The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
RAYMOND HALL, )
)
) Civil Action No.:
) 2:25-CV-01622-NBF-CBB
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Nora Barry Fischer
) Senior United States District Judge
PITTSBURGH REGIONAL TRANSIT, )
)
) Christopher B. Brown
) United States Magistrate Judge
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON MOTION TO DISMISS ECF No. 12
Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
This civil action was initiated in this court on October 20, 2025, by pro se
Plaintiff Raymond Hall (“Hall”). ECF No. 1. Hall alleges his employer, Defendant
Pittsburgh Regional Transit (“PRT”), subjected him to race based discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e, et seq. ECF No. 3. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
Presently pending before the Court is PRT’s motion to dismiss for a more
definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) and alternatively for failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 12. The motion is fully briefed and
ripe for consideration. ECF Nos. 13, 18, 19. For the reasons that follow, it is
respectfully recommended the Court grant PRT’s motion to dismiss for more
definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), dismiss Hall’s amended complaint
without prejudice and allow Hall to file a second amended complaint. It is further
recommended if Hall is granted the opportunity to file a second amended complaint
and fails to do so, that dismissal of his complaint be converted to dismissal with
prejudice. Lastly, it is recommended PRT’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim be dismissed as moot and without prejudice to raise those arguments at a
future procedural juncture.
II. Report
a. Background
Hall submits a two-page complaint and alleges he is “one of only a small
number of African American Wirepersons in the entire PRT system.” ECF No. 3 at ¶
4.a. He claims after he filed “internal complaints” and “EEOC charges” of an
unspecified nature, PRT “subjected [him] to accelerated discipline, repeated ‘105’
hearings and unwarranted written warnings” despite Hall presenting evidence to
his supervisors that “his work was complete.” Id. at ¶¶ 4.b-c. Hall further alleges in
August 2025, several supervisors instructed him and one other employee to “remove
their tools and belongings from a shared workspace” but did not instruct other
employees to do the same. Id. at ¶ 4.d. He alleges “White wirepersons committing
similar errors were not disciplined or were given lesser corrective actions” and his
union representative did not file a grievance on his behalf. Id. at ¶ 4.e-f. It is on
this basis Hall alleges PRT discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of
Title VII.
Hall attached several documents related to his EEOC charges to his amended
complaint. See ECF No. 3-1. Generally, these documents show that Hall filed an
EEOC Charge at EEOC No. 533-2025-01637 (“First EEOC Charge”), the EEOC
made no findings, and Hall received a Right to Sue Notice for the First EEOC
Charge on July 22, 2025. Id. at 2-3. Hall then filed a subsequent EEOC Charge at
EEOC No. 533-2025-03187 on September 9, 2025 alleging racial discrimination and
retaliation (“Second EEOC Charge”) from July 31-August 27, 2025. Id. at 6-7. In
the Second EEOC Charge, Hall alleged before he filed the First EEOC Charge, he
“had a clear work record” and after, he was subjected to “harassment and
disciplinary actions which are unwarranted.” Id. at 6. According to Hall, the Second
EEOC Charge remains pending. Id. at 1.
b. Standard of Review: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) Motion for More
Definite Statement and Pro Se Litigants
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits a party to “move for a more
definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which
is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Rule 12(e) is part of the “district court’s case-management
arsenal,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593 n. 13 (2007), that, in
conjunction with the rest of Rule 12 and Rule 8, serves “to frame and govern [the]
court's assessment of the quality of a pleading.” Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Cloud, No.
CIV. 08-1200, 2008 WL 3895895, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008). Generally
speaking, “Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored in light of the liberal pleading
standards established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).” Transp. Int'l Pool, Inc. v. Ross Stores,
Inc., No. CIV. A. 06-1812, 2009 WL 1033601, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009); see also
Country Classics at Morgan Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Country Classics at
Morgan Hill, LLC, 780 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[M]otions for a more
definite statement are ‘highly disfavored.’ ”). Thus, courts will grant a Rule 12(e)
motion only “if a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot
reasonably be required to make a responsive pleading.” Country Classics at Morgan
Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (internal quotations omitted).
Because Hall is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the Amended Complaint
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can reasonably
read the Amended Complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it
will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal
theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading
requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982). Despite this leniency,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing
Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Judging
the sufficiency of a pleading “is a context-dependent exercise.” Garrett v. Wexford
Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc.
v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)). At a minimum, however, the pleading
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, a complaint must identify “discrete defendants and the actions taken
by these defendants[.]” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). Dismissal under
Rule 8(a) is appropriate when the “complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”
Muhammad v. U.S. States Bd. of Governors Postal Sys., 574 F. App'x 74, 74 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).
c. Discussion
After a close review of the allegations of the amended complaint, the Court
finds that the allegations are insufficient to discern plausible claims against PRT
which would allow it to frame a responsive pleading. As such, the amended
complaint does not meet the pleading standards under Rule 8.
While Hall generally complains of racial discrimination and retaliation in his
workplace, he does not provide any particular facts that tend to support his claims.
In his amended complaint, Hall appears to include only facts that occurred after he
filed his EEOC charges. ECF No. 3 at p.1; ¶ 4 (indicating he received a Right to Sue
Letter from the EEOC on July 22, 2025 yet the offending conduct in the amended
complaint occurred after that date between August 2-6, 2025). Hall also attaches
several EEOC documents to his amended complaint, including one EEOC charge
filed September 8, 2025 which provides a narrative description of the discrimination
and retaliation he claims to have suffered from July 31-August 27, 2025 (i.e. before
and after the time period alleged in the amended complaint) and which remains
pending. See ECF No. 3-1 at 2-11. As such, it is unclear whether Hall bases his
present claims on the allegations that post-date his EEOC charges, whether he
intends to litigate the facts set forth in the EEOC charges attached to the amended
complaint, or on some other conduct. “While courts may consider exhibits attached
to a complaint when considering whether dismissal is appropriate, a plaintiff does
not automatically incorporate into [his]complaint every fact asserted in such
attachments. Moreover, facts asserted in such attachments may not necessarily be
considered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Hymer v. Kross, No. 23-2374, 2024
WL 3026781, at *2 (3d Cir. June 17, 2024). Without more information explaining
what discriminatory or retaliatory conduct Hall intends to litigate, the Court cannot
discern whether he has adequately stated a claim, and PRT cannot determine
whether it has any viable defenses.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended the Court grant PRT’s
motion to dismiss for more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), dismiss
Hall’s amended complaint without prejudice and allow Hall to file a second
amended complaint. It is further recommended if Hall is granted the opportunity to
file a second amended complaint and fails to do so, that dismissal of his complaint
be converted to dismissal with prejudice. Lastly, it is recommended PRT’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim be dismissed as moot and without prejudice to
raise those arguments at a future procedural juncture.
If Hall is permitted to amend his complaint, he shall further comply with the
attached instructions.
Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,
and the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties may file objections by July 31,
2026. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights. Brightwell v.
Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
DATED this 17th day of July, 2026.
Respectfully submitted:
s/Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge