Muslow

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KATHERINE MUSLOW, et al. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 19-11793

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SECTION M (2)

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND

AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL

COLLEGE, et al.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative,

a motion for new trial, or in the further alternative, a motion for remittitur filed by defendant the

Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

(“LSU”).1 Plaintiffs Katherine Muslow and Meredith Cunningham (together, “Plaintiffs”)

respond in opposition,2 and LSU replies in further support of its motion.3 Also before the Court

is Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment to include an award of prejudgment interest.4 LSU

responds in opposition,5 and Plaintiffs reply in further support of their motion.6 Having considered

the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons

denying LSU’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial; granting LSU’s motion

for remittitur; and granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment.

1 R. Doc. 656.

2 R. Doc. 665.

3 R. Doc. 667.

4 R. Doc. 653.

5 R. Doc. 664.

6 R. Doc. 666.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an action for retaliation under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) arising from

the rescission of two job offers. Katherine Muslow served as general counsel for the LSU Health

Sciences Center in New Orleans (“LSUHSC-NO”), and Meredith Cunningham was a part-time

staff attorney there.7 While at LSUHSC-NO, Muslow worked under Dr. Larry Hollier, the

chancellor of LSUHSC-NO, and Cunningham worked under Muslow.8 In 2018, however, LSU

implemented Permanent Memorandum 72, which consolidated legal services system-wide across

all LSU campuses under the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) in Baton Rouge, and Plaintiffs

were advised in August and again in December of that year that their positions would transfer to

the OGC.9 In January 2019, the OGC extended written offers to both Plaintiffs for positions at the

OGC, with salaries identical to those they made at LSUHSC-NO: $227,520 for Muslow and

$76,500 for Cunningham at 60% full-time equivalent, annualized to $127,500.10 The OGC offered

Plaintiffs salaries identical to their LSUHSC-NO salaries despite the OGC’s determination that an

appropriate salary range for Muslow’s position was between $130,377 and $188,014.11 Neither

plaintiff signed the offer letters (in the form of proposed contracts). On February 12, 2019, the

OGC sent a reminder regarding their execution.12

On Friday, February 15, 2019, Muslow sent an email on behalf of both Plaintiffs raising

concerns about gender pay equity at LSUHSC-NO, attaching materials from a 2017 LSUHSC-NO

Market Salary Study (the “2017 Market Study”), asking that their salaries be reviewed, and

proposing salaries of $375,000 for herself and an annualized $204,748 at an increased workload

7 R. Docs. 658 at 138-39; 659 at 148-50.

8 R. Doc. 657 at 72-73.

9 Trial Exs. 103, 125, 134.

10 Trial Exs. 110, 113; R. Doc. 660 at 31.

11 Trial Ex. 312.

12 Trial Ex. 106.

for Cunningham.13 The following Monday, February 18, 2019, Thomas Skinner – then general

counsel at LSU – rescinded both offers.14 LSU maintains it did so because the contracts remained

unsigned as the transition date approached and because the salaries that Plaintiffs proposed were

too high and would have created salary compression within the OGC.15 Plaintiffs contend that

both explanations were pretextual and that the rescission was retaliation for the pay-equity

concerns raised in the February 15 email.16 Plaintiffs remained in their LSUHSC-NO positions

for several months before those positions were retired; LSU later posted the OGC positions

competitively and invited Plaintiffs to apply, but neither did.17

Plaintiffs filed this action on July 22, 2019, against LSU and several individual defendants,

alleging violations of Title VII, Title IX, the EPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Louisiana

Employment Discrimination Law.18 After extensive preliminary motion practice and the filing of

a third amended complaint, which together narrowed the claims to gender discrimination under

Title VII, the EPA, and § 1983, and retaliation under Title VII and the EPA, this Court granted the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims.19 On appeal, the

Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ gender-discrimination and retaliation claims

except their “Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims alleging that LSU retaliated against [them] by

revoking their employment contracts following their salary-review request.”20 On remand, in a

series of rulings, this Court determined that back- and front-pay was not available as damages21

13 Trial Exs. 100, 201.

14 Trial Ex. 102.

15 R. Doc. 656-1 at 7-13.

16 R. Doc. 665 at 1-2, 4-18.

17 Trial Ex. 318.

18 R. Docs. 1; 581 at 3.

19 R. Docs. 451; 452. At the time, there were several individual defendants along with LSU.

20 Muslow v. La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., Bd. of Supervisors, 2023 WL 5498952, at *11 (5th Cir.

Aug. 24, 2023).

21 R. Doc. 561 at 26-33. The Court also determined that punitive damages and EPA liquidated damages were

not available.

and that the Fifth Circuit had held in its decision that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case

with respect to their retaliatory rescission claim as a matter of law – including that their belief of

gender-based wage discrimination was reasonable and that the gender-based pay-equity statements

in the February 15, 2019 email constituted protected activity.22 This Court further determined that

LSU could not assert at trial any non-retaliatory reason for the rescission beyond the two it had

identified: namely, that Plaintiffs had not signed the contracts, and that Plaintiffs’ salary demands

were too high.23 Accordingly, the sole liability issue remaining for trial was whether those two

stated reasons were pretext for unlawful retaliation.24

Given the limited issue to be resolved at trial, the Court excluded all evidence going only

to Plaintiffs’ belief of wage discrimination, including their EEOC charges, their dismissed

discrimination claims, non-party pay-equity complaints, internal audit exhibits, a Title IX review,

and a 2019 LSUHSC-NO equity review.25 It declined, however, to exclude compensation

evidence bearing on LSU’s stated too-high-salary rationale, including the 2017 Market Study,

LSUHSC-NO and OGC salary exhibits, and the LSUHSC-NO pay adjustments policy,

emphasizing that “the only remaining jury issue to which compensation evidence may be relevant

is whether LSU rescinded the OGC contracts based on its subjective belief that the salaries

requested by Plaintiffs for the OGC positions were ‘too high,’” and expressly reserving the right

to exclude such evidence at trial if it proved unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or confusing.26 The

Court issued additional, more specific evidentiary rulings just before trial which aligned with its

earlier ruling.27

22 R. Doc. 581 at 17-20.

23 Id. at 20.

24 Id. at 20-21.

25 Id. at 19-20.

26 Id. at 21-22.

27 R. Docs. 626; 629; 630; 631; 632; 633.

The case was tried before an eight-person jury over five days, from April 27, 2026, to May

1, 2026. From time to time throughout trial, the Court found it advisable to give limiting

instructions contemporaneously with the admission of certain compensation evidence, and then

again in the final charge, instructing the jury that the sole liability issue was whether LSU had

retaliated against Plaintiffs by rescinding the OGC contracts; that the evidence presented at trial

could be considered only for the purpose of resolving this issue and not other issues that may have

been suggested by the evidence; that but-for causation was required; and that damages could be

awarded only for injuries proximately caused by the rescission of the contracts and not for the

retirement of Plaintiffs’ LSUHSC-NO positions.28 The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding

that LSU retaliated against Plaintiffs and awarding $750,000 to each of them for pain and suffering,

inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.29 The Court entered judgment in

accordance with the verdict, but it did not address prejudgment or post-judgment interest.30 The

parties then filed the pending posttrial motions. Specifically, LSU moves for judgment as a matter

of law, new trial, or remittitur, while Plaintiffs move to alter the judgment to include awards of

prejudgment and post-judgment interest.31

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. LSU’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

LSU moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure at the close of Plaintiffs’ evidence at trial and orally renewed its motion at the

close of all evidence.32 Both times, the Court denied the motion.33 LSU now renews its motion

28 See, e.g., R. Docs. 658 at 145-46; 659 at 51-52, 88-90; 640-2 at 5-8.

29 R. Doc. 641.

30 R. Doc. 645.

31 R. Docs. 653 (Plaintiffs’ motion to alter judgment); 656 (LSU’s omnibus posttrial motion).

32 R. Docs. 659 at 263-274; 660 at 261-69.

33 R. Docs. 659 at 278; 660 at 271.

under Rule 50(b).34 LSU contends that judgment as a matter of law in its favor is warranted

because Plaintiffs failed to prove that their protected statements were the “but for” cause of LSU’s

rescission of their employment contracts and because they failed to establish that they are entitled

to compensatory damages.35 The Court will address and analyze each argument in turn.

In ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, a “court may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the

jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Judgment as a matter of law on an issue is appropriate when “the court finds

that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on

that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). When evaluating a Rule 50(b) motion, courts “consider all of

the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th

422, 431 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). “Thus, a Rule 50 motion must be denied unless the

facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable

jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1. LSU’s argument that Plaintiffs failed to prove but-for causation

LSU first argues that Plaintiffs failed to prove that their protected statements were the “but

for” cause of LSU’s rescission of their employment contracts, such that the rescission amounted

to retaliation under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, making six points in connection with this

argument.36 First, LSU notes that it is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not sign the employment

contracts.37 Second, LSU observes that Plaintiffs requested substantially higher salaries than those

offered by LSU, and Muslow’s offer was already above the salary recommended by LSU’s Baton

34 R. Doc. 656-1 at 6-19.

35 See id.

36 Id. at 7-8.

37 Id. at 8-9.

Rouge Office of Human Resources Management (“HRM”).38 Third, argues LSU, Plaintiffs’ trial

presentation that the 2017 Market Study justified their salary requests was insufficient to show

pretext where multiple witnesses confirmed that the OGC, rather than LSUHSC-NO, was the

Plaintiffs’ employing agency.39 Fourth, LSU submits that there was insufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to conclude that LSU’s intent to implement salary compression was pretextual

based on (1) Plaintiffs’ reference to Dr. Hollier’s total compensation as both LSUHSC-NO

chancellor and a vascular surgeon and (2) Plaintiffs’ speculation that LSU head coaches earn more

than its athletics director.40 Fifth, LSU urges that “Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to conclude that the OGC [contract] rescissions were retaliatory, as opposed

to a disagreement over OGC’s compensation structure and Plaintiffs’ higher salary requests,” and

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law since Plaintiffs’ burden was to show that LSU

acted with retaliatory intent, not merely poor business judgment.41 Sixth and finally, LSU

maintains that the evidence Plaintiffs adduced at trial, which it says relied upon “speculative

inferences,” was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that both of LSU’s stated reasons

for the contract rescission were pretextual and that retaliation was the real reason.42

In their opposition, Plaintiffs make five points in support of their contention that the trial

record contains substantial evidence that the gender-based pay-equity statements in Muslow’s

February 15, 2019 email were the but-for cause of LSU’s rescission of the OGC contracts.43 They

emphasize that the jury needed to find only that the rescission would not have occurred absent the

protected activity, not that it was the sole reason.44

38 Id. at 9-11.

39 Id. at 11-12.

40 Id. at 12-13.

41 Id. at 13-14 (quote at 14).

42 Id. at 14-16.

43 R. Doc. 665 at 4-18.

44 Id. at 5.

First, Plaintiffs posit that trial evidence showed that LSU’s rescission of the OGC

employment offers was not based on the length of time that passed before the contracts were

signed. This was demonstrated by the testimony of Trey Jones, LSU’s current general counsel and

its deputy counsel at the time of the subject events, that the contracts’ effective date was not a

deadline and that “Plaintiffs’ lack of signature on the employment contracts was not LSU’s reason

for rescinding the contracts”; Skinner’s testimony that Plaintiffs’ failure to sign the contracts “was

not ‘an explanation for why’ the contracts were rescinded”; the testimony of Donna Dewailly,

OGC’s business manager, that the timing of the agency transfer of Plaintiffs’ positions was for the

benefit of Plaintiffs, not any needs of LSU; and evidence that Muslow’s replacement did not begin

his role until September 16, 2019, months after the rescission.45

Second, according to Plaintiffs, the evidence showed that they did not demand significantly

higher salaries, but instead merely requested a review of their offered salaries.46 In connection

with this point, Plaintiffs further argue that LSU misrepresented Cunningham’s requested salary

in its opening statement, that LSU’s salary-compression argument could not have applied to

