Mumphrey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CATHERINE MUMPHREY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1111

ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, SECTION “N”

ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Sheriff Randall Smith,

in both his individual and official capacity, in which he asks the Court to dismiss with

prejudice all claims against him pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, to find that he is entitled to qualified immunity

and to dismiss the claims.1 Plaintiff Catherine Dunn Mumphrey filed an opposition,2

though she failed to address Smith’s substantive arguments, and Smith filed a reply

in further support of his motion.3 Having considered the parties’ briefing, the record,

and applicable law, the Court issues this Order and Reasons granting Smith’s motion

to dismiss the claims against him.

BACKGROUND

Mumphrey was formerly employed as a special needs teacher at an elementary

school in the St. Tammany Parish School System. On or about May 22, 2024, an

incident occurred between Mumphrey and a student that led the St. Tammany Parish

Sheriff’s Office to seek a felony warrant for her arrest.4 Mumphrey arranged to

1 Rec. Doc. 43.

2 Rec. Doc. 44.

3 Rec. Doc. 45.

4 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶¶ 14, 18-22.

surrender at the Parish jail, and on June 4, 2024, she presented herself for booking

accompanied by counsel and her mother.5

Mumphrey alleges that upon her arrival, she was separated from her attorney

and her mother, changed into a jail uniform, and placed in a cell.6 Deputy Jane Doe

then brought her to a room where George Bode, a representative of the St. Tammany

Parish School Board’s Human Resources department, was waiting.7 Bode presented

her with a resignation letter and told her she needed to sign it before she was booked,

warned that the alternative was termination, and represented that resigning would

preserve the possibility of future rehire.8 When Mumphrey allegedly asked to consult

her attorney, Bode responded that doing so was unnecessary because the document

“did not concern the criminal matter.”9 Deputy Doe was present throughout and, at

one point, allegedly remarked, “I’d sign it if I were you.”10 Mumphrey signed the

letter; Bode countersigned it.11 Mumphrey further alleges that a “Do Not Rehire”

notation on the document was circled at some later point.12

Mumphrey connects Smith to these events by alleging that “a person or

persons within the Sheriff's Office under the supervision of Defendant Sheriff Randy

Smith coordinated and conspired with a person or persons within the Office of Human

Resources … in order to notify Defendant George Bode that Plaintiff would be in

5 Id. ¶¶ 20-21.

6 Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

7 Id. ¶ 25.

8 Id. ¶¶ 26-29.

9 Id. ¶ 28.

10 Id. ¶ 30.

11 Id. ¶ 31.

12 Id. ¶ 33.

custody at the Parish Jail on a specific date and time.”13 Mumphrey does not allege

that Smith personally participated in the resignation encounter or the booking.14

Smith seeks dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) of Mumphrey’s claims of conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights.15 In

the alternative, if the Court does not dismiss those claims, Smith claims he is entitled

to qualified immunity under federal and state law, and thus, the claims should be

dismissed.16

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if

the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of her claim that would

entitle her to relief.17 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’”18 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.”19 The Court, however, does not accept as true legal

conclusions or mere conclusory statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal

conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion

13 Id. ¶ 35.

14 See generally Rec. Doc. 36.

15 Rec. Doc. 43.

16 Id.

17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.

2007).

18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

19 Id.

to dismiss.”20 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements”21 or “naked assertion[s]”22 devoid of “further factual

enhancement”23 are not sufficient.

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—

‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”24 “Determining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief [is]… a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”25 “Although detailed

factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the complaint

‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”26

Under Fifth Circuit precedent, courts generally should not grant a motion to

dismiss solely because it is unopposed, without considering the merits of the

arguments.27 Because dismissal with prejudice “denies a litigant the opportunity to

be heard and operates as an adjudication on the merits,” this “severe sanction” is

reserved for “extreme circumstances,” such as where a litigant has egregiously and

continuously refused to abide by the court’s deadlines.28 Thus, despite Mumphrey’s

failure to file a substantive opposition, the Court evaluates the merits of the motion

20 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)

(citation modified).

21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

22 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

23 Id.

24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

25 Id.

26 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Clark v. Amoco Prod.

Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir.1986)).

27 Webb v. Morella, 457 F. App’x 448, 452 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing precedent).

28 Id. (citation modified).

to dismiss.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Smith argues alternatively that Mumphrey’s claims against him are

barred under Heck v. Humphrey,29 or that qualified immunity protects him

from Mumphrey’s individual-capacity claims while she also fails to state an

official-capacity claim. The Court addresses each in turn.

I. Heck v. Humphrey does not bar Mumphrey’s claims.

The Heck doctrine “prohibits suit under § 1983 if success on the claim

would necessarily imply that a prior conviction or sentence is invalid.”30 Where

a judgment for the plaintiff would have that effect, the claim may not proceed

unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction has been “reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”31 The rule preserves the “finality

and consistency” of criminal judgments by forbidding the use of § 1983 to

collaterally attack them.32

The inquiry is “fact-intensive, requiring [the Court] to focus on whether

success on the . . . claim requires negation of an element of the criminal offense or

proof of a fact that is inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal

29 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

30 Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87).

31 Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

32 Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

conviction.”33 The Court accordingly compares the elements of the offense of

conviction against the proof required to prevail on the civil claim and asks whether

a judgment for Mumphrey would necessarily imply that her conviction is invalid.

Mumphrey’s guilty plea for a simple battery establishes a single operative

fact: that on or about May 22, 2024, she intentionally used force or violence upon

the child, in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:35.34 Her § 1983 claim, however,

rests on a different set of facts, on a different day, at a different place. Mumphrey

alleges that during her booking at the St. Tammany Parish Jail, she was coerced

into signing a resignation, denied the assistance of counsel during that period of

coercion, and made the subject of a conspiracy to extract that resignation.35

To prevail on those claims, Mumphrey need not negate any element of

simple battery, or prove any facts inherently inconsistent with her guilty plea. A

fact finder could conclude both that Mumphrey committed a battery on May 22

and that her constitutional rights were violated when she was allegedly coerced

into resigning her employment during the booking process on June 4; the two

findings are not incompatible.

Mumphrey alleges deprivation of due process and her right to counsel while

she was allegedly pressured into resigning her employment on June 4.36 But

whether she was unconstitutionally pressured into resigning, while barred from

33 Id. (citation modified); see Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008).

34 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶ 86 (“In the course of her prosecution for Felony Cruelty to Juveniles Ms. Mumphrey

was offered and accepted a plea bargain to misdemeanor Simple Battery.”).

35 Id. at 11.

36 Id. ¶¶ 50, 52.

consulting her attorney, has no bearing on whether she used force on a minor, and

a judgment in her favor on this theory would leave the factual basis for her plea

undisturbed.37 And, to be clear, the denial of due process and right to counsel that

Mumphrey alleges occurred in the context of the deprivation of her employment—

unrelated to her criminal charges.38 Nor is there any allegation that Mumphrey

admitted in her resignation that she had engaged in any element of battery. To

the contrary, Mumphrey alleges that she understood she could be rehired in the

future if she resigned. And, finally, her privacy theory seemingly concerns the

disclosure of her arrest, which has no bearing on the fact of her conviction.39

Smith’s argument—that these claims are barred because they “should have

been raised … in her criminal trial”—misapprehends Heck.40 Heck is not an

exhaustion rule, and it does not bar civil claims simply because they could, in

theory, have been litigated alongside the criminal case.41 It asks only whether a

civil judgment would be irreconcilable with the standing conviction. Here, the

answer is no.

Because success on Mumphrey’s § 1983 claims would not “necessarily imply

37 Simple battery is “a battery committed without the consent of the victim.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann

§ 14:35(A). A battery, in turn, is “the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.”

Id. § 14:33. The offense thus required, and Mumphrey’s plea established, only that she intentionally

applied force to a child on May 22, 2024. None of her § 1983 theories, each directed at the

circumstances of her June 4 booking, requires negation of any of the elements of battery.

38 Rec. Doc. 36 at 6; see Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983) (“In other words, once a

guilty plea has been entered, all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings against a defendant are

waived. Barrientos v. United States, 668 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir.1982). This includes all claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel.”). There is no dispute that Mumphrey was represented by counsel

during the criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 36 at ¶¶ 21-22.

39 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶¶ 61-67.

40 Rec. Doc. 43-1 at 5.

41 Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon §1983.”).

the invalidity” of her conviction, Heck does not bar them.42

II. Mumphrey fails to allege any violation of a constitutional right by

Smith.

To overcome Smith’s defense of qualified immunity, Mumphrey must show:

“(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”43 Mumphrey does not

identify the constitutional provisions (with exception of the Fifth Amendment)

underlying the “non-exclusive particulars” of the alleged rights violations;44 she

pleads conduct rather than rights. Construing the allegations in Mumphrey’s favor,

the Court reads her complaint to assert deprivations of due process, the privilege

against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the right to privacy in arrest

records. Because these rights do not reach the alleged conduct as a matter of law, the

Court resolves the motion at the first prong. And, because a § 1983 conspiracy claim

“is not actionable without an actual violation of section 1983,”45 the absence of an

underlying violation defeats the conspiracy claim as well.46

A. Self-Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is a

“fundamental trial right” that is violated “only at trial,”47 when a compelled

42 Id. at 487.

43 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)).

44 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶ 49.

45 Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation modified).

46 Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A conspiracy by itself, however,

is not actionable under section 1983.”).

47 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (“Here, Martinez was never made to be a “witness”

against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Self–Incrimination Clause because his

statements were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case.”); see United States v.

Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (“The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by

statement is used against the accused in a criminal case. Mumphrey alleges she was

pressured during her booking, to sign a resignation form.48 She does not allege that

the resignation was ever introduced against her in a criminal proceeding; in fact, her

conviction rests on her own guilty plea.49 Because no compelled statement was used

against her in any criminal trial, the privilege was not violated, and thus, she fails

to allege a § 1983 claim.

B. Right to Counsel

Mumphrey alleges that she asked to consult her attorney during the

resignation discussion and was refused.50 No right to counsel attached to that

conversation under either the Sixth or the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment

right to counsel is “offense specific” and attaches only to a charged offense as well as

any uncharged offenses that would be considered the same offense.51 The resignation

discussion was not a stage of Mumphrey’s prosecution; by her own account, it

concerned her employment.52 A conversation about an employment document is not

a critical stage of a criminal case, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not

attach to it. Nor does the Fifth Amendment right to counsel provide grounds for

Mumphrey’s claim. That right is triggered by custodial interrogation: questioning by

the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law

enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs

only at trial” (citation modified)); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (describing

the Fifth Amendment as a “‘trial right’ ”).

48 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶ 53 (“Defendants, and their agents acting under color of state law, illegally obtained

a statement from Plaintiff in the form of her resignation in violation of her Fifth Amendment

protection against self-incrimination.”).

49 Id. at 16.

50 Id. at 6.

51 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 166, 173 (2001)

52 See Rec. Doc. 36 ¶¶ 26-31 (discussing the signing of the resignation letter).

law enforcement reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.53 The

resignation discussion was neither. It was not an interrogation, and it was not

conducted by law enforcement. Rather Mumphrey alleges that a human-resources

representative of the School Board presented the document to her.54 Again,

Mumphrey has not alleged a constitutional violation, and her § 1983 claim fails.

C. Right to Privacy

Mumphrey alleges that “Defendants” invaded her right to privacy, apparently

through the disclosure of her arrest.55 The claim fails as to Smith on two independent

grounds.

First, Mumphrey alleges no disclosure by Smith. The only public disclosure she

alleges is a statement to the media by the School Board's Superintendent on June 6,

2024.56 The privacy theory therefore fails against Smith. Second, even setting

attribution aside, Mumphrey identifies no clearly established right against the

disclosure. The fact of an arrest is an official act and a matter of public record.57 The

Fifth Circuit has not held that the disclosure of public arrest information implicates

53 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-

01 (1980) (“We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is

subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent… that the police should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”).

54 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶ 25.

55 It is not entirely clear what privacy right Mumphrey invokes. The operative complaint alleges only

that “Defendants, acting under color of state law, compromised Plaintiff's good name and

professional reputation and invaded her right to privacy through conspiracy, trickery and deceit.”

The Court construes the Mumphrey’s complaint as alleging a deprivation of privacy.

56 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶¶ 61-64.

57 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (“Thus even the prevailing law of

invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade when the information

involved already appears on the public record.”).

a constitutional privacy interest, and those circuits that have addressed the question

have held that it does not.58 Whatever privacy interest Mumphrey may assert, it was

not clearly established at the time of the conduct alleged.

D. Due Process

Mumphrey’s due process theory fails because Smith did not deprive her of any

rights. Under Louisiana law, a public-school teacher’s entitlement to continued

employment—and thus any property interest cognizable under the Fourteenth

Amendment—arises only from tenure.59 A tenured teacher may be removed only for

an enumerated cause and upon statutory process. A teacher without tenure “may be

discharged ... without notice or a hearing, so long as valid reasons ... are expressed in

writing by the Superintendent.”60 Mumphrey does not allege that she was ever a

tenured teacher.61 The Court need not decide whether Mumphrey has pleaded a

protected property interest, however, because any such interest would arise from her

employment relationship with the School Board. Mumphrey did not allege that Smith

ever deprived her of a property interest in her employment. By Mumphrey’s own

account, the School Board’s representative presented the resignation, urged her to

sign, and countersigned it.62 The only allegation connecting Smith to that conduct is

the claim that unidentified members of his office “conspired” to facilitate it. The due

58 See, e.g., Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[G]overnment disclosures of

arrest records . . . do not implicate the right to privacy.”) (citation modified); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170

F.3d 396, 403 (3d Cir. 1999); cf. Lott v. City of Lubbock, 184 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(noting this consensus while resolving on other grounds).

59 In re Richard, 379 So. 3d 849, 855-56 (La. Ct. App. 2024).

60 Tate v. Livingston Par. Sch. Bd., 391 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1980); see La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§§ 17:442, 17:443.

61 See generally Rec. Doc. 36.

62 Id. ¶ 25.

process theory therefore rises and falls with the conspiracy. Because the conspiracy

claim against Smith fails, the due process claim also fails.

E. Section 1983 Conspiracy

A conspiracy claim under § 1983 “is not actionable without an actual violation

of section 1983.”63 And where the claim is actionable, it requires “an agreement

among the alleged co-conspirators to deprive [the plaintiff] of [her] constitutional

rights.”64 The operative facts of the alleged agreement must be pled with specificity.

Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy will not suffice.65

Two independent deficiencies defeat the conspiracy claim against Smith.66

First, as to Mumphrey’s self-incrimination, right-to-counsel, and privacy theories, the

operative complaint alleges no underlying constitutional violation.67 A conspiracy to

engage in conduct that violates no constitutional right is not actionable, and these

theories therefore fail as to Smith for the same reasons they fail on their own terms.68

Second, as to the due process theory, Mumphrey fails to allege an agreement,

or any act by Smith, with the specificity the law requires. The allegation connecting

Smith to the resignation is the following:

63 Hale, 45 F.3d at 920 (citation modified).

64 Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see also Cinel v.

Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994).

65 Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314 (per curiam) (“Conclusory allegations that do not reference

specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state a civil rights

conspiracy claim under § 1983.”) See also McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir.

1989) (citation modified) (“It is now well settled in this Circuit that ‘mere conclusory allegations of

conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts,’ state a substantial claim of federal

conspiracy.”).

66 Rec. Doc. 36 at 7.

67 See supra parts-A-D.

68 Hale, 45 F.3d at 921.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff avers that a person or persons

within the Sheriff's Office under the supervision of Defendant Sheriff

Randy Smith coordinated and conspired with a person or persons within

the Office of Human Resources under the supervision of Defendant

Steve Alfonso in order to notify Defendant George Bode that Plaintiff

would be in custody at the Parish Jail on a specific date and time.69

This allegation does not identify who within the Sheriff’s Office participated,

when or how any agreement was reached, or what Sheriff Smith is alleged to have

done; it pleads “coordinat[ion]” and “conspir[acy]” “[u]pon information and belief” and

nothing more. Such pleading is insufficient. In Montgomery, the Fifth Circuit held

that alleging an agreement without specific facts establishing the “time, date, or

circumstance[s]” of the conspiracy failed to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim.70 And in

Jabary v. City of Allen, even allegations that officials “actively conspired” through

“several conversations, private meetings, and other communications” were too

conclusory to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.71 Mumphrey alleges far less

than the pleadings rejected in Jabary. Her complaint describes no conversation,

meeting, or communication, and no time or place.

In any event, the only concerted action the complaint does describe—that

members of the Sheriff’s Office notified Bode that Mumphrey would be in custody—

is not an agreement to deprive her of a constitutional right. Read generously, the

allegation describes the sharing of information, not a “meeting of the minds” to

accomplish an unconstitutional end.

69 Rec. Doc. 36 ¶ 35.

70 759 F. App’x at 314.

71 547 F. App’x 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013).

The defect is compounded by the manner of pleading. Mumphrey advances her

conspiracy allegations against “Defendants” collectively, without distinguishing the

conduct of Sheriff Smith from that of the School Board or any of its representatives.

Collective allegations that fail to separate each defendant’s conduct are inadequate

to survive a motion to dismiss.72 A § 1983 plaintiff “must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.”73 The court will not “construe allegations contained in the

[c]omplaint against the ‘defendants’ as a group as properly imputable to any

particular individual defendant unless the connection between the individual

defendant and the [unconstitutional conduct] is specifically pled.”74 The requirement

is heightened, not relaxed, where qualified immunity is at issue, because each

official’s entitlement to immunity must be assessed by reference to his own conduct.75

Mumphrey’s collective allegations do not satisfy that standard as to Smith.

Because Plaintiff alleges no underlying violation as to three of her theories

and no plausible agreement or individualized conduct as to the fourth, the § 1983

conspiracy claim against Smith must be dismissed.

72 Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Armstrong’s allegation also suffers

from the distinct problem of group pleading…”); Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365

F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Consistent with our rejection of the ‘group pleading’ doctrine, we do

not construe allegations contained in the Complaint against the ‘defendants’ as a group as properly

imputable to any particular individual defendant unless the connection between the individual

defendant … is specifically pleaded.”).

73 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through

the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

74 Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 365 (citation modified).

75 Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 274-75 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676); see also Marie Ramirez v.

Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x 710, 716, n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Our precedent makes clear that ‘we

examine each individual's entitlement to qualified immunity separately.’”) (quoting Carroll v.

Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 174 (5th Cir. 2015)).

F. Official Capacity Claim

Mumphrey sues Smith in his official as well as his individual capacity. A suit

against a sheriff in his official capacity is “in essence” a suit against the

governmental entity he represents,76 and qualified immunity is not a defense to it.77

Such a claim is instead governed by Monell, under which a local government is

liable only where an official policy or custom is the “moving force” behind a

constitutional violation; it may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat

superior.78

The official-capacity claim fails on two independent grounds. First,

Mumphrey identifies no policy, custom, or practice of the St. Tammany Parish

Sheriff’s Office, and attributes no challenged conduct to a final policymaker.79

Second, and independently, the Court holds herein that Mumphrey alleges no

underlying constitutional violation by Smith or any employee of his office.80 Without

a constitutional injury, there is no ground for municipal liability.81 The claims

against Smith in his official capacity are dismissed with prejudice.

76 Brown v. Strain, 663 F.3d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Because Strain is being sued in his official

capacity as St. Tammany Parish Sheriff, the suit against him is ‘in essence”’ a suit against a

municipality.”)

77 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).

78 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978).

79 Rec. Doc. 36; see also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted) (“isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger

liability.”).

80 See supra parts A-D.

81 See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no

constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental

regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the

point.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Sheriff

Randall Smith is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against Smith, in his individual

and official capacity, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, including Plaintiffs

§ 1983 claims premised on the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to

counsel; the right to privacy, and conspiracy, including her procedural due process

theory insofar as it depends on an alleged conspiracy.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE