Kirkpatrick

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LANE KIRKPATRICK,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:23-cv-1180-TJC-LLL

v.

DAVE KERNER, in his Official

Capacity as Executive Director of

the Department of Florida Highway

Safety and Motor Vehicles,

Defendant.

ORDER

In 2023, plaintiff Lane Kirkpatrick filed this suit to challenge a 2014

Florida statutory amendment which requires him to have a driver’s license or

identification marked “SEXUAL PREDATOR.”1 Kirkpatrick alleges the mark

is compelled speech that violates his First Amendment right to free speech,

including the right to refrain from speaking. In addition to defending the

statute on the merits, Defendant Dave Kerner, the Executive Director of the

Department of Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“Director”),

contends Kirkpatrick does not have standing and that his claim is barred by the

1 Final decision in this case was delayed while awaiting pertinent

decisions by the Eleventh Circuit and Florida courts.

statute of limitations. Following a hearing, the Court denied motions to

dismiss and for a preliminary injunction so the matter could be considered on a

fully developed record (Docs. 31 & 34). Thereafter, the parties filed briefs and

exhibits in support of their positions via cross-motions for summary judgment

(Docs. 39-43, 46, 49); the Court held a hearing on those motions, the transcript

of which (Doc. 62) is incorporated by reference. At the Court’s direction, the

parties filed further briefs after supplemental authorities issued (Docs. 52-57,

59, 61, 63-71, 73).

I. Background Facts2

Almost thirty years ago, Kirkpatrick was arrested in Clay County, Florida

on charges of sexual battery upon a child, the conviction for which results in a

designation as a sexual predator under Florida’s Sexual Predators Act (“Act”),

Fla. Stat. § 775.21.3 Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 17, Doc. 40-2, Doc. 40-3. Kirkpatrick

ultimately entered a plea deal, resulting in a “withholding of adjudication.”4

2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

The material facts here are undisputed; as both parties have moved for

summary judgment, the result hinges on determining which side is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

3 Generally speaking, Florida law designates as “sexual predators” those

who are “[r]epeat sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence,

and sexual offenders who prey on children.” Fla. Stat. § 775.21(3)(a); see also

Fla. Stat. § 775.21(4).

4 Kirkpatrick claims he is innocent and only entered the plea to avoid the

Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 17, 101-02; Doc. 40-17 at 2. The Act treats this as a conviction.

Fla. Stat. § 775.21(2)(e). The Act was effective in 1993 and has been amended

multiple times, including a variety of changes to the notification and

registration requirements. See West Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.21 Credits (listing

initial 1993 enactment and all subsequent amendments). Absent a full pardon

or having a conviction set aside, sexual predators must comply with the

registration requirements for life. Fla. Stat. § 775.21(6)(l).

Among other requirements of the Act, sexual predators are required to

have and pay for either a driver license or official ID issued by the Florida

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.5 Fla. Stat. § 775.21(6)(f).

Starting in 2007, the driver license for a sexual predator was required to be

marked on the front “775.21, F.S,” the statutory reference to the Act. See 2007

Fla. Laws Ch. 2007-207, § 1, codified at Fla. Stat. § 322.141(3)(a) (2007).

Sexual offenders were required to carry licenses bearing a similar mark

indicating the statutory reference for sexual offenders, “943.0435, F.S.” See

2007 Fla. Laws Ch. 2007-207, § 1, codified at Fla. Stat. § 322.141(3)(b) (2007).

When the 2007 amendment went into effect, Kirkpatrick obtained a driver

possibility of a lengthy jail term. Doc. 39 at 2. The Director filed documents

relating the details of the charges and subsequent proceedings. Doc. 40, Ex. 2-

19.

5 This opinion refers to the driver license requirements but they are

equally applicable to official IDs. Fla. Stat. § 775.21(6)(f)(1).

license marked “775.21, F.S.” Though he disagreed that he was a sexual

predator, Kirkpatrick knew Florida designated him as such and he did not take

issue with having to carry a license bearing that statutory designation. Doc.

40-1 at Tr. 9, 13-14.

