The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNATHAN ROBINS, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-1474
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
SECRETARY WETZEL, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
Currently before the Court are Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings and pro se Plaintiff Johnathan Robins (“Robins”)’s motion to
substitute one of the Defendants in this case. For the reasons stated below,
the Court will grant Robins’s motion to substitute and grant in part and deny
in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
Robins, a convicted state prisoner, commenced this action by filing a
complaint, a handwritten application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP Application”), and a certified prisoner trust fund account statement, all
of which the Clerk of Court docketed on August 26, 2021. (Docs. 1–3.)
Because the IFP Application did not contain the necessary information for
the Court to determine whether to allow Robins leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, an Administrative Order was entered directing him to either remit
the filing fee or file a proper application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. 5.) Approximately two weeks later, Robins remitted the filing
fee. (Doc. 6.)
In the complaint, Robins named as Defendants: (1) the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”); (2) John Wetzel
(“Wetzel”), former Secretary of the DOC; (3) Bobbi Salamon (“Salamon”),
Superintendent of Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Rockview
(“SCI Rockview”); (4) Supervisor of SCI Rockview’s Sex Program Tice
(“Tice”); (5) SCI Rockview Unit Manager Condo (“Condo”); (6) SCI Rockview
Counselor Williams (“Williams”); (7) SCI Rockview Program Coordinator
Damico (“Damico”); (8) the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“Parole Board”); (9) Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner (“Krasner”);
and (10) the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (“DA Office”). See (Doc.
1 at 1–2). Robins purported to sue all Defendants in their “professional
capacit[ies],” as well as Salamon, Condo, Williams, and Damico, in their
individual capacities. (Id. at 2.)
Regarding his factual allegations, Robins alleged that he was
incarcerated at SCI Rockview following his criminal convictions in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. See (id. at 3). Because those
convictions are interwoven with Robins’s other factual allegations, the Court
will preliminarily discuss them here for contextual purposes.
The factual background for Robins’s convictions is as follows:
The complaining witness, E.J., testified that as of the date of trial,
she was seventeen years old. She stated her date of birth as July
30, 1992[.] She also testified that she had a two[-]year[-]old child
born on February 20, 2008, identifying Robins as the father of
the child.
E.J. testified that she met Robins in early January 2007 through
a telephone chat line. Although the chat line was restricted to
parties eighteen years or older, she told Robins, during their
initial conversation, that she was fourteen years old. At this time,
[Robins] refused to divulge his age, but indicated that E.J.’s age
presented no problem for him saying, “it wouldn’t mater [sic] how
old you were, if I find a woman I will treat them the same because
they all get, they all should be treated the same.”
Shortly after this initial conversation, E.J. and Robins met and
had dinner together, after which they went to a movie. E.J.
testified that at the end of this first dinner together, Robins
reluctantly told her he was thirty[-]nine year[s] old. E.J. testified
that she and Robins communicated frequently, that she spent
time in Robin[s]’s home, and that they went shopping for clothes
for her.
E.J. testified that she and [Robins] first engaged in sexual
intercourse in Robin[s]’s home in March 2007. After this initial
encounter, she and Robins had sexual relations “a couple times
out of a month.” In addition to vaginal sex, E.J. testified [t]hat she
and Robins also engaged in oral sex, describing these sexual
acts in detail.
E.J. testified that she became pregnant on Mother’s Day of 2007
as a result of her relationship with Robins. She stated that she
was scared and was afraid to tell her mother. In addition, she
considered having an abortion but Robins talked her out of it
saying there’s “no need for that if I’m going to be here helping
you.” E.J. moved into Robin[s]’s home in October or November
of 2007, after it was confirmed that she was nineteen weeks
pregnant.
In early July of 2007, E.J. testified that Robins took her to Florida
to celebrate her fifteenth birthday. E.J. testified that, prior to going
to Florida, Robins took her to his sister’s wedding reception in
Atlantic City in June of 2007 to meet his family.
On January 15, 2008, Robins told E.J. they were flying to St.
Louis, Missouri to get married. When she asked him why not wait
until she was sixteen or eighteen, Robins responded “we can do
it now to stop your mom from getting in between, like, what we
trying to do.” In applying for the marriage license in Missouri, E.J.
testified that he used a fake South Carolina driver’s license,
indicating that she was twenty[-]three years old. She testified that
at sometime [sic] prior to January of 2008, Robins took her to a
check cashing establishment in Philadelphia to obtain this false
identification.
. . .
Robin[s]’s testimony essentially mirrored that of E.J. Robins
testified that he met E.J. on a dating phone line for adults over
the age of eighteen. After talking on the phone, they met for
dinner and talked about having a family. Robins admitted that
sometime after their meeting that “yes we did have intercourse.”
Robins testified on cross examination that he also engaged in
oral sex with E.J. Attempting to down play [sic] this aspect of their
relationship, he testified that they were [t]hen trying to have a
baby.
Robins testified that after E.J. became pregnant, he wanted to
marry her before the child was born. Robins testified that he
researched the marriage laws of both Pennsylvania and Missouri
before deciding to take E.J. to Missouri to get married. Robins
testified that he chose to marry E.J. in Missouri because it does
not require a three[-]day waiting period and “I could do it in one
day.” Robins testified that it wasn’t until January of 2008, after
they returned from Missouri that he learned E.J.’s true age.
Robins v. Superintendent of Rockview SCI, No. 18-cv-1385, 2020 WL
12863472, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2020) (“Robins II”) (citations to record
and original alterations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2021
WL 6335804 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2021).
Based on these facts, a jury convicted Robins of unlawful contact with
a minor (18 Pa. C.S. §6318), statutory sexual assault (18 Pa. C.S. §3122.1),
interference with the custody of a child (18 Pa. C.S. §2904(a)), and
corruption of minors (18 Pa. C.S. §6301(a)(1)) on March 12, 2010. See (Doc.
1 ¶14.); Commonwealth v. Robins, No. 2047 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 4276084,
at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2017) (“Robins I”); Robins II, 2020 WL
12863472, at *1. Robins alleges that the jury found him not guilty of
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) – forcible compulsion (18 Pa.
C.S. §3123(a)(1)), even though his sentencing sheet shows him as being
found guilty. See (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14, 21). According to Robins, the jury instead
found him guilty of IDSI under a different subsection, namely, subsection
(a)(7), which requires that the victim be less than sixteen (16) years of age,
the defendant four (4) or more years older than the victim, and the victim and
the defendant to not be married to each other. See (id. ¶21 (citing 18 Pa.
C.S. §3123(a)(7))). Robins asserts that despite this conviction, he was never
charged with this offense. See (id.).
Following these convictions, Robins was sentenced to state
confinement and was incarcerated at SCI Rockview. See (id. ¶15). While at
SCI Rockview, Robins was enrolled in a “sex program” (the “Program”) run
by a coordinator, non-party Ms. Miller (“Miller”). See (id.) The requirements
of the Program were “to give honest feedback and take responsibility for
[your] actions.” (Id.) Robins completed all paperwork in the booklet given to
him as part of the Program, and he “admitted to all actions testified to at trial
by witnesses, but said they are not criminal offenses.” (Id.) He also stated
that he “would not lie and agree with false information in the record.” (Id.)
Robins alleged that he legally married the victim in his criminal case
on January 16, 2008, despite her status as a minor. See (id. ¶17). He
indicates that the victim lied to him, his family, and others about her age, and
the victim’s mother knew that the victim lied to others about her age to gain
employment. See (id. ¶¶17–18). He also avers that the victim testified that
“she presented him with a ring first[,] they were married by a Judge on
January 16, 2008[, and he] was arrested in February 2009.” (Id. ¶19.) He
asserts that the prosecution did not want him to introduce evidence about his
marriage to the victim during the trial, and the trial court precluded him from
introducing this evidence. See (id. ¶20).
Overall, Robins believes that he is innocent; as such, he provided
Miller with documents in support of his belief. See (id. ¶16). After reviewing
these documents, Miller determined that there was no purpose in Robins
continuing with the Program. See (id. ¶22). She then issued a letter dated
December 22, 2020, removing Robins from the Program and stating that “he
would not be listed as a refusal[,] and it would not be disciplinary.” (Id.) Miller
also “provided documents to [the] Parole Board for review.” (Id.)
Thereafter, Robins had a meeting with Williams and Condo in which
they informed him that the prison would not recommend him for parole
because he did not complete the Program. See (id. ¶23). Robins alleges that
“[s]taff tried to coerce [him] into agreeing with false information that he was
guilty of IDSI ‘by forcible compulsion’ and that him having sex with his wife
was a criminal offense.” (Id.)
On March 18, 2021, “[s]omeone” placed Robins back into the Program.
(Id. ¶24). A non-party, “Ms. Ace,” initially ran the Program, but Damico later
replaced her. (Id.)
Robins finished all his “written work,” and he asked Williams, his parole
agent, as well as Damico, “if participants were allowed to lie to satisfy [sic]”
the Program. (Id.) Neither Williams nor Damico answered Robins’s question.
See (id.). However, Williams apparently told Robins that they were “not
debating [Robins’s] marital status because it was not relevant in the [DOC],”
Damico stated that Robins “having sex with his wife was an offense,” and
Salamon told Robins he “must . . . take[] up” “any errors in [his] sentencing
documents” with the Philadelphia justice system. (Id.)
On April 2, 2018, March 18, 2019, February 12, 2020, and September
7, 2020, Robins contacted the Integrity Unit of the Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office about the “false information in his record.” (Id. ¶26). Despite
these communications, “Krasner’s office has yet [sic] refused to correct it.”
(Id.)
In mid-May 2021, Robins was involuntarily removed from the Program.
See (id. ¶27). Tice stated that Robins was removed for “lack of progress.”
(Id.) Robins was supposed to “see parole in July 2021,” but the Parole Board
canceled this meeting via a letter dated May 28, 2021, because Robins “had
not attended and participated in [the P]rogram.” (Id.) In response, Robins
informed the Parole Board on June 7, 2021, “that he was involuntarily
removed from [the P]rogram[,] and he did attend and participate as the Pa
[sic] law requires to see parole.” (Id.) Robins averred that “[h]e has yet to see
[the] Parole Board.” (Id.)
Robins alleged that Salamon stated that his “belief in his innocense
[sic] makes [P]rogram completion impossible,” and both Williams and Tice
told him that the Parole Board “will not see him” unless he is in the Program.
(Id. ¶28.) Robins notes that he has never refused to participate in the
Program. See (id.).
On April 11, 2021, Robins filed a grievance (No. 922994) because the
DOC “would not honor” Miller’s assessment, he continued receiving
“disrespectful statements about [his] marriage,” he was coerced “to
disrespect and demonize his marriage,” and he was “forced . . . to lie and
agree with false facts to complete [the P]rogram.” (Id. ¶29.) This grievance
was initially denied and upheld on appeal. See (id.).
Based on these factual allegations, Robins asserted claims under 42
U.S.C. §1983 for (1) violations of his equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) age
discrimination, (3) a “religious violation,” and (4) a Fourteenth Amendment
due process violation. See (id. at 8–13). For relief, Robins sought, inter alia:
(1) injunctive relief in the nature of an order prohibiting DOC staff “from
making any negative comments about [his] marital relationship” and from
“coercing [him] into making false statements”; (2) injunctive relief directing
the DOC to “correct policy [sic] which discriminates against persons
convicted of sex crimes to have equal opportunity to see [the] Parole Board
as other convictions [sic]”; (3) injunctive relief directing the DA’s Office to “try
to correct [the] ‘clerical error’ saying [he] was convicted of IDSI §3123(a)(1)”;
(4) injunctive relief directing the Parole Board to conduct a parole hearing for
him; (5) injunctive relief directing SCI Rockview to allow him to complete the
Program; and (6) punitive damages. (Id. at 13–14).
After screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, the Court
issued a Memorandum and Order on December 9, 2021. (Docs. 12, 13.) The
Court construed the complaint as containing claims under Section 1983 for
violations of (1) Robins’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, (2) his procedural and substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3) his equal protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See (Doc. 12 at 12–20). The Court also
construed the complaint as including a challenge to the denial of Robins’s
parole and a claim for verbal harassment. See (id. at 10–11, 20–21). After
construing the complaint as such, the Court dismissed all claims for the
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, did not give Robins
leave to file an amended complaint, and directed the Clerk of Court to close
the case. See (Doc. 12 at 21–22; Doc. 13 at 1).1
On September 21, 2021, Robins filed a timely appeal from the
dismissal of his complaint to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15.)
Approximately a year later, on September 28, 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed
in part and vacated in part the judgment, and it remanded the action here for
further proceedings. See (Doc. 17); Robins v. Wetzel, No. 22-1006, 2022 WL
4533850 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) (unpublished). The Third Circuit essentially
affirmed the dismissals of the claims the Court identified in the complaint, but
vacated the dismissal to the extent that Robins raised claims regarding the
“acceptance-of-responsibility” component of a sex-offender treatment
program under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (“RLUIPA”) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”) because those claims were not addressed as part of the Court’s
decision. See Robins, 2022 WL 4533850, at *2–3.
B. The Amended Complaint
Upon remand, the Court entered an Order on September 28, 2022,
which, inter alia, allowed Robins to file an amended complaint relating to only
1 Although the Court’s Order referenced 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i),
see (Doc. 13 ¶1), the dismissal was entered pursuant to Section 1915A(b)(1)
because Robins paid the fee and was not proceeding in forma pauperis.
the RLUIPA and RFRA claims the Third Circuit referenced in its decision.
See (Doc. 18 at 1–2). Robins timely filed an amended complaint, which the
Clerk of Court docketed on October 21, 2022. (Doc. 19.) On the same date,
Robins also filed a motion to amend the complaint a second time and a
supporting brief. (Docs. 20, 21.)
After reviewing Robins’ submissions, the Court determined that they
failed to comport with the Third Circuit’s mandate limiting the complaint to
only the acceptance-of-responsibility component of a sex-offender treatment
program in the context of RLUIPA or RFRA and instead attempted to reraise
the same claims that the Court previously dismissed and which the Third
Circuit had affirmed on appeal. See (Doc. 22 at 1–2). As such, the Court
issued an Order on January 31, 2023, which, inter alia, denied Robins’s
motion to amend as moot, struck his amended complaint and proposed
amended complaint, and directed him to file an amended complaint limited
to the impact of his acceptance of responsibility in the sex-offender treatment
program on his constitutional and statutory rights to the free exercise of
religion. See (id. at 2).
Robins then timely filed an amended complaint, which the Clerk of
Court docketed on February 24, 2023. (Doc. 24.) In his amended complaint,
Robins names as Defendants: (1) Wetzel; (2) Salamon; (3) Tice; (4) Damico;
(5) Durst, a Supervisor of the Program at SCI Rockview; (6) Collins, a
Program Coordinator at SCI Rockview; and (7) Ace, also a Program
Coordinator at SCI Rockview. See (id. at 1–2). Robins’s allegations relate to
his criminal convictions in Philadelphia County as well as his participation in
the Program at SCI Rockview. See (id. at 2–10).
Robins again alleges that after a trial in the Philadelphia County Court
of Common Pleas, a jury convicted him of unlawful contact with a minor,
statutory sexual assault, interference with the custody of a child, and
corruption of minors, and he continues to assert that his record falsely shows
that he was also convicted of IDSI – forcible compulsion. (Doc. 24 ¶12.)
Robins asserts that during the trial, he wanted to present his marriage license
as well as his “marriage laws” to show the jury that he did not commit a crime
due to spouses being exempted from the charged offenses, but the trial
judge refused to allow him to show his “marriage evidence” or “explain
marriage [sic] laws to [the] jury” after the prosecutor objected. (Id. ¶13.) Then,
after preventing Robins from telling the jury about his “marriage evidence” or
using “a marriage defense,” the trial judge “told [the] jury [that] no one
presented any marriage evidence.” (Id.)
Following his convictions, Robins was confined at SCI Rockview. See
(id. ¶14). While there, he enrolled in the Program, which was coordinated by
Miller. See (id.). Robins completed all paperwork for the Program, and even
though he admitted to “all actions testified to at trial,” he asserted that those
actions did not constitute crimes because they involved his wife. (Id.) Robins
also provided Miller with copies of his trial transcripts, the “Judge’s Opinion,”
his marriage certificate, “marriage laws, and other documents.” (Id. ¶15.)
Based on the information provided by Robins, Miller “assessed there was no
purpose in furtherance of any government interest to have [him] continue
[the P]rogram,” removed him from the Program, and told him that his removal
would not be considered as a refusal and “it would not be listed as
disciplinary.” (Id.)
Presumably at some point thereafter, Salamon stated that Robins’s
marriage had to be “evaluated” and that “his marital relationship was deviate
behavior.” (Id. ¶16.) As a result, Robins returned to the Program, which was
now coordinated by Damico. See (id.). However, in mid-May 2021, Robins
was involuntarily removed from the Program “because he refused to disavow
and slander his religious tenet of his marriage.” (Id.) Tice stated that Robins
was removed due to a “lack of progress.” (Id.)
Because Robins was removed from the Program, the Parole Board
informed him via a letter dated May 28, 2021, that the members would not
see him because the DOC reported that he “had refused to attend and
participate in [the P]rogram.” (Id.) Additionally, Salamon stated that because
Robins was asserting his innocence, and “following his religious tenets of
marriage,” it was “impossible” for him to complete the Program. See (id.).
Robins submitted a grievance (No. 922994) about this issue, which was
initially denied and then upheld on appeal to final decision. See (id.).
Robins alleges that he was placed into the Program for a third time on
November 2, 2021. See (id. ¶17). At this time, Ace was running the Program.
See (id.). Robins notes that the Program requires its participants to be
honest, and he would have violated this requirement if he lied. See (id.).
Thus, because he believed he was innocent based on his “religious tenets
on [sic] his marriage and refused to lie, make false statements, slander,
demonize, or disavow the sanctity of his marriage,” he was removed from
the Program. (Id.) Following his removal, Robins filed another grievance (No.
955415), which he appealed to final decision. See (id.).
On an unknown date, Robins was placed into the Program for a fourth
time, this time while Collins was coordinating the Program. See (id. ¶18).
Robins tried to show Collins his “marriage evidence” in support of his claim
that he did not commit a crime, but she refused to review it. See (id.). Durst
then told Robins that “because he would not disavow, slander, and demonize
his marriage[,] the [DOC] was going to max [out] his sentence . . . and Durst
was going to record him as refusing to take [the P]rogram.” (Id.) Robins
asserts that he never refused to take the Program, and he filed another
grievance (No. 972323), which he appealed to final decision. See (id.).
On yet another unknown date, Robins was again put in the Program
while Ace was coordinating it. See (id. ¶19). Robins alleges that “Ace always
[told] the group that the age of consent in [Pennsylvania] is eighteen[,] even
though [he] tells her its [sic] sixteen.” (Id.) In addition, although Robins
“admitted to the facts in [the] case and admitted to what the law clearly says,”
Ace wanted him “to make false statements that [did] not align with the facts
of the case or the law” insofar as she wanted him to “disavow, slander, and
demonize his marriage against his religious tenets as well as give false
witness against his marriage.” (Id.) Robins refused to make such statements.
See (id.).
Ace also required him and the other inmates in the Program “to state
thinking errors for offense [sic], how they were stressed out to make them
offend, and what was triggering them to do offense [sic].” (Id. ¶20.) In
response, Robins and other inmates told Ace that “some of these things did
not apply to them.” (Id.) Nevertheless, Ace told them that they needed to
agree that those “things” did apply for them to stay in the Program. See (id.).
Robins refused to “make false statements to continue” in the Program. (Id.)
Robins alleges that Ace also required him to “discuss his most intimate
marital affairs with [the] group.” (Id.) Robins refused to discuss his marital
affairs because it “was against his religious tenets.” (Id.) Due to his refusals,
Robins was removed from the Program for a fifth time. See (id.).2
As for the Program, Robins avers that it is governed by a Pennsylvania
statute, 42 Pa. C.S. §9718.1, which requires only “attendance and
participation in [a] sex program” and does not state that “one must complete
it.” (Id. ¶22.) Robins points out that “[t]he [P]rogram is mandatory to see [sic]
parole,” and he believes that he “has satisfied [its] requirements . . . multiple
times” by “admitt[ing] to all actions shown by the facts of his case and . . .
accept[ing] responsibility for his actions.” (Id. ¶¶21–22.) Robins contends
that “[t]his should satisfy the ‘acceptance-of-responsibility’ component of the
sex-offender program.” (Id. ¶21.) However, “because the law states [that his]
actions were legal[, DOC staff] wants [him] to make up false statements and
fake complexes to pass” the Program. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Robins asserts that Defendants violated
his “[r]eligious [r]ights” under RLUIPA, RFRA, and Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution because the DOC’s “application of the
2 It is unclear whether Ace was the individual who removed him from
the Program.
‘acceptance-of-responsibility’ component of the sex-offender program
infringes upon [his] religious practices as it pertains to his martial religious
tenets.” (Id. ¶23.) He alleges that DOC staff are substantially burdening his
“religious practices concerning marriage . . . by using coercion to deny him
his liberty interest in being seen by parole.” (Id. ¶24.) He also alleges that
DOC staff are:
abus[ing] their use of the “admission-of-responsibility”
requirement in the sex program [by n]ot only . . . requir[ing]
participants to admit the facts in their cases, [but] . . . requir[ing]
them to admit to psychological complexes that the participants
disagree that they have. Forcing participants to state what ever
[sic] staff tells them to say whether the participants agree with it
or not negates the honesty requirement in the [P]rogram[, and]
what is the compelling government interest in that. [sic]
(Id. ¶25.) If a participant does not say what the DOC staff want them to say,
they are removed from the Program. See (id. ¶26).
Robins also alleges the following about his marriage and Defendants’
actions:
Plaintiff’s marriage is part of his recognition of his religion and
has spiritual significance. His faith is exercised through is
commitment and dedication to his marriage as it is a solemn vow
made in connection to his faith. Plaintiff’s religious beliefs require
him not to lie and give false witness about his marriage, not to
disavow or slander it, to hold private the intimate relationship
between husband and wife, and to defend it against attack.
. . . [DOC] staff’s attack on Plaintiff’s religious marital vows also
include his wife and son; as staff’s disrespect flows to them as
well. Staff acts as if Plaintiff’s family is subhuman without the
rights as others who have marital vows under their religion and
the family values that flow from such tenets. This is a hurtful
message that is a terrible irreparable harm against Plaintiff and
his family.
(Id. ¶¶27–28.)
Robins indicates that he is asserting his claims against Defendants in
their official capacities, see (id. ¶¶29–30), and he seeks an injunction
requiring “a procedure be put in place by the [DOC] which would allow [him]
to have a parole hearing that does not require [him] to disregard his religious
practices and disavow, slander, and make false statements about his
marriage.” (Id. ¶31.) Robins does not seek any monetary relief in this version
of his complaint.
C. Proceedings Following Robins’s Amended Complaint
On February 28, 2023, the Court issued an Order which, inter alia,
directed the Clerk of Court to reopen this case and send copies of the
amended complaint as well as waiver of service forms to Defendants. (Doc.
26.)3 Defendants waived service (Doc. 31), and they filed a motion to dismiss
3 On the same date Robins filed his amended complaint, he filed
another notice of appeal to the Third Circuit from the Court’s January 31,
2023 Order striking his October 21, 2022 amended complaint and dismissing
as moot his motion to amend his complaint for a second time. (Doc. 25.) The
Third Circuit dismissed Robins’s appeal on July 3, 2023, after he failed to
pay the filing fee for the notice of appeal. See (Doc. 54); see also Robins v.
Wetzel, et al., No. 23-1359 (3d Cir.), ECF No. 14.
Robins’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), along with a supporting brief, on April 28, 2023 (Docs. 34, 35).
Robins filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion on May 30, 2023.
(Doc. 38.)
While Defendants’ motion to dismiss remained pending, Robins filed
three motions to compel discovery along with supporting briefs on June 20,
2023, October 18, 2023, and December 26, 2023. (Docs. 41, 42, 47, 48, 51,
52.) The Court issued an Order on November 8, 2023, which denied the
second of those motions as moot. (Doc. 50.) Then, on March 21, 2025, the
Court entered a Memorandum and Order which, inter alia, denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Robins’s amended complaint and directed
Defendants to file responses to Robins’s other motions to compel discovery.
(Docs. 55, 56.)
Defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses to Robins’s
amended complaint on April 4, 2025 (Doc. 57), to which Robins filed a
response and supporting exhibits (Docs. 59, 60). The parties also filed
additional briefs relating to Robins’s motions to compel. (Docs. 58, 61.)
On May 30, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on
the pleadings and a supporting brief. (Docs. 62, 63.) On June 12, 2025, the
Court issued a Memorandum and Order denying Robins’s remaining motions
to compel discovery. (Docs. 64, 65.)
Robins filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings on July 8, 2025. (Doc. 66.) Approximately three weeks later,
on July 28, 2025, Robins filed a motion to substitute the current DOC
Secretary, Dr. Laurel R. Harry (“Harry”), for Wetzel as a Defendant, along
with a supporting brief. (Docs. 67, 68.) Defendants never filed a response to
this motion. As such, Robins’s motion to substitute and Defendants’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings are ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A
motion for judgment on the pleadings is a procedural hybrid of a motion to
dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.” Gaughen v. United States, No.
09-cv-2488, 2011 WL 292019, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011). In considering
such a motion, a district court ordinarily considers “the pleadings and
attached exhibits, undisputedly authentic documents attached to the motion
for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs’ claims are based on the
documents, and matters of public record.” Tristate Antiques v. Fed. Ins. Co.,
No. 17-cv-1823, 2017 WL 4539287, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2017). Judgment
on the pleadings is only warranted where “the plaintiff[] would not be entitled
to relief under any set of facts that could be proved.” Green v. Fund Asset
Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2001).
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that
apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417
(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y., N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134
(3d Cir. 2010)); see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004)
(explaining that there is “no material difference in the applicable legal
standards” for 12(b)(6) motions and 12(c) motions for judgment on the
pleadings). As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must therefore “view
the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” and cannot
grant the motion “unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue
of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d
187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig. (No. VI),
822 F.3d 125, 133 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016)).
In addition, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, the Court
must be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d
333, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “when presented with a pro se
litigant, we have a special obligation to construe [their] complaint liberally”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a pro se operative
complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429
U.S. at 106). This means the Court must always “remain flexible, especially
‘when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants . . . .’” Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th
182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
B. RLUIPA
“Congress passed RLUIPA to grant heightened protection to prisoners
from burdens imposed by the government.” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d
272, 276 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721
(2005) (explaining that RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are
unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent
on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their
religion”). To accomplish this protection, Section 3 of RLUIPA provides in
pertinent part that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. §2000cc–1(a). RLUIPA also has an “expansive[]” definition of
“religious exercise,” which includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Nunez v. Wolf, 117
F.4th 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-5(7)(A)).
In addition, “Congress mandated that [RLUIPA] ‘shall be construed in
favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by . . . the Constitution.’” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-3(c)). Overall,
RLUIPA . . . affords inmates even “greater protection” than that
provided by the First Amendment. Holt[, 574 U.S. at 357]. Under
the latter, a prison regulation that substantially burdens religious
exercise is subject to intermediate scrutiny and thus must be
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987);
under RLUIPA, however, that regulation is subject to strict
scrutiny, requiring the government to prove that it “is the least
restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental
interest,” 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1(a)(2). . . . [T]hat burden is a heavy
one and carries unique implications in the prison context for both
the interests recognized as compelling and the acceptable
means to accomplish them.
Nunez, 117 F.4th at 146 (first and second alterations added).
RLUIPA establishes a private right of action through which an
aggrieved individual may “obtain appropriate relief against a government.”
Id. §2000cc-2(a). It defines the “government” to include: “(i) a State, county,
municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a
State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an
entity listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State
law . . . .” Id. §2000cc-5(4)(A); Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir.
2012) (identifying RLUIPA’s definition of “government” (citing 42 U.S.C.
§2000cc-5(4)(A))).
“To state a plausible claim under RLUIPA, a [prisoner-]plaintiff must
allege that the prison placed a ‘substantial burden’ on the plaintiff’s sincerely
held religious belief.” Lapp v. Nye, No. 1:23-cv-419, 2024 WL 53017, at *7
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2024) (citing Washington, 497 F.3d at 277–78). A plaintiff
can demonstrate that a substantial burden exists if:
1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts
of [their] religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally
available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the
precepts of [their] religion in order to receive a benefit; OR (2) the
government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to
substantially modify [their] behavior to violate [their] beliefs.
Washington, 497 F.3d at 280 (capitalization of “OR” in original) (footnote
omitted). “If a prisoner-plaintiff establishes a substantial burden on a
sincerely held religious belief, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that
the policy or practice furthers a compelling government interest and is the
least restrictive means of doing so.” Lapp, 2024 WL 53017, at *7 (citing Holt,
574 U.S. at 361–62); see also Holt, 574 U.S. at 355 (explaining that RLUIPA
“prohibits a state or local government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the religious exercise of an institutionalized person
unless the government demonstrates that the action constitutes the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest”).
C. RFRA
“RFRA prohibits the ‘Government from substantially burdening a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability’ unless the Government ‘demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.’” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682,
705 (2014) (cleaned up) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1). To state a prima
facie RFRA claim, a plaintiff “must allege that the government (1)
substantially burdened (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise.” Davis v. Wigen,
82 F.4th 204, 211 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Mack, 839 F.3d at 304).
At the pleadings stage, a district court must only inquire whether
plaintiff has alleged these elements. See id. Once the case moves to
summary judgment or a trial, however, “if the plaintiff makes an initial
showing that the defendant substantially burdened his sincere religious
exercise, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the offending
policy is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government
interest.” Id. A substantial burden occurs when “1) a follower is forced to
choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits
otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the
precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government
puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs.” Id. (quoting Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272,
280 (3d Cir. 2007)). “A burden can be ‘substantial,’ triggering heightened
scrutiny under RFRA, ‘even if it involves indirect coercion to betray one's
religious beliefs.’” Mack II, 839 F.3d at 291. The question of whether a burden
is ‘substantial’ is a question of law, not a question of fact. Real Alternatives,
Inc. v. Sec’y of HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 356 (3d Cir. 2017). RFRA provides relief
only if the burden on religious exercise is indeed substantial; it does not
provide relief “from all government burdens.” Id. at 357. “There is no
substantial burden if the governmental action does not coerce the individuals
to violate their religious beliefs or deny them the ‘rights, benefits, and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens – even if ‘the challenged Government
action would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue
spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs.” Id. (quoting Lyng
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Robins’s Motion to Substitute
Robins moves for an Order substituting Harry for Wetzel as a
Defendant in this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25. (Docs. 67,
68.) The Court will grant his motion as unopposed because Defendants did
not file a response to the motion and the time for them to do so has passed.
See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.6 (“Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion
for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14)
days after service of the movant’s brief . . . . Any party who fails to comply
with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.”). Furthermore,
even if the Court did not grant the motion as unopposed, the Court would
grant Robins’s motion because substitution is warranted under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as Robins asserts only official-capacity
claims for injunctive relief against Wetzel in his amended complaint. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer who is
a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office
while the action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically
substituted as a party. . . . The court may order substitution at any time, but
the absence of such an order does not affect the substitution.”). Accordingly,
the Court will grant Robins’s motion to substitute and substitute Harry for
Wetzel as a Defendant in this action.
B. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings
on Robins’s RLUIPA claim because (1) they are entitled to qualified
immunity, (2) his religious beliefs are insincere, (3) he has not established
that the admission-of-guilt requirement substantially burdened his religious
beliefs, and (4) the admission-of-guilt requirement furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. See
(Doc. 63 at 4–11, 12–15). Defendants also argue that they have sovereign
immunity from Robins’s claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See (id.
at 11–12). The Court will address each of Defendants’ arguments in turn
after first discussing certain aspects of the parties’ submissions.
1. Preliminary Notes
a. Robins’s RFRA Claim
When the Third Circuit remanded the instant case, it did so “for the
District Court to address the RLUIPA and RFRA claims in the first instance.”
Robins, 2022 WL 4533850, at *3 (emphasis added). On March 21, 2025, the
Court complied with the Third Circuit’s directive by addressing Robins’s
RFRA claim and determining that it must be dismissed because RFRA is
inapplicable in this case because Defendants are state, and not federal,
officials. See (Doc. 55 at 7 (“RFRA applies to the federal government, and
RLUIPA applies to the states. Because [Robins] is a state inmate bringing
his claims against state officials, RFRA is inapplicable in this case and any
claim under RFRA will be dismissed.”)). However, the Court did not reference
dismissal of Robins’s RFRA claim in the Order accompanying the March 21,
2025 Memorandum. See (Doc. 56 at 1–2). To remedy this administrative
discrepancy, the Court will include language dismissing Robins’s RFRA
claim for the reasons set forth in the March 21, 2025 Memorandum in the
Order accompanying the instant Memorandum.4
4 Even if the Court had not dismissed the RFRA claim on March 21,
2025, the Court could still do so today because it retains authority to sua
sponte dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim under the Prisoner
Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c) (“The court shall on its own
(footnote continued on next page)
b. Robins’s Reply to Defendants’ Answer and
Affirmative Defenses to His Amended Complaint
After Defendants filed their answer and affirmative defenses to
Robins’s amended complaint, Robins filed a “Response to Defendants’
Answer with Affirmative Defenses to [His] Second Amended Complaint”
along with separately docketed exhibits. (Docs. 59, 60.) Robins asserts that
he filed these documents because there was “a need to provide
documentation to the Court to clarify the facts” insofar as Defendants
“misinterpret[ed] the details of events of [his] underlying [criminal] case to
present a false narrative remixing fact into fiction.” (Doc. 59 at 1.) As such,
he “provid[ed] trial transcripts [and] direct witness testimony, where all facts
are supposed to flow from.” (Id.) More specifically, he attaches copies of: (1)
his State of Missouri marriage license, see (Doc. 60 at 2); (2) a transcript of
a December 31, 2008 proceeding in Lucille Freeman v. Jonathan Robins,
No. 08-2157, in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, see (Doc.
60-1); (3) transcripts from proceedings on March 11–12, 2010, in his criminal
trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, see (Docs. 60-2–
motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the
court is satisfied that the action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted . . . .”).
60-3); (4) portions of a booklet from the DOC’s Program, see (Doc. 60-4); (5)
portions of the DOC’s Access to Mental Health Care Procedures Manual
13.8.1, see (Doc. 60-5); and (6) an Inmate’s Request to Staff Member dated
February 9, 2025, see (Doc. 60-6).
The Court notes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
delineate the permissible pleadings in a civil action, which include: “(1) a
complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim
designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party
complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and (7) if the court orders
one, a reply to an answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Here, the Court construes
Robins’s “Response to Defendants’ Answer with Affirmative Defenses to
[His] Second Amended Complaint” as a “reply to an answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
7(a)(7). However, Robins did not seek leave of Court to file his reply, and the
Court did not order him to file a reply. Thus, Robins filed an unauthorized
and improper reply to Defendants’ answer to his amended complaint.
Although the Court must liberally construe pro se filings, see Vogt, 8
F.4th at 185, it does not mean that pro se litigants such as Robins may “flout
procedural rules[; instead, they must abide by the same rules that apply to
all other litigants.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will not consider Robins’s reply
to Defendants’ answer, as well as his separately filed exhibits, in resolving
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.5
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court construed Robins’s filings as a
motion for leave to file a reply to Defendants’ answer, the Court would deny
the motion because, contrary to his assertion in his reply, no such reply was
needed in this case. There was nothing improper about Defendants’ answer;
they merely admitted or substantively denied Robins’s allegations as
required by the Federal Rules. See (Doc. 57 at 1–6); Fed. R. Civ. P.
5 Some courts would strike Robins’s reply as an unauthorized pleading,
primarily relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to do so. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court
may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before
responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days
after being served with the pleading.”); see, e.g., Smith v. Richardson, No.
24-cv-13000, 2026 WL 715818, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2026) (striking
plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s answer to his complaint filed without leave of
court); Mitchell v. Williams, No. 23-cv-141, 2023 WL 8275895, at *1 n.1 (W.D.
Wis. Nov. 30, 2023) (same); Williams-Evans v. Advance Auto Parts, No. 18-
cv-148, 2019 WL 2426443, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2019) (same); Kaimowitz
v. Supervisor of Elections, No. 16-cv-257, 2016 WL 6594110, at *1 (N.D. Fla.
Oct. 25, 2016) (same), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Hillel
Kaimowitz v. Supervisor of Elections, 2016 WL 6573973 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4,
2016); Crosky v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 09-cv-400, 2010 WL
3061816, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2010) (same). However, at least one
district court has cast doubt as to whether Rule 12(f) permits striking an entire
pleading. See Ortiz v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 13-cv-32, 2013 WL
2151674, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 16, 2013) (declining to strike entire
complaint under Rule 12(f) and pointing out that “Defendant provides no legal
authority for the proposition that Rule 12(f) permits a court to strike an entire
pleading”).
8(b)(1)(B) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must: . . . admit or deny the
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(2)
(“A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the allegation.”). Moreover,
Robins’s reply consists of various legal arguments and provides additional
allegations and evidence in support of the allegations and claims in his
amended complaint, which would have been proper if he was responding to
a motion for summary judgment, but not to an answer and affirmative
defenses to his amended complaint. Accordingly, even if the Court construed
Robins’s reply as a motion for leave to file a reply, the Court would deny it.
See, e.g., Stephens v. Alliant Techsystems Corp., 714 F. App’x 841, 844
(10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (concluding that “the district court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Stephens to file a reply” where the
defendant’s answer did not contain a counterclaim).
c. Robins’s IDSI Conviction
Robins has repeatedly asserted in his submissions in this case that
there is a clerical error on his criminal record from his Philadelphia County
case because the jury did not convict him of IDSI by forcible compulsion
under 18 Pa. C.S. §3123(a)(1). See, e.g., (Doc. 24 ¶12). It appears that
Robins’s assertion is accurate.
The docket for Robins’s criminal case, which is available on the Unified
Judicial System of Pennsylvania’s Web Portal
(https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch), shows that the jury found him
guilty of IDSI by forcible compulsion. See Docket, Commonwealth v. Robins,
No. CP-51-CR-3430-2009 (Phila. Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.).6 In addition, the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ sentencing order indicates that
the jury found Robins guilty of IDSI by forcible compulsion, see (Doc. 57 at
26), and the Court of Common Pleas’s Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a) memorandum opinion addressing Robins’s appeal from
the denial of his PCRA petition acknowledges that the jury’s “verdict sheet
indicate[d] §3123(a)(1).” (Id. at 17.) On the other hand, in the same
memorandum opinion, the Court of Common Pleas explained that it had
instructed the jury on IDSI under Section 3123(a)(7), which requires only that
the Commonwealth prove that he had deviate sexual intercourse with a
complainant who was less than 16 years of age and to whom he was not
married at the time, and expressed that “it is clear that the jury found [Robins]
6 The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. See
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 373 F.2d 771, 778 (3d Cir. 1967)
(“[A] federal court may take judicial notice of matters of record in state courts
within its jurisdiction.”); Zedonis v. Lynch, 233 F. Supp. 3d 417, 422 (M.D.
Pa. 2017) (“Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial System provides online access
to the docket sheets for criminal cases, and this Court may take judicial
notice of those public dockets.” (citations omitted)).
guilty of IDSI pursuant to [Section 3123(a)(7) even though] the verdict sheet
indicates [Section] 3123(a)(1).” (Id. at 16–17.) Moreover, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court’s decision affirming the dismissal of Robins’s PCRA petition
explains that the jury convicted him of IDSI under Section 3123(a)(7). See
Robins I, 2017 WL 4276084, at *2 (discussing Robins’s IDSI conviction).
Although there appears to be an administrative mistake relating to the
subsection of the IDSI statute under which the jury convicted Robins, it
remains unclear from Robins’s amended complaint why the mistake is
relevant in this case. He does not allege in his amended complaint that the
DOC or the Parole Board attempted to coerce him into admitting that he
committed IDSI by forcible compulsion as part of the Program, and he does
not explain therein why this mistake is relevant to his claims for injunctive
relief. See (Doc. 24 at 2–10). He does, however, state in his unauthorized
reply to Defendants’ answer that the DOC wants him to admit to IDSI by
forcible compulsion as part of the Program. See (Doc. 59 at 12).
Since Robins does not allege that Defendants (or any DOC officials)
attempted to coerce him into admitting that he committed IDSI by forcible
compulsion in his operative complaint, the Court has not considered such an
allegation in addressing Defendants’ motion. Additionally, even if Robins
included this allegation in his amended complaint, the Court is skeptical that
the DOC is seeking such an admission or, more importantly, that it would
alter the outcome of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
considering the nature of Robins’s remaining claims under RLUIPA and the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
D. Robins’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion
In his brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion, Robins asserts that
Defendants are violating his rights under Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, RLUIPA, and the First Amendment. See (Doc. 66
at 4). Despite mentioning the First Amendment in his brief, Robins did not
expressly include such a claim in his amended complaint. See (Doc. 24 at 1,
7–10). Moreover, although this Court did not construe Robins’s original
complaint as containing a First Amendment claim, see (Doc. 12 at 1–2, 9–
22), the Third Circuit already concluded that such a claim “is facially
meritless.” Robins, 2022 WL 4533850, at *3. It explained that:
This Court has recognized that states “have a vital interest in
rehabilitating convicted sex offenders and acceptance of
responsibility for past offenses is a critical first step in a prison’s
rehabilitation program for such offenders,” and, on that basis, has
declined to find First Amendment violations where sex offenders
are required to admit guilt, even where the offender believes
such an admission is false.
Id. (citing Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, the Court has not, and will not, address any First Amendment
claim as part of these proceedings, and Robins cannot attempt to assert such
a claim by referencing it in an opposition brief.
2. Qualified Immunity
The Court will now address the substance of Defendants’ arguments
in their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants contend that they
are entitled to qualified immunity on Robins’s RLUIPA claim because there
is a “lack of controlling precedent regarding whether the acceptance-of-
responsibility component of the sex offender treatment program violates an
inmate’s RLUIPA rights.” (Id. at 12–15). However, even if they are correct
about the lack of controlling precedent, Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity on Robins’s RLUIPA claim in this case.
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money
damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated
a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (emphasis added) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether a right was clearly established, the
Court must ask “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that [their]
conduct was unlawful in the situation [they] confronted.” Schmidt v. Creedon,
639 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). “If it would not have been clear
to a reasonable officer what the law required under the facts alleged, then
[they are] entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. In other words, for a right to be
clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. “This
demanding standard protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63
(2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Accordingly,
“there must be sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to
the plaintiff’s allegations, to put [the] defendant on notice that his or her
conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting McLaughlin v.
Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001)). In making this determination, the
Court looks to applicable Supreme Court precedent, but if none exists, “a
‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals
could clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.” Id. (quoting
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 826 (2015)).
The inquiry into whether a right is clearly established “do[es] not
require a case directly on point,” instead, “existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v.
Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). The clearly established law “must
be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case,” and the presentation of a unique
set of facts by a case is an “important indication” that a defendant’s conduct
at issue did not violate a “clearly established” right. Id. at 79–80 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). However, a constitutional deprivation that occurs under unique
factual circumstances does not necessarily warrant an automatic grant of
qualified immunity. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (holding
that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law
even in novel factual circumstances”). There may be the rare “obvious case,”
where “a body of relevant case law” is not necessary, Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004), especially when the case in question presents
“extreme circumstances” to which “a general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity.” Taylor v.
Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
Here, Robins does not seek monetary damages against Defendants;
rather, he asserts only claims for injunctive relief against them in their official
capacities. See (Doc. 24 ¶¶29–31). As such, Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity on Robins’s RLUIPA claims for injunctive relief because
qualified immunity is a defense to claims for damages but not for injunctive
or declaratory relief. See Harper v. Cnty. of Delaware, 779 F. App’x 143, 147
(3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“Qualified immunity is a defense to claims for
damages but not for injunctive or declaratory relief.” (citing Panzella v.
Sposato, 863 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2017) and Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t
of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 488 (3d Cir. 2014))). Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to the extent they seek
qualified immunity from Robins’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief against
them.
3. Alleged Violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution
Robins asserts that Defendants violated his right to religious freedom
under Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See (Doc. 24
¶23); see also Pa. Const. art. I, §3 (“All men have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support
any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no
human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights
of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
establishments or modes of worship.”). Defendants contend that they are
entitled to judgment on this claim because of sovereign immunity. See (Doc.
63 at 11–12).
The Court concludes that Robins waived his claim for a violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to address Defendants’ arguments for
dismissal in his opposition brief. See (Doc. 66 at 1–10). “Courts have
consistently found that the filing of a brief in opposition . . . that fails to
respond to a substantive argument to dismiss a particular claim results in the
waiver or abandonment of that claim.” McDonough v. Scranton Sch. Dist.,
No. 25-cv-2442, 2026 WL 1663013, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2026) (citing
cases); see also Dribelbis v. Scholton, 274 Fed. App’x 183, 185 (3d Cir.
2008) (affirming district court’s finding of waiver as to an argument where
plaintiff had opportunity to address it in his opposition brief but failed to do
so); Coit v. Wynder, No. 22-cv-1277, 2025 WL 2656069, at *9 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 16, 2025) (stating that pro se plaintiff’s failure to specifically address
Defendants’ motion to dismiss his general cruel-and-unusual claim in his
opposition brief constitutes a waiver or abandonment of this claim”). Thus,
since Robins failed to address Defendants’ argument seeking dismissal of
his claim for violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Court deems him
to have waived this claim and will grant Defendants’ motion as to this claim.
4. RLUIPA
Defendants contend that the Court should enter judgment on the
pleadings on Robins’s RLUIPA claim because he fails to establish that the
acceptance-of-responsibility component of the DOC’s sex-offender
treatment program substantially burdens his religious rights insofar as crimes
occurred before his marriage to the victim. See (Doc. 63 at 4–11). Although
Defendants raise persuasive arguments in their supporting brief, particularly
regarding the fact that Robins’s crimes occurred prior to his marriage to the
minor victim, the standard of review applicable to motions for judgment on
the pleadings constrains the Court’s ability to appropriately address their
arguments because the Court’s review is limited to the pleadings.
For instance, Defendants argue that Robins’s religious belief is
insincere, and they point out that there are various factors that the Court
must consider when determining whether a plaintiff maintains a sincere
religious belief. See (id. at 7 (identifying factors)). The Court cannot analyze
those factors based solely on the pleadings, even with the benefit of the facts
of Robins’s criminal case. Overall, the Court lacks the necessary information
pertaining to what transpires during the program for the Court to
appropriately assess whether the acceptance-of-responsibility part of the
program substantially interferes with his sincerely held religious beliefs. As
such, the Court will deny this part of Defendants’ motion without prejudice to
them addressing it in a motion for summary judgment based on the record
established during discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will: (1) grant Robins’s motion
to substitute and substitute Harry for Wetzel as a Defendant in this action;
(2) grant Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings to the extent that
they seek dismissal of Robins’s claims for violations of the Pennsylvania
Constitution; and (3) deny Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
in all other respects. The Court will also direct the parties to file a report
detailing the status of discovery on or before September 4, 2026 so the Court
may issue an Order establishing deadlines for discovery (if needed) and for
the filing of any motions for summary judgment. An appropriate Order
follows.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: August 17, 2026
21-1474-04