Cunningham’s actual request, and that LSU presented no evidence of a market study it may have

done for Cunningham’s position.47 With respect to Muslow’s salary request, Plaintiffs contend

that, although Muslow requested a salary higher than Jones’s or Skinner’s salary at the time, there

was no evidence that she was aware of their salaries.48 Further, say Plaintiffs, a finding of pretext

is supported by the insufficient evidence of the accuracy and completeness of the OGC market

study done for Muslow’s OGC position; the evidence that the OGC salary initially offered to

Muslow exceeded the recommended range; and LSU’s failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ inquiries

45 Id. at 5-7.

46 Id. at 7.

47 Id. at 7-9.

48 Id. at 10.

following the rescission.49 Plaintiffs also assert that there was a basis for the jury to conclude that

Muslow’s salary request was reasonable in light of her own experience and background because

the jury heard evidence that Muslow’s replacement, Louis Colletta, who was hired at a salary

within the OGC range, lacked commensurate qualifications and experience for the role.50

As their third point in opposition, Plaintiffs submit that their use of the 2017 Market Study

at trial was an appropriate rebuttal of LSU’s stated rationale that Plaintiffs’ salary demands were

too high.51 Plaintiffs make four arguments in support of this point: first, that the 2017 Market

Study directly undermined LSU’s contention that Plaintiffs’ salary requests were too high;52

second, that although Plaintiffs’ positions were being transitioned from LSUHSC-NO to the OGC,

there was evidence that Plaintiffs’ positions would remain inextricably linked to LSUHSC-NO,

even after implementation of the transition;53 third, that when Muslow previously submitted a

salary adjustment request that did not mention pay equity, LSU’s response (viz., a salary

adjustment) stands in contrast to its response to her February 15, 2019 email requesting a salary

adjustment on the basis of gender pay equity;54 and fourth, that Plaintiffs’ introduction of the 2017

Market Study did not invite the jury to second-guess LSU’s business judgment when presented in

conjunction with other evidence.55

Plaintiffs’ fourth of five points in opposition to LSU’s argument that Plaintiffs failed to

submit evidence sufficient to support a finding of pretext is that they appropriately rebutted LSU’s

salary compression theory. Specifically, Plaintiffs urge that, although LSU’s HR witness Joyce

Whitfield testified that inversion – a subordinate’s salary approaching, equaling, or exceeding their

49 Id. at 10-12.

50 Id. at 12.

51 Id. at 12-18.

52 Id. at 12-13.

53 Id. at 13-14.

54 Id. at 14-15.

55 Id. at 15.

supervisor’s salary – is discouraged, she did not testify that it never occurs.56 Plaintiffs highlight

that salary compression was not a concern with respect to Cunningham’s salary request and that,

although Muslow’s requested salary would have exceeded that of OGC administrators, it was less

than Hollier’s salary, for whom Muslow would continue to work at LSUHSC-NO.57 Finally,

Plaintiffs say that LSU’s own witness examination invited Plaintiffs’ comparison of the salaries of

LSU’s coaches to that of its athletic director.58

Fifth, Plaintiffs submit that they did not ask the jury to assess the fairness of LSU’s salary

decisions, only whether the salary dispute was pretext for the rescission of the employment

offers.59 Plaintiffs finally remark that the evidence at trial – specifically, Skinner’s admissions and

LSU’s shifting proffered reasons for rescinding Plaintiffs’ employment contracts – was sufficient

for a reasonable jury to conclude that LSU’s stated reasons were pretextual.60

In reply, LSU says that none of Plaintiffs’ purported causation evidence withstands

scrutiny.61 LSU first contends that, although Skinner testified that he was aware that the email

contained statements of gender pay disparity, a reasonable jury could only conclude that the

rescission was actually motivated by the too-high salary request because there was no evidence of

LSU’s retaliatory motive.62 Next, LSU asserts that Jones’s testimony confirms not that the

contracts had no signing deadline or that the February 15 email was the only thing that could have

resulted in the rescission, but that LSU had the ability to revoke the unaccepted offers at any time

and indeed did so as a result of Muslow’s salary demand.63 LSU then argues that whether the

56 Id.

57 Id. at 15-17.

58 Id. at 17.

59 Id.

60 Id. at 18.

61 R. Doc. 667 at 1-2.

62 Id. at 3-4.

63 Id. at 4.

February 15 email could be classified as a suggestion or demand does not change the fact that

Muslow’s proposed salary created salary compression concerns and that Cunningham’s proposed

salary exceeded the OGC’s annualized salary offer by more than 60%.64 LSU next posits that the

proximity in time of the February 15 email to the February 18 rescission does not show causation

“because the same period included intervening, non-retaliatory reasons [for rescission]: Plaintiffs

had not signed the OGC contracts, the appointment date had passed, and Plaintiffs had proposed

structurally unworkable salaries.”65 And as to Plaintiff’s assertion of shifting explanations, LSU

says that Plaintiffs “confuse[] elaboration with contradiction” and “mistakenly treat[] context as

changed rationale.”66 Finally, LSU argues that comparing Muslow’s 2017 pay-raise request to her

2019 pay-raise request is not probative of retaliatory motive as the requests involved different

decision-makers, positions, budgets, and chains of command.67

To prevail on its Rule 50(b) motion, LSU must show that “the jury’s factual findings are

unsupported by substantial evidence or ‘the legal conclusions implied from the jury’s verdict

cannot in law be supported by those findings.’” Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quoting Williams v.

Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C., 898 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2018)). LSU’s arguments largely ask the

Court to reweigh the evidence presented at trial and to draw inferences in its favor, rather than in

favor of the jury’s verdict. The Court concludes that the record contains sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable jury could find that the gender-based pay statements in Muslow’s February 15,

2019 email was the but-for cause of LSU’s decision to rescind the employment contracts.

First, LSU’s reliance on the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs never signed the OGC

employment contracts does not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law because there was sufficient

64 Id. at 4-5.

65 Id. at 5.

66 Id.

67 Id. at 5-6.

evidence presented at trial upon which the jury could reasonably rely to reject LSU’s suggestion

that the unsigned contracts independently explained the rescission. To be sure, Plaintiffs point to

testimony from multiple witnesses that the absence of signed contracts was not the reason the

offers were rescinded: Jones testified that the contracts’ effective date did not operate as a signing

deadline and acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ failure to sign the contracts was not LSU’s actual

reason for rescission;68 Skinner testified that Plaintiffs’ failure to execute the contracts was not “an

explanation for why” the contracts were rescinded;69 and Donna Dewailly further testified that the

timing of the transfer was designed to benefit Plaintiffs rather than to meet some necessary internal

deadline.70

Although LSU did present evidence that it was Plaintiffs’ too-high salary requests alone

which motivated its decision to rescind the OGC employment offers, the jury was also presented

with sufficient evidence upon which they could reasonably conclude that the protected activity in

the February 15, 2019 email also motivated LSU’s decision to rescind the contracts. No party to

this litigation need be reminded that the February 15 email did not simply request higher

compensation; it expressly raised Plaintiffs’ concerns regarding gender-based pay disparities and

requested that their salaries be reviewed in this light. And Thomas Skinner testified that he “took

[Muslow’s email] to mean … that there was potentially a pay disparity between males and females

at [LSUHSC-NO]” and that he “read the letter as indicating that she had a problem with gender

disparity in pay at [LSUHSC-NO],” confirming that he understood the email to entail protected

activity in addition to making the salary requests.71 The jury also heard evidence sufficient for it

to reasonably disbelieve LSU’s explanation that Plaintiffs’ requested salaries were the reason it

68 R. Doc. 658 at 7.

69 R. Doc. 660 at 174.

70 Id. at 74-75.

71 R. Doc. 661 at 4-5.

decided to rescind the offers. First, Plaintiffs introduced evidence challenging the thoroughness

of the market analyses underlying the salaries proposed for the OGC positions.72 Second, even

though LSU emphasized that the OGC, rather than LSUHSC-NO, would become Plaintiffs’

employing agency, Plaintiffs introduced evidence that their positions would remain closely

connected to LSUHSC-NO after the transition73 and that LSUHSC-NO would reimburse the OGC

for Muslow’s and Cunningham’s salaries.74 Third, Plaintiffs presented the 2017 Market Study as

evidence that their requested compensation was not facially unreasonable. Although the parties

spill much ink over whether the 2017 Market Study remained relevant to assessing Plaintiffs’

proposed salaries, the Court had resolved that legal question before trial, leaving to the jury the

question of what weight to assign the 2017 Market Study in evaluating the reasonableness of the

requested salaries. The Court will not disturb the jury’s findings merely because LSU offers an

alternative interpretation of the evidence.

Sufficient evidence likewise supports the jury’s apparent rejection of LSU’s salary-

compression rationale. Jones ultimately acknowledged that Cunningham’s proposed salary fell

below both his and Skinner’s, indicating that salary compression was not a concern with respect

to her.75 A rationale that cannot possibly explain the rescission as to one of the two Plaintiffs is

one the jury could reasonably infer was not the real rationale for either.

LSU’s argument that Plaintiffs merely challenged the reasonableness of its business

decisions mischaracterizes the theory presented at trial. This is not to say that the reasonableness

of the salary figures was not an issue at trial; it was, as LSU urged that it rescinded Plaintiffs’

contracts based on unreasonable salary requests, and Plaintiffs responded that they were entitled

72 R. Doc. 660 at 107-143.

73 Trial Ex. 103; R. Docs. 6 58 at 20-22, 24; 660 at 194-95.

74 R. Doc. 660 at 85-86.

75 Id. at 240-41.

to develop evidence to establish the reasonableness of their salary requests in an effort to show

pretext. However, in doing so, Plaintiffs did not ask the jury to determine whether LSU made

sound compensation decisions or to second-guess its salary structure, as LSU contends. Rather,

Plaintiffs sought to establish that LSU’s stated business reasons were pretextual – not bad business

judgments – and that the true reason for rescinding the contracts was retaliation for Plaintiffs’

protected complaints about gender-based pay disparities. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel made this

very distinction in her closing argument.76

Finally, the temporal relationship between Plaintiffs’ protected activity and LSU’s decision

to rescind the contracts further supports the verdict. Although temporal proximity alone may not

always establish but-for causation, it is probative evidence that may be considered together with

other evidence of pretext. Harris v. FedEx Corp. Servs. Inc, 92 F.4th 286, 297 (5th Cir. 2024).

Plaintiffs’ February 15 email raising gender pay-equity concerns was followed by the rescission

of both employment contracts only three calendar days (and just one business day) later. Here, the

jury heard additional evidence that LSU failed to contemporaneously communicate to Plaintiffs

that their too-high salary requests were the reason for rescission, that LSU’s explanations for the

rescission evolved over time, and that prior salary-adjustment requests unaccompanied by

allegations of pay inequity had elicited a materially different response. Viewed as a whole, this

evidence permitted the jury to conclude that LSU’s proffered explanations were not its actual

reasons for rescission.

In sum, the trial record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that LSU’s stated reasons for rescinding Plaintiffs’ employment contracts were pretextual

and that Plaintiffs’ protected activity was the but-for cause of the rescission. The Court

76 R. Doc. 661 at 25.

acknowledges that the trial record also contains substantial evidence to support a verdict in favor

of LSU, had the jury come out that way. But that’s what trials are for. Because LSU’s arguments

principally invite the Court to reweigh conflicting evidence and reassess witness credibility, relief

under Rule 50 is unwarranted. Therefore, LSU is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.

