Davila

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EDWIN DAVILA,

Plaintiff

No. 23 CV 1739

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

REYNALDO GUEVARA, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendants Reynaldo Guevara and the Chicago

Police Department’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Edwin Davila’s

claims under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments for conspiracy, and under various Illinois statutes related

to Davila’s arrest and conviction for the murder of Jaime Alvarez. (See generally R.

225.) The defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment because (1)

Guevara’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment is not evidence for summary judgment

purposes, (2) he had probable cause to arrest and detain the plaintiff, (3) witnesses

made independent affirmative identifications of the plaintiff as the suspect, (4)

certain state law claims are time-barred, (5) there is not enough evidence to meet the

standards governing the state law claims, and (6) he is entitled to qualified immunity.

(Id.) For the reasons below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 submissions,1

the materials cited therein, and other aspects of the record in this case.

I. THE INCIDENT

In the early morning hours of July 2, 1995, Michael Ybarra drove his 1986

Volkswagen Jetta on North Ashland Avenue with Jaime Alvarez in the passenger

seat and Ivar Velasco in the back seat. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 7.)2 Ybarra, Alvarez,

and Velasco had been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF

¶ 1.) While stopped at West Blackhawk Street and Ashland, Ybarra and Velasco

observed a group gathered in front of Duk’s Restaurant who flashed gang signs and

yelled “King Killer,” “Disciples,” and other gang-related statements. (Id. ¶ 2.) Ybarra

and Alvarez shouted, “Fuck you,” after which a white Buick pulled up alongside

Ybarra’s car and threw glass beer bottles at the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 9; Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF

¶ 3.) Ybarra got angry and wanted to record the license plate number, so he began to

follow the white Buick westbound onto West Pierce Avenue. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF

¶ 4.) The white Buick pulled in front of Ybarra’s car and blocked it. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Additional people emerged and began to throw food and other items at it. (Id. ¶ 6.)

1 Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def. SOF”) (R. 223); Plaintiff’s

Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF”)

(R. 245); Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(B)(3)(c) (“Pl.

SOF”) (R. 239); Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts (“Def. Resp.

to Pl. SOF”) (R. 250.)

2 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) in the document’s ECF header

unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more appropriate.

Shots were then fired into Ybarra’s car, striking Ybarra (who survived) and killing

Alvarez. (Id. ¶ 7.)

II. YBARRA AND VELASCO’S INTERVIEWS

Ybarra drove to St. Mary’s Hospital; Chicago Police Department officers Marco

David and Tammie Pena spoke with Ybarra and Velasco there. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF

¶ 12.) In that interview, Ybarra and Velasco both told the officers they heard shots

but did not see who the shooter was. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 14.) Later in the

morning, Detectives Thomas Fallon and Harry Collins interviewed Ybarra, but

Ybarra had to cut the interview short to go into surgery. (Id. ¶ 13.) In his interview,

he stated that occupants of a white vehicle threw a bottle at his car, that he followed

the vehicle until it stopped, and that people on the street then threw objects at his

car before someone began shooting. (Id. ¶ 14.) He stated in that interview that he did

not see who did the shooting. (Id.; Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 17.) Both Fallon and Collins

spoke to Velasco, who said he heard gunshots in succession but also did not see who

fired the shots. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 15.) Fallon, Collins, and Velasco all drove the

route that Ybarra had described. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Detective Ernest Halvorsen then interviewed Ybarra on the night of July 2 at

the Cook County Hospital trauma unit. (Id. ¶ 18.) Again, Ybarra said he did not see

the driver of the white Buick’s face but described the front-seat passenger as a white

Hispanic male, approximately twenty to twenty-five years old, with short brown hair

brushed back and with a goatee and mustache. (Id. ¶ 20; Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 20.)

On July 9, Detectives Halvorsen and Guevara interviewed Velasco, during which

Velasco identified the offender’s vehicle as a 1988 Buick Regal out of a vehicle

identification book. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶¶ 24–25.)

After interviewing Velasco, Guevara and Halvorsen noted in a police report

that they spoke with some children in an alley near the scene of the shooting who had

heard that a Latin Jiver committed the shooting. (Id. ¶ 27.) The children gave

Guevara a list of suspect names—Cubano, Charlie, Toby, Jimmy, Joey, and Willie/Pee

Wee—and said that Cubano was most likely the shooter. (Id.) Guevara and Halvorsen

did not receive any identifying information from the children, nor is there evidence

that they took notes of the interactions. (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.) They also did not interview

any of the people named by the children or investigate whether those names were

linked to the plaintiff in any way. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 27–28.) Guevara then

sought the information of five adult men near Pierce and North Paulina Avenue, one

of whom was Davila. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 29.) The plaintiff told them that he lived

on North Cleaver Street. (Id. ¶ 31.) Guevara and Halvorsen noted during the

interaction that the plaintiff had a tattoo identifying him as a Jiver. (Id. ¶ 32.)

On July 11, Guevara and Halvorsen presented to Ybarra a photo array

consisting of the five men while Ybarra was at the hospital. (Id. ¶ 34.) Ybarra

identified the plaintiff as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 35.) On July 13, Guevara and Halvorsen

presented Velasco with the same photo array, and Velasco, too, identified the plaintiff

as the shooter. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40.)

III. THE PLAINTIFF’S ARREST AND SUBSEQUENT LINEUP IDENTIFICATION

On July 29, Officers Frank Vukonich and Alan Pergrande arrested the plaintiff

for the murder of Jaime Alvarez and the attempted murder of Michael Ybarra and

took him to Area 5 (the regional policing command for the Chicago Police

Department’s Area 5 districts). (Id. ¶ 44.) The plaintiff has alleged that after his

arrest, Guevara told the plaintiff that he would put him in a lineup and that he would

be identified regardless of whether he was at the scene or committed the crime. (Id.

¶ 45; Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 56.)

On July 30, Officers William Johnston and Stephen Gawrys conducted a lineup

with the plaintiff and three fillers. (Id. ¶ 48.) At that lineup, Ybarra and Velasco both

identified the plaintiff as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 49.) The parties dispute whether Guevara

was present at this lineup. (Id. ¶ 50.) The plaintiff maintains that Guevara met with

Velasco and Ybarra before the lineup. (Id.)

According to the plaintiff and based on the 2025 depositions of Ybarra and

Velasco, Guevara pressured Ybarra and Velasco to identify the plaintiff as the

shooter. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 54.) Specifically, Guevara told Ybarra to pick the plaintiff and

pointed at the plaintiff’s photo saying, “That is—isn’t this the guy right here?” (Id. ¶

51.) He also testified in 2025 that “Guevara was persistent about he was the shooter”

and that he “wasn’t sure if it was him, but they’re telling me it was him.” (Def. Resp.

to Pl. SOF ¶ 43.) Ybarra felt like he needed to stick with this story, both at the lineup

and at trial, lest Guevara “put a case on” him or harm his family. (Pl. Resp. to Def.

SOF ¶¶ 52, 61.)

Guevara also pressured Velasco to identify the plaintiff as the shooter because

“he had a determination” that the plaintiff was the shooter, and he told Velasco to “go

with the flow” in making that identification. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54.) Velasco, however,

testified in 2025 that he did not see the shooter and told as much to Guevara

repeatedly. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 49.) He felt like he “was being coached and being

advised . . . or being pressured to . . . add an image to something that [he] didn’t see.”

(Id. ¶ 50.) Velasco said Guevara told him that the plaintiff was dangerous to society

and that he should not be walking the streets. (Id. ¶ 51.)

IV. FELONY REVIEW AND GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

On July 31, Cook County Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Michael Cawley

interviewed witnesses. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 57.) The parties dispute whether he

reviewed police reports as well. (Id. ¶ 61.) The plaintiff, at the advice of his then-

attorney, John Klunk, did not make a statement to ASA Cawley or any other officer.

(Id. ¶ 58.) ASA Cawley interviewed Ybarra and Velasco separately and found both to

be credible. (Id. ¶¶ 59–60.) At that point, ASA Cawley approved the charges of murder

and attempted murder against the plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 61.)

On August 18, ASA Garfinkel presented the plaintiff’s case to a grand jury. (Id.

¶ 61.) The plaintiff was indicted for first degree murder, attempted first degree

murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated battery with great bodily

harm, aggravated battery on a public way, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and

armed violence. (Id. ¶ 62.) Guevara testified at this grand jury proceeding that he

investigated and learned that the plaintiff shot Alvarez and Ybarra and shot toward

Velasco. (Id. ¶ 63.)

V. PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

ASA Timothy Tomasik, another ASA assigned to the plaintiff’s prosecution,

met with Ybarra and Velasco before trial. (Id. ¶ 66.) Tomasik reported that when he

asked Ybarra and Velasco why they did not identify the plaintiff the day of or after

the shooting, they responded that they feared retaliation, but the plaintiff disputes

this. (Id. ¶¶ 67–68.) Tomasik also testified that he was “sure [he] talked to [Guevara]

after [he] got the case” about the fact that an eyewitness identification was not made

immediately following the shooting, where Guevara also said that Ybarra and Velasco

feared retaliation—another fact the plaintiff disputes. (Id. ¶ 70.) Velasco expressed

anxiety at the prospect of testifying, especially in light of Guevara’s pressure and

involvement. (Id. ¶ 71.)

VI. THE PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL

The plaintiff’s state court bench trial began on March 20, 1996. (Id. ¶ 78.) In

its case-in-chief, the State called as witnesses Alvarez’s sister, Ybarra, Velasco,

Guevara, and Vukonich, and the parties stipulated to the testimony of Cook County

Medical Examiner forensic pathologist Dr. Lifschultz. (Id. ¶ 79.) When the State

examined Ybarra, he identified the plaintiff in open court as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 82.)

He also testified regarding his identifications of the plaintiff out of the photos

presented to him on July 11 and the July 30 lineup and made yet another

identification of the plaintiff in a lineup photo. (Id. ¶¶ 83, 85.) Velasco, too, testified

regarding his identification of the plaintiff in the July 13 photo array and the July 30

lineup. (Id. ¶¶ 90, 92.) He also testified that on July 9, he identified the 1998 Buick

Riviera as the type of vehicle involved in the shooting. (Id. ¶ 88.)

Guevara then testified to the following: while investigating the shooting on

July 9, he and Halvorsen went to the corner of Pierce and Paulina and spoke with a

group of children. (Id. ¶ 95.) They then toured the area and saw the plaintiff and

another person loading a stereo into a car on Pierce. (Id. ¶ 96.) Guevara told the men

he was trying to locate information about the incident. (Id. ¶ 97.) He conducted five

interviews, including with the plaintiff, and collected the interviewees’ information.

(Id. ¶ 98.) After the interviews, he ran a name check and obtained photos of the men

and used them in a photo array. (Id. ¶ 99.) On July 11, he brought five color photos

to Ybarra and asked him if he recognized anyone, and Ybarra pointed out the plaintiff

as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 100.) On July 13, he did the same with Velasco, who also

identified the plaintiff as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 101.) After Guevara’s testimony,

Vukovich testified that on July 19, he placed the plaintiff under arrest and noticed a

Jiver tattoo on the plaintiff’s shoulder during the arrest. (Id. ¶ 104.)

The plaintiff moved for a directed finding, which was denied. (Id. ¶¶ 106–07.)

After closing arguments, the judge concluded that the State’s witnesses were credible

and found the plaintiff guilty of first-degree murder of Alvarez and attempted first-

degree murder of Ybarra. (Id. ¶¶ 108–09.)

VII. POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Before sentencing, the plaintiff moved for a new trial, asserting there was new

evidence after two witnesses, Carlos Cotto and Christopher Lorenzi, contacted his

attorney and stated that Phillip Willis was the shooter and provided affidavits. (Id. ¶

110.) Cotto and Lorenzi presented these statements during an oral argument on the

motion. (Id. ¶ 111.) The Illinois Appellate Court later affirmed the denial of the

plaintiff’s new trial motion in December 1997, finding that the trial court was correct

that the newly discovered evidence was not likely to change the outcome of the trial.

(Id. ¶ 115.) On April 17, 1996, the judge sentenced the plaintiff to fifty years in the

Illinois Department of Corrections for the murder of Alvarez and a concurrent

sentence of six years for the attempted murder of Ybarra. (Id. ¶ 113.) The plaintiff

moved the judge to reconsider the sentence, which was denied on August 8, 1996. (Id.

¶ 114.)

On February 20, 1998, the plaintiff filed a petition for post-conviction relief,

arguing that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed

to discover additional witnesses Cotto and Lorenzi, along with the plaintiff’s

girlfriend Myriam Porras, whose testimony would have changed the outcome of the

trial. (Id. ¶ 116.) On March 30, 1998, Judge Lon William Shultz denied the petition,

finding that the claim was waived for not being raised on direct appeal and that the

plaintiff’s attorney’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. (Id. ¶ 117.) On April 24, 1998, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of

the denial. (Id. ¶ 118.) The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial on July 16,

1999, finding that the affidavits from Porras, Lorenzi, and Cotto were discoverable

prior to trial. (Id. ¶ 119.) The Illinois Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition

for leave to appeal on December 1, 1999. (Id. ¶ 120.)

On September 14, 2000, the plaintiff filed a second petition for post-conviction

relief with newly discovered affidavits from Pedro Carmona and Samuel Matias. (Id.

¶ 121.) Judge Shultz denied this petition as frivolous and lacking merit on November

29, 2000, finding that the plaintiff did not present new evidence, there was a lack of

due diligence, and even this new evidence would not have changed the outcome at

trial. (Id. ¶ 122.) After the plaintiff appealed based on actual innocence, the Illinois

Appellate Court again affirmed Judge Shultz’s denial, finding that the Carmona and

Matias affidavits were substantially similar to Lorenzi and Cotto’s affidavits and that

the plaintiff did not make a showing that the result at trial would have changed. It

also found that the affidavit was not sufficiently conclusive to support a claim of

actual innocence. (Id. ¶¶ 123–24.)

The plaintiff then filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing

that (1) his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate information about a different

shooter, call Lorenzi, Cotto, and Porras as witnesses, subpoena Porra’s phone records,

and adequately challenge Ybarra and Velasco’s testimony; (2) Carmona and Matias’

affidavits show actual innocence; (3) his trial counsel failed to present mitigating

evidence at his sentencing hearing; and (4) the trial court erred when it dismissed his

second state postconviction petition. (Id. ¶ 125.) On June 9, 2012, the plaintiff filed a

pro se petition for relief of judgment because the court did not mention or impose a

term of mandatory supervised release, which was denied. (Id. ¶ 126.) On August 23,

2022, the plaintiff filed a petition for relief from judgment, alleging that Guevara had

a pattern and practice of misconduct unknown at the time of the original trial. (Id.

¶ 127.) On November 15, 2022, Judge Joanne Rosado granted the petition and

vacated the plaintiff’s convictions that day. (Id. ¶ 128.) On October 25, 2023, Judge

Erica Reddick issued a certificate of innocence for the plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 129.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In reviewing a

motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255. However, the nonmoving party cannot

rely on mere conjecture or speculation to manufacture a genuine issue of material

fact. McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS

I. COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 56.1

The defendants argue in their reply brief that the plaintiff failed to comply

with Local Rule 56.1 because many of his responses to the defendants’ facts are

argumentative. (See generally R. 244.) The Court agrees that the plaintiff’s responses

often veer into argument territory, especially when looking at the responses’ length

and numerous legal citations. (See, e.g. id. ¶¶ 36, 42.) That said, many of the facts in

the defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement are themselves argumentative in nature. (Id.)

As an example, “there is no evidence that Guevara was involved in any illegally

suggestive or coercive identification techniques[,]” (id. ¶ 43,) leans much closer to a

legal conclusion than a factual statement. The Court reminds both parties that the

rules regarding statements of fact require strict compliance and that they should save

the argument for their respective briefs.

II. FIFTH AMENDMENT

Guevara has invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

The defendants first argue that Guevara’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment may

not be taken as independent evidence for summary judgment purposes. (R. 225 at 10–

12.) In civil cases, a trier of fact may make an adverse inference against a defendant

who invokes their Fifth Amendment right in refusing to testify. LaSalle Bank Lake

View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit held in

Seguban that at summary judgment, “although inferences based on the assertion of

the privilege are permissible, the entry of judgment based only on the invocation of

the privilege and ‘without regard to the other evidence’ exceeds constitutional

bounds.” Id. at 391 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)). Here,

however, the plaintiff provides corroborative evidence that does not pin the sole

weight of a potential judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on Guevara’s invocation of the

Fifth Amendment.

III. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The defendants next argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the

plaintiff’s claims under the due process clause (Count I) because (1) Ybarra and

Velasco made independent eyewitness identifications of the plaintiff, and (2) the

plaintiff cannot bring a Brady claim for fabricated eyewitness identifications. (R. 225

at 12–26); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

A. Fabrication of Evidence and Suggestive Identification

Procedures

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deliberate fabrication of evidence by

a state official. Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing

Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012)). To show fabrication of

evidence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant “(1) knowingly fabricated (2) false

evidence (physical or testimonial), (3) the false evidence was used against him in his

criminal trial, and (4) it was material to his conviction.” Patrick v. City of Chicago,

974 F.3d 824, 835 (7th Cir. 2020).

Here, the plaintiff presents evidence showing that the inclusion of the plaintiff

in the lineup, as well as the composition of the lineup, were based on his and his

home’s proximity to the scene of the crime. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 32–33.) Under

the plaintiff’s view of the facts, Guevara created his array from a canvas of the

neighborhood near the crime scene and identified five Latino men to create a photo

array. (Id. ¶ 34.) The parties do not dispute that the evidence was used against the

plaintiff in his criminal trial and that it was material to his conviction. (Id. ¶ 68.)

Here, the plaintiff’s evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to

the elements of intent and falsity of the evidence. CPD policy dictates that a photo

array should be created using one suspect and fillers who match eyewitness

descriptions of the suspect. (Id. ¶ 35.) Here, Guevara’s creation of an all-suspect photo

array appears to violate that policy. (Id.) While CPD policy alone is not probative of

a federal constitutional violation, Guevara’s supposed violation of CPD policy does

bear on whether he knowingly fabricated the array to frame the plaintiff. And a

reasonable jury could conclude that his pressure on Ybarra and Velasco to

affirmatively identify the plaintiff meant that the evidence was false in nature.

Ultimately, a determination of Guevara’s mental state and the resulting

identifications are subject to disputes of fact that must be resolved by a jury. The

Court denies the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count I as to

fabrication of evidence.

As to the constitutionality of a suggestive identification process, the Seventh

Circuit employs a two-step analysis. First, “the petitioner must demonstrate that the

identification procedures were unduly suggestive.” Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d

1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003). If they are, the court must determine the reliability of the

identification, assessed under the following factors:

(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at

the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention;

(3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the

criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the

witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time

between the crime and the confrontation.

Id. (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)). Both steps are assessed under

the totality of the circumstances. Id. The record is rife with disputes of material fact

as to the veracity of the eyewitness identifications, disputes that will require

resolution by a jury.

First, as to suggestive identification procedures, the plaintiff provides evidence

that Guevara pushed Ybarra and Velasco to pick the plaintiff out of the provided

lineup. Ybarra and Velasco have testified that Guevara pressured them by saying,

“This is the guy. This is the guy. You already said he’s—he jumped out and ran

around. And so, this has got to be the guy.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 42.) But Ybarra

himself said, “I’m not sure if he was [the shooter]. I could not definitely say it was

him. But Guevara was persistent about he was the shooter . . . . And I wasn’t sure if

it was him, but they’re telling me it was him.” (Id.)

The reliability of the identifications is also subject to dispute. Ybarra and

Velasco testified that at the hospital immediately following the shooting, they told

the officers that they did not see who fired the shots, so the opportunity to view the

suspect was limited. (Id. ¶ 14.) And they both testified that, during the lineup, they

had said that the plaintiff was not the shooter but were told by Guevara to identify

the plaintiff regardless. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 50.) This shows a dispute over the level of certainty

demonstrated by the witnesses at the confrontation.

The defendants’ conflicting evidence is that, ultimately, Ybarra and Velasco

did independently and affirmatively identify the plaintiff as the shooter during the

police lineup. (R. 225 at 13–14.) They argue that “[t]he uncertainties expressed by

Ybarra and Velasco at their depositions nearly three decades later were most

decidedly not about Plaintiff’s involvement but rather whether they could discern if

it was Plaintiff’s hand that raised the gun from the area in which he was sitting in

the car.” (Id. at 14.) Whether it is the case that such uncertainties were “most

decidedly” about anything and the import of those uncertainties are questions for the

jury to resolve, not for this Court. It is clear that there are disputes of material fact

over both the suggestiveness of the identifications and the reliability of such

identifications. A reasonable jury may conclude that the uncertainties meant that

Guevara pressured Ybarra and Velasco to identify the plaintiff in the lineup in

violation of his due process rights.

The defendants are also not entitled to qualified immunity for Guevara’s

suggestive tactics. “Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for

damages if their actions did not violate clearly established rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361, 365

(7th Cir. 2009). In Blackmon, the Seventh Circuit held that it was not clearly

established that “a suggestive photo array or lineup by itself” could expose police

officers to damages. Blackmon v. Jones, 132 F.4th 522, 526 (7th Cir. 2025) (emphasis

omitted). Damages require “unusual circumstances” such as “defrauding the

prosecutor or otherwise manufacturing evidence.” Id. In fact, the circumstances of

the factual dispute at play here are the exact situation the Seventh Circuit envisioned

as an exception to its holding in Blackmon. Id. at 525–26. Taking all facts in favor of

the plaintiff, the facts here do not show a mere “suggestive photo array or lineup”

operating alone. They show a detective who could have manufactured identifications

out of eyewitnesses at a police lineup. The Court accordingly denies the defendants’

motion on Count I as to suggestive identification procedures.

B. Exculpatory Evidence

Under Brady v. Maryland, a failure to turn over exculpatory evidence to a

criminal defendant is a violation of due process. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). To show a Brady

violation, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused,

either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching;

(2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the state,

either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must

have been material, meaning there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have

been different.

Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Carvajal v.

Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2008)). Here, the defendants argue that

the plaintiff cannot prove a Brady violation because fabrication of evidence is not a

“suppression” of evidence, especially under Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556 (7th

Cir. 2015). (R. 225 at 23–26.) This is correct. The Seventh Circuit has held that

compliance with Brady does not “compel police officers to accurately disclose the

circumstances of their investigations to the prosecution.” Saunders-El, 778 F.3d at

562. Thus, to the extent that the plaintiffs present evidence regarding Guevara’s

fabrication of evidence insofar as his investigatory capacity is concerned, such

evidence cannot sustain a claim under Brady. The Court grants the defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Count I as to the plaintiff’s Brady claim.

IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT

The defendants next argue that the plaintiff cannot prove malicious

prosecution (Count II) or unlawful detention (Count IV) because Guevara had

probable cause to detain the plaintiff. (R. 225 at 26–32.) To prove malicious

prosecution under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that:

(i) the suit or proceeding was instituted without any

probable cause; (ii) the motive in instituting the suit was

malicious, which was often defined in this context as

without probable cause and for a purpose other than

bringing the defendant to justice; and (iii) the prosecution

terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused.

Neita v. City of Chicago, 148 F.4d 916, 939 (7th Cir. 2025).

A plaintiff cannot state a malicious prosecution claim against an officer who

investigates or pursues criminal charges with probable cause. Johnson v. Saville, 575

F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009). An officer has probable cause “if at the time of arrest

the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he

has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent person in believing

that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377

F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004). The defendants argue that Guevara had probable cause

because of “the statements and repeated identifications made by Ybarra and Velasco,”

and the grand jury’s indictment of the plaintiff. (R. 225 at 28–29.)

When the underlying facts are in dispute, the question of whether probable

cause exists is for the jury. Braun v. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 549–50 (7th

Cir. 2022). As discussed regarding fabrication of evidence and suggestive

identification procedures, supra, there are numerous factual disputes regarding

Guevara’s interactions with Ybarra and Velasco that call into question whether a

reasonable officer in his situation would believe that the plaintiff had, in fact,

committed an offense. The grand jury indictment here rests on the very same

fabricated evidence and identifications, so that indictment cannot be relied upon to

confer probable cause to Guevara. See Cervantes v. Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 811 n.7 (7th

Cir. 1999). Taking the facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Court finds that the existence

of fabricated evidence and manufactured identifications means that the issue of

Guevara’s probable cause must, at the very least, be determined by the jury.

The defendants’ arguments regarding the Cook County State’s Attorney’s

Office’s independent prosecutorial commencement and the existence of separate or

independently developed information do not fare much better. (R. 225 at 29–30.)

Because Ybarra and Velasco said that their pressured identifications influenced their

testimony and subsequent answers to interview questions, Guevara’s role in the

commencement of the proceedings against the plaintiff remains in play, and the

indictment does not break the chain of causation between Guevara’s conduct and the

subsequent prosecution. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017).

The role of Guevara’s influence on any additional information that prosecutors gained

regarding Ybarra and Velasco’s identifications must be resolved by a jury.

Nor is Guevara shielded by qualified immunity for this conduct. Because the

evidence here supports an inference of evidence fabrication in the criminal case,

fabrication which was material to the finding of probable cause, the Court finds that

Guevara is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Brown v. City of Chicago, 633 F.

Supp. 3d 1122, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (citing Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 589

(7th Cir. 2008)); contra Fleming v. Livingston Cnty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 879–80 (7th

Cir. 2012). The Court accordingly denies the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to Counts II and IV.

V. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The defendants next argue that the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress (IIED) (Count VII) is barred by Illinois’ one-year statute of

limitations on tort actions against local officials, which accrue at the time of arrest.

(R. 225 at 32–33); 745 ILCS 10/8-101; see also Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675

(7th Cir. 2013). However, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489–90 (1994), “a

§ 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or

sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” In

Parish v. City of Elkhart, the Seventh Circuit held that a claim for IIED, where the

plaintiff’s conviction is the “crux of the claim,” is controlled by Heck and so accrues

after the invalidation of the plaintiff’s conviction. 614 F.3d 677, 683–84 (7th Cir.

2010). Here, the plaintiff’s IIED claim rests on conduct by Guevara that was material

to the plaintiff’s conviction. The defendants’ reliance on Bridewell is inapposite

because the plaintiff in that case was never convicted, so Heck was not at issue. See

Bridwell, 730 F.3d at 675. Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiff was barred from

bringing his IIED claim until after his convictions were vacated in November 2022.

(Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 128.) Because he brought the claim within one year after the

vacaturs, it is within the statute of limitations.

The defendants’ argument regarding probable cause is rejected for the same

factual disputes recited under Section II, supra. And the Court finds that the plaintiff

has presented sufficient evidence to show that Guevara’s actions, which led to his

conviction and incarceration for over twenty-four years, were extreme and outrageous

and caused severe distress. See Sun v. Xu, 99 F.4th 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2024) (laying

out IIED standard); see also Brown v. City of Chicago, 633 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1172

(N.D. Ill. 2022) (“A finder of fact could reasonably conclude [a police detective] acted

in an extreme and outrageous manner toward Mr. Brown by fabricating the court-

reported statements of his co-suspects[.]”). Therefore, the Court denies the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count VII.

VI. REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS

The plaintiff has forfeited his claims for failure to intervene (Count III), § 1983

conspiracy (Counts IV and IX), and willful and wanton conduct (Count VIII). (R. 243

at 11 n.2.) The Court accordingly grants the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to those claims.

VII. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND INDEMNIFICATION

Finally, the defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on

the plaintiff's claims for respondeat superior liability and indemnification under

Counts X and XI because those claims are derivative of the underlying merits claims.

(R. 225 at 39.) They continue that Count X for respondeat superior liability should

also be dismissed because such liability is available only through state law claims.

(/d.) But because the Court has denied summary judgment on a number of underlying

claims, including the state law ITED claim, the Court also denies summary judgment

on Counts X and XI.

CONCLUSION

The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [225] is granted in part and

denied in part. Specifically, it is granted as to Counts I (only as to the Brady claim),

III, IV, VIII, and IX and denied as to Counts I (excluding the Brady claim), IT, VI, VII,

X, and XI.3

Date: August 17, 2026 é

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge

3 Count V was dismissed with prejudice on December 23, 2025, pursuant to the parties’

stipulation. (See generally R. 213.)

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