In 2014, the marking requirement for the driver licenses of sexual

predators changed from the statutory reference of “775.21, F.S.” to the words

“SEXUAL PREDATOR” which appear in capital letters on the face of the license

See 2014 Fla. Laws Ch. 2014-216, § 31, codified at Fla. Stat. § 322.141(3)(a)

(2014). The new marking requirement did not include any legislative findings,

reports or studies about why the change was needed and there was not a similar

change for sexual offenders, whose licenses continue to include only the

statutory reference. Doc. 35 ¶ 18; Fla. Stat. § 322.141(3)(b). The driver

license marking requirement for sexual predators has not changed since 2014.

See Fla. Stat. § 322.141(3)(a).

Kirkpatrick learned of the “SEXUAL PREDATOR” marking requirement

in 2014, and received a reissued license with that marking in September 2015.

Doc. 40-1 at 86–87. At the time, Kirkpatrick was upset about the changed

mark. Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 87-88. According to the State’s sexual predator

registry records, Kirkpatrick indicated his discontent to law enforcement when

advised of the upcoming change and stated he would not comply. Doc. 43-1 at

2. Kirkpatrick consulted a lawyer about how to mount a challenge to the new

requirement but determined he could not afford to do so. Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 88-

89. At that time, Kirkpatrick did not try to find a lawyer or legal organization

that might be able to represent him without cost. Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 89. Since

getting the marked license in 2015, Kirkpatrick alleges that when presenting

his license, he has been subject to additional searches or scrutiny at airport

security, a hotel (a Disney property) cancelled his reservation at check-in, he

lost a job as a handyman (he has since retired), and he has felt stigmatized or

experienced fear and stress at doctor’s offices or similar settings where he

presents his license. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 28-32; Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 66–78, 87-90, 100, 104-

06. Kirkpatrick states he began suffering these injuries once he obtained a

license marked SEXUAL PREDATOR in 2015. Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 89, 106-07.

Kirkpatrick renewed his license in 2020 (which continues to bear the same

mark6), and filed this lawsuit in 2023. Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 79.

In this suit, Kirkpatrick does not complain of Florida’s designation of him

as a sexual predator, the registration requirements, the reporting

requirements, or the other restrictions with which he must comply. See Doc.

1; Doc. 40-1 at Tr. 30-32, 95-96. Kirkpatrick’s challenge is only to the

requirement that he carry a driver license bearing the words “SEXUAL

PREDATOR” (rather than a license bearing the statutory reference “755.21

6 A redacted photo of Kirkpatrick’s current driver license is in the record

at Doc. 41-1 at 7-8.

F.S.,” as was previously required), claiming that the 2014 amendment is

unconstitutionally overbroad, forcing Kirkpatrick and others designated as

sexual predators to engage in speech communicating the government’s message

in violation of the First Amendment.

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Standing

To demonstrate Article III standing, Kirkpatrick must show (1) an injury

in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and complained of conduct,

and (3) that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Director challenges

each of these, arguing that Kirkpatrick lacks admissible evidence of injury

because he merely testified about his own experiences of how people react to the

marked license when it is proffered; that without evidence of injury, there is no

causal connection; and that Kirkpatrick’s alleged injury is being identified as a

sexual predator, yet even if the statute is declared unconstitutional, Kirkpatrick

will still be identified as a sexual predator by use of the statutory reference—

meaning a favorable decision would not redress the injury.

The Court is satisfied that Kirkpatrick’s testimony about his own

experience when he presents the license is admissible. Kirkpatrick testified

he had a hotel reservation cancelled, received dirty looks, lost work, and had

extra screenings by TSA. Even if these did not constitute actual injury, a

finding of forced speech or violation of a constitutional right would itself be an

injury. See, e.g., Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[E]ven

a temporary infringement of First Amendment rights constitutes a serious and

substantial injury.”) (citation omitted); Solomon v. City of Gainesville, 763 F.2d

1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting the “liberal standing rules utilized in First

Amendment challenges of overbreadth”) (citations omitted). Kirkpatrick

adequately alleges an injury and a causal connection between the injury and

the complained of conduct.

As to redressability, the Director is correct that even with a favorable

decision, Kirkpatrick will still be identified as a sexual predator by use of the

statutory reference on his driver license and the public availability of the

information on the FDLE website. This argument, however, does not consider

that different forms of identification (or communication) have different

consequences. Kirkpatrick plausibly contends that the statutory reference

alone is more obscure and that it is the requirement that the words “SEXUAL

PREDATOR” be on the license that causes him to suffer the most significant of

his injuries. Therefore, Kirkpatrick’s challenge to the 2014 amendment and

its consequences are sufficiently redressable by a favorable decision.

Accordingly, the Court finds Kirkpatrick has standing.

B. Statute of Limitations

The Director argues Kirkpatrick’s suit is barred by a four-year statute of

limitations,7 which began to run in 2014 when Kirkpatrick learned of the

change, or at least in 2015, when Kirkpatrick was first issued a license marked

“SEXUAL PREDATOR.” Doc. 42 at 9–14.

There is no question that Kirkpatrick was aware of the 2014 amendment

in 2014 and that he was certainly affected by it in 2015 when he paid for and

received his first Florida driver license bearing the mark “SEXUAL

PREDATOR.” In July 2014, a Florida law enforcement officer reported on

Kirkpatrick’s sexual predator registry form that Kirkpatrick stated he would

not comply with the upcoming change to his license because doing so would

violate his rights. Sometime thereafter Kirkpatrick consulted a lawyer about

challenging the law. Kirkpatrick states that from the time he received the new

license in 2015, he began experiencing the stigma he associated with the new

law as well as anxiety, stress, and other ill effects when presenting his license,

all of which continue to this day. “The statute of limitations for a

constitutional challenge to a statute is triggered by injury.” Doe ex rel. Doe v.

Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2022) (addressing statute of

7 There is no dispute that a § 1983 action filed in Florida is subject to a

four-year statute of limitations. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283

(11th Cir. 2003).

limitations issues in sex offender registry case). Kirkpatrick’s claim accrued,

at the very latest, in 2015 when he received and began experiencing ill effects

from the new license. Indeed, at argument, Kirkpatrick agreed he had a ripe

cause of action back in 2014 or 2015. Doc. 62 at Tr. 19-20. This case was filed

in 2023. Thus, barring an exception, Kirkpatrick’s claim is untimely under the

four-year statute of limitations.

Kirkpatrick argues that two possible exceptions apply: first, that

renewing and reissuing his license in 2020 constituted the second in a series of

repeated violations, each of which starts a new limitations period; and second,

that his claim is timely under the continuing violation doctrine.8 Doc. 46 at 4.

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes an exception to the statute of limitations

for “a series of repeated violations of an identical nature,” each one of which is

its own violation, not dependent on actions taken before the limitations period

began. Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579, 582-83 (11th Cir. 1994). See

also Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1306 (“[W]hen a defendant takes separate and

discrete acts that repeatedly violate the law . . . a plaintiff may seek to remedy

8 Kirkpatrick does not argue that his inability to afford a lawyer is a basis

to equitably toll the limitations period, “a form of extraordinary relief” available

only when a party is faced with “extraordinary circumstances that are both

beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Bhd. of Locomotive

Eng’s and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines v. CSX

Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (citations

omitted). At oral argument, Kirkpatrick agreed that his inability to afford a

lawyer was not a defense to the statute of limitations. Doc. 62 at Tr. 21.

the discrete violations that occurred within the limitations period.”) (citing

Knight, 19 F.3d at 581-82).

In Knight, a group of fire department officers claimed the City failed to

pay them overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 19

F.3d at 580. More than three years earlier (the relevant timeframe for the

applicable statute of limitations), the City had classified the officers as exempt

employees not due to be paid FLSA overtime. Id. The City argued the officers’

claims were untimely. Id. at 580-81. But the Eleventh Circuit determined

that if the officers were entitled to overtime, each paycheck without overtime

within the three-year limitations period was a new violation for which they

could seek recovery. Id. at 581. In distinguishing between these repeated

violations and those of the continuing violation doctrine (further discussed

below), the Eleventh Circuit explained that the present claims did not depend

on the City’s earlier classification—if the officers were not exempt employees

under the FLSA, then each paycheck (within the limitations period) that did

not include overtime was a new violation, regardless of why or when the officers

were erroneously classified as exempt. Id. at 583.

The Knight case included a second group of plaintiffs who did not fare as

well. More than three years earlier, the City had determined not to give pay

raises to non-officer plaintiffs who claimed they were due to receive raises under

the FLSA. Id. at 583-84. Again, the City raised the statute of limitations as

a defense. Id. at 580. This time the Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that the

non-officers had not suffered from repeated violations of the FLSA, as had their

officer colleagues. Id. at 584. Instead, the non-officers’ claim was that the

City failed to give them pay raises back in 1987, an act outside the limitations

period (and of which the plaintiffs were aware). Id. The City’s action, “even

if unlawful,” was therefore “insulated from legal attack.” Id. That the non-

officers continued to feel the repercussions of that decision in each paycheck did

not save their claim. Id.

Like the non-officer plaintiffs in Knight, in Brown v. Georgia Bd. of

Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff unsuccessfully

argued that a later event started a new limitations period. Brown, a state

prisoner since 1983, raised a constitutional ex post facto challenge to the

retroactive application of a Georgia parole policy that decreased the frequency

of parole review from no less than every three years to no less than every eight

years. Id. at 1259-60. Brown had been informed in 1995 that his request for

parole was denied and would not be reconsidered until 2000. Id. at 1260. In

2001, Brown’s parole was reconsidered and again denied, and his next parole

hearing was set for 2007. Id. Brown sued in 2002. Id. The Eleventh

Circuit rejected Brown’s claim that the 2001 decision to set-off his parole

reconsideration until 2007 was a “distinct and separate harm” from the original

1995 decision to put off his parole review until 2000. Id. at 1261. As the Court

explained, “[w]hat Brown ignores is the fact that the statute of limitations

begins to run from the date the facts which would support a cause of action are

apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard

for his rights,” which, for Brown, was in 1995 when the Board applied its new

policy. Id. at 1261-62 (citation omitted). “Each time Brown’s parole

reconsideration hearing is set, it does not amount to a distinct and separate

injury.” Id. at 1261. “The successive denials of parole do not involve separate

factual predicates and therefore do not warrant separate statute-of-limitations

calculations.” Id. at 1262; see also Holland v. Governor of Georgia, No. 25-

14515, 2026 WL 1329206, at *2 (11th Cir. May 11, 2026)9 (explaining that

enforcement of sex offender registry requirements were not alleged to be

separate statutory violations giving rise to discrete injuries and new causes of

action but were instead traceable to plaintiff’s initial registration as a sex

offender). Cf. Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1307-08 (holding injuries “expressly

related” to threatened enforcement of newly added registry provisions were not

time-barred where the injuries were not previously suffered, but that claims

that aggressive tactics by Commissioner allegedly damaged plaintiffs’

reputations were not actionable discrete acts because they caused the same

9 In this opinion, the Court relies on unpublished decisions as persuasive

authority, not as binding precedent. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055,

1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022).

injury plaintiffs allegedly suffered long ago (though some were timely under the

continuing violation doctrine)).

Kirkpatrick argues he is like the officer plaintiffs in Knight, and with

each renewal of his driver license he again suffers a new violation. But his

challenge is to the 2014 statutory amendment that requires the marked license.

