Badenhorst

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LEONARD BADENHORST,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 25-cv-00382-SPM

v.

DANIEL MONTI,

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,

JOHN AND JANE DOES, Members of the

Psychiatry Board, and

DR. BEDNARZ,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Leonard Badenhorst,1 an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is

currently incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center (Centralia), filed this case claiming

constitutional violations regarding denial of treatment and services for her autism spectrum

disorder (ASD). (Doc. 1). Following initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915A, Plaintiff is proceeding with the following claims:

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Monti,

Wexford, John and Jane Does (members of the Psychiatry Board),

and Bednarz for denying Plaintiff screening, diagnosis, and

treatment for autism spectrum disorder.

(Doc. 15). Now before the Court is a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 41). In

the motion, Plaintiff states that the proposed amended complaint (1) removes references to Shulty,

Christine Vineyard, and Mental Health Authority Jane Doe 1, who were named in the original

Complaint as defendants and dismissed pursuant to Section 1915A; (2) repleads ADA claims; (3)

1 Plaintiff identifies herself as a transgender female, who goes by the name Samantha. (See Doc. 5, p. 1).

pleads allegations against newly added Defendant Warden Wehking; (4) removes the conspiracy

claim, which was asserted in the original Complaint and dismissed pursuant to Section 1915A; and

(5) adds new exhibits. (Id. at p. 1). Along with the motion, Plaintiff submitted a proposed amended

complaint. (Doc. 41-1). Defendant Monti opposes the motion. (Doc. 44, 52).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), courts “should freely give leave [to

amend] when justice so requires.” Under Rule 15(a), “district courts have broad discretion to deny

leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies, undue prejudice to defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.” Mulvania

v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546

F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed in her attempt to cure

the previous Complaint’s deficiencies and allowing Plaintiff to amend would be futile.

A review of the proposed amended complaint shows that in an attempt to correct

deficiencies and add claims and new defendants, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead her

existing claims. For example, currently, Plaintiff is proceeding on an Eighth Amendment claim

against Wexford for having a policy and/or practice of prohibiting medical staff from screening

and diagnosing ASD. (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 15, p. 7). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

Bednarz and the psychiatry board created a policy not to screen or diagnose inmates for ASD at

the direction of Wexford, IDOC, and Warden Monti because “it has been deemed undesirable.”

(Id. at p. 11). As a result, all ASD related services for inmates have been denied, and Dr. Bednarz

was prohibited from screening Plaintiff for ASD and issuing a diagnosis. (Id.).

In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations against Wexford are different.

Plaintiff asserts that Wexford is liable for “maintaining a policy, practice, and custom to deny

medical treatment for autism spectrum disorder and conditions in combination that may lead to a

diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder.” (Doc. 41-1, p. 20). She then recounts how she was denied

medical treatment for ASD by Mental Health Professional James in April 2022 at Western Illinois

Correctional Center and then again by Dr. Bednarz at Centralia Correctional Center, after Dr.

Bednarz met with the psychiatry board. These allegations are not sufficient to state a claim against

Wexford. Plaintiff does not connect the conduct of medical staff to any Wexford policy, and

Wexford cannot be held liable solely for the misconduct of its employees. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of

Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). The facts do not allow the inference that a Wexford policy

caused a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights based on the conclusory statement that Wexford has a

policy of denying medical treatment. See Myrick v. Anglin, 496 F. App’x 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012)

(affirming dismissal of Monell claims based on an alleged policy “to cut medical costs” because

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Wexford in the

proposed amended complaint. Because an amended complaint renders the previous complaint

void, if Plaintiff is allowed to amend, the claim against Wexford would be dismissed. The Court

assumes it was not Plaintiff’s intention to dismiss Wexford from this litigation.

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to state a new and viable claim under the ADA/RA.

Plaintiff asserts three ADA/RA claim. First, Plaintiff alleges that staff at Centralia are violating

the ADA/RA by denying her medical services for ASD. (Doc. 41-1, p. 9). A claim for denial of

medical treatment, however, is improper under the ADA/RA. See Wachter v. Director of IDOC,

No. 23-cv-02428-SPMm 2024 WL 416493, at *2 (S.D. Ill. 2024) (citations omitted). “A claim that

Plaintiff has not been properly treated for a medical condition is distinctly different from a claim

that [s]he has been denied access to services or programs because [s]he is disabled.” Id. Her first

ADA/RA claim, therefore, fails.

Second, Plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against in violation of the ADA/RA

when she was excluded from playing in the pickleball event because she could not find a partner

to be on her team. (Doc. 41-1, p. 13). Plaintiff alleges that to play in the pickle ball event the

facility had a rule requiring two-player teams to be from the same housing unit. (Id.). Plaintiff

states that because of her disability, ASD, she has difficulty socializing and forming relationships,

and as a result, no one in her housing unit wanted to be her partner. (Id. at p. 14). The only inmate

who would partner with Plaintiff was from another housing unit. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that she

requested that the rule be modified to allow her and the inmate from the other housing unit to team-

up and register together, but the event was held before she received a response. (Id.). These facts,

as pled, do not state a claim under the ADA or RA. There are no facts in the proposed amended

complaint from which the Court can infer that staff acting intentionally on the basis of Plaintiff’s

disability or that staff refused to provide reasonable accommodation. (See Doc. 41-2, p. 14-15).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s assertion that she could not play in the pickleball event on a single

occasion is more akin to an “inconvenience,” rather than a total denial of a program or service. See

Wagoner v. Lemon, 778 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that a paraplegic inmate did not

state an ADA or RA claim based on inadequate transportation for a wheelchair or the lack of

wheelchair repairs because while both issues caused inconveniences, they did not deny him access

to services or programs). Thus, she has failed to state an ADA/RA claim regarding the pickleball

event.

