Buchanan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

ROBERT BUCHANAN, Jr., )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 26-4145-SEM-DJQ

)

WARDEN BAKER, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Robert Buchanan, Jr., proceeding pro se and

currently in custody at Hill Correctional Center, filed a Complaint

(#1) on June 2, 2026. Plaintiff alleges therein that he is receiving

inadequate medical care at Hill. Plaintiff names as Defendants:

Warden Baker, Healthcare Unit Administrator Nellie Boone, Nurse

Practitioner Shinn, Nurse Practitioner Kramer, Wexford Health

Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), IDOC Director Hughes, Governor J.B.

Pritzker, Warden Bailey, Medical Provider Centurion, and

John/Jane Does.

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The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

and the case is now before the Court for a merit review of his

claims.

BACKGROUND

In the first half of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Wexford

and Centurion, private corporations that have contracted to provide

healthcare services to IDOC inmates, have a policy of deliberately

understaffing the prisons. He maintains that this policy results in

inmates across the IDOC being deprived of adequate healthcare.

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that former Hill Warden Baker, IDOC

Director Hughes, and Governor Pritzker are well aware of the

medical understaffing in the prisons due to the class action

lawsuits that have been brought in the past but have done nothing

to remedy the issue.

Plaintiff next alleges that he fell and injured himself on August

15, 2025, after slipping on spilled water. He alleges that he and two

other inmates informed maintenance supervisor Kunutea and

correctional officers Scandlin, Kane, and Johnson about the water

on the floor. Plaintiff suggests that those four individuals should

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not have allowed the prisoners out of their cells and should instead

have seen to it that the water was mopped up.

Plaintiff then makes a number of allegations concerning

specific health issues. First, Plaintiff alleges that he has a heart

condition and that a device has been placed in his chest to monitor

his heart. The device is monitored by cardiac specialists at UIC

Hospital. On one occasion—some time around September 6, 2025—

he experienced chest pain and was supposed to be seen by the UIC

Hospital cardiologist. However, Plaintiff was never called to go to the

hospital.

Plaintiff also suffers from prostate issues that required him to

have surgery. After the surgery, he was told that he would be

monitored to be sure his condition did not worsen. Some time again

around September 6, 2025, Plaintiff began to experience

excruciating pain in his groin area. He made a request to go to the

healthcare unit but never heard back. He maintains that this was a

deliberate denial of adequate medical care.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he has been prescribed

Gabapentin for chronic pain in his knees. He asserts that the

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medication has been ineffective because Nurse Practitioners Shinn

and Kramer have forced him to take it via the crush and float”

method. Under this method, the capsule is opened up and the

contents dumped into a cup of water, to be drunk by the patient.

That method is employed, Plaintiff notes, because some inmates

have been caught hoarding pills.

Plaintiff maintains that the crush and float method renders

the medication “useless.” Plaintiff told Shinn and Kramer that the

Gabapentin, delivered in this manner, was not alleviating his pain,

yet they persisted in their course of treatment. Plaintiff filed

grievances on the matter on September 5 and 6, 2025. He alleges

that the IDOC and Hughes have “turned a blind eye” to the medical

staff using the crush and float method.

In the final portion of his Complaint, Plaintiff complains that

Shinn and Kramer are mere nurse practitioners, rather than

specialists, and are therefore insufficient to meet his many medical

needs. Plaintiff insists that he needs to be seen by “a specialist who

is an expert in a specified field of study of medicine.” Wexford,

Centurion, and the IDOC are unable to provide this, Plaintiff

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alleges, as proven by the fact that he was previously sent to UIC

Hospital.

Analysis

Request for Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Request Counsel (#5). In deciding

whether to recruit counsel for a pro se litigant, the Court must

determine: (1) whether the indigent plaintiff has made a reasonable

attempt to obtain counsel on his own; and (2) “given the difficulty of

the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?”

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff has attached to his Motion seven undated letters

requesting representation, each identical except for being addressed

to different law firms. He does not attach any replies, nor does he

otherwise state in the Motion that he has received any replies. The

Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable

attempt to obtain counsel on his own.

As for the second inquiry, Plaintiff states in his Motion that he

has attained his GED. He does not indicate that he has any

difficulty reading or writing. Indeed, his claims are neatly and

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cogently presented in his Complaint. Moreover, at least at this early

stage in the proceeding, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s claims to

be legally or factually complex. While most of those claims concern

Plaintiff’s medical care, they relate largely to issues of delay, rather

than complicated medical issues. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (#5).

Merit Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must “screen”

Plaintiff’s complaint and, through such process, identify and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if

warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Plaintiff’s general allegations of inadequate medical treatment

suffered by all IDOC inmates due to a policy of understaffing are

insufficient to state a claim. To state a Section 1983 claim, a

plaintiff must allege that a defendant harmed them by infringing

specific constitutional rights. See Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d 670,

673 (7th Cir. 2014). “Section 1983 is a tort statute,” which means

Plaintiff must allege that he has suffered “cognizable legal harm.”

Doe v. Welborn, 110 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1997). Relatedly, to

state a claim for liability under Monell, a plaintiff must, inter alia,

plausibly allege that a policy or custom caused his constitutional

rights to be violated. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319,

324 (7th Cir. 2000). But “[w]ithout a harm, there is no causal link

between an injury and . . . a policy[.]” Fanady v. Dart, 2025 WL

2764509, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding that “[g]enerally

alleging inadequate medical care” is insufficient).

The court thus turns to Plaintiff’s specific allegations of harm

he has suffered. Plaintiff alleges that he put in a sick call requesting

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to be seen by a specialist regarding his heart condition and a sick

call regarding potential prostate-related pain. Both requests,

Plaintiff alleges, went unanswered.

In both of these instances, Plaintiff has failed to identify an

individual responsible for deprivation of his constitutional rights.

“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a

defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a

constitutional right.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th

Cir. 1995).

To the extent Plaintiff may intend to pursue these claims

under a Monell theory, he never explicitly asserts that the delay in

his care was connected to his general allegations of understaffing

made earlier in his Complaint. “Monell complaints are typically

dismissed where plaintiffs have failed to tie the alleged policy to

their particular injury or have failed to provide any facts beyond a

bare assertion that the policy exists.” Sanchez v. Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., 2026 WL 691871, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2026)

(cleaned up); see also Arita v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2016 WL

6432578, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff's

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“factually unsupported, boilerplate allegation” regarding a general

policy of ignoring inmates’ requests for medical attention).

Furthermore, Plaintiff makes clear later in his Complaint the

precise parameters of his issue with the staffing at the prison: He

would like more doctors and specialists to be on staff. There is no

plausible inference to be drawn from Plaintiff’s allegations that the

lack of such medical professionals was the cause of his not getting

a response to his sick call requests. See Ruiz-Cortez v. City of

Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Causation under

Monell requires a ‘direct causal link’ between the [policy] and the

constitutional injury.”).

Plaintiff next alleges that nurse practitioners Shinn and

Kramer have persisted in providing him Gabapentin delivered via

crush and float method despite knowing that the medication, taken

in this manner, is “useless.” These allegations “straddle the line

between demanding care versus receiving allegedly inadequate or

inappropriate care.” Lyons v. Crain, 2026 WL 1045499, at *7 (S.D.

Ill. Apr. 17, 2026). Still, the Court at this preliminary juncture must

accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true. Allegations that Defendants

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Shinn and Kramer declined to adjust Plaintiff’s chronic pain

treatment—whether by switching him to a new medication or by

terminating the crush and float delivery—despite knowing that the

present treatment was doing nothing for his chronic pain, are

sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifferent to serious

medical needs. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir.

2011).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Hughes or Baker

responsible, on a policy level, for the administration of his

medication via crush and float method, the Court notes that the

Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff from suing these Defendants for

damages. Trujillo v. Hughes, 2025 WL 1724484, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June

20, 2025) (citing Gerlach v. Rokita, 95 F. 4th 493, 498-99 (7th Cir.

2024)). While injunctive relief against these Defendants would be

available, Plaintiff does not seek any injunctive relief relating to his

Gabapentin.

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to hold maintenance supervisor

Kunutea and correctional officers Scandlin, Kane, and Johnson for

his slip on spilled water. The Court notes that none of these

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individuals are named as Defendants in the caption of Plaintiff’s

Complaint or in the list of Defendants provided within the

Complaint. More importantly, A plaintiff “may join Defendants in

the same action only if the claims against each one ‘aris[e] out of

the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences[.]” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 502-03 (7th Cir.

2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)). “[U]nrelated claims against

different defendants belong in separate lawsuits[.]” Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). “Rule 21 grants district

courts broad discretion to sever or dismiss claims and parties that

are improperly joined in the same action.” Davenport v. Baker, 2024

WL 3088529 (S.D. Ill. June 21, 2024).

Plaintiff’s claims against Kunutea, Scandlin, Kane, and

Johnson are wholly unrelated to those against Shinn, Howard, or

any other medical Defendant. Those claims against those parties

are therefore improperly joined here and should be brought in a

separate lawsuit. As the incident in question took place in August of

2025, dismissal for misjoinder will have no statute of limitations

ramifications. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Kunutea,

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Scandlin, Kane, and Johnson will be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (#5) is DENIED.

2. Pursuant to its review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

Complaint states a claim against Defendants Shinn and Kramer for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Any additional claims shall not be included in

the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for

good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15.

3. The Clerk is directed to DISMISS all other defendants

from this case.

4. The Clerk is directed to effect service of process on

Defendants Shinn and Kramer pursuant to the Court’s standard

procedures.

5. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before

filing any motions in order to give Defendant notice and an

opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

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Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be

denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the

Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

6. The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing

waivers of service to him. Defendant has sixty (60) days from the

date the waiver is sent to file an answer. If Defendant has not

filed an answer or appeared through counsel within ninety (90) days

of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the

status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will

enter an Order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant

worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used

only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be

maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8. Defendant shall file an answer within sixty (60) days of

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the date the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not

an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate

under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings

shall be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general,

an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule

on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by

Defendant. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or

will be considered.

9. This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after defense counsel has filed an appearance, defense counsel will

automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper

filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to

defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that Plaintiff

has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery

requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not

filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or

responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does

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not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance and the

Court has entered a Scheduling Order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

10. Counsel for Defendant is hereby granted leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for Defendant shall

arrange the time for the deposition.

11. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s

failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone

number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

12. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through

the U.S. Marshal Service on Defendant and will require Defendant

to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified

protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

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ENTERED August 17, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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