The renewal of the license—something all Florida drivers do every eight

years10—is not a new violation.11 While it is true that Kirkpatrick is subject to

penalty if he fails to renew (a penalty far more serious than those applicable to

other Florida drivers who fail to timely renew12), his challenge is to the mark

on his license which he has carried since 2015. And while some of his sex

offender registration requirements are tied to the license renewal timeframe

(see, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 322.141(4)), those requirements are not part of his legal

challenge here. Unlike the officer plaintiffs in Knight (and like Brown and the

10 See Fla. Stat. § 322.18(4)(a).

11 Kirkpatrick did not allege in his complaint that the 2020 renewal

caused a violation of his rights. Of course, because the statute of limitations is

an affirmative defense, a plaintiff need not plead facts in his complaint to avoid

it. See, e.g., Nance v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 59 F.4th 1149, 1154 (11th

Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

12 Under the Act, a sexual predator who fails to renew a driver license

commits a third-degree felony. See Fla. Stat. § 775.21(10)(a). There is no

renewal “requirement” for most other drivers, but driving without a valid

license, which includes a license that has expired by more than six months, is a

second-degree misdemeanor (for first time offenders). See Fla. Stat. §

322.03(1)(b), § 322.03(6).

non-officer plaintiffs in Knight), Kirkpatrick’s claim is entirely dependent on

action taken outside the limitations period, here, in 2014. The license

Kirkpatrick received in 2015 said SEXUAL PREDATOR and the license he

received in 2020 merely keeps that same designation. And unlike in

Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1307, where some of the plaintiffs’ claims alleged new

injuries from new registration requirements, when Kirkpatrick renewed his

license in 2020, he did not face a new and different registration requirement, or

a change in the frequency of his reporting requirements, or any new threats of

enforcement.

Admittedly, the Swearingen Court queried whether a sex offender could

make an argument that a new claim accrues each time he or she is made to

register or re-register (an argument the Swearingen plaintiffs had not made so

the Court did not further address). Id. at 1309. But unlike the ordinary

license renewal Kirkpatrick (like all Florida drivers) undertakes every eight

years, the registration (and re-registration) requirements the Swearingen

plaintiffs challenged included burdensome and time-consuming actions to re-

register in person up to eight times a year and to do so within 48 hours of any

change, including, for example, leaving a residence for more than three days or

having a roommate get a new license plate number. Id. at 1299, 1309. The

re-registration requirements were based on the myriad new factual predicates

the Swearingen plaintiffs encountered, not tethered to prior events, and carried

new penalties for non-compliance. Id. at 1301; see also Knight, 19 F.3d at 583

(holding officers’ overtime pay claims were timely where they were not

dependent on actions outside the limitations period); cf. Brown, 335 F.3d at

1262 (“[S]uccessive denials of parole do not involve separate factual predicates

and therefore do not warrant separate statute-of-limitations calculations.”).

Indeed, the Swearingen plaintiffs had alleged that prior to the 2018 statutory

amendments (which was also the year they sued), the registry laws presented

a “manageable burden.” Id. at 1300. It was only the 2018 amendments that

brought on the onerous changes which they timely challenged. Id. at 1301.

Here, by contrast, Kirkpatrick has faced (and complained of) the same

requirements since 2014 and indeed, conceded that his challenge to the

SEXUAL PREDATOR designation on his license was ripe when he received that

license in 2015. Kirkpatrick’s 2020 driver license renewal was not analogous

to the registration requirements in Swearingen.

Kirkpatrick also cites Swearingen for the proposition that “[b]ecause the

enforcement of an unconstitutional statute causes an injury, a person can

challenge a statute enacted long ago based on a new threat of enforcement.”

Id. at 1304. But that point was in the context of explaining that the effective

date of a statute may not necessarily be the time that an injury occurs (citing

as an example the passage of a statute that may never be enforced against a

particular plaintiff). Id. As the Court went on to explain, claims accrue when

“plaintiffs [are] injured by the allegedly unconstitutional actions they are

challenging.” Id. at 1305. And while the Eleventh Circuit determined that

some of the Swearingen plaintiffs’ claims accrued during the relevant

limitations period because that’s when they were injured, id. at 1307, others

were deemed timely under the continuing violations doctrine, id. at 1307,

130813, and still others were barred by the statute of limitations, id. at 1310.

As to those claims which were barred, the Swearingen Court found the plaintiffs

faced “nothing more than the lingering effects” of an out of time action by

defendants—the more than twenty-year-old sexual offender designation. Id.

at 1310.