2. LSU’s argument that Plaintiffs failed to establish entitlement to compensatory

damages as a result of rescission

LSU also argues that Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence at trial to support an

award of compensatory damages for LSU’s retaliatory rescission.77 LSU first highlights that, after

the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that Plaintiffs’ “salary-review request was not the but-for cause of their

termination,” this Court rightly rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that LSU’s rescission of their

employment contracts resulted in their actual termination.78 LSU then urges that both Muslow’s

and Cunningham’s testimony related to emotional damages they suffered as a result of LSUHSC-

NO administrators’ and employees’ responses to their position retirements – that is, termination –

rather than the OGC’s decision to rescind the proposed employment contracts.79 LSU also submits

that, although three of Plaintiffs’ former LSUHSC-NO coworkers testified about Plaintiffs’

emotional damages, those witnesses testified to comments that LSUHSC-NO (not OGC)

administrators made to the coworkers and that Plaintiffs never heard firsthand, which comments

LSU says do not support any award of emotional damages, or at least do not support damages in

the amount of $750,000 per plaintiff.80 Finally, LSU argues that, because Plaintiffs could recover

only emotional distress damages, and Plaintiffs introduced no medical evidence, expert testimony,

77 R. Doc. 656-1 at 16-19.

78 Id. (citing Muslow, 2023 WL 5498952, at *9).

79 Id. at 17-18.

80 Id. at 18.

spouse and family member testimony, or proof of psychiatric injury, the jury awarded them

$750,000 each only at the suggestion of Plaintiffs’ counsel, which LSU claims “doubles Muslow’s

prior $375,000 salary request to the OGC and effectively functions as an award of lost wages plus

liquidated damages.”81 Consequently, concludes LSU, no reasonable jury could have found that

the Plaintiffs suffered damages based on the evidence presented at trial.82

In their opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the evidence at trial established that their

emotional distress damages were a result of the OGC contract rescission, not the retirement of their

LSUHSC-NO positions.83 Specifically, Plaintiffs point to Muslow’s testimony “that she was

‘stunned’ when she received Mr. Skinner’s rescission letter”; that the response she received to her

email raising pay-equity concerns was not what she expected; that colleagues avoided her or

stopped communicating with her after the rescission; and that her departure from LSU affected her

identity and self-confidence.84 Muslow broke down and wept on the stand when explaining this

last reaction. Plaintiffs also highlight Cunningham’s testimony in which she compared her LSU

contract rescission to the loss of her father, explaining that she was shocked by the rescission, that

it caused her to grieve her career, and that it also affected her family relationships and identity.85

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court does not agree

with LSU that Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence that they suffered compensable

emotional distress damages as a result of the retaliatory rescission of the OGC employment

contracts, as opposed to the subsequent elimination of their LSUHSC-NO positions. Plaintiffs did

indeed testify to the emotional distress they suffered as a direct result of the rescission of the offers.

81 Id. at 18-19 (quote at 19).

82 Id. at 19.

83 R. Doc. 665 at 18-19.

84 Id.

85 Id. at 19.

For example, the jury heard testimony that, following the rescission, coworkers stopped

communicating with Muslow or avoided her altogether, circumstances that she described as

profoundly affecting her sense of professional identity and self-worth.86 Likewise, Cunningham

testified that the rescission of the OGC employment contract came as a shock, caused her to grieve

the loss of her career, and negatively affected both her personal identity and her family

relationships.87 A reasonable jury could conclude from this testimony that Plaintiffs suffered

emotional distress attributable to the retaliatory rescission itself.

LSU cannot prevail on its position that the evidence is insufficient to support damages

resulting from the rescission simply because certain testimony referenced Plaintiffs’ ultimate

departure from LSU. It is true that the Fifth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’ protected activity was not

the but-for cause of the termination of their LSUHSC-NO employment, Muslow, 2023 WL

5498952 at *9, and that this Court likewise recognized that the elimination of Plaintiffs’ existing

positions was distinct from the rescission of the contracts and thus could not be the basis for any

damages.88 Those rulings, however, do not constrain this Court to rule now that the evidence of

Plaintiffs’ emotional distress presented at trial was insufficient; instead, it was reasonable, from

the evidence, for the jury to award damages for distress that it found resulted from the rescission

of the OGC contracts, even though some manifestations of that distress may have lingered until

when Plaintiffs’ LSUHSC-NO positions terminated.

Although LSU emphasizes the absence of medical records, expert testimony, and testimony

from family members, such evidence is not a prerequisite to recovering compensatory damages

for emotional distress under Title VII. A plaintiff’s own testimony, if credited by the jury, may be

86 R. Doc. 658 at 185-86.

87 R. Doc. 659 at 183-84, 2 00-03, 191-92.

88 See generally R. Doc. 561 at 13-38.

sufficient to support such an award generally. See, e.g., Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365,

377-78 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, both Plaintiffs testified extensively regarding the emotional impact

of the rescission and their treatment by others in the wake of rescission. And the jury had the

opportunity to assess the Plaintiffs’ credibility firsthand, including observing Muslow become

visibly emotional while describing the effect the events had on her identity and self-confidence.

Former coworkers of Plaintiffs corroborated the altered attitudes of other coworkers and further

testified to their observations of Plaintiffs’ emotional distress in the LSUHSC-NO workplace

following the rescission.

Finally, LSU’s challenge to the amount of the jury’s award does not warrant judgment as

a matter of law.89 The relevant inquiry under Rule 50 is not whether the jury could have reached

a different amount, but whether there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which the jury

could conclude that Plaintiffs suffered compensable emotional harm as a result of the retaliatory

rescission. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, the Court concludes that there was.

B. LSU’s Motion for a New Trial

“After a jury trial, Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes courts to

grant motions for new trial for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an

action at law in federal court.” Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431. Those reasons include “if the trial court

finds that the verdict is against the weight of evidence; the damages awarded are excessive; the

trial was unfair; or prejudicial error was committed.” Adams v. Ethyl Corp., 838 F. App’x 822,

827 (5th Cir. 2020). “Notwithstanding the broad sweep of Rule 59, courts do not grant new trials

unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice

89 The Court will consider LSU’s arguments with respect to the amount of damages in conjunction with its

analysis of LSU’s alternative motion for remittitur. See infra Section II.C.

has not been done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests on the party seeking the new

trial.” Gen. Access Sols., Ltd. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2026 WL 823162, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25,

2026) (quotation omitted). In other words, “a new trial is warranted only if the opposing party

shows that it was sufficiently prejudiced considering all the facts and circumstances of the case.”

Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166, 180 (5th Cir. 2005). Counsels’ “improper

remarks become the basis for granting a new trial when the trial judge, with the benefit of his or

her first hand knowledge of the entire proceedings, believes that the remarks infected the

deliberations and conclusions of the jury.” Guar. Serv. Corp. v. Am. Emps.’ Ins. Co., 893 F.2d

725, 729 (5th Cir.), modified on reh’g on other grounds, 898 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1990).

As LSU makes eight arguments in support of its motion for a new trial, for clarity and ease

of discussion, the Court will address each argument in turn.

1. Admission of the 2017 Market Study and related compensation evidence

LSU contends that the 2017 Market Study and associated compensation exhibits were

irrelevant and should have been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 because

the OGC was the employing agency and set salaries by reference to its own budget and

recommendations from LSU’s Baton Rouge HRM, and that neither Skinner nor Jones knew of the

study when the OGC established the salaries for the new positions.90 It argues in the alternative

that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 because, according to LSU, it allowed

Plaintiffs to place their dismissed wage-discrimination claims before the jury indirectly.91

Plaintiffs respond that the study bore directly on LSU’s stated rationale (i.e., whether the salaries

Plaintiffs requested were unreasonably high) and that the Court’s rulings confined it to that use.92

90 R. Doc. 656-1 at 21-23.

91 Id. at 23-24.

92 R. Doc. 665 at 20-22.

Specifically, say Plaintiffs, because some evidence established that Skinner received relevant

portions of the 2017 Market Study before rescinding Plaintiff’s employment offers, there is support

for an inference that Skinner understood the basis for Plaintiffs’ pay-disparity complaints, but did

not inquire into the reasonableness of their requested salaries.93 LSU replies that the evidence was

used in a way “[t]hat invited the jury to decide whether the OGC made a fair compensation

decision, not whether LSU retaliated” and thus amounted to prejudicial error.94

The Court addressed these arguments in its pretrial evidentiary rulings, and it now adheres

to those rulings. In its August 20, 2025 order, the Court held that “the only remaining jury issue

to which compensation evidence may be relevant is whether LSU rescinded the OGC contracts

based on its subjective belief that the salaries requested by Plaintiffs for the OGC positions were

‘too high.’”95 Having advanced that rationale as one of its two reasons for rescinding the contracts,

LSU cannot fairly insist that the jury evaluate this rationale without reference to the document

from which Plaintiffs derived the figures they proposed. Pretext is measured against the

employer’s stated reason, and a jury cannot fairly assess whether that reason is worthy of credence

without necessary context.

The Court also previously considered and rejected the premise on which LSU’s relevance

argument rests. In declining to exclude LSUHSC-NO compensation evidence, the Court observed

that the salaries in the proposed OGC contracts matched Plaintiffs’ existing LSUHSC-NO salaries,

and so the distinction between the two entities did not justify categorical exclusion.96 LSU does

not point to anything at trial that requires the Court to reconsider that observation. Simply put,

LSU was able to, and indeed did, put forth evidence that the OGC positions were entirely separate

93 Id. at 22.

94 R. Doc. 667 at 6 (emphas is in original).

95 R. Doc. 581 at 21-22.

96 Id. at 21 n.130.

from those at LSUHSC-NO and, thus, were not governed by the 2017 Market Study.97 But

Plaintiffs put forth countervailing evidence that LSUHSC-NO would reimburse the OGC for the

Plaintiffs’ salaries, suggesting that the study was an appropriate consideration.98 Accordingly,

whether the OGC should have taken into account the 2017 Market Study in determining Plaintiffs’

salaries was a question properly decided by the jury on competing evidence.

Finally, LSU’s Rule 403 objection has already been addressed by the mechanism the rule

contemplates. The Court excluded nearly all compensation evidence concerning LSUHSC-NO

employees other than Plaintiffs, limited testimony on the methodology of the study, excluded

evidence regarding the asserted culture of discrimination at LSUHSC-NO, and reserved authority

to revisit admissibility of such evidence as the trial developed. That the Court did not exercise that

reserved authority reflects its contemporaneous judgment that the evidence presented remained

within permissible bounds.

2. The adequacy of the limiting instructions

Second, LSU argues that the Court’s limiting instructions were insufficient to cure the

prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence concerning the 2017 Market Study and

Plaintiffs’ allegations of gender-based pay inequity (i.e., the dismissed claim of discrimination).99

According to LSU, Plaintiffs consistently presented evidence and argument suggesting that

LSUHSC-NO underpaid them based on gender and that the OGC improperly failed to use the 2017

Market Study salary data when evaluating their compensation requests such that the volume and

repetition of that testimony and evidence rendered the limiting instructions ineffective.100

Plaintiffs respond that the limiting instructions were not rendered ineffective because the Court

97 See, e.g., R. Docs. 658 at 28-29; 660 at 206.

98 R. Docs. 657 at 88; 658 a t 50-51; 660 at 85-86, 242.

99 R. Doc. 656-1 at 24-25.

100 Id.

reissued targeted limiting instructions each time a witness’s testimony touched upon the subject of

pay inequity, and that the instructions explicitly told the jury to consider the evidence only in

connection with the sole liability issue being tried (viz., whether LSU’s stated reasons for

rescinding the contracts were pretext for unlawful retaliation).101 Plaintiffs also note that LSU

never objected to the sufficiency of the limiting instructions, proposed additional limiting

language, or otherwise raised the concern it now presses.102 Finally, Plaintiffs submit that LSU’s

argument, if accepted, would essentially mean that no case in which pretext evidence overlaps with

dismissed claims could be fairly tried.103 In reply, LSU says that it preserved its objections through

motions in limine and reiterates its point that the repetition and volume of the testimony rendered

limiting instructions ineffective.

LSU has not shown that it is entitled to a new trial due to inadequate limiting instructions.

First, despite LSU’s contention, the instructions given were neither generic nor infrequent. The

Court instructed the jury contemporaneously multiple times when the notion of pay inequity was

broached104 and, again, in the final charge.105 The charge stated that “it has been established,

through prior proceedings in this case, that LSU did not discriminate against Plaintiffs on the basis

of gender,” and directed the jury “not to give any weight to testimony or argument presented by

either party that LSU discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of their gender.”106 It further

confined the jury to the sole liability issue to be tried and instructed that the evidence be considered

“only for the purpose of resolving this issue and not other issues that may have been suggested by

the evidence.”107 These instructions were clear, repeatedly given, and narrowly tailored to address

101 R. Doc. 665 at 23-24.

102 Id. at 24.

103 Id.

104 See, e.g., R. Docs. 658 at 145-46; 659 at 51-52, 88-90.

105 R. Doc. 640-2 at 6.

106 Id.

107 Id. at 5-6.

the concerns raised by LSU. Second, LSU contends that the Court’s limiting instructions failed to

“limit Plaintiffs’ theme at trial that LSUHSC-NO market studies set the proper salary ranges.”108

This Court has already explained that whether the 2017 Market Study was or should have been

considered by the OGC in setting Plaintiffs’ salaries was a factual question for the jury and, thus,

a proper theme for Plaintiffs’ case at trial necessitating no limiting instruction.

“A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234

(2000). LSU has offered nothing to overcome that presumption – especially where, as here, the

particular instructions were given several times contemporaneously to cabin the purportedly

prejudicial testimony.

3. Second-guessing of salary decisions

Third, LSU argues that Plaintiffs improperly invited the jury to second-guess the OGC’s

salary decisions by relying on the 2017 Market Study to compare the OGC’s salary offers against

Plaintiffs’ qualifications.109 According to LSU, this evidence shifted the jury’s focus from whether

the rescission was retaliatory to whether the OGC made a fair or correct compensation decision,

contravening jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit which precludes courts from reviewing an

employer’s business judgments.110 Plaintiffs respond that the jury was asked not whether LSU

made the right salary decision, but simply whether it made the rescission decision on the basis

LSU claimed.111 Plaintiffs also note that the jury charge instructed that employers may act for

good, bad, or no reasons, so long as the decision is not retaliatory and that their counsel expressly

acknowledged that standard in her closing argument.112 Finally, Plaintiffs emphasize that LSU

108 R. Doc. 656-1 at 24.

109 Id. at 25-26.

110 Id. at 26 (citing Lemaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007); Abbood v.

Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 783 F. App’x 459, 463-64 (5th Cir. 2019)).

111 R. Doc. 665 at 24-26.

112 Id. at 25.

ignores substantial evidence that supports pretext, including the temporal proximity between the

email and rescission and LSU’s failure to engage with Plaintiffs about their salary requests.113

LSU has not shown that it is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the jury was invited

to evaluate the fairness of the OGC salary offers. The jury instructions explicitly distinguished

between perceived poor business decisions and retaliatory motives.114 Specifically, this Court

instructed the jury that “employers are entitled to make decisions in the workplace for good

reasons, bad reasons, or for no reasons at all, so long as the decisions are not based on unlawful

retaliation” and that “the fact that a decision was a mistake, unwise, or was even harsh or unfair,

does not constitute retaliation.”115 The jury was not asked whether LSU’s salary determinations

were correct or wise. It was asked only whether the rescission occurred as a result of the protected

activity in Muslow’s February 15 email.116

LSU says that “[m]erely disputing the facts does not establish pretext” and that “Plaintiffs

must ‘submit evidence to support an inference that [LSU] had a retaliatory motive, not just an

incorrect belief.’”117 This is true, but the Court finds that Plaintiffs did submit sufficient evidence

to support an inference of LSU’s retaliatory motive. By way of example, Dewailly testified that

the timing of Plaintiffs’ transition to the OGC had already been adjusted once and could have been

extended again;118 Jones testified that the February 1 effective date was not a deadline;119 and

Skinner testified that the lack of signature was not an explanation for the rescission.120 All of this

is evidence of pretext which, although circumstantial, when weighed together with all the

113 Id. at 25-26.

114 R. Doc. 640-2 at 7.

115 Id.

116 See R. Doc. 641.

117 R. Doc. 656-1 at 26 (quoting Coleman v. Jason Pharms., 540 F. App’x 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2013)).

118 R. Doc. 660 at 80-84.

119 R. Doc. 658 at 7.

120 R. Doc. 660 at 174.

evidence, is sufficient to support an inference of LSU’s retaliatory motive. See Harmon v. Collier,

158 F.4th 595, 615-16 (5th Cir. 2025).

4. The “CYA” characterization

Fourth, LSU contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s repeated characterization of LSU’s post-

rescission application invitations for the OGC positions as “CYA” was materially prejudicial to

LSU’s defense because it was a pejorative label that suggested LSU’s dishonesty rather than an

impartial view of disputed evidence and encouraged the jury to form opinions based on rhetoric

rather than the evidence.121 LSU says that “[t]he prejudice was heightened in light of pre-trial

rulings that determined Plaintiffs’ failure to apply for OGC positions after rescission – despite

multiple invitations – ‘cemented their termination,’ eliminating a retaliatory termination claim.”122

Plaintiffs respond that the “CYA” characterization was record-based argument rather than

inflammatory rhetoric, noting that both Muslow and Cunningham used the term in their own sworn

testimony to describe, in their opinion, the post-rescission invitations.123 Plaintiffs distinguish

Clapper v. American Realty Investors, Inc., 95 F.4th 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2024) (to which LSU cites),

where a new trial was granted following a barrage of personal attacks on opposing counsel and an

expert, as bearing no resemblance to their use of “a common and understandable refrain.”124

Plaintiffs further note that here the Court addressed the “CYA” complaint in real time from the

bench, expressing its confidence that the jury could place the evidence and argument in proper

perspective and instructing the jury that statements of counsel are not evidence.125 In reply, LSU

121 R. Doc. 656-1 at 26-27.

122 Id. at 27-28 (quote at 27 ).

123 R. Doc. 665 at 26.

124 Id. at 27.

125 Id.

says that the frequency of the term “CYA” is not the issue; instead, the critical issue is the meaning

and usage of the term.126

LSU states that “the constant use of ‘CYA’ encouraged the jury to infer bad faith from

rhetoric rather than objective evidence.”127 But even assuming that the “CYA” references could

be considered to “suggest[] dishonesty and wrongdoing by LSU,”128 the Court finds that the use

of the term does not entitle LSU to a new trial. The term “CYA” was not pervasive: it was used

at trial roughly twelve times across five trial days by Plaintiffs, their counsel, and by LSU’s counsel

during cross-examination.129 Further, it was not either counsel’s invention or argument of facts

that were “false or without basis in the record.” Clapper, 95 F.4th at 313 (quotation omitted). To

be sure, Muslow testified that she understood the invitations to reapply for their positions as “a

CYA,”130 and Cunningham testified that she similarly viewed the certified-mail letter inviting her

to reapply as “CYA.”131

Additionally, the Court addressed LSU’s objection to Plaintiffs’ use of the term “CYA”

during trial and sees no basis to revisit that assessment now. As the Court stated during trial, the

jury heard sufficient evidence and argument to place the Plaintiffs’ “CYA” characterization in

proper perspective and was instructed that statements of counsel were not evidence. In sum, the

Court finds that LSU is not entitled to a new trial as a result of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s use of the term

“CYA” during trial.

126 R. Doc. 667 at 7-8.

127 R. Doc. 656-1 at 27.

128 Id.

129 R. Docs. 657 at 25; 658 at 70, 90, 178, 181; 659 at 39, 194, 208; 661 at 25, 28, 31.

130 R. Doc. 658 at 178.

131 R. Doc. 659 at 194.

5. The testimony of Christine Manalla and Nicole Honoree

Fifth, LSU submits that a new trial is warranted because a portion of Plaintiffs’ emotional

distress claim relied upon testimony from former LSUHSC-NO coworkers regarding statements

made by LSUHSC-NO administrators (Larry Hollier and John Harman) outside of Plaintiffs’

presence.132 LSU emphasizes that the referenced comments were purportedly made by LSUHSC-

NO administrators (specifically, Hollier) who were not involved in the decision to rescind

Plaintiffs’ OGC contracts.133 Because the statements were not made by decision-makers, contends

LSU, they are not relevant to retaliatory motive, and even if they were, their relevance was

outweighed by the risk of prejudice – particularly, that the jury would confuse Hollier’s statement

as evidence of retaliatory motive on the part of Skinner.134 Plaintiffs respond that the testimony

of Honoree and Manalla was admitted for a proper limited purpose and cabined by

contemporaneous instruction.135 Plaintiffs identify two independent grounds for its relevance: to

describe the workplace atmosphere Plaintiffs experienced after the rescission, which bore on

emotional distress damages; and to frame for the jury LSU’s perspective on the post-rescission

invitations to reapply for the OGC positions.136 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that LSU invited the

testimony by introducing evidence of the offers to reapply, that LSU’s objections go to weight

rather than admissibility, that LSU cites no authority holding a limiting instruction of this kind

insufficient, and that LSU never requested a more robust instruction.137

LSU is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of Manalla’s and Honoree’s testimony about

certain comments made to them outside of Plaintiffs’ presence. Honoree testified that senior

132 R. Doc. 656-1 at 28.

133 Id.

134 Id. at 28-29.

135 R. Doc. 665 at 27-28.

136 Id.

137 Id. at 29.

administrators “sort of made joking disparagements about [Muslow]” after the February 15, 2019

email.138 The Court instructed the jury, as the testimony came in, that statements made outside

Plaintiffs’ presence could not be considered “for the truth of the matters that were asserted in these

remarks or references,” but only “in terms of general impressions.”139 The Court further clarified

that the testimony about Honoree’s own assessment of the remarks was not relevant to whether

Plaintiffs were damaged.140 And after Manalla testified that Hollier made certain disparaging

remarks more generally in the office, the Court issued the same instruction.141 LSU cites no

authority holding that an instruction of this kind is inadequate to the task, and, as Plaintiffs point

out, it never asked for a stronger one. Because the jury was told, each time this testimony arose,

precisely how it could and could not be used, LSU’s assertion that the jury nonetheless treated

these remarks as proof of retaliatory motive on the part of Skinner, the ultimate decision-maker,

rests on speculation rather than anything in the record.

6. The damages award as evidence of passion or prejudice

Sixth, LSU contends that the jury award of compensatory damages is so large that it can

only be the result of bias, passion, or prejudice, and thus a new trial – rather than remittitur – is the

appropriate remedy.142 LSU submits that the jury’s damages award of $750,000 to each of the

Plaintiffs, which is the figure that Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested was appropriate during closing, is

exactly twice the amount of the salary Muslow requested from the OGC, $375,000, and thus

“indicates the jury was swayed by emotional appeals.”143 Plaintiffs respond that the damages

award does not reflect passion or prejudice.144 Plaintiffs point to the jury charge directing the jury

138 R. Doc. 659 at 61.

139 Id. at 62.

140 Id. at 63.

141 R. Doc. 659 at 92-94.

142 R. Doc. 656-1 at 29.

143 Id. at 29-30 (quote at 30).

144 R. Doc. 665 at 29-30.

to make its decision without passion, prejudice, or sympathy and to not award damages as

punishment, and they argue that LSU offered no evidence the jury disregarded either of these

instructions.145 Plaintiffs maintain that an award explained by the evidence is not a passion verdict,

and they go on to describe the evidentiary record of emotional distress as detailed, specific, and

independently corroborated.146 Plaintiffs also dispute LSU’s theory that the verdict is twice

Muslow’s requested salary, noting that counsel did not reference the salary figure in her closing

argument and that nothing in the record would tie Cunningham’s damages award to Muslow’s

suggested salary.147

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. LSU’s theory that the jury “anchored” its award to

Muslow’s requested salary on the suggestion of Plaintiffs’ counsel does not compel the conclusion

that the verdict reflects passion or prejudice. LSU observes that $750,000 is twice the salary

Muslow proposed, but Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the jury consider a range of $500,000 to

$1 million for damages and told the jury the figure for any award was theirs to determine.148 The

amount awarded is the midpoint of that range, and the same sum was awarded to Cunningham,

who proposed no such salary figure to LSU.

Because an award of damages in some amount is supported by credible evidence of

emotional distress, this Court cannot say that it is the product of passion or prejudice such that a

new trial is warranted. As this Court has already explained in connection with LSU’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law, record evidence supports an award of compensatory damages. Both

Plaintiffs testified at length and with specificity to the consequences of the rescission, and three

145 Id.

146 Id. at 30.

147 Id.

148 R. Doc. 661 at 34-35.

witnesses described observable changes in them during the relevant period.149 Whatever the

correct measure of those damages, the award of some amount is not unmoored from evidence the

jury heard and was entitled to credit. The jury was instructed to decide the case in a fair, impartial,

and unbiased manner, to avoid influence by passion, prejudice, or sympathy, and that damages

could not be imposed or increased to penalize LSU.150 LSU offers no evidence that these

instructions were disregarded.

