Lucas-Vicks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DORGINIA LUCAS-VICKS * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 26-1152

PAOLA EDINFIELD * SECTION “E” (2)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Dorginia Lucas-Vicks filed a Complaint and an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to

Proceed in forma pauperis on May 29, 2026. ECF Nos. 1-2. The matter was referred to the

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to submit proposed findings and recommendations

for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), including frivolousness review under 28

U.S.C. § 1915.

On June 3, 2026, I granted Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis motion and, consistent with the

duties imposed by § 1915(a) and (e)(2)(B), ordered that summons not be issued until completion

of the statutorily mandated review. ECF No. 4. This Order also required Plaintiff to file a written

response by June 24, 2026, setting forth the specific facts upon which she relies to establish subject

matter jurisdiction and the bases for her claims. Id. at 12. Plaintiff failed to file a response.

I. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Dorginia Lucas-Vicks, a citizen of Louisiana, filed this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due process violations against Defendant Paola Edinfield, a citizen of

Mississippi, invoking this Court’s federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331). ECF No. 1 ¶¶

1-2, 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to send a default letter and then improperly sought a

state court eviction judgment relating to property she purchased via a bond for deed1 under LA.

1 A bond for deed is a contract to sell real property. The buyer pays the agreed purchase price to the seller in

installments after which the seller delivers title to the buyer. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2941.

REV. STAT. §§ 9:2941-2945. Id. ¶¶ 7-13. She contends that pursuing eviction without notice

constitutes breach of contract, fraud, violations of Louisiana law and violations of her federal

constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 14-17. She also asserts a claim of discrimination because Defendant

allegedly gave other homeowners default notices. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Statutorily Mandated Review

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) grants the court authority to summarily dismiss in forma pauperis

complaints if the asserted claims are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.2 Indeed, the statute specifically mandates that the court “sua sponte dismiss

[the case] at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.”3

This review mandate applies to both prisoner and non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases.4

A claim is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”5 A claim

“lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if

the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”6 A court may

not dismiss a claim simply because the facts are “unlikely.”7 A factually frivolous claim alleges

only facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise

2 Tam Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4624, 2011 WL 743466, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2011), R.&R. adopted sub

nom., Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4264, 2011 WL 740909 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).

3 Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

4 James v. Richardson, 344 F. App’x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires dismissal of frivolous

IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.”); see also Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227,

231 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying § 1915(e)(2)(B) to a non-prisoner whose complaint was frivolous).

5 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

6 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.

1997)).

7 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)).

to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them.”8

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual

allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in

the complaint are true, even if doubtful.9 The Supreme Court clarified the standard for a Rule

12(b)(6) motion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face (i.e., the factual allegations must “be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).10 If the “facts” alleged are “merely consistent”

with those minimally required to establish liability, the complaint “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility.”11 “Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.”12

Although the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and consider the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”13 The court may consider not only the

allegations but also any documents attached to the complaint, referenced documents that are

central to the claim, and documents that are part of the public record or subject to judicial notice.14

8 Id. (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33).

9 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)).

10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

12 Roy v. Cobb, No. 20-0167, 2020 WL 2045791, at *2 (W.D. La. April 7, 2020) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

13 Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540,

544 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Lehman Bros. Small

Balance Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, 881 F.3d 933, 943–44 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding

conclusory fraud allegations that the defendant intended plaintiff to act upon representations and plaintiff acted in

reliance on representations insufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) challenge).

14 See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (directing courts to “consider the

complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to

dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take

In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule

12(b)(6), the Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), held that a claim that is

dismissed under one rule does not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.15 If an in forma pauperis

complaint lacks even an arguable basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule 12(b)(6)

and § 1915(e).16 “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court

ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

appropriate; however, dismissal under [§ 1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”17

B. Pleading Standard

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint set forth “sufficient

facts from which the court can determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and from

which the defendants can fairly appreciate the claim made against them.”18 While Rule 8’s

pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does demand more than an

“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”19 Although documents filed

pro se are “liberally construed,”20 even the complaints of pro se litigants must satisfy Rule 8 to

convince the court that plaintiff has a colorable claim.21

C. Availability of Amendment

Claims filed by a pro se litigant that fail to state grounds upon which relief can be granted

judicial notice.”); Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court may rely on the complaint,

its proper attachments, documents incorporated by reference, and matters of judicial notice).

15 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)).

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Kinchen v. Sharp, No. 11-1040, 2012 WL 700920, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2012) (quoting Bremer v. Hous. Auth.

of New Orleans, No. 98-2735, 1999 WL 298795, at *1 (E.D. La. May 12, 1999)), R.&R. adopted, 2012 WL 700265

(E.D. La. Feb. 29, 2012).

19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

20 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 98, 106 (1976)).

21 Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that, although pro se pleadings are treated

more liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to establish a colorable claim; conclusory allegations do not suffice).

should generally be dismissed without prejudice, unless the plaintiff has been given adequate

opportunity to cure the deficiencies or if the pleadings demonstrate the plaintiff has pleaded his

best case:22

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a

pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the

complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him to the legal theory

underlying the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing

the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to

conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action.23

Unless it is clear that a plaintiff is unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid

dismissal, the court errs in not providing a pro se plaintiff with at least one opportunity to cure

pleading deficiencies before dismissing.24 When, however, the “complaint alleges the plaintiff's

best case,” a further factual statement from the plaintiff need not be allowed.25 Frivolous claims,

however, are generally dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend because the plaintiff

cannot cure the frivolity.26

D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized

by Constitution or statute,”27 and “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on

their own initiative.”28 Under their limited jurisdiction, federal courts generally may only hear a

case if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of citizenship exists between the

22 James v. Smith, 152 F.4th 594, 610 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415,

423 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citations omitted)); Ricks v. Khan, 135 F.4th 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2025).

23 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329-30.

24 Dierlam v. Trump, 977 F.3d 471, 478 n.44 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned

up); Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020).

25 Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

26 See Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

27 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994)).

28 Ruhrgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).

parties.29 The court must presume that the lawsuit lies outside its limited jurisdiction, and the party

invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it.30 Indeed, the court

has an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the

absence of a challenge from any party.31

The absence of a valid cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction unless

the claim is either immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where

such a claim is wholly insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior Supreme Court decision,

frivolous, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.32 If the

court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or the plaintiff fails to establish

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).33 The dismissal of an

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice and does not preclude a plaintiff

from pursuing relief in state court or other proper jurisdiction.34

1. Federal Question

Congress authorized federal district courts to exercise original jurisdiction in “all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This federal question jurisdiction exists when “a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that

federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on

29 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

30 Mourning v. U.S. Dep’t of State-Visa Off., 32 F. App’x 130 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243

F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001)); St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998).

31 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583).

32 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citations omitted); see also WickFire, L.L.C. v.

Laura Woodruff; TriMax Media, L.L.C., 989 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-

83 (1946)).

33 Hicks v. TXU Energy, No. 24-463, 2024 WL 1481058, 2024 WL 1481058, at *2 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)

(“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”)),

R.&R. adopted, 2024 WL 3378726 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2024).

34 Griener v. United States, 900 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2018) (“A dismissal for want of jurisdiction bars access to

federal courts and is res judicata only as to the lack of a federal court's power to act. It is otherwise without prejudice

to the plaintiff's claims.”).

resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”35 This “‘creation’ test . . . accounts for the vast

bulk of suits that arise under federal law.”36

2. Diversity

“Diversity jurisdiction is determined based upon the citizenship of a party at the time the

case is filed.”37 It requires each plaintiff’s citizenship to be diverse from each defendant’s

citizenship, i.e., “complete diversity,”38 and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000.39

Because “clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations” are required at the

pleading stage,40 parties’ citizenship must be “distinctly and affirmatively alleged” and cannot be

established argumentatively or by mere inference.41

The citizenship of a natural person is determined by domicile, which requires residency

plus an intent to remain.42 Thus, a party’s domicile is not determined solely by the party’s

residence.43 For that reason, an allegation of residency alone does not satisfy the required

35 Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers

Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)); see also In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A federal

question exists if there appears on the fact of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of federal law. (internal

quotations and citation omitted)).

36 Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257; see also Perez ex rel. Est. of Lozano v. Se. SNF, L.L.C., No. 21-50399, 2022 WL 987187,

at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2022). A small class of state law causes of action support federal question jurisdiction when

a federal issue is (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal

court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (quoting Grable &

Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2005)).

37 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1986).

38 MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting McLaughlin v. Miss.

Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).

39 § 1332(a), (b).

40 MidCap Media Fin., 929 F.3d at 313 (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir.

1988)); see Megalomedia Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 115 F.4th 657, 659 (5th Cir. 2024) (noting the manner and

degree of evidence required to establish citizenship at different stages of the litigation and clarifying “[a]t the pleading

stage, the party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction must allege the citizenship [of the parties]” (citing Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (explaining that standing “must be supported . . . with the manner and

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation”))); see also Midcap Media Fin., 929 F.3d at 315

n.* (quoting Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)).

41 Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1259 (citations omitted).

42 SXSW, L.L.C. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). A change in domicile requires

physical presence at the new location and an intention to remain their indefinitely. Dos Santos v. Belmere Ltd. P’ship,

516 F. App’x 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2009)).

43 See MidCap Media Fin., 929 F.3d at 313 (discussing the difference between citizenship and residency).

allegation of citizenship.44

“The amount in controversy is ‘not proof of the amount the plaintiff will recover’ but ‘an

estimate of the amount that will be put at issue in the course of the litigation.’”45 The amount in

controversy “is measured by the direct pecuniary value of the right the plaintiff seeks to enforce

or protect; stated somewhat differently, it is the value of the object or subject matter of the suit that

is critical.”46 And it is determined by the court “as of the time the complaint is filed . . . .”47

“[D]ifferent standards of proof [are applied] depending upon whether the complaint alleges

a dollar amount of damages. Where the plaintiff has alleged a sum certain that exceeds the

requisite amount in controversy, that amount controls if made in good faith.”48 For a court to

refuse jurisdiction, “it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the

jurisdictional amount . . . .”49 “[W]hen a complaint does not allege a specific amount of damages,

the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount.”50 The court must first examine “the

complaint to determine whether it is ‘facially apparent’ that the claims exceed the jurisdictional

amount.”51 Allegations of general categories of damages without any indication of the amount of

damages sought are not considered.52 If not facially apparent, the court “may look to ‘summary-

44 Id. (quoting Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984 (per curiam)).

45 Durbois v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. of Holders of AAMES Mortg. Inv. Tr. 20054 Mortg. Backed Notes,

37 F.4th 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 2008)).

46 Wilson v. DG La., LLC, No. 24-2957, 2025 WL 2434382, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2025) (Ashe, J.) (quoting 14B

WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3707, at 590 (5th ed. 2023); and citing Durbois, 37 F.4th

at 1057 (citing cases)).

47 St. Paul Reinsurance, 134 F.3d at 1253-54.

48 Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab

Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)).

49 Berrocal v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 25-50259, 2025 WL 3488842, *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025) (quoting St. Paul

Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289).

50 St. Paul Reinsurance, 134 F.3d at 1253.

51 Id. (quoting Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335).

52 See, e.g., Young v. Popeyes La. Kitchen, Inc., No. 24-1807, 2024 WL 4263173, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2024)

(citing cases).

judgment type’ evidence in the record to ascertain the amount in controversy.”53

3. Supplemental Jurisdiction

When the court has jurisdiction over a cause of action, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes the

court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims that do not independently fall within

its jurisdiction, but that form part of the same “case or controversy.”54 The supplemental claims

must be “so related” to the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, i.e., both claims

must “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”55 The court may, however, decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if, among other things, “the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”56

The court has “wide discretion” to refuse or retain supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent

state law claim.57 In the determination, the court should consider the statutory factors enumerated

in § 1367(c) as well as the common law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity.58 Generally, however, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining

state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.59

E. Required Elements of a § 1983 Claim

Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or

statutory rights under color of state law:

53 Galan v. Deepwater Horizon Med. Benefits Settlement Claims Adm’r, No. 23-30459, 2023 WL 8434048, at *2 (5th

Cir. Dec. 5, 2023) (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance, 134 F.3d at 1253).

54 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 458 (2003) (quoting § 1367(a)).

55 S J Associated Pathologists, P.L.L.C. v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 964 F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

§ 1367(a); Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))).

56 § 1367(c)(3).

57 Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.

1993)).

58 Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011).

59 Watson v. City of Allen, 821 F.3d 635, 642 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prods., 554

F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law . . . .60

“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of authority to deprive

individuals of federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”61

Generally, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish § 1983 liability:

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law;

(2) that occurred under color of state law; and

(3) was caused by a state actor.62

Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any

substantive rights, “an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability.”63

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim must identify both the constitutional violation and the

responsible person acting under color of state law.64 Plaintiff thus must identify the person who

deprived her of a federal right while acting under color of law,65 or in other words, the plaintiff

must show state action.66 This requires an allegation that “the claimed deprivation has resulted

from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority.”67 “Mere private

conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” is excluded from § 1983’s reach.68 Only in

60 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

61 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).

62 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

63 Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

64 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).

65 Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1342 (5th

Cir. 1994)).

66 Pearson v. Shriners Hosps. for Children, Inc., 133 F.4th 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Priester, 354 F.3d at 421;

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001) (“If a defendant's conduct

satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes action ‘under color

of state law’ for § 1983 purposes.”)); see Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194-95 (2024).

67 Pittman v. Campbell, No. 24-2168, 2025 WL 358922, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2025) (Africk, J.) (quoting Hernandez

v. Causey, 124 F.4th 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2024)).

68 Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

limited circumstances is private conduct deemed state action and fairly attributable to the State.69

Fair attribution may be found where a private entity “is involved in a conspiracy or

participates in joint activity with state actors.”70 This “joint action test” requires the plaintiff to

plead “facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds between the state actor and the private

actor to engage in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the private

actor was a willing participant in joint action with the state or its agents.”71 “[I]t is not enough

merely to recite that there was an agreement or that defendants conspired or acted in concert, for

these are conclusions, not facts.”72

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff § 1983 Claim is Frivolous

Plaintiff sole federal claim is asserted against Defendant under § 1983 for violation of her

rights guaranteed by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ECF No. 1 at 8. Defendant is a private person, and Plaintiff does not set forth any allegations to

suggest that Defendant is an official who qualifies as a state actor nor does she include any

allegations to establish that Defendant conspired with or acted in concert with a state actor.73

Section 1983 claims are properly seen as “frivolous or insubstantial” when a plaintiff sues

a private actor and does not otherwise allege that the private actor acted under color of state law.74

69 Moody v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Priester, 354 F.3d at 423).

70 Id. (quotation omitted); Pearson, 133 F.4th at 433 (quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S.

802, 808 (2019)).

71 Hernandez, 124 F.4th at 337 (quoting Pikaluk v. Horsehoe Ent., L.P., 810 F. App’x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2020)).

72 Polacek v. Kemper County, 739 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952-53 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (emphasis in original) (citing Harrison

v. Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, No. 05-30370, 2006 WL 558902, *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 8,

2006) (recognizing that while “a non-state actor may be liable under [§] 1983 if the private citizen was a willful

participant in joint activity with the States or its agents,” “[a]llegations that are merely conclusory, without reference

to specific facts, will not suffice”); Priester, 354 F.3d at 420 (stating that “[a]llegations (of conspiracy) that are merely

conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not suffice.”); Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir.

1982) (observing that conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot survive a motion to dismiss)).

73 Priester, 354 F.3d at 420.

74 Farooq v. Cody Cofoer & James Luster L. Firm, No. 24-10933, 2025 WL 602161, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2025)

(affirming dismissal of lawsuit without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); accord. Mitchell v.

B. The Frivolous § 1983 Claim Does Not Support Jurisdiction over State Law Claims

Initially, Plaintiff does not invoke diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4. Even if

she had, she fails to allege sufficient facts to establish same. Although Plaintiff alleges that the

parties are of diverse citizenship (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2), she fails to include any facts to establish that

the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.

While § 1983 is a federal statute that could provide federal subject matter jurisdiction,75

when the claim is patently frivolous or wholly without merit, dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is proper.76 Without a colorable federal claim, Plaintiff cannot invoke federal question

jurisdiction to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.77

Even if Plaintiff had asserted a colorable § 1983 claims subject to dismissal but sufficient

to trigger supplemental jurisdiction, considering § 1367(c) and balancing the relevant factors of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity and considering the early stage of this

proceeding, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims and dismiss them without prejudice so that she may pursue same in state court.

C. Plaintiff’s Requested Relief is Barred by the Anti-Injunction Act

Even if Plaintiff had established subject matter jurisdiction, the relief sought is barred by

Clinkscales, 253 F. App’x 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding Plaintiff failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction in

a § 1983 case absent allegations that defendant acted under color of state law); Lavergne v. Sanford, 570 F. App’x

386, 386 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding no federal jurisdiction under § 1983 for claims against non-state actors); Drake v.

St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 353 F. App’x 901, 905 (5th Cir. 2009) (determining § 1983 was inapplicable to defendant

who was not a state actor, such that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim against him); Encalade

v. Thomas, No. 09-2999, 2009 WL 1704461, at *8-9 (E.D. La. June 12, 2009) (adopting recommendation that § 1983

claims against private actors be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Yang v. Roper, No. 24-3019, 2024

WL 5160369, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2024) R.&R. adopted, 2024 WL 5161856 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2024); Borne v.

Home Bank, N.A., No. 24-303, 2024 WL 5455920, at *3 (M.D. La. Dec. 27, 2024), R.&R. adopted, 2025 WL 920267

(M.D. La. Mar. 26, 2025).

75 See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994).

76 Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell v. Health-Mor, 549 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir.

1977)); see also Suthoff v. Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp., 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (same).

77 Plaintiff also fails to establish diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. Although the parties are of diverse citizenship

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2), she fails to include any facts to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

the Anti–Injunction Act, which generally prohibits federal courts from interfering with state court

proceedings.78 Only three exceptions to § 2283 are recognized:79 an injunction to stay state court

proceedings is allowed “as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of

[the court’s] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”80 But no exception applies

here. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, “proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed

to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any,

through the state appellate courts and ultimately this Court.”81

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Dorginia Lucas-Vicks’ § 1983 claim against

Defendant Paola Edinfield be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) for being legally frivolous.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from

attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by

the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will

78 Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Vines v. Univ. of La., 398 F.3d 700, 704 (5th

Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283)).

79 See Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970); Vines, 398 F.3d at 704.

80 Health Net, 534 F.3d at 493.

81 Id. at 494 (citation modified) (citing Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 287).

result from a failure to object.*?

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of July, 2026.

DO PHILL ys CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

82 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (Sth Cir. 1996). Douglass referenced the previously

applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended

to extend the period to fourteen days.

14