Analogous to the time-barred claims in Swearingen, since 2015

Kirkpatrick has carried a driver license marked SEXUAL PREDATOR and

claims harm from doing so since that time. Kirkpatrick had four years from

2015 to file suit before the statute of limitations expired. He did not. Barring

some new, injurious, action on the part of the Director, Kirkpatrick does not

receive a new four-year limitations period every eight years when he renews his

driver license. The successive renewals of Kirkpatrick’s driver license “do not

13 The Swearingen Court excused the parties’ delay in bringing these

claims earlier because the amendments to the registry statute had grown “more

and more burdensome over the years” with the 2018 amendments being “the

straw that broke the camel’s back.” 51 F.4th at 1308, 1309. Here, by contrast,

Kirkpatrick alleges the same harm today as he did in 2015. The circumstance

of the 2020 driver license renewal did not change anything in this regard.

involve separate factual predicates and therefore do not warrant separate

statute-of-limitations calculations.” Brown, 335 F.3d at 1262. The 2020

renewal of Kirkpatrick’s license did not start a new limitations period. 14

Nor is Kirkpatrick’s claim saved by the continuing violation doctrine.

“The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise

time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the

statutory period.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331,

1334 (11th Cir. 2006). 15 However, the doctrine is limited to those

circumstances where a party is subjected to continuing violations, not merely

14 This same principle holds true in other areas of the law as well. See,

e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189-90 (1997) (explaining in

antitrust law that a plaintiff cannot use new predicate acts as a basis for

recovery absent a showing that the new act caused harm over and above the

harm caused by earlier, untimely acts); Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326, 1330-

31 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining civil RICO’s “separate accrual rule,” under which

an injury from a new RICO predicate act must be more than a continuation of

the initial injury in order to qualify as “new and independent,” and therefore

actionable); Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding

in death penalty litigation that absent a showing that the substitution of one

drug for another constituted a substantial alteration to protocol, claims were

untimely unless filed within four years of adoption of lethal injection as method

of execution); Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir.

1985) (in an ADEA case, determining that without new and discrete acts of

discrimination, a refusal to rehire cannot resurrect an expired discrimination

claim; otherwise any potential plaintiff could circumvent the limitations period

by reapplying for employment).

15 The Court rejects plaintiff’s position (Doc. 46 at 5 n.3) that Center for

Biological Diversity and other cases with fact patterns significantly different

from Kirkpatrick’s case are “simply irrelevant.” The principles of law

announced therein are not dependent on their facts.

continuing harms from a previous (now out of time) violation. See Swearingen,

51 F.4th at 1305 (“A prior violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights is not a

continuing violation simply because its effects linger into the present.”). For

example, in Swearingen, the Eleventh Circuit found the continuing violation

doctrine applied to plaintiffs’ claims that they suffered reputational injury and

substantive due process violations from continued enforcement actions which

included regular visits to neighbors and increasingly onerous registration

requirements, injuries caused not by their initial designation as sex offenders

but by the continued threat of enforcement and more frequent registration

requirements. 51 F.4th at 1307-09 (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 453

F.3d at 1334-35). However, the continuing violation doctrine did not apply to

the Swearingen plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and substantive due process

claims which were based on the lifelong sex offender registry requirement

because those causes of action were complete more than twenty years earlier

when plaintiffs were initially designated and registered as sex offenders. Id.

at 1310. See also McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1307-08 (11th Cir.

2020) (holding continuing violation doctrine could not save a constitutional

challenge to the posting of plaintiff’s personal information on Florida’s sex

offender registry website even after plaintiff completed probation and moved

out of state where the posting had initially occurred fourteen years earlier and

plaintiff knew six years earlier that Florida planned to maintain the posting

even after he moved); Huff v. Swearingen, 847 F.App’x 816, 817 (11th Cir.

2021) (rejecting application of continuing violation doctrine where plaintiff

knew his personal information was published on Florida’s sex offender registry

in 2012 but did not sue until 2019, finding the losses of employment

opportunities were continuing harms, not continuing violations of his

constitutional rights) (citing McGroarty, 977 F.3d at 1307-08).

The continuing violation doctrine “is premised on the equitable notion

that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to run until facts supportive

of the cause of action are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person

similarly situated.” McGroarty, 977 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Hipp v. Liberty

Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations

omitted). Thus, in § 1983 actions, the Eleventh Circuit has determined that

the continuing violations doctrine does not save untimely claims for “plaintiffs

who were able to avoid the problem by filing within the statute of limitations

period.” McGroarty, 977 F.3d at 1308. See also Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181,

1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting application of continuing violation doctrine

where the defendant’s action in deciding not to consider parole again for eight

years “was a one time act with continued consequences” which does not extend

the limitations period); Brown, 335 F.3d at 1261 (holding that Lovett precluded

application of continuing violation doctrine to prisoner’s untimely ex post facto

claim); Holland, 2026 WL 1329206, at *2 (explaining that while plaintiff alleged

continuing reputational injuries from statute imposing a continuing duty to

update information under threat of prosecution, continuing violation doctrine

did not apply because plaintiff could have timely filed suit when his alleged

reputational injuries began—back when he was first required to register as a

sex offender); Staley v. Sex. Offender Reg. Rev. Bd., No. 22-11813, 2023 WL

1797018, at *3-4 (11th Cir. Feb. 7, 2023) (holding continuing violation doctrine

did not apply to claim challenging plaintiff’s classification as sexual predator

which sought to enjoin continued compliance with attendant restrictions where

his alleged injuries accrued when he was classified as a predator,

notwithstanding that he continued to face collateral effects of the decision)

(citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 453 F.3d at 1334; Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1183;

and Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1310); USA Ent. Grp., Inc. v. Tony, 847 F. App’x

642, 647 (11th Cir. 2021) (determining continuing violation doctrine did not

apply, noting plaintiff’s earlier threat of legal action as one indication that it

could have filed its claim within the original statute of limitations); Smith v.

Pate, 741 F. App’x 610, 612 (11th Cir. 2018) (rejecting application of continuing

violation doctrine where initial decision to apply new parole procedures was the

alleged violation, and later applications of that decision did not extend the

limitations period) (citing Brown, 335 F.3d at 1261-62); Harvey v. Dixon, No.

4:24cv494-RH-MAF, 2025 WL 2992925, at *9-10 (N.D. Fla. July 8, 2025)

(discussing McGroarty and Swearingen and rejecting application of continuing

violation doctrine in challenge to sex offender registration requirement where

plaintiff did not challenge any new provisions or additional burdens, and his

“alleged injury stem[med] from his continuing duty to comply with the law,” the

knowledge of which he had upon sentencing).

The undisputed record before the Court (based in large measure on

Kirkpatrick’s own deposition testimony) demonstrates that Kirkpatrick knew

the facts that supported his claim in 2015, at the latest. See supra at 4-5.

Indeed, he told law enforcement in 2014 that he thought the 2014 statutory

amendment violated his rights and then contacted a lawyer about filing a claim.

Moreover, the harms Kirkpatrick allegedly suffered then are the same as those

he allegedly suffers now, further demonstrating his awareness of the claim.

The 2020 renewal of Kirkpatrick’s driver license is a “continued consequence”

of the 2014 amendment, Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1183, providing no basis to avoid

the time bar. The continuing violation doctrine does not apply.

Kirkpatrick’s suit is barred by the statute of limitations.

III. Conclusion

The Court finds Kirkpatrick has standing but his claim is untimely. The

Court therefore has no occasion to reach the merits. The Court makes no

prediction as to the outcome of a challenge presented by a different plaintiff.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) is DENIED and

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) is GRANTED. The

Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant Dave Kerner in his

Official Capacity as Executive Director for the Florida Department of Highway

Safety and Motor Vehicles and against plaintiff Lane Kirkpatrick. Thereafter,

the Clerk shall close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida the 30th day of July,

2026.

te Cimctheg Corrig □□

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

STHCtS Senior United States District Judge

Copies:

Counsel of record

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