Opinion

Brown

Court
District Court, W.D. New York
Filed
Aug 19, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 44.2%

The opinion

SINIES DISTRICFS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ED FILED CS

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK S

AUG 1 9 2026

AY Ew

GERMAINE VESTER BROWN, LESS woe is SEL

ERN DISTRIC\

Plaintiff,

v. 25-CV-421 (JLS)

NIAGARA FALLS POLICE

DEPARTMENT; SHANLEY;

PROIETTI; MILES; PETER WYDYSH;

TARNOWSKI; and WILDT,!

Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Germaine Vester Brown is a prisoner confined at the Elmira

Correctional Facility and has filed this action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

arising from a January 15, 2025 arrest by officers of the Niagara Falls Police

Department. Dkt. 1. Brown also seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) and has filed the required authorization. Dkt. 4.

Because Brown meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he is granted

permission to proceed IFP. The Court therefore screens his complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b).

For the below reasons, Brown’s claims against Wydysh in his official capacity

for monetary damages, the Niagara Falls Police Department, and his Fourteenth

! The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as it appears above.

Amendment claim arising from his inability to participate in a diversion program

are dismissed without leave to amend. His remaining claims are dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) with leave to amend as

directed below.

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Review Under the IFP Statutes

A court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental

entity, if the court determines the action “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); see 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (setting forth the same criteria for dismissal).

B. Pleading Standards

In evaluating a complaint, the court must “accept all of the facts alleged in

the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Larkin v.

Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). Although “a court is obliged to construe

[pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations,”

McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even a pro se complaint

must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a

complaint to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint states a claim for

relief if the claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007).

A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other

words, although a pro se complaint need not provide every last detail in support of a

claim, it must contain sufficient factual allegations to nudge the claim “across the

line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. See Komatsu v.

Cubesmart, Daniels Norelli Cecere & Tavel PC, No. 20-3676-CV, 2021 WL 6060603,

at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (Summary order) (to avoid sua sponte dismissal under

the IFP statute, “a complaint must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)); Scott Phillip Lewis v.

R.L. Vallee, Inc., d.b.a. Maplefield’s, No. 24-1438, 2025 WL 1077412, at *1 (2d Cir.

Apr. 10, 2025) (summary order) (same).

The Court’s liberal pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

A complaint fails to state a claim if it supplies only “labels and conclusions,”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action,” id., or “naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Although a court is “obligated

to draw the most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff]’s complaint supports, [it]

cannot invent factual allegations that he [or she] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius,

618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010).

C. Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege that the

challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law,

and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d

400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it

provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established

elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).

To establish liability against an official under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that individual’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation;

it is not enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the chain of command. See

McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, the theory of

respondeat superior is not available in a Section 1983 action. See Hernandez v.

Keane, 341 F.3d 187, 144 (2d Cir. 2008). There is “no special rule for supervisory

liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). Rather, “a

plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through

the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

D. Leave to Amend

Generally, a court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to

be heard prior to dismissal, unless it “can rule out any possibility, however

unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.”

Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Federal

Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)). But a court may deny leave to

amend pleadings when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu,

222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131

(2d Cir. 1998) (“Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be

productive ... it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”).

TI. ALLEGATIONS?

Defendants Shanley, Proietti, Miles, Tarnowski, and Wildt are officers with

the Niagara Falls Police Department. Dkt. 1 at 8. On January 15, 2025, Brown

“was in [his] wife’s car when [he] was approached by a Niagara Falls City Police

officer.” Jd. at 14. Brown was having a diabetic reaction, which the officer mistook

for him being intoxicated. Jd. at 5. After Brown told the officer that he was not

under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances, a field sobriety test was

performed. Id. at 14. Brown was also given a breathalyzer test, and the reading

2 The complaint includes attachments. To the extent that the attachments are

relevant to the incidents described in the complaint, the Court will consider them.

See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he

complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit

or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”). The facts alleged

in the complaint are sparse, and the most detailed account of what transpired is

found in the attachments to the complaint.

was 0.00. Id. The officer, however, told Brown that he had failed the test, and

placed him under arrest. Id.

Brown was transported to the Niagara Falls Memorial Hospital and was

forced to undergo a blood test without his consent. Id. The officer told Brown that

he had given the officer consent to order the blood draw, but Brown denies that he

gave consent. Id.

Brown was then transported to the police station, where “[t]he

officers ...beat[ ] [him] up” while handcuffed, id. at 5, 11, 14, and left him in a cell

for approximately 30 hours without having access to his insulin medication. Id. at

14. No one checked his glucose or provided “any other medical attention to find out

if that [was] why [he] was so incoherent and disoriented.” Jd. Instead, they

assumed that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol despite his request for

insulin and their knowledge from prior encounters that he was diabetic. Id. at 14-

15.

Brown also alleges that the officers and district attorneys tried to stop him

from participating in a diversion program. Id. at 15-16. Specifically, District

Attorney Peter Wydysh (“Wydysh”) “set[ ] [him] up” and officers tampered with

evidence. Id. at 11.

Brown does not indicate what he was charged with; nor does he identify the

disposition of the charges. He requests monetary damages. Id. at 6.

Til. ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment

“When prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State,

acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State not the county.” Baez v.

Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988). To the extent that Brown names Wydysh

in his official capacity, Dkt. 1, at 2, it “is, in effect, a suit against the state itself[.]”

Berman Enters., Inc. v. Jorling, 3 F.3d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1998).

“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress

has overridden it .. . a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of

the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); see also

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). New York

has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit under Section 1983, see

Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977),

and state sovereign immunity has not been abrogated by Section 1983, see Will v.

Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989); Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y.,

900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990).

The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to state officials sued in their official

capacities for monetary damages. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. Accordingly, Brown’s

claims against Wydysh in his official capacity are dismissed.? Because amendment

would be futile, the dismissal is without leave to amend.

3 “Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity ‘constitutes a true issue of subject

matter jurisdiction or is more appropriately viewed as an affirmative defense’ has

not yet been decided by the Supreme Court or [the Second Circuit].” Allco Fin. Lid.

B. Municipal Liability

The Niagara Falls Police Department is an “arm of the City . . . and does not

have a legal identity separate and apart from the City.” Forbes v. City of Rochester,

612 F. Supp. 3d 159, 170 (W.D.N.Y. 2020). Therefore, the Niagara Falls Police

Department is dismissed as a defendant from this action without leave to amend.

Brown has also sued individual Niagara Falls Police Department officers—

Shanley, Proietti, Miles, Tarnowski, and Wildt—in their official capacities,4 which

“is functionally equivalent” to a suit against their employer—the City of Niagara

Falls. Baines v. Masiello, 288 F. Supp. 2d 376, 384 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing, inter

alia, Graham, 473 U.S. at 166).

A municipality such as the City of Niagara Falls cannot be held liable under

Section 1983 unless the challenged action was undertaken pursuant to a municipal

policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 486 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead three elements: “(1) an official

policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a

v. Roisman, No. 22-2726, 2023 WL 4571965, at *1 (2d Cir. July 18, 2023) (citation

modified). Because “the Second Circuit has routinely affirmed such dismissals

based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” the Court will treat it as a dismissal

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which must be without prejudice. Canfield v.

New York, No. 6:24-CV-1357 (GTS/TWD), 2025 WL 1288747, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 5,

2025).

4 Where, as here, “a pro se litigant does not specify in what capacity the individual

defendants are being sued, courts generally ‘liberally construe the complaint as

alleging both official and individual capacity claims.” Anderson v. Pedalty, No. 14-

CV-00192, 2015 WL 1785192, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2015) (quoting McCloud v.

Kane, 491 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).

constitutional right.” Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995)

(quoting Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)).

An official policy or custom can be established by showing:

a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions or

decisions made by municipal officials with decision-making authority;

(8) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom

of which policymakers must have been aware; or (4) a failure by

policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates, such

that the policymakers exercised “deliberate indifference” to the rights of

the plaintiff and others encountering those subordinates.

Kurmangaliyev v. City of New York, 2023 WL 86540238, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,

2023) (citing cases).

Brown’s claims against Shanley, Proietti, Miles, Tarnowski, and Wildt in

their official capacities are dismissed with leave to amend. If Brown opts to replead

these claims in an amended complaint, he must allege that his constitutional rights

were violated pursuant to a policy or custom of the City of Niagara Falls.

C. Prosecutorial Immunity

The Supreme Court has held that “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in

preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in

the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of

absolute immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1998). “[A]bsolute

immunity protects a prosecutor from § 1983 liability for virtually all acts, regardless

of motivation, associated with his function as an advocate.” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d

81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994). This extends to even “allegedly conspiring to present false

evidence at a criminal trial.” Id. Absolute immunity applies “even when the result

may be that a wronged plaintiff is left without an immediate remedy.” Anilao v.

Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 863 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

427 (1976)).

Nevertheless, “the broad reach of absolute prosecutorial immunity ... does

not extend to ‘those acts a prosecutor performs in administration or investigation

not undertaken in preparation for judicial proceedings.” Stokes v. Wayne County,

No. 6:23-CV-06482 EAW, 2024 WL 4262276, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2024)

(quoting Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)).

Based on the allegations of the complaint, Wydysh’s conduct, even if

improper, was related to his role as an advocate and was within his prosecutorial

function, thereby entitling him to prosecutorial immunity for the claims asserted

against him in his individual capacity. See Anilao, 27 F.Ath at 864 (“[A]bsolute

immunity extends even to a prosecutor who ‘conspir[es] to present false evidence at

a criminal trial. The fact that such a conspiracy is certainly not something that is

properly within the role of a prosecutor is immaterial, because the immunity

attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.” (alteration in

original) (quoting Dory, 25 F.3d at 83)). The Court, however, will permit Brown an

opportunity to amend the complaint to allege sufficient facts that Wydysh acted

outside the scope of his role as prosecutor and, thus, was not shielded by absolute

immunity. See Morales v. Weiss, 569 F. App’x 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order)

(“[T}he district court erred in dismissing... claims against [the] prosecutors...

without affording plaintiff the opportunity to amend his pro se complaint to allege

10

sufficient facts that those defendants acted outside the scope of their roles as

prosecutors and, thus, were not shielded by absolute immunity.”).

D. False Arrest

“A [Section] 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment

right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures[,] is substantially the

same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Alexander v. City of

Syracuse, 132 F.4th 129, 156 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Kee v.

City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2021)). “Under New York law, to

prevail on a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant

intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,

(8) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not

otherwise privileged.” Id. (quoting Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128, 136

(2d Cir. 2021)). The existence of probable cause renders an arrest privileged. See

Singh v. Petro, No. 21-CV-813-LJV-JJM, 2025 WL 885594, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,

2025) (citing Ashley, 992 F.3d at 136). Consequently, “[p]robable cause to arrest is a

complete defense to a false arrest claim.” Alexander, 132 F.4th at 156 (quoting Kee,

12 F.4th at 158).

Generally, “probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge

or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient

to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be

arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady,

728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101

11

F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)). A finding of probable cause is not defeated simply

because “it is based upon mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer was

reasonable in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98,

103 (2d Cir. 1994).

Brown sufficiently alleges the elements of a false arrest claim at this stage.

He indicates that he was arrested for unspecified crimes appearing to relate to

driving while intoxicated, when, in fact, he was suffering from a diabetic episode,

and that the arresting officers were aware of his condition. Dkt. 1 at 5, 14. He also

alleges that he was subjected to a breathalyzer test, which revealed no alcohol in his

system. Jd. at 14. These allegations call into question a determination that there

was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

Lacking, however, is any indication who, among the five officers named as

defendants, was personally involved in Brown’s arrest. While Brown alleges that

“all’ defendants are responsible for the false arrest, Dkt. 1 at 5, his allegations point

to only one officer participating in his arrest. Jd. at 14.5 The false arrest claim is

therefore dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint should identify

each defendant who participated in Brown’s arrest and identify their role.

Additionally, any amended complaint should identify what Brown was

arrested for and the status of the criminal charge(s). These added factual

5 A letter from the Niagara Falls Police Department attached to complaint suggests

that Shanley was the arresting officer, but it is not conclusive. Dkt. 1 at 8. If

Shanley was in fact the arresting officer, this may be clarified in the amended

complaint.

12

allegations are necessary because damages in § 1983 cases are barred if a judgment

in the plaintiffs favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

EK. Excessive Force

Brown alleges that the “officers also use[d] excessive force when [he] was

arrested[,| [and was] beat[ ] up at the station.” Dkt. 1 at 5. At the time, he alleges

that he was handcuffed and “no threat to officers.” Jd. at 11.

Because the use of force appears to have occurred after Brown’s arrest but

before his arraignment, it is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. See Powell v.

Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment standard

probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person

arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint)

of the arresting officer.”); Cornelius v. Luna, No. 3:20-CV-01047 (JCH), 2024 WL

6859647, at *4 (D. Conn. June 13, 2024) (“[M]ost courts in this Circuit have

analyzed claims of excessive force arising after arrest but prior to arraignment

under the Fourth Amendment.” (citing cases)), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL

4116564 (D. Conn. Sept. 9, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-1859-CV, 2025 WL

2753718 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025).

“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from the government’s use of

excessive force when detaining or arresting individuals.” Jones v. Parmley, 465

F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.

13

1999)). As a result, these claims are subject to the Fourth Amendment’s objective

“reasonableness” standard. Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604, 612 (2d Cir.

2019).

“TA] government officer may not intrude on a person’s Fourth Amendment

rights by employing a degree of force beyond that which is warranted by the

objective circumstances of an arrest” or a detention. Jd. In making this

determination, courts look to the following factors, which include

(1) the nature and severity of the crime leading to the arrest, (2) whether

the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or

others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight., (4) the need for the application of

force, (5) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that

was used, (6) the extent of the injury inflicted, and (7) whether force was

applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

Linton v. Zorn, 185 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

Brown’s allegations that he was assaulted while handcuffed and compliant

raise a colorable claim of excessive force. Although the complaint attributes the use

of excessive force, as well as a variety of other claims, to “all” defendants, Dkt. 1 at

5, some identification of the conduct allegedly attributable to each defendant is

necessary to state a claim against a particular defendant.®

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “does not demand that a complaint be a

model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged, it requires, at a minimum,

6 A letter from the Niagara Falls Police Department suggests that Prioietti, Miles,

Tarnowski, and Wild were alleged to have been involved in the use of force and/or

deliberate indifference incidents. Dkt. 1 at 8. Plaintiff may clarify this in an

amended complaint.

14

that a complaint give each defendant ‘fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and

the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34

(2d Cir. 2001) (Summary order) (quoting Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d

847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961)). A complaint that “lump[s] all the defendants together in

each claim and provid[es] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct . . . fail[s] to

satisfy this minimum standard[.]”’ Id. Therefore, this claim is dismissed with leave

to file an amended complaint identifying the alleged conduct attributable to each

defendant.

F. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

Brown’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim is analyzed

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bruno v. City of

Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (addressing a

deliberate indifference to medical need claim under the Fourteenth Amendment). A

Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claim requires a plaintiff to plausibly

allege two elements: an objective prong demonstrating the existence of a “serious

medical need”, and a “mens rea” prong, that defendants “acted with deliberate

indifference to such needs.” Charles v. Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir.

2019) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d

17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).

The serious medical need element “contemplates a condition of urgency such

as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Id. Under the

mens rea prong, “something more than mere negligence” is necessary. Id. at 87

15

(quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996)). Deliberate indifference

must be “shown by something akin to recklessness” but “does not require proof of a

malicious or callous state of mind.” Jd. Thus, a plaintiff can “allege either that the

defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment would

pose a substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should have known that

failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to

the detainee’s health.” Id.

“[D]iabetes is a sufficiently serious medical condition to meet the objective

prong.” Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing cases).

Brown’s allegations that officers failed to test his blood sugar and denied him

insulin for 30 hours—despite their awareness that he was a diabetic and suffering

adverse consequences from the lack of insulin—is also sufficient to meet the

subjective prong. Dkt. 1 at 13-14.

Again, however, Brown fails to identify what role, if any, each defendant

played in the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical condition. This claim is

therefore dismissed with leave to amend.

G. Malicious Prosecution

To state a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege “(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the

defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the

accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding, (4) actual

malice, [and] (5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the

16

plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.” Alexander, 182 F.4th at 158 (citation

modified). “[U]nlike Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest, in the Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution context, probable cause must support each

charge brought by the prosecution.” Id. (citing Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602

U.S. 556, 562 (2024)). A grand jury indictment creates a rebuttable presumption

that probable cause exists to prosecute. See McClellan v. Smith, 489 F.3d 137, 145

(2d Cir. 2006).

Brown fails to identify what he was charged with or the disposition of the

charges. Without satisfying the favorable termination element, Brown has failed to

state a malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the claim is dismissed, but with

leave to amend. Any amended complaint should also include allegations identifying

the personal involvement of each defendant against whom Plaintiff brings the

claim.

H. Due Process Claim: Diversion Program

Brown alleges that he was not permitted to participate in a diversion

program due to the false allegations against him. Dkt. 1 at 18, 15-16. To the extent

that Brown claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were

violated because he was not permitted to participate in the diversion program, that

is not a cognizable claim under Section 1983. See Ruffin v. New York State Parole,

22-CV-185-LJV, 2023 WL 2480584, at *3 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2023) (quoting

Bonano v. Staniszewski, 12 CV 5879 (DLI)(LB), 2016 WL 112638168, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 2, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4220402 (W.D.N.Y.

17

2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-4163, 2018 WL 3814299 (2d Cir. May 30, 2018))).

Because further amendment of this claim would be futile, Brown’s Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim arising from his inability to participate in the

diversion program is dismissed without leave to amend.

I. Warrantless Search

Liberally interpreting the complaint, Brown raises a Fourth Amendment

illegal search claim related to the taking of his blood sample at the hospital without

consent or probable cause. Dkt. 1 at 14.

“Although blood tests are ‘searches’ under the Fourth Amendment, the

Fourth Amendment only proscribes those searches that are unreasonable.” Luck v.

Westchester Med. Ctr., No. 17-CV-9110 (NSR), 2020 WL 564635, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989);

Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2003)). “A blood test at

the direction of law enforcement with probable cause, exigent circumstances, and a

reasonable examination procedure is not unreasonable.” Id.

Brown has stated a colorable Fourth Amendment claim by alleging that the

blood sample taken at the hospital was without his consent or probable cause.

However, he has not identified which officer or officers were responsible for ordering

the blood sample. This claim is therefore dismissed but with leave to amend.

J. Failure to Intervene

Brown characterizes his claim as a “failure to protect.” Failure to protect

claims arise from the duty of prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at

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the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). There

is no allegation that Brown was assaulted by a prisoner. Instead, the Court

interprets the complaint as alleging a failure to intervene claim, which is based on

the duty of law enforcement officers “to intervene to protect the constitutional rights

of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence.”

Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994).

“An officer may be liable for the preventable harm caused by the officer’s

failure to intervene during a constitutional violation where the officer ‘observes the

constitutional violation and has sufficient time to act to prevent it.” Loftin v. City

of New York, No. 15-CV-5656 (MKB), 2017 WL 3614437, at *10 (H.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,

2017) (alteration omitted) (quoting Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir.

2016)). The dismissal of all of the underlying constitutional claims requires

dismissal of the failure to intervene claim. Wieder v. City of New York, 569 F.

App’x. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“Because the underlying

constitutional claims were properly dismissed, we also affirm the district court's

dismissal of plaintiff's failure to intervene claim.”). Brown may, however, replead

this claim in an amended complaint. If he does so, the amended complaint shall

identify which officers failed to protect him from which constitutional violations.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Brown’s claims against Wydysh in his official

capacity for monetary damages, the Niagara Falls Police Department, and his

Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from his inability to participate in a diversion

19

program are dismissed without leave to amend. His remaining claims are

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to

state a claim but with leave to amend. Brown may file an amended complaint by

October 5, 2026, in which he includes the necessary allegations as directed above

and in a manner that complies with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Brown is advised that an amended complaint completely replaces the prior

complaint in the action, and thus it “renders [any prior complaint] of no legal

effect.” Intl Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore,

any amended complaint must include all allegations against each Defendant so that

the amended complaint stands alone as the only complaint in this action.

Brown is further advised that he has been granted leave to amend only those

claims addressed above. A district court has the inherent authority to dismiss

claims that exceed the scope of the court’s order granting leave to amend. See Palm

Beach Strategic Income, LP v. Salzman, 457 F. App’x 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2012)

(summary order) (collecting cases).

ORDER

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Brown’s application to proceed IFP, Dkt. 4,

is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Brown’s claims against Wydysh in his official capacity,

claims against the Niagara Falls Police Department, and his Fourteenth

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Amendment claim arising from his inability to participate in a diversion program

are DISMISSED without leave to amend; and it is further

ORDERED that the remaining claims alleged in the complaint are

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(6)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted but with leave to amend; and it is

further

ORDERED that Brown may file an amended complaint as directed above by

October 5, 2026; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send to Brown with this order, a

copy of the Amended Complaint, a blank Section 1983 complaint form, and the

instructions for preparing an amended complaint; and it is further

ORDERED that if Brown does not file an amended complaint by the deadline

set forth above, the claims dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim will remain dismissed and the Clerk of the

Court shall close this case as dismissed with prejudice without further order; and it

is further

ORDERED that in the event the complaint is dismissed because Brown has

failed to file an amended complaint, this Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith

and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v.

United States, 369 US. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on appeal as a poor

person should be directed, on motion, to the United States Court of Appeals for the

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Second Circuit, in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

ORDERED that pursuant to Western District of New York Local Rule of Civil

Procedure 5.2(d), Brown must immediately notify the Court in writing each time his

address changes. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of the action with

prejudice.

SO ORDERED. po

□□

Dated: August 19, 2026 [

Buffalo, New York |

JOHN L. SINATRA, JR. ~

UMTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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