And third and finally, Plaintiff attempts to state an ADA/RA claim based on the denial of

communication and interpretation services. (Doc. 41-1, p. 14). Plaintiff asserts that on July 16,

2025, another inmate with ASD, named Wachter, submitted a letter to the IDOC ADA coordinator

requesting “peer-led interpretive services” on behalf Wachter and Plaintiff. (See Doc. 41-2, p. 86-

87). The ADA coordinator never responded to the letter. (Doc. 41-1, p. 15). According to the letter,

peer-led interpretive services would involve assigning an inmate who is trusted by Plaintiff to

accompany Plaintiff throughout the day and “observe all interactions but not interfere. After the

interaction with inmates or staff, the [inmate] would provide missing non-verbal information and

correct or explain missing interpretations.” (Doc. 41-2, p. 88). According to Plaintiff, she was

informed by Wachter that Warden Wehking stated that no services would be provided to inmates

with ASD without a court order. (Doc. 41-1, p. 15). Plaintiff asserts that without communication

services, she will be (1) subjected to continued “unwanted sexual encounters” with other inmates;

and (2) repeatedly issued disciplinary tickets. (Id.). Although without a peer-led interpretive

service, Plaintiff is finding it difficult to communicate with fellow inmates and prison staff, she

does not assert facts suggesting that she is being denied the benefits of a service, program, or

activity based on her disability and how her requested accommodation, “peer-led interpretive

services,” would allow her to access Centralia’s services on the same basis as other inmates. See

Shuhaiber v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 980 F.3d 1167, at *1170 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming that the

plaintiff, who was confined to a wheelchair, had failed to state an ADA/RA claim where he alleged

difficulties with his cell, shower, and van, but did not specify that he was denied access to facilities

or services). Plaintiff has therefore failed to state an ADA/RA claim for denial of peer-led

interpretive services.

Based on these two issues alone, Plaintiff’s failure to replead the existing claim against

Wexford and failure to state a new and viable ADA/RA claim, the Court finds that allowing

Plaintiff to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint

is DENIED. (Doc. 41).

OTHER MOTIONS

Plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking additional time to identify the John and Jane Doe

Defendants, described as members of the psychiatry board. (Doc. 40). The motion is GRANTED.

The deadline for Plaintiff to identify the John/Jane Doe Defendants and file a motion to substitute

is extended to September 15, 2026. On or before August 25, 2026, Defendants shall file a notice

with the Court informing the Court of whether they have provided Plaintiff with the names of the

individuals who served on the psychiatry board during the relevant time frames.

The motion to stay the deadline to file a motion for summary judgment on exhaustion filed

by Defendant Warden Monti is GRANTED. (Doc. 48). The dispositive motion re exhaustion of

administrative remedies deadline is STAYED and will be reset once all Defendants are identified

and served.

The motion to withdraw affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

filed by Defendants Wexford and Bednarz is GRANTED. (Doc. 49). Their affirmative defense of

failure to exhaust is DEEMED withdrawn. Merits discovery remains STAYED.

Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking the Court’s assistance in resolving issues she has had

with filing documents in this case and a motion to supplement. (Doc. 51, 53). The motions are

DENIED. The Court previously addressed Plaintiff’s concerns regarding obtaining a copy of the

documents electronically filed with the Court in Doc. 56 and provided Plaintiff with instructions

on how to obtain copy of any of the documents filed on the docket. Plaintiff has a copy of the

operative Complaint in this case (see Doc. 53), and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended

complaint and to supplement have been denied. (Doc. 41, 46, 55). Plaintiff has filed hundreds of

pages in this case, and the record does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that she is being impeded

from filing documents with the Court. The declines to take any action regarding Plaintiff’s

assertions that the prosecution of her claims is being obstructed by staff at Centralia.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint filed by

Plaintiff Badenhorst is DENIED. (Doc. 41).

Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time is GRANTED. (Doc. 40). The deadline for

Plaintiff to identify the John/Jane Doe Defendants and file a motion to substitute is extended to

September 15, 2026. On or before August 25, 2026, Defendants shall file a notice with the Court

informing the Court of whether they have provided Plaintiff with the names of the individuals who

served on the psychiatry board during the relevant time frames.

The motion to stay the deadline to file a motion for summary judgment on exhaustion filed

by Defendant Warden Monti is GRANTED. (Doc. 48).

The motion to withdraw affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

filed by Defendants Wexford and Bednarz is GRANTED. (Doc. 49). Their affirmative defense of

failure to exhaust is DEEMED withdrawn.

Plaintiff’s motion for court order and motion to supplement are DENIED. (Doc. 51, 53).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 18, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge