Opinion

HALL

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jul 17, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 44.1%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

RAYMOND HALL, )

)

) Civil Action No.:

) 2:25-CV-01622-NBF-CBB

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Nora Barry Fischer

) Senior United States District Judge

PITTSBURGH REGIONAL TRANSIT, )

)

) Christopher B. Brown

) United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON MOTION TO DISMISS ECF No. 12

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation

This civil action was initiated in this court on October 20, 2025, by pro se

Plaintiff Raymond Hall (“Hall”). ECF No. 1. Hall alleges his employer, Defendant

Pittsburgh Regional Transit (“PRT”), subjected him to race based discrimination

and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§

2000e, et seq. ECF No. 3. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331.

Presently pending before the Court is PRT’s motion to dismiss for a more

definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) and alternatively for failure to state a

claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 12. The motion is fully briefed and

ripe for consideration. ECF Nos. 13, 18, 19. For the reasons that follow, it is

respectfully recommended the Court grant PRT’s motion to dismiss for more

definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), dismiss Hall’s amended complaint

without prejudice and allow Hall to file a second amended complaint. It is further

recommended if Hall is granted the opportunity to file a second amended complaint

and fails to do so, that dismissal of his complaint be converted to dismissal with

prejudice. Lastly, it is recommended PRT’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim be dismissed as moot and without prejudice to raise those arguments at a

future procedural juncture.

II. Report

a. Background

Hall submits a two-page complaint and alleges he is “one of only a small

number of African American Wirepersons in the entire PRT system.” ECF No. 3 at ¶

4.a. He claims after he filed “internal complaints” and “EEOC charges” of an

unspecified nature, PRT “subjected [him] to accelerated discipline, repeated ‘105’

hearings and unwarranted written warnings” despite Hall presenting evidence to

his supervisors that “his work was complete.” Id. at ¶¶ 4.b-c. Hall further alleges in

August 2025, several supervisors instructed him and one other employee to “remove

their tools and belongings from a shared workspace” but did not instruct other

employees to do the same. Id. at ¶ 4.d. He alleges “White wirepersons committing

similar errors were not disciplined or were given lesser corrective actions” and his

union representative did not file a grievance on his behalf. Id. at ¶ 4.e-f. It is on

this basis Hall alleges PRT discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of

Title VII.

Hall attached several documents related to his EEOC charges to his amended

complaint. See ECF No. 3-1. Generally, these documents show that Hall filed an

EEOC Charge at EEOC No. 533-2025-01637 (“First EEOC Charge”), the EEOC

made no findings, and Hall received a Right to Sue Notice for the First EEOC

Charge on July 22, 2025. Id. at 2-3. Hall then filed a subsequent EEOC Charge at

EEOC No. 533-2025-03187 on September 9, 2025 alleging racial discrimination and

retaliation (“Second EEOC Charge”) from July 31-August 27, 2025. Id. at 6-7. In

the Second EEOC Charge, Hall alleged before he filed the First EEOC Charge, he

“had a clear work record” and after, he was subjected to “harassment and

disciplinary actions which are unwarranted.” Id. at 6. According to Hall, the Second

EEOC Charge remains pending. Id. at 1.

b. Standard of Review: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) Motion for More

Definite Statement and Pro Se Litigants

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits a party to “move for a more

definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which

is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Rule 12(e) is part of the “district court’s case-management

arsenal,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593 n. 13 (2007), that, in

conjunction with the rest of Rule 12 and Rule 8, serves “to frame and govern [the]

court's assessment of the quality of a pleading.” Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Cloud, No.

CIV. 08-1200, 2008 WL 3895895, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008). Generally

speaking, “Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored in light of the liberal pleading

standards established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).” Transp. Int'l Pool, Inc. v. Ross Stores,

Inc., No. CIV. A. 06-1812, 2009 WL 1033601, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009); see also

Country Classics at Morgan Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Country Classics at

Morgan Hill, LLC, 780 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[M]otions for a more

definite statement are ‘highly disfavored.’ ”). Thus, courts will grant a Rule 12(e)

motion only “if a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot

reasonably be required to make a responsive pleading.” Country Classics at Morgan

Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (internal quotations omitted).

Because Hall is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the Amended Complaint

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can reasonably

read the Amended Complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it

will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal

theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading

requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982). Despite this leniency,

“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a

claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing

Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).

Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Judging

the sufficiency of a pleading “is a context-dependent exercise.” Garrett v. Wexford

Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc.

v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)). At a minimum, however, the pleading

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, a complaint must identify “discrete defendants and the actions taken

by these defendants[.]” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). Dismissal under

Rule 8(a) is appropriate when the “complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or

otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”

Muhammad v. U.S. States Bd. of Governors Postal Sys., 574 F. App'x 74, 74 (3d Cir.

2014) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).

c. Discussion

After a close review of the allegations of the amended complaint, the Court

finds that the allegations are insufficient to discern plausible claims against PRT

which would allow it to frame a responsive pleading. As such, the amended

complaint does not meet the pleading standards under Rule 8.

While Hall generally complains of racial discrimination and retaliation in his

workplace, he does not provide any particular facts that tend to support his claims.

In his amended complaint, Hall appears to include only facts that occurred after he

filed his EEOC charges. ECF No. 3 at p.1; ¶ 4 (indicating he received a Right to Sue

Letter from the EEOC on July 22, 2025 yet the offending conduct in the amended

complaint occurred after that date between August 2-6, 2025). Hall also attaches

several EEOC documents to his amended complaint, including one EEOC charge

filed September 8, 2025 which provides a narrative description of the discrimination

and retaliation he claims to have suffered from July 31-August 27, 2025 (i.e. before

and after the time period alleged in the amended complaint) and which remains

pending. See ECF No. 3-1 at 2-11. As such, it is unclear whether Hall bases his

present claims on the allegations that post-date his EEOC charges, whether he

intends to litigate the facts set forth in the EEOC charges attached to the amended

complaint, or on some other conduct. “While courts may consider exhibits attached

to a complaint when considering whether dismissal is appropriate, a plaintiff does

not automatically incorporate into [his]complaint every fact asserted in such

attachments. Moreover, facts asserted in such attachments may not necessarily be

considered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Hymer v. Kross, No. 23-2374, 2024

WL 3026781, at *2 (3d Cir. June 17, 2024). Without more information explaining

what discriminatory or retaliatory conduct Hall intends to litigate, the Court cannot

discern whether he has adequately stated a claim, and PRT cannot determine

whether it has any viable defenses.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended the Court grant PRT’s

motion to dismiss for more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), dismiss

Hall’s amended complaint without prejudice and allow Hall to file a second

amended complaint. It is further recommended if Hall is granted the opportunity to

file a second amended complaint and fails to do so, that dismissal of his complaint

be converted to dismissal with prejudice. Lastly, it is recommended PRT’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim be dismissed as moot and without prejudice to

raise those arguments at a future procedural juncture.

If Hall is permitted to amend his complaint, he shall further comply with the

attached instructions.

Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,

and the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties may file objections by July 31,

2026. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights. Brightwell v.

Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).

DATED this 17th day of July, 2026.

Respectfully submitted:

s/Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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