

Amendment.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Brown has not

plausibly plead facts which constitute excessive force. And like Brown’s false arrest claim,

Vallia and Lockhart could not have gleaned that their specific conduct was proscribed by

clearly established law. Accordingly, Vallia and Lockhart are entitled to qualified

immunity on Count I.

B. The City

Because the Court found that Brown has not plausibly alleged facts to establish

Vallia or Lockhart’s actions amounted to constitutional violations of false arrest or

excessive force, the City cannot be liable under § 1983 for those actions. See Gold v. City

of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] municipality may be held liable for

the actions of a police officer only when municipal ‘official policy’ causes a constitutional

violation.” (emphasis added) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95)); see also Smothers v.

Childers, 159 F.4th 922, 931 (11th Cir. 2025); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289

(11th Cir. 2004). Because Brown fails to state a claim against the City on Counts I and II,

those claims against it are due to be dismissed.

C. State Law Claims

The Court is granted discretion “to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over [related state law claims] if [it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3). Even so, precedent strongly counsels in favor of

dismissal. Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2022)

(“[C]oncerns of federalism—namely, of federal courts of limited jurisdiction weighing in

on state law—counsel in favor of dismissing state-law claim after the federal claims are

dismissed.”); Raney v. Allstate Ins., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have

encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal

claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated

before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise [pendent]

jurisdiction . . . .”); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)

(“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial

in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). Dismissal of state

law claims on this discretionary basis “usually should [be] do[ne] . . . without prejudice as

to refiling in state court.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir.

2018) (citation omitted).

Here, the considerations of judicial economy and convenience to the parties do not

outweigh the interests guaranteed by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this

posture. Proceedings in state court would “promote justice between the parties[] by

procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable [state] law”—furthering fairness—

and advance comity by avoiding the “[n]eedless [federal] decisions of state law.” Gibbs,

383 U.S. at 726. Thus, the balance of factors counsel in favor of declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the outstanding state law claims. Accordingly, the Court

finds that Counts III and IV are due to be dismissed without prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, and for good cause, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (doc. 39), is GRANTED as to Counts I

and II, and these Counts are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) as to Counts III and IV, and these Counts are DISMISSED without

prejudice.

3. This case is DISMISSED.

4. A separate and final judgment will be entered.

DONE this 20th day of August, 2026.

/s/ Emily C. Marks

EMILY C. MARKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE