Opinion

King

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Aug 4, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 44.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

TAMMY KING,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-375-KCD-KRH

v.

SHERIFF CARMINE MARCENO,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

LEE COUNTY SHERIFF; DEPUTY

JAY BRETT, INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITY; DEPUTY MELQUIAS

OLIVO, INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;

MILLENIUM PHYSICIAN GROUP,

LLC, FRANCISCO MARASIGAN,

KRISTIN GUSTIN,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

In 2023, a routine medical appointment took a distressing turn for

Plaintiff Tammy King. After staff determined that she required an

involuntary psychiatric evaluation under Florida’s Baker Act, Lee County

Sheriff’s Deputies Jay Brett and Melquias Olivo were dispatched to transport

her to a local hospital. What was supposed to be a medical transport quickly

escalated into a physical confrontation. When King hesitated to hand over

her purse, Deputy Brett shoved her against a wall, struggled to secure her

hands, and deployed pepper spray into her face. The ordeal continued during

the subsequent drive. Deputy Olivo allegedly placed a shackled King into the

seatbelt-less, unpadded metal compartment of a corrections van, where she

was tossed about and injured.

King brought this lawsuit to hold the deputies accountable for her

physical and psychological injuries. Following a series of voluntary dismissals

(Doc. 101-1), the initial complaint has been pared down to a single claim for

excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

Deputies Brett and Olivo (collectively “Defendants”) now move for

summary judgment. (Doc. 107.) They maintain that the force used to secure

and transport King was objectively reasonable and, alternatively, they are

entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 2.) King opposes the motion. (Doc. 113.)

I. Background

At the summary judgment stage, the Court must view the evidence in

the light most favorable to King and draw all reasonable inferences in her

favor. See Las Brisas Condo. Homes Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins.

Co., No. 2:21-CV-41-KCD, 2023 WL 8978168, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2023).

Because the parties present two sharply contrasting accounts of what

occurred, the Court highlights those factual disputes where they arise.

The events start at the Millennium Physician Group clinic in Saint

James City. King was experiencing significant personal stress and scheduled

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

an appointment to receive assistance with her medications. But clinic staff

soon concluded she was experiencing a mental health crisis. Invoking

Florida’s Baker Act, the clinic initiated an involuntary psychiatric

examination and dialed 911 to request transport.

Deputy Brett responded to the call. And here is where the stories first

diverge. King insists she had agreed to a voluntary evaluation, knew nothing

of the Baker Act paperwork, and was therefore not subject to involuntary

commitment when the deputy arrived. Brett, by contrast, asserts that he

arrived fully authorized to detain her. One detail, however, escapes dispute.

The 911 caller requested transport for a Baker Act patient. (Doc. 67-1.) So

that was the information Brett arrived on scene with.

Before leaving the clinic for the hospital, King asked to use the

restroom. Brett permitted her to do so but followed her in. Noting that King

carried a purse with visible pill bottles, Brett demanded she hand the bag

over for safety reasons. A physical struggle ensued. Brett claims King refused

his commands, actively resisted, and struck him in the chest with her hand.

King tells a different story. While she admits refusing to surrender the purse,

she denies that the deputy ever asked for it. She also denies striking the

deputy, asserting instead that when she finally released the bag, the

momentum caused it to hit his chest.

What happened next forms the crux of the first excessive force claim.

Brett shoved King against the bathroom wall and secured her right wrist in a

handcuff. When he could not immediately secure her left hand, Brett

deployed pepper spray into King’s face—three times, according to King. Brett

claims the chemical spray was necessary to gain compliance because King

ignored multiple verbal commands and physically resisted. King insists she

was fully compliant, not resisting at all, and crying for help when she was

sprayed and fell to the ground.

Once secured, Brett placed King in the back of his patrol vehicle to

await a transport van. The parties fiercely dispute the conditions of this

confinement. The deputies point to emergency medical service records

indicating that King’s eyes were flushed with saline, she was placed in an air-

conditioned vehicle, and she exhibited no physical injuries. King counters

that her decontamination consisted only of a wet rag that quickly fell off her

face. She alleges she was left to suffer the burning effects of the spray for

hours in a hot car, denied access to a bathroom, and forced to sit in her own

urine.

Brett then drove King to a grocery store parking lot and transferred

custody to Deputy Olivo, who operated a transport van. At the handoff, Brett

told Olivo that she had been decontaminated from the pepper spray. But the

factual disputes continue here. King alleges that Olivo secured her ankles in

shackles so tightly that they caused lasting bruises. Olivo denies using ankle

restraints at all.

Olivo placed King into a metal cage in the back of the van. It is

undisputed that the van was not equipped with seatbelts. During the

approximately two-and-a-half-hour ride to the hospital, Olivo made two

additional stops to pick up other detainees. King alleges she was violently

thrown against the metal walls with every stop and turn, suffering multiple

physical injuries. She also says that Olivo ignored her explicit pleas for help

and medical attention. Olivo counters that the compartment was too small for

King to be thrown around and maintains that she never reported any injuries

during the trip.

The van eventually reached the hospital. Medical staff evaluated King,

noting her complaints of burning eyes from the pepper spray, a small bump

on her forehead, and a bruise from the handcuffs. Following her release, King

filed this lawsuit. As mentioned, the complaint has been pared down to a

single claim against the deputies for excessive force. (See Doc. 101-1.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial. It is appropriate only

“when a movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gonzalez v. Indep.

Ord. of Foresters, No. 24-10758, 2025 WL 337898, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 30,

2025). “When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a judge is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Las Brisas

Condominium Homes Condominium Association, Inc., 2023 WL 8978168, at

*1. We must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 2. If the record is so one-sided

that a party must prevail as a matter of law, summary judgment is

appropriate.

The mechanics are straightforward. The moving party bears the initial

burden. They must show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

The nonmoving party must then step up, go beyond the pleadings, and point

to specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Do v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 1:17-

CV-23041-JLK, 2019 WL 331295, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2019).

III. Discussion

Before addressing the merits of the excessive force claims against Brett

and Olivo, a threshold issue requires attention: which constitutional

amendment actually governs this dispute. The complaint invokes both the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. But the Constitution does not apply a

single standard to excessive force claims. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

394 (1989) (“In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983,

analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly

infringed by the challenged application of force.”). Rather, the proper

framework depends on where the plaintiff is located within the legal system.

When officers make an arrest, the Fourth Amendment’s ban on

“unreasonable searches and seizures” governs the encounter. See Graham,

490 U.S. at 394. At the other end of the timeline, the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” protects convicted

prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). For those in the

middle—so-called pretrial detainees—the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause steps in to bar the use of excessive force. See Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 393 (2015).

The distinction between these constitutional lanes is not just

academic—it dictates exactly what a plaintiff must prove to survive summary

judgment. Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the inquiry is

objective. A court asks only whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable

given the facts and circumstances on the ground. The Eighth Amendment, by

contrast, sets a much higher hurdle. Because its text specifically targets

“cruel and unusual punishments,” a convicted prisoner must also prove that

the officer acted with a subjective culpable state of mind. See Sconiers v.

Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020).

Sorting out Brett’s conduct is straightforward. He applied force while

actively taking King into custody. Because his actions occurred during an

initial seizure, the Fourth Amendment provides the governing framework.

Olivo presents a trickier question. His alleged use of force—applying tight

shackles and conducting a rough, unsecured transport—occurred only after

King had been fully detained and transferred to his custody. Jumping on this

timeline, Defendants argue that the initial seizure was complete and so the

Fourteenth Amendment must control Olivo’s conduct. (Doc. 107 at 22.)

The Court cannot agree. The Fourteenth Amendment is the domain of

“pretrial detainee[s].” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., Alabama, 923 F.3d 947, 952

(11th Cir. 2019). Achieving that status generally requires a “judicial

determination of probable cause” as a prerequisite to an extended restraint

on liberty. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). King never reached that

milestone. She was not taken into custody for committing a crime, but rather

for a psychiatric evaluation. And while she was undeniably detained during

transport to the hospital, it makes little sense to categorize her as a pretrial

detainee when she was entirely outside the judicial process. See, e.g., Hicks v.

Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1254 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005). The governing doctrine only

reinforces the point. When analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment in this

context, a court must “account for the legitimate interests that stem from [the

government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,

appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in th[e] judgment of jail

officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain

institutional security.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Those institutional

considerations fit perfectly within the walls of a jailhouse. They make no

sense here.

Because Olivo’s transport was a direct, uninterrupted continuation of

the initial Baker Act seizure, the Fourth Amendment remains the proper

constitutional standard for evaluating his actions as well. See, e.g., Albritten

v. Dougherty Cnty., Ga., 973 F. Supp. 1455, 1459-60 (M.D. Ga. 1997).2 The

Court now turns to the merits. And because the two deputies played

distinctly different roles in this encounter, their conduct is addressed

separately below.

A. Deputy Brett

King tries to undermine Brett’s defense right at the start, arguing he

had no legal basis to seize her at all. (Doc. 113 at 11.) And if the seizure

2 Taking Defendants’ position would make no practical difference. An excessive force claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment requires a purely objective analysis—just like a Fourth

Amendment claim. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Because the test under either amendment

asks only whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable, swapping the

constitutional label would not alter the outcome here. See Beavers v. City of Oneonta,

Alabama, No. 2:22-CV-00592-RDP, 2022 WL 14068942, at *6 n.4 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2022).

lacked a legal foundation, her logic goes, then the deputy had no authority to

use any force. (Id.)

For starters, this theory is not cognizable here. “[A] claim that any force

in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal stop or

arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206

F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000). King voluntarily dismissed her unlawful

seizure claim, so she cannot now backdoor a false arrest argument into an

excessive force claim. See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 159 (11th Cir.

1995).

In any event, King’s argument fundamentally misreads how the Fourth

Amendment operates. Courts evaluate a seizure based on the information

known to the officer at the time, not the facts unearthed in hindsight. See

King v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 725 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2024). When

Brett arrived at the clinic, he knew what dispatch had relayed: a medical

facility needed transport for a Baker Act patient. He was not sent to conduct

his own Baker Act evaluation, nor was he instructed to wait around for

signatures. And nothing in the record shows Brett was informed the Baker

Act paperwork was incomplete. Armed with a clear directive from a medical

provider, a reasonable officer in Brett’s shoes would believe he had the legal

authority to detain King if she refused to cooperate.

With that threshold question about the initial seizure sidelined, the

Court must determine whether Deputy Brett’s use of force crossed the

constitutional line. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of

“unreasonable” force during a seizure. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197

(11th Cir. 2002) (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that

the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it

the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect

it.”). Reasonableness is not evaluated from the safety of judicial chambers. It

is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, forced to

make split-second decisions in tense and often rapidly evolving

circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. To measure whether an officer’s

actions were objectively reasonable, we look to the totality of the

circumstances. This includes factors like the severity of the situation,

whether the individual posed an immediate threat, and whether she was

actively resisting. Id. at 396.

Even if an officer misjudges the amount of force required, qualified

immunity can step in to shield him from liability. Qualified immunity

protects government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violates

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

The doctrine gives officers breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken

judgments, protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). To

overcome this formidable shield, a plaintiff must show not only that a

constitutional violation occurred, but also that the right was so clearly

established that every reasonable official would have understood his conduct

was wrong. Id. at 741.

Applying this framework to the chaotic seconds inside the clinic

bathroom, it’s not easily discernible whether Brett went too far. On the one

hand, King undeniably demonstrated resistance. By her own admission, she

ignored Brett’s commands and refused to hand over her purse—a bag that

was open and contained visible prescription pill bottles. (See Doc. 112-24.)

This is not a case where a deputy encountered a peaceful, fully compliant

individual and responded with unprovoked force. Brett had a legitimate

safety interest in securing the bag of an individual experiencing a mental

health crisis before entering the bathroom. And once the physical struggle

over the bag ensued, Brett had every justification to push King against the

wall and attempt to secure her hands.

On the other hand, King claims that Brett deployed pepper spray into

her face three times. And, critically, she alleges this force came after the

deputy had already secured her right wrist in a handcuff. According to King,

she was fully compliant at that moment, not actively resisting efforts to

secure her other arm. Using pepper spray on an individual who is partially

restrained and no longer actively resisting presents a much closer

constitutional question. “Courts have consistently concluded that using

pepper spray is excessive force in cases where the crime is a minor infraction,

the arrestee surrenders, is secured, and is not acting violently, and there is

no threat to the officers or anyone else.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,

1348 (11th Cir. 2002). But “using pepper spray is reasonable . . . where the

plaintiff was either resisting arrest or refusing police requests, such as

requests to enter a patrol car or go to the hospital.” Id.

Thankfully the Court need not resolve whether Brett’s use of force was

excessive. Even assuming he should have stopped short of using the pepper

spray, King’s claim still fails at the second step of the analysis. “If the

government official was engaged in a discretionary function,” as is

undisputedly the case here, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that

the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Frankes v. City of

Boynton Beach, No. 25-80396-CIV, 2026 WL 304399, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5,

2026). King has not shown that Brett’s conduct violated clearly established

law.

“[T]he touchstone of qualified immunity is notice.” Bussey-Morice v.

Gomez, 587 F. App’x 621, 627 (11th Cir. 2014). “[I]t does not offer protection if

an official knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took

within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional

rights of the [plaintiff].” Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir.

2003). “[T]he nub of the inquiry is whether the state of the law [at the time of

the alleged violation] gave the officials fair warning that their [acts were]

unconstitutional.” Id.

A constitutional right can be clearly established in one of three ways.

Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021). “The plaintiff must

point to either (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing

the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the

Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional

right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly

violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Watkins v. Fort Lauderdale

Police Officer, No. 24-11030, 2025 WL 902117, at *3 (11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2025).

Only decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, “or

the highest court in a state can clearly establish the law.” Crocker, 995 F.3d

at 1240. And when the plaintiff relies on a general rule to show that the law

is clearly established, it must “appl[y] with obvious clarity to the

circumstances.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 584 (11th Cir. 2007).

King clears none of these three hurdles. First, she points to no

materially similar case finding a constitutional violation under these

circumstances. The only decision she offers is Borton v. City of Dothan, 734 F.

Supp. 2d 1237 (M.D. Ala. 2010). (Doc. 113 at 16.) As a threshold matter,

Borton is a district court case and thus cannot not serve as controlling

precedent to put the deputies on notice. That aside, the critical distinction

between the two cases lies in the plaintiff’s level of restraint. In Borton, the

court denied summary judgment after an officer repeatedly tased a patient

experiencing a manic episode while she was being transported for mental

health treatment. The Borton plaintiff, however, was completely restrained.

She was strapped to a gurney with her wrists handcuffed and legs secured.

Borton, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1249-50. The court explained she was incapable of

physically fighting with the officers, posed no threat to anyone, and presented

no flight risk. King, by contrast, was only partially restrained in a clinic

bathroom and had actively resisted by refusing to surrender her purse.

Because King retained a degree of mobility and physical resistance that the

fully incapacitated Borton plaintiff lacked, the cases are not factually similar.

Second, King cannot rely on a broad statement of principle. While the

Fourth Amendment undeniably prohibits excessive force, that general rule

does not apply with “obvious clarity” to the chaotic reality Brett faced inside

the clinic. Hughes v. Locure, 166 F.4th 121, 128 (11th Cir. 2026). He was

forced to make a split-second judgment about how to fully secure a non-

compliant individual who had just physically struggled with him over her

purse. “[P]epper spray is a very reasonable alternative to escalating a

physical struggle with an arrestee.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348

(11th Cir. 2002). Because the bounds of proper force in this scenario remain

unclear, the suitability of Brett’s actions was not beyond debate. Where the

law fails to provide clear lines, a general constitutional rule cannot supply

the obvious clarity required to strip a deputy of qualified immunity. See

Hughes, 166 F.4th at 128.

Finally, Brett’s conduct does not fall into the narrow exception for

obviously unconstitutional acts. This third path is reserved for the most

extreme behavior that shocks the conscience—conduct so plainly unlawful

that no officer could possibly think it was permissible. While pepper-spraying

a partially restrained individual might present a close question on the merits,

it is a far cry from the kind of unprovoked violence that strips an officer of

qualified immunity in the absence of guiding case law. See Lewis v. City of W.

Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).

King’s qualified immunity analysis is entirely perfunctory. (Doc. 113 at

19.) That will not do. See, e.g., Patel v. Lanier Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1185

(11th Cir. 2020) (“[I]n addition to proving a constitutional violation, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the law underlying his claim was clearly

established at the time of the incident in question.”). By offering only a

superficial treatment of the qualified immunity framework, King fails to

carry her burden to show that every reasonable deputy would have known

the force used here was unlawful. Brett is thus entitled to qualified

immunity.

B. Deputy Olivo

King’s claims against Olivo suffer from the same flaws. She offers only

a perfunctory qualified immunity analysis that relies entirely on conclusory

statements. (Doc. 117 at 15-17.) Her brief identifies no materially similar

case that would have put every reasonable deputy on notice that Olivo’s

actions during the transport—either the tight restraints or the unsecured

transport—were unlawful. (Id.) And the obvious clarity exception offers no

lifeline either. The legal landscape governing the acceptable level of force

when transporting a suspect is murky at best, and outright unfavorable at

worst. See, e.g., Poulin v. Jeter, No. 608-CV-299-ORL-31KRS, 2010 WL

3701384, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2010) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit has

determined that transporting prisoners in vans without seatbelts does not

amount to a constitutional violation.”); Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903,

913-14 (11th Cir. 2020); cf. Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d

902, 906 (8th Cir. 1999). Because King has not shown that Olivo’s conduct

falls clearly outside the law, he is also shielded by qualified immunity.

IV. Conclusion

Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law. Defendants fall into neither category.

Because King cannot point to clearly established law prohibiting the force

used in the clinic or her transport, Defendants are shielded from suit.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 107) is

GRANTED and the remaining claim against them (Count II) is

DISMISSED.

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate Deputy Jay Brett and Deputy

Malquias Olivo as parties. Because other claims remain pending against the

surviving defendants, the Court will withhold judgment until the conclusion

of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 4, 2026.

KyleC.Dudek ——«*S

United States District Judge

18

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