7. Plaintiffs’ closing argument

In LSU’s seventh argument for new trial, it identifies eight statements in Plaintiffs’ closing

argument that it says are misleading or prejudicial and warrant a new trial.151 Plaintiffs respond

to each of the eight challenged closing argument statements.152 Examined collectively and in

context, none of the statements necessitates a new trial. The Court will address the parties’ briefing

on each statement separately.

First, LSU contends that Plaintiff’s counsel’s comparison of the credentials of the author

of the 2017 Market Study to those of Joyce Whitfield (who gathered compensation data for the

OGC), and counsel’s description of the Baton Rouge HRM analysis as a screenshot from an app,

was an ad hominem attack inviting the jury to discount the HRM salary recommendations on which

the OGC’s salary scale rested.153 Plaintiffs respond that counsel’s remarks concerning Whitfield’s

methodology and credentials tracked her testimony that she drew her data from a third-party salary

platform and that she obtained her compensation certificate in 2020, after the January 2019

recommendation.154 LSU takes issue with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s statement that characterized the

149 See discussion infra accompanying notes 213-243.

150 R. Doc. 640-2 at 2, 8.

151 R. Doc. 656-1 at 30-39.

152 R. Doc. 665 at 30-35.

153 R. Doc. 656-1 at 30-31 (citing trial testimony at R. Doc. 661 at 23-24).

154 R. Doc. 665 at 31 (citing trial testimony at R. Doc. 660 at 93, 100-101, 131).

OGC’s market study as “a screenshot from an app without any information of the job duties,

searched by a woman who didn’t even have a certificate in compensation administration until three

years after the screenshot.”155 The Court finds, however, that this portion of counsel’s argument

is a fair comment on a witness’s methodology and qualifications, where such comment was

grounded in her own testimony.

Second, LSU submits that counsel improperly invited the jury to compare Plaintiffs’

qualifications to those of Skinner, Jones, and Colletta (who was hired as chief counsel after

Muslow), on an issue unrelated to the reason for rescission.156 Plaintiffs respond that the

comparison was responsive to LSU’s salary compression defense and that LSU itself placed the

comparison before the jury by eliciting on the direct examination of Jones that Colletta was hired

within the HRM salary range and below the salary offered to Muslow, opening the door to rebuttal

that Plaintiffs had flagged in pretrial motions and that the Court permitted.157 The Court has

already explained that the reasonableness of the salaries Plaintiffs requested was an issue fairly

before the jury. And the statements made in Plaintiffs’ closing argument do not exceed the limits

set by this Court regarding the evidence of Colletta’s qualifications that could be developed at

trial.158 Again, the Court finds that the statements with which LSU takes issue here are fair

comment on the facts in evidence.

Third, LSU contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel misleadingly discounted LSU’s salary

compression concerns by analogizing Plaintiffs to LSU coaches who earn more than their

supervisor (the athletic director), which shifted focus from LSU’s genuine belief about the

155 R. Doc. 661 at 24.

156 R. Doc. 656-1 at 31-32.

157 R. Doc. 665 at 31-32.

158 See R. Doc. 658 at 100-01.

reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ salary requests to Plaintiffs’ asserted market value.159 Plaintiffs

respond that the comparison illustrated that LSU tolerates subordinates earning more than

supervisors where market factors support it, rebutting LSU’s suggestion of a categorical constraint,

and that a reasonable inference from the record is not a material misstatement.160 The reference

to coaching salaries followed LSU’s own cross-examination question to Cunningham whether she

knew of any instance in government of a subordinate earning substantially more than a

supervisor.161 Accordingly, because the jury had heard testimony analogizing Plaintiffs’ situation

to that of LSU coaches, the Court does not find that such reference in the closing argument was so

prejudicial to LSU as to warrant a new trial.

Fourth, LSU posits that Plaintiffs’ counsel misstated the evidence by suggesting that LSU

invented new positions and hired a less-experienced candidate at $182,000, even though the HRM

recommended salary range of $131,000 to $188,000 predated the rescission and the same positions

were later publicly posted through a competitive process.162 In response, Plaintiffs say that the

statement illustrated their pretext theory and tracked the documentary record, given testimony that

the transition was contemplated to be an agency transfer, not a competitive process, until after

Plaintiffs pressed their pay-equity concerns.163 Again, the assertions of Plaintiffs’ counsel in

closing were based on facts in evidence or fair inferences to be drawn from such facts.164

Fifth, LSU contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel inaccurately told the jury that the OGC was

not paying the salaries at issue, which LSU says conflated interagency chargebacks with the

OGC’s status as the employing agency and undermined LSU’s salary-compression rationale.165

159 R. Doc. 656-1 at 32.

160 R. Doc. 665 at 32-33.

161 R. Doc. 659 at 249-52.

162 R. Doc. 656-1 at 33.

163 R. Doc. 665 at 33.

164 R. Doc. 660 at 32, 64, 187.

165 R. Doc. 656-1 at 33-34.

Plaintiffs respond that their statement was supported by documentary evidence and LSU’s own

witnesses’ testimony that LSUHSC-NO would fund Plaintiffs’ salaries by reimbursing the

OGC.166 Counsel’s statement that Plaintiffs’ salaries would ultimately be borne by LSUHSC-NO

was supported by documentary evidence and by LSU’s witnesses.167

Sixth, LSU says that Plaintiffs’ counsel misstated the but-for liability question by framing

the issue as whether LSU retaliated because Plaintiffs sent the February 15, 2019 email, which

LSU argues improperly treated the entire email as protected activity even though it also contained

unprotected (and, to LSU, unreasonable) salary requests exceeding the OGC’s offers.168 Plaintiffs

respond that their closing argument, considered as a whole, repeatedly isolated the protected

activity (i.e., the pay-equity concerns) from the balance of the email, and that any imprecision in

an initial shorthand reference was cured by counsel’s narrowing of the issue and the Court’s but-

for instruction.169 It is true that Plaintiffs’ counsel initially framed the issue as whether LSU

retaliated because Plaintiffs sent the February 15 email,170 which contained both protected

statements and unprotected salary requests. But it is also true that this framing did not stand alone.

The theme of Plaintiffs’ closing argument was the gender-based pay statements, such that it is

highly unlikely that the jury could have understood the protected activity to be any other portion

of the February 15 email. In addition, later in the closing argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel articulated

the protected activity with specificity and addressed the causation standard directly.171 The Court

then charged the jury in precise terms on but-for causation.172 In sum, considering the entire

argument made by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the jury could not have been confused about what

166 R. Doc. 665 at 33-34.

167 R. Doc. 660 at 85-86.

168 R. Doc. 656-1 at 34-36.

169 R. Doc. 665 at 34.

170 R. Doc. 661 at 16.

171 Id. at 29.

172 R. Doc. 640-2 at 7-8.

constituted the protected activity, but even if they were at the start of Plaintiffs’ closing, any

imprecision was corrected by counsel’s later statements and the jury charge itself.

Seventh, LSU submits that Plaintiffs’ counsel improperly equated Muslow’s 2017 pay

raise request while in her LSUHSC-NO role with her 2019 salary request for her anticipated role

with the OGC, which LSU says disregarded differences in position, employing agency, decision-

maker, budget, and compensation structure.173 Plaintiffs respond that the statement was offered

to show a departure from prior practice requiring explanation, that the factual distinctions LSU

identifies were all before the jury, and that arguing an available pretext inference is not

misrepresentation.174 The distinctions LSU identifies were before the jury, and LSU argued them.

That the jury may have been persuaded to draw Plaintiffs’ suggested inference is not a ground for

relief to LSU.

Eighth, LSU argues that Plaintiffs’ counsel invited an excessive emotional distress award

through anchoring (that is, suggesting a damages figure), noting that the only supporting evidence

was the testimony of Plaintiffs and three former coworkers, without medical documentation, expert

testimony, or corroboration from family members, and that no front pay, back pay, liquidated, or

punitive damages were available.175 Plaintiffs respond that suggesting a damages figure is

accepted practice, that counsel offered a range of $500,000 to $1 million and expressly left the

decision of the amount of any award to the jury, and that a jury’s acceptance of a figure within the

range supported by the evidence reflects the reasonableness of the suggestion rather than “the

power of the anchor.”176 Plaintiffs also observe that LSU declined to offer the jury an alternative

173 R. Doc. 656-1 at 37.

174 R. Doc. 665 at 34.

175 R. Doc. 656-1 at 38-39.

176 R. Doc. 665 at 35.

figure, which they characterize as a strategic choice.177 The Court tends to agree that suggesting

a range of damages is a fairly common practice. Further, counsel explained that she was suggesting

a proposed range of $500,000 to $1,000,000, but said to the jury that “[t]he number you decide is

entirely up to you.”178 That the jury chose the midpoint of that range does not mean that counsel’s

suggestion of a range was improper or prejudicial, and LSU cites no authority to that effect as

would support a new trial.179

* * * *

Although it has considered each of the eight closing-argument statements with which LSU

takes issue individually, the Court is aware that such “statements must be examined collectively

and in the specific context of the trial at issue.” Clapper, 95 F.4th at 314. Given that the eight

statements of Plaintiffs’ counsel were largely fair characterizations of record evidence and

otherwise not prohibited practices for closing arguments, the Court concludes that a new trial is

not warranted when the eight statements are considered collectively against the backdrop of the

trial as a whole.

8. The great weight of the evidence

Eighth and finally, LSU argues that a new trial is warranted because the verdict is against

the great weight of the evidence.180 LSU contends that the cumulative effect of the references to

dismissed claims and market studies, the repeated “CYA” characterization, the secondhand

remarks by non-OGC personnel, and the suggested damages figure overshadowed the sole liability

question tried to the jury.181 LSU asserts that the resulting $1.5 million combined award, which

177 Id.

178 R. Doc. 661 at 35.

179 Whether the suggested range and awards were excessive, even if not so prejudicial as to warrant a new

trial, is a different question that will be taken up in conjunction with the Court’s consideration of LSU’s motion for

remittitur.

180 R. Doc. 656-1 at 39-40.

181 Id.

exactly matched the amount suggested by Plaintiffs’ counsel, confirms substantial prejudice that

was cumulative rather than isolated and that could not be cured by limiting instructions.182 In

response, Plaintiffs say the verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence.183 They contend

that each component of LSU’s cumulative argument fails on its own terms and that the volume of

unsuccessful arguments does not change the result.184 Plaintiffs identify eight categories of

evidence supporting liability: the near-immediate rescission; Muslow’s earlier successful salary-

review request based on the 2017 Market Study without any mention of gender equity; Skinner’s

own admissions regarding the reasons for the rescission; LSU’s shifting explanations both after

the rescission and during the litigation; the implausibility of the deadline for signing the OGC

contracts and lack-of-signature rationale; the mischaracterization of the February 15 email as a

salary demand; LSU’s refusal to engage on Plaintiffs’ request for a salary review in the months

that followed; and the existence of LSU’s own market study, which Plaintiffs relied on and which

they contend was ignored.185 As to damages, Plaintiffs point to their testimony regarding lasting

physical harm, permanent personal loss, and professional ostracism.186 Plaintiffs conclude that

every concern LSU raises – spillover from dismissed claims, inflammatory rhetoric, secondhand

testimony, and improper anchoring – was addressed by the jury instructions or by the limiting

instructions given throughout the trial, that the jury is presumed to have followed them, and that

LSU has offered nothing sufficient to overcome that presumption.187

As an initial matter, LSU’s weight-of-the-evidence argument is really a cumulative-error

argument; that is to say, LSU does not contend that the great weight of the evidence is in its favor,

182 Id.

183 R. Doc. 665 at 35.

184 Id.

185 Id. at 35-36.

186 Id. at 36.

187 Id.

but that the cumulative effect of its complained-of trial testimony and rulings warrant a new trial.

To that end, the Court has addressed each of LSU’s arguments individually and found that none

of them warrants a new trial. That result does not change just because the arguments are presented

in the aggregate.

Then, to the extent that LSU makes the argument that the evidence is contrary to the great

weight of the evidence, it does not satisfy the standard for a new trial. The Court, in its discussion

of LSU’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, has chronicled the Plaintiffs’ evidence that was

sufficient to support the verdict,188 and LSU does not make a specific argument that the great

weight of the evidence is in its favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that LSU has not shown that

the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.

C. LSU’s Motion for Remittitur

LSU, in its alternative motion for remittitur, first seeks to establish that, although Plaintiffs’

claims arose under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act – and that compensatory damages are

available under both statutes – Plaintiffs cannot recover separate compensatory damages under

both statutes because plaintiffs generally “may not receive duplicative compensatory damages for

the same wrong.”189 Then, LSU argues that the jury’s compensatory damages award for each

Plaintiff is excessive when compared to awards in other cases in the Fifth Circuit, providing 13

cases it says are evidence of “the typical compensatory damages’ [sic] awards in this circuit.”190

188 See discussion supra Section II.A.

189 R. Doc. 656-1 at 41-42 ( quote at 41).

190 Id. at 42-43 (quote at 42) (citing Liner v. Terminix Pest Control, Inc., 2025 WL 2054584, at *3 (E.D. La.

July 18, 2025); Harris v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 92 F.4th 286, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2024); Pickett v. Miss. Bd. of Animal

Health, 2021 WL 3373806, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 3, 2021); Wallace v. Bd. of Supervisors for Univ. of La. Sys., 2017

WL 1428459 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2017); Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F. App’x 909, 916 (5th Cir. 2008);

Salinas v. O’Neill, 286 F.3d 827, 830-33 (5th Cir. 2002); Picou v. City of Jackson, 2002 WL 31016468, at *5-6 (5th

Cir. Aug. 13, 2002); Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 297 F.3d 361, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2002); Giles v. Gen. Elec.

Co., 245 F.3d 474, 487-89 (5th Cir. 2001); Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2000); Williams

v. Trader Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2000); Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (5th

Cir. 1998); and Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 941 (5th Cir. 1996)).

LSU specifically submits that Plaintiffs’ awards are excessive because much of the trial testimony

related to damages, such as the “career grief shock” Cunningham reported experiencing and

emotional damages resulting from the extension of Muslow’s LSUHSC-NO position retirement

date, was attributable to Plaintiffs’ dismissed claims of wage discrimination and wrongful

termination.191 LSU next asserts that the jury’s award is “anchored to double Muslow’s prior OGC

$375,000 salary request” and “indicates the compensatory damages award may have effectively

served as disguised lost wages and unauthorized liquidated damages.”192 Finally, says LSU,

because the jury understood Plaintiffs’ emotional distress testimony to primarily address Plaintiffs’

concerns of gender-based pay inequity, how the retirement of their positions affected them,

remarks from certain LSUHSC-NO administrators which Plaintiffs did not hear firsthand, and their

perceived isolation from others during the final days of their employment at LSUHSC-NO, the

jury’s award was based on sympathy for Plaintiffs and an intent to punish LSU and, thus, must be

remitted.193

In response, Plaintiffs submit that remittitur is not warranted because of the strong

presumption in favor of affirming jury awards.194 And further, say Plaintiffs, remittitur is

unwarranted because, on the basis of the verdict form, LSU has no ground to argue that the

recovery is duplicative and because it is proper to presume, on the basis of the Court’s jury

instructions, that the jury found sufficient causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ contract

rescission and the emotional damages to which they testified.195 Plaintiffs then argue that the

evidence presented at trial satisfies the requisite standard for the award of emotional distress

191 Id. at 44.

192 Id. at 45.

193 Id. at 45-46. LSU also requests that, if this Court orders remittitur, and Plaintiffs do not accept such

remittitur, the Court order a new trial on damages only.

194 R. Doc. 665 at 36-37.

195 Id. at 37-38.

damages on several grounds, including Muslow’s testimony regarding the specific and lasting

physical consequences she suffers as a result of the emotional distress she endured following her

contract recession (i.e., elevated blood pressure, an inability to return to LSU facilities

unaccompanied, a lack of desire to leave her home, being avoided by coworkers, mocking by

colleagues, and a “destruction of [her] professional identity”);196 Cunningham’s testimony of

“distressing symptoms” (i.e., a feeling a being in limbo, “career grief shock,” negative impacts to

“her dynamic with her children,” fear of permanent professional consequences, and the guilt she

felt when seeing the way Muslow had been treated);197 and corroborating witness testimony of

three coworkers (i.e., Nicole Honoree’s testimony that the atmosphere at the university became

more hostile, that she witnessed “observable physical deterioration,” and that Muslow had not been

eating and did not look well; Christine Manalla’s testimony that “avoidance atmosphere [existed]

around Plaintiffs’ office,” that Hollier made remarks in the general office area that amounted to

counting down the days Plaintiffs would remain employed at LSUHSC-NO, and that the Plaintiffs

were anxious and felt disrespected; and the testimony of Terrilyn Cunningham that she withdrew

from her friendship with Muslow out of fear of retaliation, that Muslow had gotten thinner and

was not herself, and that she observed the same changes in Meredith Cunningham).198

Plaintiffs further argue that the cases to which LSU cites for its proposition that the jury’s

damages award is too high are insufficient to establish excessiveness of the awards. First, Plaintiffs

note that six of the cases are insufficient to use as benchmark verdicts for the maximum recovery

rule, as five are unpublished and one is a bench trial damages award to which the maximum

recovery rule never applied.199 Second, Plaintiffs also submit that the three cases to which LSU

196 Id. at 39-40.

197 Id. at 40.

198 Id. at 40-41.

199 Id. at 42.

cites with the lowest verdict awards200 were remitted “because the emotional distress evidence was

legally insufficient,” not necessarily because the amount of damages was too high.201 Then, say

Plaintiffs, the evidence they elicited at trial with respect to their emotional distress was specific

and extensive, and contains none of the same deficiencies as did the evidence in those cases.202

Third, Plaintiffs posit that remittitur is not appropriate based on “‘the mere fact that an award is

greater or less than awards in comparable cases,’”203 and they provide several cases in which

verdicts, although lower than the jury award in this case, were upheld based on evidence of

emotional distress damages that Plaintiffs maintain either is less credible or reflects less severe

distress.204 Accordingly, say Plaintiffs, those cases support upholding the jury award in this case,

as the record here has more credible evidence of more severe emotional distress.205 Fourth,

Plaintiffs submit that the jury’s adoption of their counsel’s suggested award of damages does not

necessarily indicate that the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice, as the jury is presumed to

have followed the Court’s instructions, and that even if such adoption did suggest passion or

prejudice on the part of the jury, the remedy would be a new trial, not remittitur.206 And finally,

Plaintiffs urge that LSU has failed to meet its burden to justify remittitur, and the command for

deference to the jury requires that the jury award be left undisturbed.207

In reply, LSU reiterates its position that the identical awards of $750,000 for each of the

Plaintiffs are excessive because Harris, the 2024 case in which the Fifth Circuit applied the

200 Vadie, 218 F.3d 365; Patterson, 90 F.3d 927; and Picou, 2002 WL 31016468.

201 Id. at 42-43.

202 Id.

203 Id. at 43 (quoting Thomas, 297 F.3d at 376 (Dennis, J., concurring)).

204 Id. at 43-44 (citing Williams, 218 F.3d at 486-87; Forsyth v. City of Dall., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.

1996); Salinas, 286 F.3d at 829-32; Giles, 245 F.3d at 487-89; Thomas, 297 F.3d at 370-72; and Harris, 92 F.4th at

300-01).

205 Id.

206 Id. at 44-45.

207 Id. at 45.

maximum recovery rule to sustain damages of only $248,619.57, included stronger evidence of

emotional distress.208 And LSU argues that certain of Plaintiffs’ cited authority is

distinguishable.209 It notes that Plaintiffs do not bother to identify a single case in which a

comparable verdict was awarded for emotional distress damages resulting from employment

retaliation.210 LSU then says that Plaintiffs’ arguments that the verdict form and jury instructions

prevented duplicative recovery or any award of non-actionable damages do not speak to a

challenge to the excessiveness of the award.211 Finally, LSU repeats that the matching $750,000

awards represent an adoption of “a rhetorical number” and, when considering that “the narrow

rescission claim affected Plaintiffs under different salaries, FTE status, and offer terms,” further

indicate the excessiveness of the awards.212

Under Rule 59(a)(1)(A), a court may “grant a new trial when the jury’s award is excessive

and against the great weight of the evidence in a manner that suggests bias or prejudice.” Gaddy

v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 3d 140, 159 (E.D. La. 2020) (citing Brunnemann v. Terra

Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1992)), aff’d sub nom., Adams v. Ethyl Corp., 838 F. App’x

822 (5th Cir. 2020). If, however, the damages award is “merely excessive or so large as to appear

contrary to right reason … remitter, not a new trial,” is the appropriate remedy. Brunnemann, 975

F.2d at 178. “An award is excessive only if it is greater than the maximum amount the trier of fact

could properly have awarded.” Moore v. M/V Angela, 353 F.3d 376, 384 (5th Cir. 2003).

Courts in the Fifth Circuit utilize a “maximum recovery rule” to determine whether a jury’s

general damages award is excessive. Harris, 92 F.4th at 299 & n.10; Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922

208 R. Doc. 667 at 8-9.

209 Id. at 9.

210 Id. at 9 n.38.

211 Id. at 9.

212 Id. at 9-10 (quote at 10).

F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2019). “The inquiry looks to other published decisions from the relevant

jurisdiction … involving comparable facts.” Longoria v. Hunter Express, Ltd., 932 F.3d 360, 365

(5th Cir. 2019). “‘The relevant jurisdiction for federal discrimination law can only mean cases

decided by this court [i.e., the Fifth Circuit].’” Harris, 92 F.4th at 299 (quoting Salinas, 286 F.3d

at 832). Although “[p]ast verdicts can provide an objective frame of reference,” they do not

control, because “[w]hen determining the excessiveness of a jury verdict, courts must review each

case on its own facts.” Puga, 922 F.3d at 297 (quotations omitted). The maximum recovery rule

allows a verdict that is less than or equal to 150% of the highest inflation-adjusted awards in

analogous, published cases from the relevant jurisdiction. Longoria, 932 F.3d at 365, 367.

The Court’s remittitur inquiry at step one, then, is the question of excessiveness. It is not

lost on the Court that “[t]here is a strong presumption in favor of affirming a jury award of

damages.” Harris, 92 F.4th at 298. But, having examined the facts and circumstances of this case,

coupled with a careful review of the prior awards in comparable cases in this Circuit, the Court is

persuaded that the jury’s damages award “‘exceeds the bounds of any reasonable recovery.’”

Brunnemann, 975 F.2d at 178 (alteration omitted) (quoting Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods.

Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984)).

As for the facts and circumstances of this case, the extent of the emotional damages

evidence came from Muslow’s and Cunningham’s own testimony, as well as that of three

corroborating witnesses – Nicole Honoree, Christine Manalla, and Terrilyn Cunningham. First,

Muslow explained that she was “shocked” and “stunned” when she received notification from

Skinner that her employment offer had been rescinded.213 Muslow testified that coworkers,

including some with whom she had had relationships for years, began to avoid her out of concern

213 R. Doc. 658 at 159-60.

that they, too, would be retaliated against.214 She described such avoidance as “hurtful.”215 She

explained that, as a result of her emotional distress, she does not sleep well, feels nervous and

uncomfortable, and struggles with self-esteem issues.216 She explained that, because she felt that

LSUHSC-NO “was [her] identity,” after she realized she would no longer work there, she became

antisocial and would rarely leave her home.217 She was too distressed to return to the LSUHSC-

NO campus, where the majority of her doctors were, so she either stopped visiting her healthcare

providers or changed them.218 She experienced high blood pressure when she visited the

campus.219 And she told the jury that she was absent “mentally” from her children’s lives and

“fe[lt] like a failure” because she was not there for her family in the way she felt she should have

been.220 Further, Muslow explained that, in order for her to receive certain retirement benefits,

LSUHSC-NO extended the end date for her position to July 15, 2019, rather than the originally

anticipated end date of June 30, 2019, but the interim prospect of losing the benefits was

worrisome.221 And according to Muslow, although LSUHSC-NO would normally not require an

employee whose employment would soon end to come into the office, they required her to go into

work, which meant Muslow could not celebrate her sixtieth birthday with her parents in

Shreveport.222 Muslow further testified that, as it turned out, that planned trip would have been

the last time she or her family could “s[ee her father] healthy … where he was himself” because

the next time she was able to see him, several months later in October, he had become ill, and he

214 Id. at 185-86.

215 Id. at 187.

216 Id.

217 Id. at 188.

218 Id. at 188-89.

219 Id. at 189.

220 Id. at 189-90.

221 Id. at 175.

222 Id. at 175-77.

died shortly afterwards.223 Muslow wept during the testimony about her inability to travel to

Shreveport in the summer of 2019 to see her parents.224

Plaintiff Cunningham testified that, after her OGC employment offer had been rescinded,

she “fe[lt] physically sick,” “unhuman,” and of little worth to LSUHSC-NO.225 When asked by

counsel about her “stress levels,” Cunningham explained that she was “very familiar with cortisol,”

evidence that she had endured stress for at least some time as a result of the rescission and that she

had been “grieving a career,” although she explained that she loves her current job.226 She attested

that her stress caused her to be “short” and “not present” with her children, which she is still trying

to make up to them.227 Cunningham also testified that the LSU system generally had been part of

her identity, as she received her undergraduate degree from LSU in Baton Rouge, and following

the rescission, “that little part of [her] is dead and gone” and she will “never get it back.”228

Cunningham likened the shock she felt when receiving Skinner’s email recounting the events

leading to the rescission to a lesser version of the shock she felt when her father passed away

unexpectedly – like “electricity flowing through your veins, and your brain kind of turns off.”229

She stated that people at work treated her like a “toxic waste dump[]” and would avoid her, which

made her feel “humiliated.”230 She explained that, as of the date of her trial testimony, she was

still not “over” the rescission.231

223 Id. at 177.

224 See id. at 178 (indicating that Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Muslow if she needed to take a break shortly after

testifying about her father’s death).

225 R. Doc. 659 at 200.

226 Id. at 183-84, 201 (quotes at 201).

227 Id. at 201-02 (quotes at 201).

228 Id. at 202-03.

229 Id. at 183.

230 Id. at 191.

231 Id. at 192.

Nicole Honoree testified that Muslow seemed significantly affected, that she “appeared to

stop eating,” and she “didn’t look well.”232 Honoree corroborated Muslow’s testimony that

Muslow was worried about her family and her retirement eligibility, and she also testified that

Muslow became more isolated at work.233 Honoree did not testify to Cunningham’s emotional

distress damages. Christine Manalla testified that the rescission was “incredibly stressful for

[Muslow],” “took a toll on [Muslow] physically,” and made Muslow “fe[el] very disrespected”

and isolated.234 She explained that people avoided both Plaintiffs at work.235 And she said that

Cunningham was similarly affected by the rescission: Cunningham was “stressed, anxious,

worried, disrespected” and “fe[lt] … tossed off.”236 Finally, Manalla testified that Hollier would

make comments about Plaintiffs – that they were “‘not really [his] problem anymore’” – out loud

in the general office area.237 Terrilyn Cunningham testified that, following the rescission, the

Plaintiffs were left off emails and not involved in the same work they would normally be involved

in;238 that people around the office, including herself, did not want or were afraid to engage with

Muslow;239 that Muslow became thinner and stopped eating certain foods she loved, like French

fries;240 that Muslow’s self-confidence began waning;241 that her friendship with Muslow

deteriorated;242 and that Meredith Cunningham became more isolated at work and stopped smiling

as much as she used to.243

232 Id. at 64.

233 Id. at 64-65.

234 Id. at 91.

235 Id. at 92.

236 Id. at 92-93 (quotes at 93).

237 Id. at 94.

238 Id. at 117.

239 Id. at 118-19.

240 Id. at 119.

241 Id. at 120.

242 Id. at 121.

243 Id. at 120-21.

The Court, after considering comparable, published cases in this district, is persuaded that

the jury’s award is clearly excessive.244 In Harris, the plaintiff Harris had been employed by

FedEx, but was terminated after she made a series of race-discrimination complaints to HR.

Harris, 92 F.4th at 291-92. After a trial, the jury found that FedEx had retaliated against Harris in

violation of Title VII and awarded her $1,160,000 for past and future pain and suffering,

inconvenience, and mental anguish, id. at 293, which the Fifth Circuit reduced to $300,000, the

compensatory damages cap for Title VII claims. Id. at 296. At trial, the jury heard testimony from

Harris “about the emotional distress she suffered from [her supervisor’s] conduct and her

termination. Specifically, Harris stated she suffered from stress and anxiety, which resulted in dry

heaving; she took medication and sought professional help; she had trouble sleeping; she gained

weight; and she generally lost her enjoyment of life.” Id. at 300. Further, Harris’s emotional

distress testimony was corroborated by her pastor, cousin, and a long-time friend, who provided

testimony that “it was like the bottom fell out [Harris] was so emotionally destroyed”; “was having

to go to the doctor for more stomach issues”; “was gaining weight”; “had a sadness about herself”;

and “wasn’t the optimistic hopeful friend” she had once been. Id. at 300-01 (quotes at 301)

(alterations omitted). The Fifth Circuit explained that Harris had provided sufficient evidence of

emotional distress such that more than nominal damages were appropriate, but that “[her]

symptoms do not warrant a $300,000 compensatory damage award.” Id. at 301 (citing Giles, 245

F.3d at 489). Finding Salinas (a 2002 case) and Giles (a 2001 case) to be the most comparable

cases, the court found that the evidence supported a compensatory damages award equal to the

244 The parties spend a substantial amount of time in their briefing on remittitur discussing whether the

evidence was sufficient to support a ny award of damages for the specific claim at issue – the rescission of Plaintiffs’

contracts. Because the Court addressed the merits of this argument in Section II.A.2 above, it does not now retread

this ground.

awards in those cases – $100,000 – and, after adjusting for inflation and applying the maximum

recovery rule, remitted Harris’s compensatory damages award to $248,619.57. Id.

In Salinas, Romeo Salinas was a Customs Service agent who, after filing three EEOC

complaints, was passed over for a promotion. 286 F.3d at 829. The jury found that the government

had retaliated against him and awarded $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, which the district

court reduced to $300,000 in accordance with Title VII’s damages cap. Id. Salinas testified to

substantial paranoia about further retaliation – specifically, “that it caused him to buy an alarm for

his house and reduced him to a constant state of fear, always looking over his shoulder and not

even allowing his wife to get the mail by herself”; to use “lots” of sick leave; to make more than

70 visits to physicians as a result of health problems brought about by his emotional harm,

confirmed by an award of $16,000 in medical damages; and to experience strain on his family

relationships. Id. at 832-33. His wife corroborated his testimony. Id. at 833. The Fifth Circuit

found that such evidence was not “enough … to support an award of $300,000” in emotional

damages. Id. The Salinas court found $100,000 to be “the proper award” supported by the

evidence and remitted the jury’s award to $150,000 in compensatory damages upon application of

the maximum recovery rule.245 Id.

The Court finds that the evidence of Plaintiffs’ emotional distress in this case cannot sustain

a damages award of $750,000 to each plaintiff. The evidence Plaintiffs presented is strikingly

similar to the evidence in Salinas and Harris – including evidence of physical manifestations of

emotional distress, deteriorating family relationships, and social withdrawal, a large part of which

was corroborated by other witnesses – which the Fifth Circuit held in those cases could not sustain

damages awards of $300,000. And although Plaintiffs suggest that remittitur is not appropriate

245 On a similar record of emotional distress testimony, the Fifth Circuit in Giles remitted a $400,000 jury

award of compensatory damages to $100,000. 245 F.3d at 489.

based on “‘the mere fact that an award is greater or less than awards in comparable cases,’”246 this

Court is convinced, based on its review of the most comparable cases, that the jury’s compensatory

damages award to Plaintiffs “exceeds th[e] bounds of reason under the facts of the case.”247

Thomas, 297 F.3d at 374 (Dennis, J., concurring).

“Having found that the jury’s award was excessive, the Court [at step two of the remittitur

inquiry] must now determine the highest amount the jury could have awarded based on the

evidence without abusing its discretion.” Gaddy, 446 F. Supp. 3d at 161. Again, Harris, along

with the principal cases upon which it relies (Salinas and Giles), serves as the best guide – if not

controlling precedent. As these cases all resulted in determinations that the appropriate award was

$100,000, this Court follows suit, finding that a more appropriate award in this case, given the

analogous facts and circumstances, is $100,000. Because the award in Harris was based off the

analogous award in Salinas, published in April 2002, the Fifth Circuit there adjusted the award to

$165,746.38 to account for inflation from 2002 through the date the jury returned its verdict and

then multiplied that number by 150%, yielding a compensatory award of $248,619.57. Likewise,

this Court will adjust the Salinas award of $100,000 for inflation through May 2026, the date the

jury returned its verdict, using the CPI Inflation Calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

See Harris, 92 F.4th at 301 & n.14. That amount is $186,386.54, and when multiplied by 150%

pursuant to the maximum recovery rule “[t]o avoid substituting our judgment for that of the jury,”

246 R. Doc. 665 at 43 (quoting Thomas, 297 F.3d at 376 (Dennis, J., concurring)).

247 Further, the Fifth Circu it has since explained that the distinction of whether to apply the maximum

recovery rule at the first step – determination of whether the award is excessive – or the second step – remitting the

damages – has no practical effect on cases decided under federal law. To be sure, the Harris court explained that,

although the Fifth Circuit “[s]ometimes … appl[ies] maximum recovery at the outset to determine whether the

damages are excessive” and “[o]ther times … use[s] the rule only to determine how much of a reduction is warranted

after deciding the award is excessive,” such inconsistency has no effect on the analysis of cases decided under federal

law. 92 F.4th at 299 n.10 (quotations omitted).

Giles, 245 F.3d at 489, each Plaintiff’s award is remitted to $279,579.83, as the highest reasonable

award for this case.

D. Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Final Judgment

The remitted jury award is below Title VII’s compensatory damages cap of $300,000. See

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Black v. Pan Am. Lab’ys, L.L.C., 646 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir. 2011)

(holding that the Title VII damages cap applies per litigant). Accordingly, as prejudgment interest

is available under Title VII when appropriate, see Thomas, 297 F.3d at 372, the Court must first

determine whether prejudgment interest is appropriately applied to the jury’s award in this case to

reflect “the time value of money and … to make the plaintiff whole.” Id. If so, the Court then sets

an appropriate interest rate. Finally, because the remitted award plus prejudgment interest may

exceed Title VII’s compensatory damages cap, the Court addresses LSU’s argument that

prejudgment interest is unavailable for damages in claims under the Equal Pay Act because

Plaintiffs also prevailed on their EPA claims and there is no damages cap in such cases.

1. The parties’ arguments

Plaintiffs request prejudgment interest because “to disallow prejudgment interest would

work an injustice, particularly considering the extensive emotional distress that Plaintiffs suffered”

in connection with the facts underlying the litigation “[a]nd the nearly seven years that this matter

has remained pending.”248 Plaintiffs suggest that either Louisiana’s judicial interest rate of 6% or

the average of the federal post-judgment interest rate and the Louisiana judicial interest rate would

be appropriate in this case.249

In its opposition, LSU takes two alternative positions. In support of its primary position –

that prejudgment interest is unavailable or inappropriate in this case – LSU argues first that, for

248 R. Doc. 653-1 at 2.

249 Id. at 2-3.

two reasons, Plaintiffs have not shown they are entitled to prejudgment interest.250 LSU first

reasons that, because prejudgment interest is not available for future emotional harms, and the jury

award does not distinguish between damages awarded for past or future emotional injury, Plaintiffs

have not carried their burden on prejudgment interest.251 LSU then reasons that, based on the

language in the jury verdict form, the jury’s damages award already includes the amount the jury

deemed “necessary to fairly compensate Plaintiffs in present dollars.”252 According to LSU, then,

awarding prejudgment interest would result in a windfall to Plaintiffs.253 LSU’s second argument

in opposition is that prejudgment interest, insofar as it is intended to compensate a plaintiff for the

time value of money, does not serve its intended purpose when applied to a jury verdict for

emotional distress damages only, which is meant to compensate for emotional injury rather than

provide a plaintiff money that had effectively been wrongly retained by the defendant.254

Reiterating its contention that the jury awarded Plaintiffs an amount that it found fully

compensated them for their injuries, LSU says that “awarding prejudgment interest would stretch

the ‘make-whole’ rationale [of prejudgment interest] beyond its intended bounds.”255 Third, LSU

argues in its opposition that, because the verdict did not establish when Plaintiffs’ injuries accrued,

the date from which interest should begin accruing is unclear and an award of interest would thus

be speculative.256 Fourth, LSU says that, because the jury’s verdict did not make clear the statute

under which it awarded damages, and because prejudgment interest is not available under 29

U.S.C. § 216(b) (a portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act, or “FLSA,” incorporated into the EPA,

one of the statutes under which their claims arise), the Court would have to speculate about this

250 R. Doc. 664 at 4-6.

251 Id. at 4-5.

252 Id. at 6.

253 Id.

254 Id. at 6-7.

255 Id. at 7.

256 Id. at 9-10.

question to establish that Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest.257 LSU concludes that, to

the extent Plaintiffs are theoretically permitted to recover more than Title VII’s statutory damages

cap of $300,000 by nature of having an identical uncapped claim under the EPA, they should be

subject to the EPA’s bar on prejudgment interest.258 Finally, LSU’s alternative position is that, if

prejudgment interest is awarded, the Court should award prejudgment interest at the federal post-

judgment interest rate, as, maintains LSU, the Louisiana state prejudgment interest rate or an

average of the federal post-judgment interest rate and the Louisiana state prejudgment interest rate

would create a windfall to Plaintiffs.259

Plaintiffs argue in their reply that LSU’s opposition rests on a “near categorical premise”

already rejected by the Fifth Circuit – namely, that emotional distress damages are too intangible

to support prejudgment interest – and contend that under Thomas v. Texas Department of Criminal

Justice, 297 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2002), prejudgment interest is available for past emotional injuries

under both Title VII and the FLSA (and, thus, the EPA).260 Plaintiffs assert that LSU’s reliance

on certain decisions that turned on “an explicit present-cash-value formulation ‘if paid now in

cash’” (that does not appear in the jury verdict form or jury charge in this case) is misplaced.261

They argue that LSU’s “speculative accrual” theory is simply a generic critique of all emotional

distress awards which the holding in Thomas forecloses, and that requiring a precise accrual date

would impose an unworkable standard on juries.262 Plaintiffs defend July 22, 2019 – the filing

date – as a conservative accrual date, citing trial testimony that placed the most acute emotional

distress in the months immediately following the February 2019 rescission of Plaintiffs’ contracts,

257 Id. at 10-12.

258 Id. at 12-13.

259 Id. at 13-15.

260 R. Doc. 666 at 1-2 (quote at 1).

261 Id. at 3-4.

262 Id. at 4-5.

before the complaint was even filed.263 They further contend that once the jury fixed a dollar

amount, the damages ceased to be “intangible,” since the judgment itself supplies the sum certain

on which interest can run.264 On the verdict form’s structure, Plaintiffs note that both the form and

jury charge were phrased in past tense and contained only a single passing reference to future

harm, with no present-value or discounting instruction anywhere in the record.265 Plaintiffs argue

that LSU waived any objection to the verdict form’s structure by failing to raise it at the charge

conference and by proposing a substantially similar form itself.266 They also argue that the

decision in Pineda v. JTCH Apartments, L.L.C., 843 F.3d 1062 (5th Cir. 2016), undermines LSU’s

§ 216 case law, since Pineda extended FLSA retaliation remedies to include emotional distress

damages and most of LSU’s cited authority predates that decision.267 Plaintiffs maintain that

because lost wages and liquidated damages were unavailable at trial, there is no double-recovery

concern as addressed by the Title VII/EPA overlap regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27(b).268 Finally,

Plaintiffs reiterate that the interest rate is discretionary, and they ask the Court to grant the motion

and award interest from July 22, 2019, through entry of judgment at whatever rate the Court finds

equitable.269

2. Whether prejudgment interest is required to make plaintiffs whole

In Title VII retaliation cases, “[p]rejudgment interest should apply to all past injuries,

including past emotional injuries.” Thomas, 297 F.3d at 372. Prejudgment interest is meant to

compensate the plaintiff for “the time value of money” and is intended “to make the plaintiff

whole.” Id. Where damages in a “certain sum” are awarded, courts should award prejudgment

263 Id. at 5-6.

264 Id.

265 Id. at 6-7.

266 Id. at 7-8.

267 Id. at 8-9.

268 Id. at 9-10.

269 Id.

interest to the plaintiff. Id. However, prejudgment interest is unavailable for future harms. Id. In

this case, the Court finds that the entire jury award relates to the Plaintiffs’ past emotional harms

and that, consequently, they are entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award.

There was virtually no testimony by either Muslow or Cunningham of future emotional

damage. Muslow’s testimony did not focus at all on emotional (as opposed to physical) harms she

may experience in the future or an expectation that any of her distress will persist. Cunningham –

although she arguably testified to the permanence of some of her injuries, including that she may

never get over the rescission and that she cannot take back the harm she did to her children –

similarly did not testify to any particular ongoing or future distress. Thus, although the jury was

instructed that it could award compensatory damages for injuries “that Plaintiffs are reasonably

likely to suffer in the future,”270 the Court sees no material evidence of future emotional harm for

which the jury could have compensated the Plaintiffs. And LSU does not specifically point to any.

A common-sense understanding of Muslow’s and Cunningham’s testimony, when viewed as a

whole, reveals that the verdict was for past damages (to which prejudgment interest is applicable).

Although LSU argues that prejudgment interest should be denied because there is no

ascertainable accrual date of such damages, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Thomas forecloses this

argument. The Court there noted that “[p]rejudgment interest should apply to all past injuries,

including past emotional injuries,” and that “[c]ourts should award prejudgment interest whenever

a certain sum is involved.” 297 F.3d at 372. The court in Thomas never concluded that Thomas’s

$30,000 award for past emotional harms corresponded to some precise injury-onset date. It simply

found that once the jury determined that the plaintiff suffered past harm and fixed the amount,

prejudgment interest had to be awarded on those past injuries. Id.

270 R. Doc. 640-2 at 8-9 (quote at 9).

LSU’s argument that the jury’s verdict reflects the present value of the Plaintiffs’ injuries

also fails. As Plaintiffs point out, the two cases to which LSU cites for the proposition that a

verdict already reflected the present value of a plaintiff’s injuries turned on the specific language

in the verdict form. See Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 846 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1988);

Aetna Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 301 F.2d 807, 813 (5th Cir. 1962). In those cases, the court asked the

respective juries to identify a sum of money, “if paid now in cash,” that would fairly compensate

the plaintiffs. Here, the jury was asked only “the total amount of money that fairly compensates”

each plaintiff for her respective injuries.271 Importantly, unlike the two cases which LSU cites,

there was no language that expressly directed the jury to consider the present worth of past harm.

See Grandstaff, 846 F.2d at 1019 (noting that the phrase “if paid now in cash” is used in Texas

practice “to direct the jury’s attention to the element of present value in a claim for future

damages”). The Court declines to read such language into the jury verdict form’s direction that

the jury award an amount of damages, if any, that “fairly compensates” the Plaintiffs. Again,

prejudgment interest should apply to all past injuries, including past emotional injuries. Because

neither the jury charge nor the verdict form encouraged the jury to consider present-value, and

because the Court will not assume that ordinary compensatory-damages language does so as would

preclude the addition of prejudgment interest for past damages, the Court determines that Plaintiffs

are entitled to prejudgment interest on their damages award.

3. The applicable prejudgment interest rate

Having determined that prejudgment interest is available for at least a portion of Plaintiffs’

claims, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest to make them whole, the Court now

turns to setting an applicable prejudgment interest rate. At first, Plaintiffs request the Louisiana

271 R. Doc. 641 at 1-2.

judicial interest rate from 2019, or alternatively, an average of the Louisiana judicial interest rate

and the federal post-judgment interest rate.272 Plaintiffs request prejudgment interest from the date

of judicial demand.273 LSU responds that the federal post-judgment interest rate is more

appropriate, as there are only federal claims in play here.274 Plaintiffs reply that they would be

satisfied with any prejudgment interest rate this Court deems appropriate.275

In light of the discussion below, the Court need not select a particular prejudgment interest

rate because any such selection is unnecessary to the final result.

4. Whether prejudgment interest is available for EPA claims

Compensatory damages under Title VII are statutorily capped at $300,000 per plaintiff,

inclusive of prejudgment interest. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sw. Rsch. Inst., 384 F. Supp. 3d 722, 727

(W.D. Tex. 2019); Marquez v. TE Connectivity Corp., 2022 WL 17494655, at *11 (W.D. Tex.

Dec. 7, 2022). Given that the remitted award nears $280,000, the addition of prejudgment interest

– by any of the requested measures applied from a start date of July 2019 – is certain to take the

award over Title VII’s statutory damages cap. Accordingly, to determine whether Plaintiffs can

recover the portion of their award, inclusive of prejudgment interest, that exceeds $300,000, it is

necessary to resolve whether prejudgment interest is available in claims brought pursuant to the

EPA – a point which the parties dispute.

In Reich v. Tiller Helicopter Services, Inc., 8 F.3d 1018, 1031 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth

Circuit explained that its practice, for years, has been to prohibit the recovery of prejudgment

interest in actions brought under § 216 – the statutory predicate for EPA damage awards. It

explained that such precedent was based on the rationale of a Supreme Court decision, Brooklyn

272 R. Doc. 653-1 at 2-3.

273 Id.

274 R. Doc. 664 at 13-14.

275 R. Doc. 653 at 10.

Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1945), which reasoned that where liquidated

damages were awarded in actions under § 216, permitting recovery of prejudgment interest would

result in a windfall to plaintiffs. Reich, 8 F.3d at 1031. The Reich court noted that it “has

consistently refused to allow prejudgment interest in actions brought under § 216 regardless of

whether liquidated damages were actually awarded.” Id. This Court is not aware of any decisions

in this Circuit since Reich – nor do Plaintiffs point to any – in which a court has awarded

prejudgment interest in an action under § 216(b).

Plaintiffs represent that the Fifth Circuit’s 2016 decision in Pineda undermines LSU’s

proposition that “FLSA retaliation remedies do not include prejudgment interest for emotional

distress damages awards.”276 Plaintiffs’ reading of Pineda, while not unreasonable, is overly

broad. Despite its rationale – “the FLSA’s broad authorization of ‘legal and equitable relief’” –

Pineda’s holding can more fairly be limited to allowing recovery for emotional injuries that an

employee suffers as a result of employer retaliation, rather than opening the door to all other kinds

of remedies. 843 F.3d at 1066. The Court declines Plaintiffs’ particular invitation here to read the

narrow holding of Pineda to have overturned the Fifth Circuit’s consistent practice predating Reich

of disallowing prejudgment interest for damages recovered under § 216 simply because the Pineda

court recognized that the FLSA broadly authorizes relief.

As a result, because Title VII’s compensatory damages are capped at $300,000, and

prejudgment interest is not available in actions under § 216, thus leaving the EPA award at

$279,579.83, each Plaintiffs’ Title VII award is the greater of the two, inclusive of prejudgment

interest, and will be capped at $300,000.

276 R. Doc. 666 at 7-8.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that LSU’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (R. Doc. 656) is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that LSU’s motion for a new trial (R. Doc. 656) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that LSU’s motion for remittitur (R. Doc. 656) is

GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ damages are remitted to $279,579.81 as to Katherine Muslow and

$279,579.81 as to Meredith Cunningham. Plaintiffs must file either an acceptance of the remittitur

or notice of intent to retry the case within 21 days of the issuance of this Order & Reasons.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the final

judgment to include prejudgment interest (R. Doc. 653) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded

prejudgment interest (whether at the federal or state interest rate) from the date of judicial demand

(July 22, 2019), through the date of the final judgment (May 7, 2026), up to the Title VII

compensatory damages cap of $300,000 (that is, prejudgment interest is awarded in an amount that

will bring the total damages figure to an amount that will exceed the statutory cap and thus is

capped at $300,000).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Plaintiffs elect to accept the remitted award, the

parties must jointly submit to the Court a proposed final judgment within five days of the date of

Plaintiffs’ notification of their choice to the Court.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 19th day of August, 2026.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE