PERKINS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DOROTHEA B. PERKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22-cv-890

)

PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION )

ASSISTANCE AGENCY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Before this court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings, (Doc. 33). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s

motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because this court’s September 30, 2025 Order dismissing

the Secretary of the United States Department of Education as a

Defendant recited the facts of Plaintiff’s 325-page complaint,

(Doc. 28 at 1–8)1, a summary of the key facts relevant to

Defendant Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency’s

(“Penn Ed” or “PHEAA”) motion is set forth below.

1 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed with this court refer to the page numbers

located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they

appear on CM/ECF.

In 1991, pro se Plaintiff Dorothea B. Perkins “responded to

a brochure left at law schools by the Pennsylvania Higher

Education Assistance Agency.” (Doc. 1-2 at 34.) This brochure

“advertised PHEAA’s Law Access Program nationwide.” (Id.) After

graduating from law school in 1994, Plaintiff “was contacted by

PHEAA’s unregistered aliases,” which “pretended they were

authorized loan servicers who assist banks in making Law Access-

branded federal student loans.” (Id. at 35.) During law school

these “unregistered aliases mailed pre-printed applications for

false federal Law Access loans and private Law Access loans to

me that included banks named by PHEAA, followed by pre-printed

promissory notes with the banks’ names.” (Id.) In 1995, the

“banks and trusts named by PHEAA were silent and unreachable in

January 1995 because they were both dead in 1995 due to

mergers.” (Id. at 36.)

This “bank records fraud scheme,” (id.) is one of twenty-

one theories of fraud that Plaintiff articulates in her

Complaint. (See Doc. 1-1 at 75–97.) Each theory “revolves around

a fake federal student loan consolidation check written by PHEAA

for a non-existent Law/Ameritrust student loan program.” (Id. at

12.) To effectuate this program, Plaintiff asserts that PHEAA

used “numerous unregistered aliases, hidden aliases, pre-printed

signatures, stamped signatures, and missing signatures,” (id.),

to create “the Law Access loan claim set” that “is fraudulent.”

(Doc. 39 at 2.) These “aliases pressured [Plaintiff] to

consolidate or default.” (Doc. 1-2 at 36.) The “consolidation

application/promissory note” Plaintiff received contained “pre-

printed incomplete and inaccurate loan information” and

“included the wrong number of claims, hid a cancellation

concealed in the National Student Loan Database, and avoided

disclosing interest rates.” (Id. at 36–37.) Moreover, “the dot-

matrix printing on the . . . promissory note showed PHEAA

swapped the names of the banks [Plaintiff] tried to contact with

trusts’ names, without ever identify[ing] the new trust

creditors.” (Id. at 37.) After identifying this “Disclosure

Statement fraud scheme,” Plaintiff states that the “Department

of Education refused to look at and advise on the PHEAA’s claim

set and deemed it a private matter.” (Id. at 37–38.)

Plaintiff argues that the consolidation affected both the

borrower and the government. (See Doc. 1-1 at 15.) While

“marketed” as “federal student loans for the subject claim set,”

(id. at 17), Plaintiff contends that “PHEAA’s unregistered Law

Access Loan Program . . . could not make federally insured

student loans and write student loan checks.” (Id. at 19.) Thus,

“PHEAA was trying to turn private loans into federal student

loans through unapproved branding.” (Id. at 62.) These

“unauthorized Law Access contracts,” not only “pretended to be

subject to procedures of the Higher Education Act, so that PHEAA

could fool consumers, the Department of Education, and the

courts to obtain untimely and unauthorized reinsurance money

from the Department of Education,” (id. at 15), but also

“tricked consumers with false advice provided by PHEAA’s

unregistered aliases that the consumers were obligated to pay

the dead banks who had no employees and never contacted the

consumers, including the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 19.) By combining

“the banks’ and trusts’ names with ‘Law Access,” PHEAA used

“aliases . . . to create blind spots around missing authorized

signatories to force unwarranted inferences about the missing

money trail.” (Id. at 57.) Because PHEAA had what Plaintiff

describes as “an impermissible cozy relationship with the

Department of Education,” (id. at 56), the two “conspired . . .

to administer PHEAA’s unregistered Law Access Program using fake

Check 150385 to continue collecting from the Plaintiff

currently.” (Id. at 56–57.)

The ”missing money trail” did not end with consolidation.

(Doc. 39 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that “PHEAA left accounts open

in the fictionalized money trail so that the Plaintiff would

have to contact PHEAA and detrimentally rely on the advice given

by PHEAA’s unregistered aliases.” (Doc. 1-1 at 124.) By leaving

accounts open, along with “PHEAA recording false registration

numbers, false party names, false checks and no bank records,”

PHEAA “gaslit the Plaintiff, regulators, the court, and PHEAA’s

court counsel about the public’s interest in the claim set.”

(Id. at 148.) Plaintiff also asserts that “the subject Law

Access loan claim set” was impermissibly assigned to PHEAA, and

that PHEAA itself impermissibly assigned “the claim set to the

Department of Education,” (Doc. 1–2 at 14), which “falsely

reported an assignment from PHEAA,” (Doc. 1–1 at 132). The

assignment was made possible because “[t]he Defendants changed

the assignment of rights procedures so that concealment of the

entire money trail persists.” (Id. at 131.)

These actions, according to Plaintiff, resulted in payments

to PHEAA, (id. at 87), and collections against Plaintiff, (id.

at 105–106). In 2005, Plaintiff reports learning that “PHEAA was

paid reinsurance by the Department of Education in 2001.” (1–2

at 42.) Then in 2008, “PHEAA misused the court system to

legitimize the unsigned Check 150385 to obtain a second

reinsurance payment from the Department of Education.” (Doc. 1-1

at 50–51.) Plaintiff also states that PHEAA garnished her wages

in 2005 and 2006, but the garnishments were “not based on bank

records or eligible lender bank activity.” (Id. at 105–106.)

Then, the “Department of Education garnished and intercepted the

Plaintiff’s 2016 federal tax refund.” (Id. at 106.) This 2016

garnishment occurred “after the 2015 Hearing Decision based on

unsigned Check 150385,” where “[t]o justify using fake Check

150385 to collect without an authorized reinsurance payment, the

Department of Education changed the procedure for holding a

hearing for a Law Access loan.” (Id.) The “secret Hearing

involved contradictory claim set consideration reports and a

controversy over the amounts and dates of reinsurance payments

without bank records to amortize.” (Id. at 107.) These

discrepancies existed because “PHEAA’s Reinsurance Fraud Scheme

served to give the impression banks consolidated their own

federal student loans by paying off their own claims using

consolidation Check 150385, followed by insurance and

reinsurance payments.” (Id.)

In total, Plaintiff “noted and counted 181 bluffs; 99

computer overrides; bank federal identity thefts; conflicts of

interest; unauthorized branding; poor document imaging;

mismatched state and federal records; missing documents; 1,035

blind spots; numerous aliases; a silence scheme; document

destruction; an accumulation of 1,078 missing requirements; and

more.” (Doc. 1–2 at 51–52.) As a result of the twenty-one fraud

schemes, Plaintiff asserts twenty-two claims which this court

identified in its previous Order. (Doc. 28 at 6–7.) Because this

court dismissed the Secretary of the United States Department of

Education as a Defendant, (id. at 24), this court will consider

each claim as alleged against Defendant PHEAA.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed her claims in state

court. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) The case was removed to this court on

October 19, 2022, (id. at 1), and PHEAA answered the Complaint

on October 26, 2022, (Doc. 7). Following this court’s dismissal

of the other named Defendant, (Doc. 28), PHEAA filed a Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 33), and supporting brief,

(Doc. 34). Plaintiff responded to the motion, (Doc. 39), and

PHEAA replied, (Doc. 40).

Defendant’s motion is ripe and ready for ruling. A hearing

is not necessary to resolve the motion.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court applies the same standard to a Rule 12(c) motion

for judgment on the pleadings as to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115–16 (4th

Cir. 2013). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests “the sufficiency of a

complaint.” Butler v. United States, 702 F.3d 749, 752 (4th Cir.

2012) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243

(4th Cir. 1999)). “To survive such a motion, the complaint must

contain facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level’ and ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Occupy Columbia, 738 F.3d at 116

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

A claim is plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable” and demonstrates “more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556–57). While this court assumes the truth of all

factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor

of the nonmoving party, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

When a party is proceeding pro se, her filings are “to be

liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

However, the principles calling for “special judicial

solicitude” in viewing pro se filings “do[] not transform the

court into an advocate.” United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789,

797 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). This court cannot “conjure up questions never squarely

presented to” it, nor can it “be expected to construct full

blown claims from sentence fragments.” Beaudett v. City of

Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). This is

particularly relevant where, like here, Plaintiff is a law

school graduate with legal training and familiarity with the

legal system. See Polidi v. Bannon, 226 F. Supp. 3d 615, 616 n.1

(E.D. Va. 2016) (collecting cases).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that “[a]ll of Plaintiff’s claims against

PHEAA are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because

the legitimacy of the consolidation loan at issue in this

lawsuit has already been adjudicated in PHEAA’s favor.” (Doc. 34

at 8.) The doctrine of collateral estoppel “is a subset of the

res judicata genre” that “forecloses the relitigation of issues

of fact or law that are identical to issues which have been

actually determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation

in which the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is

asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” In re

Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir.

2004) (quoting Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d

219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998)). When the prior issue was litigated in

federal court, federal principles of collateral estoppel apply

to the issue before the court. Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 12-

CV-383, 2013 WL 4520264, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2013), aff’d,

564 F. App’x 698 (4th Cir. 2014). Defendant, as the “party

seeking to rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel,” must

establish five elements:

(1) that “the issue sought to be precluded is

identical to one previously litigated” (“element

one”); (2) that the issue was actually determined in

the prior proceeding (“element two”); (3) that the

issue’s determination was “a critical and necessary

part of the decision in the prior proceeding”

(“element three”); (4) that the prior judgment is

final and valid (“element four”); and (5) that the

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted

“had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue

in the previous forum” (“element five”).

Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 217 (4th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Sedlack, 134 F.3d at 224).

Defendant argues that each element is satisfied because

“the existence and legitimacy of the consolidation loan was

adjudicated more than twenty years ago by the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in

PHEAA’s favor.” (Doc. 34 at 8.) Both cases, according to

Defendant, are “premised on the nonexistence/illegitimacy of the

consolidation loan.” (Id. at 9.) While “the exact theory of

nonexistence/illegitimacy has seemingly evolved,” Defendant

argues that “[t]he foundation of Plaintiff’s Complaint and all

of her claims is that the consolidation loan does not exist and,

as a result, all actions taken subsequent to the ‘fake’

consolidation were improper.” (Id. at 9–10 (citing Doc. 28 at 3–

4).)

Along with the “identical” issue of the “existence/

legitimacy of the consolidation loan,” (id. at 10), Defendant

contends that the four other collateral estoppel elements are

satisfied. For element two, Defendant explains that “PHEAA

obtained a Judgment against Plaintiff in her adversary

proceeding where she challenged the existence/legitimacy of the

consolidation loan” and “the Bankruptcy Court determined the

consolidation loan existed.” (Id.) For element three, Defendant

identifies Plaintiff’s “attempt[] to discharge her law school

loans” through Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. (Id.) The “challenge” to

the “existence of the consolidation loan” was “specifically

rejected” as “one of three explicit issues that was critical and

necessary to determining whether Plaintiff’s education debts

could be discharged.” (Id. at 11.) For element four, Defendant

states that the court’s judgment “was final and did not proceed

to trial” and “Plaintiff did not appeal.” (Id.) For element

five, Defendant maintains that the “judgment was the product of

a complete adversarial proceeding in which Plaintiff was able to

conduct discovery and present all arguments and evidence

available to her to prove that the consolidation loan did not

exist/was illegitimate.” (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff contends that “PHEAA fails on all five prongs of

the collateral estoppel test.” (Doc. 39 at 18.) “Because PHEAA

generated and controlled all the documents created,” Plaintiff

argues that “the bankruptcy court erroneously found a dead bank

was paid insurance when there was no insurance payment of bank

record.” (Id. at 18–19.) Moreover, “[c]ollateral estoppel should

not be found because PHEAA refused to file a proof of claim for

challenge.” (Id. at 19.) Because “PHEAA concealed four

consolidation dates and more,” Plaintiff asserts that “PHEAA’s

records must be removed.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that “the

bankruptcy court is a different kind of court with different

procedures which makes it clear the circumstances are

different.” (Id.) Plaintiff explains that “[t]he facts are

different” such that “Plaintiff did not know the consolidation

check had not been cashed; that no bank was involved or had a

record; that PHEAA was the hidden original lender; or that PHEAA

had already paid themselves reinsurance.” (Id.) These facts,

according to Plaintiff, meant that the “judgment wasn’t ‘valid

and final’ in a just sense.” (Id.) Instead, the “judgment’s lack

of integrity makes the judgment void or voidable.” (Id.) Thus,

the “bankruptcy court decision was merely advisory because it

was based on fraud committed and concealed by PHEAA, who was not

a real party in interest.” (Id.)

Construing Plaintiff’s challenges to collateral estoppel

liberally, as is required for a party proceeding without

counsel, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, Plaintiff’s twenty-one

theories of fraud can be categorized into four variations based

on time and the actors involved. First, Plaintiff argues that

PHEAA, in 2004, committed fraud on the bankruptcy court. PHEAA,

according to Plaintiff, “intentionally corrupted the judicial

process itself, going beyond mere perjury or incorrect facts.”

(Id. at 14.) By using “tricky language in the Affidavit, PHEAA’s

attorneys committed fraud in seven ways.” (Id.) Second,

Plaintiff argues that the court, in 2004, did not consider

certain evidence of fraud. Plaintiff contends that “PHEAA’s

document custodian did not disclose contradictory evidence to

the court, like the single note marked ‘paid in full’ and the

cover letter; the trust owners name; and Law Access activity.”

(Id. at 10.) Third, Plaintiff argues that certain evidence of

fraud was not discovered until after the 2004 bankruptcy

proceeding. For example, Plaintiff asserts in her Complaint that

a 2014 audit report revealed “promissory notes . . . that were

alleged to be destroyed or somehow missing without a Missing

Records Report during the 2004 In Re Perkins Litigation.” (Doc.

1–1 at 107–08.) Fourth, Plaintiff argues that she now pleads

theories of fraud beyond the issues considered by the court in

2004. Plaintiff explains that she “never litigated PHEAA’s

fraud, Disclosure Statement identity theft, and deception.”

(Doc. 39 at 18.)

This court finds that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped

from pursuing claims premised on her educational debt

consolidation loan. As explained in this court’s previous order,

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of

North Carolina “held that with respect to the consolidation

loan, there was ‘no question of fact regarding the existence of

an educational loan debt.’” (Doc. 28 at 4 n.3 (quoting In re

Perkins, No. 03-80777C-7D, 03–9075, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2

(M.D.N.C. Br. May 20, 2004)). The bankruptcy court explained:

The record contains a copy of a promissory note for a

consolidation loan signed by Plaintiff in February

1995, and Plaintiff has admitted signing such a

promissory note. The affidavit of Ms. Diane Perneta,

an Administrative Officer with PHEAA, states that the

promissory note evidences the consolidation loan that

Plaintiff received on May 3, 1995 in the amount of

$44,205.46. Plaintiff argues that the consolidation

loan was never made as she never received proof of the

consolidation. However, the record contains a

disclosure statement sent by the lender, which

Plaintiff admits to receiving, that included a copy of

the check used to pay off the Plaintiff’s pre-

consolidation student loans, a list of such pre-

consolidation student loans, and a statement of the

amounts paid on each of the consolidated student

loans. Although Plaintiff now questions whether the

consolidation loan occurred, Plaintiff sent a letter

to the lender on October 27, 1995, requesting that the

consolidation of her student loans be rescinded. When

her request was denied, she requested and was granted

the first of several forbearances on the consolidation

loan.

Plaintiff’s argument that the consolidation loan was

not made in May 1995 appears to rest on the fact that

she received a copy of a promissory note for one of

her original student loans marked paid in full on 3–

21–96, and on the fact that an unnamed “disgruntled

employee” of PHEAA informed Plaintiff that her student

loans had not been properly consolidated. While

Plaintiff contends that the consolidation loan was

never made, Plaintiff admits that she has never been

contacted by any lender regarding payment on the

multiple student loans she took out to finance her

legal education. Even when the facts are taken in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, this court has

concluded that there is insufficient evidence to raise

a disputed issue of material fact as to whether an

educational loan exists.

In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2-3 (emphasis added).

Applying the elements of collateral estoppel to the bankruptcy

court’s determination, this court finds that each element is

satisfied.

For the first element, Plaintiff’s action to “discharge

educational debts” required the bankruptcy court to find

“whether student loan debt exists” and “whether the debt is owed

to, insured by, or guaranteed by a governmental agency or non-

profit institution.” Id. at *2. Thus, the existence of

Plaintiff’s educational debt consolidation loan from PHEAA was

an element central to the bankruptcy proceedings. Just as

Plaintiff now argues that the case before this court “revolves”

around a “fake federal student loan consolidation check,” (Doc.

1–1 at 12), Plaintiff argued then that “her student loans had

not been properly consolidated” and the “consolidation loan was

never made.” In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2. The court

rejected such arguments because Plaintiff “admitted signing such

a promissory note,” admitted to receiving “a disclosure

statement sent by the lender,” requested and received “several

forbearances on the consolidation loan,” and had “never been

contacted by any lender regarding payment on the multiple

student loans she took out to finance her legal education.” Id.

at *2–3. Because Plaintiff, both then and now, argued the

nonexistence of the same loan issued by the same Defendant, this

court finds the first element satisfied.

Second, the bankruptcy court actually resolved the issue.

In addition to the reasons stated above, the court found

Plaintiff’s evidence “that she received a copy of a promissory

note for one of her original student loans marked paid in full

on 3-21-96” insufficient. Id. at *3. Plaintiff continues to make

similar arguments before this court, contending that PHEAA

failed to “keep a copy of the cover letter for the note marked

‘paid in full’” and “[a]ny Federal Fund financial activity and

any note marked ‘paid in full’ would be based on unsigned

consolidation Check 150385.” (Doc. 1–1 at 40–41.) Thus,

Plaintiff not only relitigates the issue with evidence already

considered and rejected by the bankruptcy court, but in making

these arguments reaffirms the consolidation check as the “crux”

of any claims. McCray v. Samuel I. White, P.C., No. CV 18-3491,

2019 WL 6895986, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2019), aff’d sub nom.,

837 F. App’x 244 (4th Cir. 2021). Because the bankruptcy court

found, at summary judgment and after discovery, that “there is

no question of fact regarding the existence of an educational

loan debt,” In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2, this court

finds the second element satisfied.

Third, resolution of the debt was critical and necessary to

the prior judgment. As explained by the Fourth Circuit, the

facts and issues resolved by prior proceedings must be more than

merely “supportive of” the prior judgment. In re Microsoft, 355

F.3d at 327. The bankruptcy court identified three elements

necessary for a “debtor to discharge educational debts.” In re

Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2. In finding the first element of

“whether student loan debt exists,” id., the court “made the

necessary determination” that Defendant provided a consolidation

loan upon Plaintiff signing a promissory note. Afzal v. Aslam,

No. CIV. 11-395, 2011 WL 2457682, at *2 (D. Md. June 15, 2011),

aff’d, 467 F. App’x 189 (4th Cir. 2012). Had the court

determined that Plaintiff raised a disputed issue of material

fact on the existence of the loan, the court could not have

granted summary judgment or eventually considered the “portion

of the debt, if any, which is dischargeable.” In re Perkins,

2004 WL 3510116, at *4. This court therefore finds the third

element satisfied.

Fourth, the judgment is final and valid. “For purposes of

res judicata, a summary judgment has always been considered a

final disposition on the merits.” Adkins v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

729 F.2d 974, 976 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). Fifth,

Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

existence of the debt. Plaintiff “participated in a

sophisticated legal setting in two levels,” In re Swilley, 295

B.R. 839, 846 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003), first when challenging

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the debt’s existence,

In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *1, and second when arguing

that the debt was dischargeable. In re Perkins, 318 B.R. 300,

313 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2004). Plaintiff not only engaged in

discovery, but states in her Complaint that she “learn[ed] of

PHEAA’s branding fraud scheme in 2004 during court discovery.”

(Doc. 1–2 at 41.) This court therefore finds all five elements

satisfied.

This court finds Plaintiff’s arguments against collateral

estoppel unconvincing. From the four variations of the twenty-

one fraud theories noted above, the first two variations address

conduct occurring during the proceedings.2 For example, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant “polluted the judicial machinery” with

its “treatment of the fake consolidation check.” (Doc. 39 at

16.) Because of the “seven ways” Defendant “committed fraud on

the bankruptcy court,” (id. at 14), “[t]he court was infected,”

(see Doc. 1-3 at 28, 69, 120, 151, 177, 210, 280), and it

“fictionalized that PHEAA paid dead Society National bank at

some point.” (Doc. 1–1 at 123.) Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates

that she not only knew of some alleged fraud at the time of the

proceedings, (see Doc. 1–2 at 41 (“I was surprised to learn of

PHEAA’s branding fraud scheme in 2004 during court discovery”)),

but that she argued fraud to the bankruptcy court, (see id. (“I

. . . believed the missing signatures and unknown authorized

signatories revealed fraud sufficiently”); Doc. 1–2 at 252 (“in

2004 . . . the judiciary reviewed sixteen (16) things out of

place on each ‘Law Access’ application”)). Thus, if Plaintiff

was aware of fraud at the time of the proceedings, this court

finds that Plaintiff is relitigating an unsatisfactory decision

and agrees with Defendant that “Plaintiff did not appeal the

Bankruptcy Court’s judgment and any attempt to challenge it now

would be more than twenty years too late.” (Doc. 34 at 11.)

2 Plaintiff’s third and fourth arguments relate to conduct

occurring after the proceedings, which this court will address

in its discussion of untimely filed claims.

Additionally, even if Plaintiff did not have evidence of

the alleged fraud until after the proceedings, (see, e.g., Doc.

1–1 at 27, 108, 125), this court again agrees with Defendant

that “Plaintiff never made any motion with the Bankruptcy Court”

to “relieve a party from judgment due to fraud on the Court”

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 40 at 2.) Any

“irregularities” must be raised in a timely and procedurally

proper manner through the original proceedings, not through

collateral proceedings. See McCray, 2019 WL 6895986, at *4.

Thus, any fraud-based arguments relating to Defendant’s conduct

or the court’s findings at the time of the bankruptcy

proceedings are untimely raised in an improper posture.

This court also rejects Plaintiff’s arguments that

collateral estoppel should not apply because of the nature of

the bankruptcy court and its proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that

the Department of Education should have been a defendant in the

bankruptcy proceedings. (Doc. 39 at 10.) Notwithstanding the

fact that Plaintiff filed the suit in bankruptcy court, (see

id.), courts have held that the inclusion of parties “does not

change the fact that the . . . previously dismissed suits

included the exact same issues of fact asserted here.” Gordon v.

Cathey, No. 3:13-CV-00229, 2013 WL 5561642, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct.

8, 2013). Plaintiff also argues that “bankruptcy court is a

different kind of court with different procedures which makes it

clear the circumstances are different.” (Doc. 39 at 19.) To the

contrary, the Fourth Circuit has maintained that “collateral

estoppel precludes relitigation of those matters actually

considered and decided by the bankruptcy court.” 1616 Reminc

Ltd. P’ship v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 778 F.2d 183,

187 (4th Cir. 1985); see also In re Urb. Broad. Corp., 401 F.3d

236, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2005). It makes no difference that the

bankruptcy court considered the issue in the context of

discharging a debt, for collateral estoppel bars successive

litigation “even if the issue recurs in the context of a

different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).

Plaintiff’s next argument that “[t]he bankruptcy court

decision was merely advisory because it was based on fraud

committed and concealed by PHEAA, who was not a real party in

interest,” (Doc. 39 at 19), is belied by the proceedings that

followed the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment order. As the

court explained in its summary judgment order, “[r]emaining for

trial will be a determination of the amount of student loan

indebtedness, and the portion of the debt, if any, which is

dischargeable.” In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *4. In a

later memorandum opinion finding that “Plaintiff has failed to

establish that requiring her to pay student loans would

constitute an undue hardship,” the court explained that an

“adversary proceeding came before the court for trial on

September 30, 2004.” In re Perkins, 318 B.R. at 303. The court’s

opinion on a substantial controversy over Plaintiff’s debts,

whereby both parties participated with adverse interests in its

dischargeability, reveals that the preceding order granting

summary judgment on the issue of the debt’s existence, which

Plaintiff challenged, was not an advisory opinion.

This court therefore finds that the doctrine of collateral

estoppel precludes Plaintiff from relitigating the validity or

legitimacy of her educational debt consolidation loan.

Next, to the extent the Complaint alleges claims that do

not “revolve[] around a fake federal student loan consolidation

check written by PHEAA,” (Doc. 1–1 at 12), this court finds that

the claims are barred by any applicable statutes of limitation.3

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state facts sufficient to

infer a continuing violation or support the doctrines of

equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment.

Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims are

“untimely under the applicable statutes of limitation.” (Doc. 34

at 16–17.) Citing this court’s previous Order, Defendant

explains that “the last conduct specifically alleged against

PHEAA was the 2008 assignment of the consolidation loan to the

DOE.” (Id. at 17 (citing Doc. 28 at 5).) Because “[t]he longest

statute of limitation governing any of Plaintiff’s claims is six

years,” (Doc. 40 at 3–4), and “[a]fter 2008, all collection

activity, garnishments, administrative proceedings, etc. concern

3 Many of the claims that Plaintiff asserts in her Complaint

do not have a private right of action. See Pro. Massage Training

Ctr., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs. & Colls., 781

F.3d 161, 169 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that under the Higher

Education Act “nearly every court to consider the issue” “agrees

that there is no express private right of action” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Kerpen v. Metro. Washington Airports

Auth., 907 F.3d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding “fatal” the

plaintiff’s failure to establish a defendant “as a federal

entity” under the Administrative Procedure Act); Swanson v.

King, No. 7:21-CV-80, 2021 WL 3856454, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 27,

2021) (“The Fifth Amendment restricts only governmental action,

and not the actions of private entities.” (citing Pub. Utils.

Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952))). Therefore,

assuming Plaintiff asserts these claims against PHEAA, and that

PHEAA is a government entity, this court will apply a six-year

statute of limitation for Plaintiff’s claims. See Jersey Heights

Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir.

1999).

allegations regarding DOE’s conduct,” (id. at 4), Defendant

asserts that “all of Plaintiff’s claims against PHEAA would . .

. be barred by the statutes of limitation.” (Id. at 5.)

Additionally, “even if there were some articulable theory of

liability that could link PHEAA to the DOE’s actions after

assignment,” Defendant states that “this Court has already

acknowledged that the last action allegedly taken by the DOE was

March 30, 2016, which would still render all of Plaintiff’s

claims untimely.” (Id. (citing Doc. 28 at 23).)

Assuming Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendant is a

government entity, Plaintiff’s Takings Clause, Administrative

Procedure Act, and Higher Education Act claims, to the extent a

private right of action exists, are subject to a six-year

statute of limitations. See infra note 3. Plaintiff’s federal

civil Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)

claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. CVLR

Performance Horses, Inc. v. Wynne, 792 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir.

2015). Plaintiff’s North Carolina RICO claims are subject to a

five-year statute of limitations. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-9.

Plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claims

are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Jackson v.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 747 F. App’x 159, 160 (4th Cir. 2019)

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). Plaintiff’s North Carolina unfair

and deceptive trade practices claims, all alleged under Chapter

75 of the North Carolina General Statutes, are subject to a

four-year statute of limitations. Williams v. HomEq Servicing

Corp., 184 N.C. App. 413, 420, 646 S.E.2d 381, 386 (2007)

(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–16.2). Plaintiff’s voidable

contracts claim and actual fraud claim are subject to a three-

year statute of limitations. Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v.

Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 7 n.4, 802 S.E.2d 888, 892 (2017)

(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–52(1), (9)).

This court finds Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent they are

not precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, are

untimely filed. For many of the claims listed above, the statute

of limitations “begins to run” when the violative conduct

occurs. See, e.g., Richardson v. Shapiro & Brown, LLP, 751 F.

App’x 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2018). For such claims, assuming that

Defendant’s actions could be connected to the Department of

Educations’ actions in March 2016, and applying the longest

statute of limitations of six years, no claim would be timely

filed by the time of the Complaint on September 12, 2022, (Doc.

1–1 at 3).

For other claims, the statute of limitations does not

accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts giving rise

to the claim. See, e.g., Hyde v. Taylor, 70 N.C. App. 523, 528,

320 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1984). The Complaint indicates that

Plaintiff “learn[ed] of PHEAA’s branding fraud scheme in 2004

during court discovery.” (Doc. 1–2 at 41.) Construed liberally,

however, Plaintiff’s third and fourth variations of the twenty-

one fraud theories relate to conduct alleged to have occurred

outside the bankruptcy litigation, including evidence

“disclosed” after 2004, (see, e.g., Doc. 1–1 at 190), and claims

never litigated before the bankruptcy court, (see Doc. 39 at

18). Thus, for the claims with a discovery rule for the statute

of limitations, Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly begin to run

after the 2004 bankruptcy litigation and the 2008 assignment

from PHEAA to the Department of Education. That said, this court

finds that Plaintiff’s claims are untimely under a discovery

rule because the Complaint establishes that by July 2015

Plaintiff received information that “confirmed” Defendant’s

fraudulent activity. (Doc. 1–2 at 44.)

The Complaint articulates three occasions where Plaintiff

received information that “revealed” the fraud schemes. (See

Doc. 1–1 at 41, 135, 238.) The first is described as “PHEAA’s

May 21, 2014 Bowman Report,” where PHEAA provided information

“in response to Plaintiff’s 2014 detailed audit request.” (Id.

at 135.) According to Plaintiff, this report disclosed “that the

banks PHEAA named on the 1995 Law Access consolidation

application/promissory note merged.” (Doc. 1–2 at 37.) It also

confirmed “that PHEAA provided an undocumented assignment to the

Department of Education on an assignment date which was later

than the date of assignment reported by the Department of

Education.” (Doc. 1–2 at 41.) The report also provided

“concealed promissory notes,” (Doc. 1–3 at 21), which “revealed

that PHEAA deliberately did not make and provide a full set of

copies of any Law Access-branded promissory notes marked ‘paid

in full’ for the claim set for the authority to collect on the

1995 consolidation claim.” (Doc. 1–1 at 41.) For Plaintiff, this

report “confirmed PHEAA defied the 2004 court Order compelling

PHEAA’s historical record by withholding vital promissory notes

that revealed clues of the banks’ deaths and lack of federal

registration.” (Doc. 1–2 at 44.)

The second set of information came from the Department of

Education’s “2015 Freedom of Information Act Request Response”

which “exposed that there were no authorized reinsurance

payments.” (Doc. 1–1 at 217.) In this response, Plaintiff “found

that the Department of Education’s employees were keeping

federal data in unnamed databases of false statements made to

the Plaintiff during the Plaintiff’s requests for audits and

documents so that Plaintiff’s requests would be ignored,

resulting in impermissible runaround.” (Id. at 97–98.) Plaintiff

also asserts that the report “revealed” a “fake entry” created

by the Department of Education “that created a false impression

about the Plaintiff’s audit request.” (Doc. 1–2 at 11–12.)

Following the information that “exposed that there was no

authorized reinsurance payment,” (Doc. 1–1 at 217), Plaintiff

received a “Debt Statement” from the Department of Education

“confirming there was no insurance payment or reinsurance

payment or transfer or physical delivery relating to the subject

Law Access loan claim set.” (Id.) This Debt Statement was “dated

July 10, 2015” and “the Department of Education admitted that

the subject claim set is time-barred because no insurance

payment, reinsurance payment, or transfer occurred.” (Id. at

68.) In other words, the Department of Education “recanted” the

“insurance payment and transfer stories,” (id. at 93), by

“admitt[ing] . . . that the federal reports of a transfer having

taken place were false.” (Id. at 135.)

The North Carolina Supreme Court has maintained that the

“discovery rule is an objective standard, not a subjective one.”

Taylor v. Bank of Am., N.A., 385 N.C. 783, 789, 898 S.E.2d 740,

746 (2024). This rule “tolls the statute of limitations only

until a reasonable person should have discovered the fraud under

the circumstances and in the exercise of reasonable prudence.”

Id. As such, “[t]he particular moment that a specific plaintiff

alleges he actually discovered the fraud is irrelevant.” Id.

(emphasis in original). While the Complaint arguably alleges

that the fraud was sufficiently discovered in 2004, (see Doc. 1–

2 at 41), it makes clear that Plaintiff believed her theories

were confirmed by July 2015. Thus, the statute of limitations

began to run by Defendant’s Disclosure Statement, making

Plaintiff’s claims before this court untimely.

The timing of Plaintiff’s discoveries also defeats

Plaintiff’s arguments for a continuing violation, equitable

tolling, or fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff asserts several

arguments against application of the statute of limitations. For

example, she maintains that “[f]raud on the court nullifies the

statute of limitations,” (Doc. 39 at 15), “[n]o statute of

limitations allows PHEAA to knowingly maintain fraudulent

records,” (id. at 17, 18), and “[t]he records PHEAA still

maintains must be removed as a source of inaccurate information

and financial statements used for continuing fraud.” (Id. at

15.) Construed liberally, Plaintiff argues that her claims are

not barred by the statutes of limitation under a continuing

violation theory, the doctrine of equitable tolling, and the

doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

Starting with fraudulent concealment and Plaintiff’s

contention that “[f]raud on the court nullifies the statute of

limitations,” (id.), this court finds that Plaintiff’s claims

are untimely even if the elements were satisfied. The Fourth

Circuit has recognized that “pursuant to this doctrine, ‘when

fraud has been concealed or is of such a character as to conceal

itself,’ and the plaintiff is not negligent or guilty of laches,

the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff

discovers the fraud.” Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow

Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 122 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis

added) (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349

(1874)); see also Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 402, 104 S.

Ct. 756, 766, 78 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)

(“Fraud did not entirely repeal the bar of limitations; rather

the period of limitations simply did not begin to run until the

fraud was discovered, or at least discoverable.”) (citing

Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918)). Because

the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, if applied, would have

the same effect as claims under a discovery rule such that the

claims’ limitation period began to run by July 2015, this court

finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not timely filed.

This court also finds Plaintiff’s continuing violation

theory inapplicable. This theory “is occasioned by continual

unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original

violation.” Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158,

1166 (4th Cir. 1991). A violation is not a “continuing

violation” if the allegations reflect “an entirely new

violation.” A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342,

348 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff asserts fraud beyond the

alleged loan consolidation and reinsurance payment, contending

that the “records PHEAA still maintains must be removed as a

source of inaccurate information and financial statements used

for continuing fraud.” (Doc. 39 at 15.) To the extent

maintenance of records is not an “entirely new violation,” A

Soc’y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 348, courts have recognized

that “a failure to provide notice or provide information or

documents as required is not treated as a continuing violation.”

Hartquist v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 11-CV-1067, 2016 WL 1312028,

at *7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2016) (collecting cases). Additionally,

even if Plaintiff’s continuing violation theory was both

recognized and not an entirely new violation, courts have

maintained that “[i]f the continuing violation doctrine is

implicated, the limitations period begins to run at the time of

the last violation.” Id. (collecting cases). Therefore, this

court finds that a continuing violation theory could not support

Plaintiff’s time-barred claims.

Equitable tolling is “reserved for those rare instances

where – due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct

– it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period

against the party and gross injustice would result.” Harris v.

Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). This doctrine

does not “extend to garden variety claims of excusable neglect.”

Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003). Courts have

recognized that, in the context of student debt relief cases,

“allegations of government harassment” when asserted through

“conclusory statements” are “not entitled to the assumption of

truth, and thus are not a basis for equitable tolling.” Winston

v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 8:22-CV-01965, 2023 WL 8452451, at

*7 (D. Md. Dec. 6, 2023).

The Fourth Circuit clarified the distinction between

equitable tolling and other equitable doctrines used to provide

relief from a limitations period. In Edmonson v. Eagle National

Bank, the Fourth Circuit recognized that equitable tolling is

“substantively different and therefore subject to different

pleading and proof standards” than fraudulent concealment. 922

F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). Where

fraudulent concealment considers “the defendant’s wrongful acts

of concealment” such that “the plaintiff is not aware of the

facts giving rise to his claim within the limitations period,”

equitable tolling “focuses on whether there was excusable delay

by the plaintiff.” Id. at 549 (quoting Johnson v. Henderson, 314

F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002)). Equitable tolling “differs from”

other doctrines “in that does not assume a wrongful – or any –

effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing.”

Id. (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451

(7th Cir. 1990)). In other words, equitable tolling “is

potentially applicable when a plaintiff’s failure to timely file

suit is not attributable to wrongful conduct by the defendant,”

and a plaintiff seeks “relief based on its mistake.” Id. at 550–

51 (emphasis in original).

In this case, Plaintiff attributes the delays in filing to

Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that “no statute of limitations

applies because PHEAA committed fraud on the court.” (Doc. 39 at

15.) Defendant’s actions, according to Plaintiff, “were a

corruption of the judicial process itself.” (Id. at 16.)

Plaintiff cannot, as is required for equitable tolling, claim

that the failure to timely file was not attributable to

Defendant while simultaneously alleging that Defendant “polluted

the judicial machinery.” (Id.) This court agrees with Defendant

that “Plaintiff has been making the same arguments about PHEAA’s

allegedly improper consolidation of her student loan, ad

nauseam,” (Doc. 40 at 3), and continues to portray Defendant as

“the hidden original lender” that “concealed” information. (Doc.

39 at 19.) Equitable tolling is thus inapplicable.

This court therefore finds that Plaintiff is collaterally

estopped from relitigating the validity or legitimacy of her

educational debt consolidation loan. Additionally, any claims

not precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel are barred

by any applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiff’s complaint

will be dismissed with prejudice. See Burnett v. Maryland Dep’t

of Lab., No. CV 24-3718, 2025 WL 2720147, at *6 (D. Md. Sep. 24,

2025) (collecting cases) (“Dismissal with prejudice is the

appropriate disposition when a plaintiff’s claims are barred by

res judicata.”); Foy v. Giant Food Inc., 298 F.3d 284, 291 (4th

Cir. 2002) (recognizing the district court “properly applied”

the statute of limitations and dismissed the “claims with

prejudice.”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 33), is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court-Ordered

Mediation Deadline, (Doc. 44), is DENIED AS MOOT.

A judgment dismissing this action will be filed

contemporaneously herewith.

This the 19th day of August, 2026.

Winw L. Blu,

United States District Judde

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