WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

RAYSHON WHITE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-01153-TWP-MKK

)

DENNIS REAGLE, )

ANDREW COLE, )

CHARLIE FOX, )

ARAMARK, )

TRENT ALLEN, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant

Aramark (Dkt. 39) and two Motions for Summary Judgment (original and corrected), filed by

Defendants Dennis Reagle, Andrew Cole, Charlie Fox, and Trent Allen (“ IDOC Defendants”)

(Dkt. 43, and Dkt. 47). Pro se Plaintiff Rayshon White ("White") alleges in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

lawsuit that both groups of Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights and state law by

depriving him of adequate nutrition, hygiene, and access to medical care during an extended

lockdown at Pendleton Correctional Facility ("Pendleton."). (Dkt. 2). For the reasons discussed

below, the motions for summary judgment are granted.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment,

the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir.

2021). The court cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment

because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir.

2014). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3);

it need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870

F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion

and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a

fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to

particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can

result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

White failed to respond to the summary judgment motions.1 Accordingly, facts alleged in

the motions are "admitted without controversy" so long as support for them exists in the record.

S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response

brief and identify disputed facts). "Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion for

summary judgment, the movant 'still [has] to show that summary judgment [is] proper given the

undisputed facts,'" Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 2011), with those

facts taken as usual in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th

1 White request to extend his deadline to respond to Defendants' motions for summary judgment was granted and he

was given until May 8, 2026 to respond. (Dkt. 49). To date, no response has been filed.

480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021). Although White has not responded, because Defendants moved for

summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most

favorable to White and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.

A. The Parties

White is in the custody of the Indiana Department of Corrections ("IDOC") and, during all

relevant times, was incarcerated at Pendleton. (Dkt. 2). Defendant Aramark provides food services

to Pendleton pursuant to its contract with the IDOC. (Dkt. 41-1 ¶ 4). Defendant Reagle served as

the Warden of Pendleton during the beginning of the lockdown in October 2023 until January

2024. (Dkt. 44-2 ¶ 1). Defendant Allen was the Warden of Pendleton from early January 2024

until December 26, 2025. (Dkt. 44-1 ¶¶ 1, 23). Cole and Fox were Deputy Wardens at Pendleton

during the lockdown at issue in this lawsuit. (Dkt. 44-3 ¶ 1; Dkt. 44-4 ¶ 1). During the lockdown,

the Wardens did not personally manage or perform every day-to-day operational task, including

food preparation, routine inmate movement, or the provision of medical care, which were handled

by designated custody, food service, and medical staff in accordance with policy. Id.

B. The Lockdown at Pendleton

Around October 6, 2023, Pendleton experienced a serious assault on staff in J-Cellhouse

in which one staff member was stabbed and transported to the hospital and another staff member

was injured while responding to the incident. (Dkt. 44-3 ¶ 5). As a result, Pendleton instituted a

facility-wide lockdown to address security concerns, conduct searches, investigate the assault, and

stabilize conditions. Id. ¶ 6. The lockdown was implemented to prevent further violence and

determine how weapons entered the facility. (Dkt. 44-2 ¶ 7). During the first week of the lockdown,

no offenders were permitted out of their housing units, and the facility operated under complete

lockdown conditions for approximately one to two weeks. (Dkt. 44-3 ¶ 8). Some form of lockdown

conditions lasted until February 2024. Id. ¶ 13.

C. Food Service During the Lockdown

During lockdowns, Aramark workers generally prepare sack meals instead of the usual hot

trays. (Dkt. 41-1 ¶ 6). These lockdown meals are part of the Master Menu created by an Aramark

dietician, but they differ from the normal hot trays. Id. ¶ 7. All meals that conform to the Master

Menu meet the American Correctional Association's nutritional guidelines, which are based on the

Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences' dietary reference intakes for

people between the ages of 19 and 50. Id.

The parties dispute the quantity and quality of the sack meals during the lockdown.

According to White, the fruit and vegetables were always rotten and the bread was stale and moldy

most of the time. (Dkt. 41-2 at 9:10-21; 21:11-25; 25:1-13). The bread was so hard at times that it

would cut your gums. Id. Portions were visibly much smaller than the normal hot food trays. Id.

at 17:22–18:17. White attest that he "complained to the officer that worked in the dorm at the time

and they called Aramark to let them know what was going on with the food and stuff, and all we

was told is that it was above their pay grade." Id. at 12:16-21.

Before the lockdown, inmates delivered meals and they did not have issues with food. (Dkt.

41-2 at12:1-5). During the lockdown, when inmate workers could not distribute the food,

correctional officers distributed it. Id. at 12:2-18. Occasionally, inmate workers were allowed out

of their cells to distribute the sack meals and Aramark supervisors escorted the inmates to deliver

the food, but did not deliver it themselves. Id. 12:10-25, 13:19–14:3.

Aramark Food Services Director, Tisha Thompson ("Thompson"), was aware of

intermittent complaints from inmates about receiving sacks instead of hot meals, but she was not

aware of widespread complaints about portion size or spoiled food. (Dkt. 41-1 ¶ 14). The IDOC

Defendants attest that they did not observe or have reason to believe that the sack meals were

nutritionally deficient. (Dkt. 44-2 ¶ 11, Dkt. 44-4 ¶ 10). They also deny receiving "substantiated

complaints" that the food was "consistently" spoiled, moldy, or rotten. (Dkt. 44-2 ¶ 14); (Dkt. 44-

3 ¶ 16); (Dkt. 44-4 ¶ 17). Thompson oversaw the production of the sack meals during lockdown

to ensure that the meals were properly stored and that the food is safe for consumption. (Dkt. 41-

1 ¶ 9).

D. Hygiene and Access to Commissary During the Lockdown

White testified that hygiene items and commissary were restricted during the lockdown,

forcing him to rely on what was provided by the IDOC Defendants. (Dkt. 2 at 2). White affirms

that during the lockdown, he observed that inmate workers did not wear gloves and they could not

wash their hands due to the lockdown restrictions on hygiene items and commissary. (Dkt. 2 at 2).

In contrast, the IDOC Defendants testified that inmates wore gloves while distributing

food. (Dkt. 44-3 ¶ 19); (Dkt. 44-4 ¶ 21). The IDOC Defendants testified that cleaning supplies

were regularly provided to housing units during the lockdown and staff routinely cleaned the

common areas by collecting trays and sweeping after meals. (Dkt. 44-4 ¶ 22). Although

Commissary was restricted during the lockdown, inmates could still purchase hygiene and

sanitation items, medical items, and snacks subject to spending limits. Id. ¶ 28. Facility records

confirm that the October 9, 2023 commissary order was cancelled, the October 23, 2023 order had

restrictions on hygiene items, the November 6, 2023 order had unrestricted hygiene, and the

remaining orders were full orders. Id. ¶ 29.

E. Access to Medical Services During the Lockdown

During the lockdown access to the medical wing was restricted. When White attempted to

speak to medical staff about his weight loss, they told him that he was not allowed to go to the

medical wing. (Dkt. 41-2 at 18:21–19:10). Medical staff came to White's dorm to dispense

medications and check vital signs, but did not provide any relief for the weight loss and digestive

and mental health issues that he experienced during the lockdown. Id. 29:12–30:24. White affirms

that during the lockdown period, he suffered physical injuries (substantial weight loss, muscle

atrophy, torturous stomach pains, a bloody stool, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, and more) and

mental/emotional injuries (significant anxiety, depression and more), as a result of the defendants'

actions and inactions" (Dkt 2 at 6).

In contrast, the IDOC Defendants testified that medical services continued to operate

during the lockdown. (Dkt. 44-3 ¶ 21). Inmates could still submit healthcare request forms, receive

routine screenings, and be escorted to the medical wing when necessary. Id. ¶ 22. The IDOC

Defendants did not issue a policy or directive denying access to medical care. Id. ¶ 25; (Dkt. 44-4

¶ 27); (Dkt. 44-2 ¶ 23).

III. DISCUSSION

White proceeds on Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Warden

Reagle, Deputy Warden Cole, Deputy Warden Fox, and Aramark as well as an Eighth Amendment

denial of medical care claim against Warden Reagle, Deputy Warden Cole, Deputy Warden Fox.

White also proceeds on an injunctive relief claim against Warden Allen and a state law breach of

contract claim against Aramark. (See Dkt. 11). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment because: (1) White cannot demonstrate success on the merits or that the benefits of

granting the injunctions outweigh the resultant harm to Defendants (2) White’s conditions were

not violative of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Aramark also argues that the state law claim should also be dismissed as summary judgment is

appropriate in favor of the Defendant pursuant to controlling case law. The Court discusses each

of White's claims below.

A. Injunctive Relief Claim against Trent Allen

The Court's screening order allowed a claim for injunctive relief to proceed against Warden

Allen in the event of another lockdown with the same restrictions described in White's complaint.

At this juncture, White has not provided any evidence that the conditions he complained about are

ongoing or that there is an immediate threat of another lockdown. Because White does not show a

threat of repeated injury, he does not have standing to sue Warden Allen for injunctive relief. See

Arcidiacono v. Whitehorn, 178 F.4th 338, 341 (7th Cir. 2026) ("To establish standing to sue for

injunctive relief, the plaintiffs must allege facts showing that they 'face a real and immediate threat

of repeated injury.'") (quoting Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024)). Therefore, the Court

grants summary judgment for Warden Allen.

B. Conditions of Confinement

The conditions described by White in his verified complaint (Dkt. 2) are deplorable. Under

the Eighth Amendment, "prisoners cannot be confined in inhumane conditions." Thomas v.

Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).

A conditions-of-confinement claim includes both an objective and subjective component. Giles v.

Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the objective component, a prisoner must

show that the conditions were objectively serious and created "an excessive risk to his health and

safety." Id. (cleaned up). Conditions of confinement count as objectively serious when they deny

a prisoner "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," such as food, sanitation, and

adequate shelter. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612,

614 (7th Cir. 2012); Vinning–El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the subjective

component, a prisoner must establish that the defendants had a culpable state of mind—that they

"were subjectively aware of these conditions and refused to take steps to correct them, showing

deliberate indifference." Thomas, 2 F.4th at 720. Neither "negligence [n]or even gross negligence

is enough[.]" Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008).

"'To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was

personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.'" Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th

698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). For this

purpose, each Defendant is considered independently. Id.

1. Warden Reagle, Deputy Warden Cox, and Deputy Warden Cole

The IDOC Defendants argue that White has not shown that he was physically injured by

their conduct, the conditions during the lockdown did not pose a serious risk to White's health, the

IDOC Defendants did not act with deliberate indifference, and they are entitled to qualified

immunity. (Dkt. 45). The Court agrees with the IDOC Defendants on the issue of deliberate

indifference and therefore only addresses this argument.

Based on the record, a reasonable jury could not infer that Warden Reagle, Deputy Warden

Cox, or Deputy Warden Cole were subjectively aware of the issues with food, hygiene, and

medical care that White describes in his complaint and in his testimony and then refused to take

reasonable measures to correct them. Although the wardens were presumably responsible for

implementing the lockdown, there is no evidence that they knew about the issues with rotten food,

small portions, or denial of medical care for White's weight loss and digestive issues.

White alleges in his verified complaint that he "informed" the wardens and they were

"aware" of the issues. See Dkt. 2 at 2–3. However, at the summary judgment stage, he must provide

evidence of this knowledge to sustain these allegations. To show deliberate indifference, the

plaintiff must point to evidence that the defendant had "actual, and not merely constructive,

knowledge of the risk." Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations

omitted). This requires that the official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference."

Id. (internal quotations omitted). Although circumstantial evidence suffices to show knowledge,

White has not designated any evidence from which a jury could conclude that the conditions he

experienced were obvious or known by the wardens. See Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago

Heights, IL. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) ("It is well established that in order

to withstand summary judgment, the non-movant must allege specific facts creating a genuine

issue for trial and may not rely on vague, conclusory allegations.").

In sum, White has not met his burden of providing evidence from which a jury could find

that the wardens knew about the conditions he endured during the lockdown. White is the

nonmoving party, so he receives "the benefit of conflicting evidence and reasonable inferences."

Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022). That said, he must "produce

evidence sufficient to establish [the] element[s] essential to" his claim. Id. Although the verified

complaint states that White "informed" the wardens and that they were "aware" of the issues with

hygiene, medical care, and food, he didn't provide any testimony or documentary evidence to prove

that (e.g., grievances or requests for interview) or "affidavits that cite specific concrete facts

establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted." Hadley v. County of DuPage, 715

F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.1983). Thus, summary judgment is granted for the IDOC Defendants on

the conditions of confinement claim.

2. Aramark

Private corporations acting under color of state law, such as Aramark, are treated as

municipalities for purposes of § 1983 and can be sued when their actions violate the Constitution.

Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Monell v. Dep't of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). To survive summary judgment on a Monell claim, White must

first show he was deprived of a federal right. Id. Then, he must provide evidence showing that

Aramark's actions plausibly deprived him of the right at issue. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375,

379 (7th Cir. 2005). Aramark cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. Id.

Thus, White must show that Aramark, "either through an express policy or an implied policy of

inaction, took deliberate action that was the moving force behind a constitutional injury." Taylor

v. Hughes, 26 F. 4th 419, 435 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Under this theory, a

plaintiff "must typically point to evidence of a prior pattern of similar constitutional violations" to

"ensure that there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event." Id. (cleaned up).

"Municipal liability only attaches when the plaintiff shows that the municipality acted with

deliberate indifference." Gasaway v. Vigo Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 672 F. Supp. 3d 651, 660 (S.D.

Ind. 2023) (citing J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Miranda v.

Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying deliberate indifference standard to

pretrial detainee's Monell claim). Under that standard, White must show that he was at serious risk

of exposure to harm, and Aramark "kn[ew] of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either

act[ed] or fail[ed] to act in disregard of that risk." Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982

F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020).

White has not designated any evidence showing that Aramark had an explicit policy or a

widespread practice of serving rotten and calorically inadequate sack meals during the lockdown.

The only evidence in the record shows that Aramark's lockdown meals conformed to its Master

Menu, which are based on the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences'

dietary reference intakes for people between the ages of 19 and 50. (Dkt. 41-1 ¶ 7). Although there

is conflicting testimony about the quantity and quality of meals that White received during the

lockdown, there is no evidence that an Aramark policy or practice caused the sacks to contain

rotten food and inadequate portions. Importantly, as seen above, in a § 1983 Aramark cannot be

held vicariously responsible for its employees' actions—there must be evidence that Aramark's

actions caused the constitutional violations. See Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 379. Accordingly, summary

judgment for Aramark on the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim is granted.

C. Denial of Medical Care

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty

on the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, "to provide adequate medical care to

incarcerated individuals." Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). "Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth

Amendment when they display deliberate indifference towards an objectively serious medical

need." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021). "Thus, to prevail on a deliberate

indifference claim, a plaintiff must show '(1) an objectively serious medical condition to which (2)

a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th

818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th

Cir. 2016)). Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or even objective recklessness.

Id. Rather, White "must provide evidence that an official actually knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of harm." Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016).

Here, White has not provided any evidence that Warden Reagle, Deputy Warden Fox, or

Deputy Warden Cole knew about his inability to access medical care during the lockdown. White

does not contradict the IDOC testimony that inmates could still submit healthcare request forms,

receive routine screenings, and be escorted to the medical wing when necessary. Furthermore, they

each testify, and White does not contradict, that they did not implement any policies or directives

denying White and other inmates' access to medical care. (Dkt. 44-3 ¶ 25). And nothing in the

record shows that the IDOC Defendants observed his declining medical condition, or that White

reported the lack of medical care directly to them. Therefore, there is no basis for inferring that

they were put on notice that White lacked the ability to seek medical treatment for his weight loss

and digestive issues. Accordingly, the summary judgment is granted for the wardens on this claim.

D. State Law Claim Against Aramark

With White's constitutional claims staged for dismissal, the Court has discretion whether

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining breach of contract state-law claim against

Aramark. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction . . . ."); see also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639

(2009) ("A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every

claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary."). "Indeed, when the federal

claims are dismissed before trial, there is a presumption that the court will relinquish jurisdiction

over any remaining state law claims." Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 631

(7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).

When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "'a federal court should

consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.'" City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173

(1997) (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted).

In the Seventh Circuit, "the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state

supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." Groce v. Eli

Lilly, 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Sharp Elecs. v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 578 F.3d

505, 514 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Normally, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district

court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on

the merits.") (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). Exceptions to the general

rule exist: "(1) when the statute of limitations has run on the pendent claim, precluding the filing

of a separate suit in state court; (2) substantial judicial resources have already been committed, so

that sending the case to another court will cause a substantial duplication of effort; or (3) when it

is absolutely clear how the pendent claims can be decided." Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650,

654 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and quoted authority).

No circumstance in this case overcomes the presumption that the Court should relinquish

jurisdiction over White's state-law claim. The statute of limitations is not a factor. Both federal and

state law toll the relevant limitation period when claims are pending in a civil action (except in

limited circumstances not present here). See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1; see also

Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Co., 159 F.3d 255, 266 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court has not expended

significant resources on the pending state-law claim. Further, it is not absolutely clear how the

state-law claim should be resolved. White's third-party breach of contract claim requires careful

scrutiny of the operative contract between the IDOC and Aramark, which does not affirmatively

name White or explicitly state that inmates in the custody of the IDOC are third party beneficiaries.

Thus, White's claim is best left for the state courts to resolve. Finally, comity always favors

allowing state courts to decide issues of state law.

Having resolved all claims within its original jurisdiction, the Court exercises its discretion

and relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over White's state law claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

White's undeveloped statements sufficed at the pleading stage. However, a motion for

summary judgment is the "put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit" and "requires a non-moving

party to respond to the moving party's properly-supported motion by identifying specific,

admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial." Grant v.

Trs. of Indiana Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). For the foregoing reasons, Defendant

Aramark's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. [39] is GRANTED, and the IDOC Defendants’

Motions for Summary Judgment, Dkts. [43] and [47] are GRANTED. White's constitutional

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the state law breach of contract

claim against Aramark and this claim is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Final judgment shall issue by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/17/2026 a ‘atten rath

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

14

Distribution:

RAYSHON WHITE

188422

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